迪康药业公司内部监督制度研究
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摘要
在企业内多层级的委托代理关系中，由于代理人的行为具有不可观察性，代理人有较大的空间实施机会主义行为，对代理人进行监督成为一种必要。按实施的主体，我们把对代理人的机会主义行为进行监督的制度分为外部监督和内部监督，外部监督主要有法律、宗教、伦理道德、市场、新闻媒体监督等，由企业外部的力量实施；内部监督由企业设计并实施。内部监督的成本包括直接的资本投入，也包括时间等不可货币化的成本。内部监督的收益是机会主义行为的减少。内部监督制度的边界是监督成本和减少的机会主义行为可能造成的经济损失的均衡点。对这个边界的判定无论从理论还是实际而言都存在着极大的困难。首先，内部监督制度的成本不易准确衡量，内部监督制度的成本多以非货币的方式支付，而且委托人通常会有意或无意地忽略实际的监督成本。其次，内部监督制度的收益也很难判断。减少的机会主义行是无法计量的，人们一般选择以机会主义行为的多少来反推减少的机会主义行为，这种做法有两方面的缺陷，第一，机会主义行为的发生与否与内部监督制度的合理性之间并不存在必然的联系。机会主义行为是潜在的，机会主义行为者的取舍标准是他的收益与成本的对比，而不仅仅是成本。而内部监督，在更多的程度上只决定机会主义行为的成本。因此，我们不能简单的以机会主义行为是否发生来判断内部监督制度的有效性。第二，我们也无法清楚界定内部监督制度和外部监督制度收益的分界点。内部监督制度只能约束部分机会主义行为，外部监督制度对一些严重的机会主义行为的约束是必要的，我们很难有效的判断机会主义行为没有出现是内部监督制度还是外部监督制度作用的结果，我们也很难判断在外部监督不变的情况下，加强某些内部监督制度是否就能有效的约束某些特定的机会主义行为。
外部监督制度的有效性企业是不能够控制的，内部监督制度属于企业可控因素，因此企业总希望通过完善内部监督制度而对机会主义
行为形成完整的约束，从而摆脱对“不可控”的外部监督制度的依赖。当外部监督的成本较高或无效时，委托人就不得不更多的依靠内部监督，就会出现内部监督制度不断强化的现象。由于内部监督制度的合理边界难于判定，在不断强化的过程中很容易超越合理边界，内部监督制度的成本超越其收益，我们把这种现象称为落入“内部监督陷阱”。对中国的民营企业而言，在制度设计中如何避免落入内部监督陷阱是个很现实的问题。
从理论上对内部监督制度的探讨一直是一个薄弱环节。在一般的经济学和管理学的理论中，对内部监督都有提及，但往往作为一个次要的内容，主要体现在企业治理结构中的“三会”之间以及“三会”和经营层之间的监督关系。严格的现代经济学和管理学产生于西方国家，这些国家有成熟的制度体系，产权明确，契约的履行有充分的保障，成熟的经理市场、产品市场和产权市场，深厚的宗教传统，活跃的新闻监督等，使得机会主义行为者违约成本高，完善的外部监督降低了对企业内部监督制度的要求，这样，西方经济学和管理学对内部监督制度研究的需求较弱，自然难有成果。而在中国，由于处在特殊的“转型时期”，经济学者专注的焦点是创值、社会经济制度的优化，对企业内部监督制度的研究也缺乏投入。在国内外理论研究出现真空的背景下，蓬勃发展的中国民营企业对内部监督制度存在着广泛的需求，企业在实际运作过程中，形成了大量有特色的内部监督制度。但这些内部监督制度的合理性往往存在一定的偏差，或者监督不足或者落入监督陷阱，已成为制约很多中国民营企业进一步发展的瓶颈。本文以四川迪康科技药业股份有限公司为例，对企业中各类内部监督制度进行了分析。作为MBA学位论文，本文的特色在于结合本人的工作经历，指出了实践中一些较为典型的落入内部监督陷阱的管理制度的特征，对实际工作中企业监督制度的设计具有一定的指导意义。
Among the multi level clientage proxy of the enterprise, the behaviors of the proxies are imperceptible, as there are big room for opportunism. Therefore, it becomes a must to establish supervision systems to the proxies. According to the principal of supervision systems execution, we divide the supervision systems of the proxy's opportunism into external supervision and internal supervision. The external supervision mainly relies on legislation, religion, moral, market, press and external force of the enterprise; whilst internal supervision is executed by the regulations of the enterprise itself. The costs of internal supervision include direct capital investment, as well as non-monetary costs such as time, etc. The income of internal supervision is to reduce the opportunism. The boundary of the internal supervision systems is the breakeven point between the supervision cost and financial loss caused by the opportunism behavior reduction. There are great difficulties to determine this boundary regardless in theory or in reality. First of all, the cost of the internal supervision systems is hardly measured with accuracy, as this cost are mostly be paid by non-monetary means, which has always been ignored by the proxies either with unawareness or on purpose. Secondly, it's also hard to determine the income of the internal supervision systems. The reduced opportunism is countless; therefore people calculate the activities of opportunism to decide the reduced ones. However, there are two aspects of defect: 1. There is no certain relation existed between the occurrence of opportunism and the reasonability of internal supervision systems. Behaviors of opportunism exist potentially. The criterion of opportunism behaviors is the contrast between the
income and the cost, instead of cost solely. Whilst with regard to the internal supervision, to most extent are determined by the cost. Therefore, we cannot simply judge the occurrence of opportunism behaviors to determine the efficiency of the internal supervision systems. 2. We can hardly define clearly the income breakeven point between the internal supervision systems and the external supervision systems. The internal supervision systems are the restriction of some opportunism activities, whilst external supervision systems are the necessary restriction for the serious opportunism behaviors. We could hardly judge the non-occurrence of the opportunism is the result of internal supervision systems or the external supervision systems. We could also hardly judge under the same circumstances of external supervision, if certain opportunism behaviors can be restricted through strengthening certain internal supervision systems.
