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财政联邦主义下的公共供应问题
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摘要
一、本文的内容和目的
    本文关注的是财政联邦主义下的公共供应问题,同时分析了中国的财政体制改革和农村公共支出。本文将公共供应理解为满足公共需要和帮助弱势人群的一种筹资机制,而财政联邦主义和公共供应的逻辑联系在于财政分权下分散供应的有效性。然而,中国的财政体制改革和农村公共支出虽然具备了财政分权和分散供应的一些特征,但并没有呈现出显著的有效性,而这也正是本文的现实出发点。
    本文的目的在于扩展这一领域的既有理论,从而将公共供应问题整合到财政联邦主义的框架之中,并为后续的经验研究和公共决策厘清思路。
    二、本文的结构
    除前言以外,本文共分为五章。第一、二章提供了公共供应和财政联邦主义的理论分析。第三、四章讨论了中国财政体制改革和农村公共支出的现实问题。第五章为总结性评论。
    第一章开始于有关私人生产、公共生产、私人供应和公共供应的关系描述,继而提出了两个公共供应的重要理由,并以教育为例扩展了分析。通过关注公共决策规则,有关公共供应的讨论过渡到了财政联邦主义的框架之中。
    在公共经济学之维,第二章呈现了分散供应和财政分权的重要意义,梳理了从传统的财政联邦主义到保全市场的联邦主义的发展线索。此外,通过拓展到政治哲学和社会哲学之维,本章还从政治观、认识论和市民社会三个方面揭示了财政联邦主义的内在逻辑。在理论部分的最后,财政联邦主义下的公共供应问题这一命题的含义将得以揭示。
    
    通过回顾1979以来的财政承包制和分税制改革,第三章展示了中国式财政联邦主义的特征,并反思了中国财政体制改革的历程。作者强调,这一改革的目标应该是正式的财政联邦主义,而不是重新集权。对于相关的预算体制、转移支付、地方债务和政府架构问题,本章也给予了讨论。
    第四章首先考察了中国农村公共支出管理中的责任划分、收入来源和决策机制三方面现实问题。随后,将提供一个框架,并应用它来分析几类中国的农村公共支出项目——这包括中国农村地区的基础教育、公共卫生和医疗保险,以及农村基础设施和农业发展支出——其目的在于探寻中国背景中的公共供应改进之道。
    第五章重申了财政联邦主义下的公共供应问题这一命题的含义。此外,本章还对财政联邦主义和联邦主义的关系、渐进主义和激进主义的争论,以及建构理性主义和文化决定主义的倾向给予了简短的评论。这些评论目的在于推进我们有关中国改革方向和前景的思考。
    三、本文的主要观点
    本文认为,公共供应是一种满足公共需要和帮助弱势人群的筹资机制,因此公共供应并不等同于公共生产。为了实现有效的公共供应,必须首先关注其决策规则,同时应该采用分散供应的形式。分散供应是同财政分权联系在一起的,所以有关公共供应问题的讨论需要纳入财政联邦主义的制度框架。通过来自公共经济学、政治哲学和社会哲学三个维度的分析,本文认为,财政联邦主义不仅是规范地划分政府间纵向关系的工具,而且更是开展实证分析的平台和提供财政激励的装置。
    本文指出,财政联邦主义下的公共供应这一命题所研究的是财政分权同公共供应的关系问题。同时,财政联邦主义下的公共供应要解决的是如何依靠“(个人)自主+(地方)自治+(国家)共治”来满足公共需要和帮助弱势人群的问题。
    本文在回顾1979年以来的中国财政体制改革后指出,中国式财政联邦主义所提供的财政激励是中国改革的积极因素。然而,由于缺
    
    
    乏正式的规则和制度,中国式财政联邦主义呈现出收入权力不断上收、支出责任不断下放的不当趋势。
    本文认为,中国财政体制改革的目标应该是正式的财政联邦主义。而所谓正式的财政联邦主义,不仅要求以某种静态的标准来划分政府间的权利和责任,而且意味着在不同层次的政府间、在政府与社会间存在种种制度化了的正向激励机制。
    本文提出并运用了一个涉及支出责任、收入来源和决策机制的公共支出分析框架来考察中国的农村公共支出。通过讨论农村基础教育、农村公共卫生和医疗保险,以及农村基础设施和农业发展支出,本文指出,过度下沉且没有收入来源的支出责任是农村地区公共供应不足和低效的首要原因。同时,决策机制上的缺陷导致了农村公共供应低质过量现象。本文认为,问题的解决依赖于多方面的改革,这包括更为正式的收支划分、提供激励的决策机制、平等适用于所有公民的规则和制度、允许个人选择和社会参与的机会和空间,等等。
    四、本文的创新和不足
    本文主要的创新在于:(1)将公共供应问题整合到财政联邦主义的框架之中;(2)不仅梳理了从传统的财政联邦主义到保全市场的联邦主义的发展线索,而且将财政联邦主义理论拓展到了政治哲学和社会哲学的维度;(3)在有关中国的财政体制改革和农村公共支出的分析中,始终强调规则和制度、个人选择和社会参与的重要性。
    本文主要的不足在于:(1)尽管指出了财政联邦主义下的公共供应问题首先是一个实证问题,但缺乏原创性的经验研究;(2)尽管指出了非政府组织在公共供应中的重要意义,但没有提供中国背景下的足够证据。
This study gave its attention to the public provision issues under fiscal federalism. Meanwhile, it analyzed China’s fiscal system and rural public expenditure. The purpose of the study is to extend the current existing theory in this area so as to integrate the issue of public provision into the framework of fiscal federalism. It is designed to clear the way for further empirical studies and public decision-makings.
    Besides the preface, this study comprises five chapters. The first two chapters provided the theories of public provision and fiscal federalism. Chapter Three and Chapter Four discussed China’s fiscal system reform and rural public expenditure. The last chapter contains some concluding remarks.
    Chapter One started with the clarification of relationships among private production, public production, private provision and public provision. Based on that, two major reasons for public provision were established and by manipulating education as an example the analysis was extended. Through the rules in public decision-making, the discussion on public provision is transmitted into the framework of fiscal federalism.
    In the dimension of public economics, Chapter Two presented the significance of decentralized provision and fiscal decentralization. It also followed the track of evolution from traditional fiscal federalism to market-preserving federalism. In addition, the analysis expanded to the dimension of political and social philosophy. It revealed the internal logic of fiscal federalism from the aspects of political conceptions, epistemology and civil society. At the end of the theoretical section, the
    
    
    essence of the public provision issues under fiscal federalism was unearthed.
    By referring to the reform of the fiscal contracting and tax-sharing system since the year of 1979, Chapter Three revealed the characteristics of China-style fiscal federalism and reflected the process of China’s fiscal system reform. Therefore, it concluded that this reform is supposed to aim at formal fiscal federalism instead of re-centralization. This chapter also discussed the related issues such as budget system, transfer payments, local debts and government structure.
    Chapter Four first of all discussed issues of responsibility identifying, revenue sources and decision-making mechanism in China’s rural pubic expenditure management. Furthermore, a framework was provided and used to analyze several China’s rural public expenditure items. These items include public expenditure for fundamental education, public health and medical insurance, and infrastructure and agricultural development in China’s rural areas. This framework and the following discussion will be served as a way to improve public provision in China.
    Chapter Five reasserted the essence of the public provision issues under fiscal federalism. Moreover, it briefly remarked on the relationship between fiscal federalism and federalism, the controversy about gradualism and radicalism, and the tendency of constructive rationalism and cultural determinism. These remarks are supposed to further our reflection on the direction and future of China’s reform.
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