The enterprise itself cannot control the effectiveness of the external supervision systems, whilst it can control internal supervision systems. Therefore the enterprises are willing to consummate internal supervision systems to completely restrict the opportunism to shake off the dependence on the "unreliable" external supervision systems. When there are high costs or inefficacy on the external supervision, the proxies have to be more relying on internal supervision. Consequently the internal supervision systems have become continuously strengthening. In virtue of the difficulties in reasonable boundary judgment of the internal supervision systems, it's easily exceeded the reasonable boundary limit in the strengthening process, i.e. the costs of internal supervision systems exceed its income. We call this phenomenon as fall into "internal supervision trap". To the Chinese civil enterprises, it's a realistic issue to avoid falling into the internal supervision trap when designing the systems.
In theory, the exploration of the internal supervision Systems has always been a week link. The internal supervision Systems has appeared in the theory of common Economics and Management, however, it has not been considered as a major content, which mainly embodies on the supervision relationship among the "three unions" of the enterpris
外部监督制度的有效性企业是不能够控制的，内部监督制度属于企业可控因素，因此企业总希望通过完善内部监督制度而对机会主义
行为形成完整的约束，从而摆脱对“不可控”的外部监督制度的依赖。当外部监督的成本较高或无效时，委托人就不得不更多的依靠内部监督，就会出现内部监督制度不断强化的现象。由于内部监督制度的合理边界难于判定，在不断强化的过程中很容易超越合理边界，内部监督制度的成本超越其收益，我们把这种现象称为落入“内部监督陷阱”。对中国的民营企业而言，在制度设计中如何避免落入内部监督陷阱是个很现实的问题。
从理论上对内部监督制度的探讨一直是一个薄弱环节。在一般的经济学和管理学的理论中，对内部监督都有提及，但往往作为一个次要的内容，主要体现在企业治理结构中的“三会”之间以及“三会”和经营层之间的监督关系。严格的现代经济学和管理学产生于西方国家，这些国家有成熟的制度体系，产权明确，契约的履行有充分的保障，成熟的经理市场、产品市场和产权市场，深厚的宗教传统，活跃的新闻监督等，使得机会主义行为者违约成本高，完善的外部监督降低了对企业内部监督制度的要求，这样，西方经济学和管理学对内部监督制度研究的需求较弱，自然难有成果。而在中国，由于处在特殊的“转型时期”，经济学者专注的焦点是创值、社会经济制度的优化，对企业内部监督制度的研究也缺乏投入。在国内外理论研究出现真空的背景下，蓬勃发展的中国民营企业对内部监督制度存在着广泛的需求，企业在实际运作过程中，形成了大量有特色的内部监督制度。但这些内部监督制度的合理性往往存在一定的偏差，或者监督不足或者落入监督陷阱，已成为制约很多中国民营企业进一步发展的瓶颈。本文以四川迪康科技药业股份有限公司为例，对企业中各类内部监督制度进行了分析。作为MBA学位论文，本文的特色在于结合本人的工作经历，指出了实践中一些较为典型的落入内部监督陷阱的管理制度的特征，对实际工作中企业监督制度的设计具有一定的指导意义。
Among the multi level clientage proxy of the enterprise, the behaviors of the proxies are imperceptible, as there are big room for opportunism. Therefore, it becomes a must to establish supervision systems to the proxies. According to the principal of supervision systems execution, we divide the supervision systems of the proxy's opportunism into external supervision and internal supervision. The external supervision mainly relies on legislation, religion, moral, market, press and external force of the enterprise; whilst internal supervision is executed by the regulations of the enterprise itself. The costs of internal supervision include direct capital investment, as well as non-monetary costs such as time, etc. The income of internal supervision is to reduce the opportunism. The boundary of the internal supervision systems is the breakeven point between the supervision cost and financial loss caused by the opportunism behavior reduction. There are great difficulties to determine this boundary regardless in theory or in reality. First of all, the cost of the internal supervision systems is hardly measured with accuracy, as this cost are mostly be paid by non-monetary means, which has always been ignored by the proxies either with unawareness or on purpose. Secondly, it's also hard to determine the income of the internal supervision systems. The reduced opportunism is countless; therefore people calculate the activities of opportunism to decide the reduced ones. However, there are two aspects of defect: 1. There is no certain relation existed between the occurrence of opportunism and the reasonability of internal supervision systems. Behaviors of opportunism exist potentially. The criterion of opportunism behaviors is the contrast between the
income and the cost, instead of cost solely. Whilst with regard to the internal supervision, to most extent are determined by the cost. Therefore, we cannot simply judge the occurrence of opportunism behaviors to determine the efficiency of the internal supervision systems. 2. We can hardly define clearly the income breakeven point between the internal supervision systems and the external supervision systems. The internal supervision systems are the restriction of some opportunism activities, whilst external supervision systems are the necessary restriction for the serious opportunism behaviors. We could hardly judge the non-occurrence of the opportunism is the result of internal supervision systems or the external supervision systems. We could also hardly judge under the same circumstances of external supervision, if certain opportunism behaviors can be restricted through strengthening certain internal supervision systems.
The enterprise itself cannot control the effectiveness of the external supervision systems, whilst it can control internal supervision systems. Therefore the enterprises are willing to consummate internal supervision systems to completely restrict the opportunism to shake off the dependence on the "unreliable" external supervision systems. When there are high costs or inefficacy on the external supervision, the proxies have to be more relying on internal supervision. Consequently the internal supervision systems have become continuously strengthening. In virtue of the difficulties in reasonable boundary judgment of the internal supervision systems, it's easily exceeded the reasonable boundary limit in the strengthening process, i.e. the costs of internal supervision systems exceed its income. We call this phenomenon as fall into "internal supervision trap". To the Chinese civil enterprises, it's a realistic issue to avoid falling into the internal supervision trap when designing the systems.
In theory, the exploration of the internal supervision Systems has always been a week link. The internal supervision Systems has appeared in the theory of common Economics and Management, however, it has not been considered as a major content, which mainly embodies on the supervision relationship among the "three unions" of the enterpris
引文
1. 四川迪康科技药业股份有限公司《招股说明书》，2001年
2. 四川迪康科技药业股份有限公司《2001年度报告》，2002年
3. 四川迪康科技药业股份有限公司《2002年度报告》，2003年
4. 陶长琪：信息经济学.经济科学出版社，2001年
5. 谢识予：经济博弈论.复旦大学出版社，2002年
6. 柯武刚 /史漫飞 ：制度经济学.商务印书馆，2002年
7. 张维迎：产权、政府与信誉.生活·读书·新知 三联书店，2001年
8. 张维迎：企业的企业家-契约理论.上海人民出版社，1999年
9. 樊纲：经济文论.生活·读书·新知 三联出版社，1997年
10. 哈罗德·德姆塞茨：所有权、控制与企业.经济科学出版社，2001年
11. 哈罗德·孔茨/海因茨·韦里克：管理学.经济科学出版社，1996年
12. Williamson,O.E： The Economic Institutions Capitalism.New York:Free Press，1985
13. 布雷克利/史密斯 / 施泽曼 ： 管理经济学与组织架构.华夏出版社,2001年
14. 朱羿锟：公司控制权配置论.经济管理出版社,2001年
15. 李维安：公司治理教程.上海人民出版社，2002年
16. 理查德L.达夫特：组织理论与设计精要.机械工业出版社，2002年
17. 联想管理模式.邓志海. 内蒙古人民出版社，2002年
18. 任新：柳传志谈联想经验.线装书局，2003年
19. 迈克尔·J·康默：公司欺诈.沈阳出版社，2001年
20. 陈炳富/周祖城：企业伦理学.南开大学出版社，2001年
2. 四川迪康科技药业股份有限公司《2001年度报告》，2002年
3. 四川迪康科技药业股份有限公司《2002年度报告》，2003年
4. 陶长琪：信息经济学.经济科学出版社，2001年
5. 谢识予：经济博弈论.复旦大学出版社，2002年
6. 柯武刚 /史漫飞 ：制度经济学.商务印书馆，2002年
7. 张维迎：产权、政府与信誉.生活·读书·新知 三联书店，2001年
8. 张维迎：企业的企业家-契约理论.上海人民出版社，1999年
9. 樊纲：经济文论.生活·读书·新知 三联出版社，1997年
10. 哈罗德·德姆塞茨：所有权、控制与企业.经济科学出版社，2001年
11. 哈罗德·孔茨/海因茨·韦里克：管理学.经济科学出版社，1996年
12. Williamson,O.E： The Economic Institutions Capitalism.New York:Free Press，1985
13. 布雷克利/史密斯 / 施泽曼 ： 管理经济学与组织架构.华夏出版社,2001年
14. 朱羿锟：公司控制权配置论.经济管理出版社,2001年
15. 李维安：公司治理教程.上海人民出版社，2002年
16. 理查德L.达夫特：组织理论与设计精要.机械工业出版社，2002年
17. 联想管理模式.邓志海. 内蒙古人民出版社，2002年
18. 任新：柳传志谈联想经验.线装书局，2003年
19. 迈克尔·J·康默：公司欺诈.沈阳出版社，2001年
20. 陈炳富/周祖城：企业伦理学.南开大学出版社，2001年
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