高管股权激励的效果与影响因素:争议及未来研究重点
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摘要
证监会2016年发布的《上市公司股权激励管理办法》,为我国企业实施高管股权激励制度扫清了法律障碍,但对高管授予股权的激励效果如何在学术界仍然存在很多争议。鉴于此,笔者在详细梳理高管股权激励相关国内外文献的基础上,对学者们关于高管股权激励如何影响企业绩效、融资成本、投资方向等企业经营状况,以及如何影响高管离职率、财务舞弊行为及抵制企业被接管等高管特殊行为的争议观点进行深入对比,并探寻国内研究下一步的拓展方向:探究股权激励对高管动机更深层影响,尽可能解决股权激励研究中的内生性问题,理清并比较不同股权激励模式的实施效果,以及探讨高管股权激励对国家宏观经济的更广泛影响。
The law China Securities Regulatory Commission issued in 2016 cleared last legal hurdles of executive stock ownership incentive of Chinese enterprises. However,there still exist lots of controversies in academic circle about incentive effects of executive stock ownership incentive. In view of this,this paper sums up literatures at home and abroad,compares different opinions about how can executive stock ownership incentive influence firm performance,financing cost,investment orientation and executives' turn-over rate,financial fraud events or resisting the firm from being taken over. On the above basis,this paper discusses further study directions such as to study the profound influence of executive stock ownership incentive on executives' motivation,to address endogenous problems in stock ownership incentive studies,to compare different effects of different stock ownership incentive modes and to further discuss extensive effects of executive stock ownership incentive on a country's macroeconomy.
The law China Securities Regulatory Commission issued in 2016 cleared last legal hurdles of executive stock ownership incentive of Chinese enterprises. However,there still exist lots of controversies in academic circle about incentive effects of executive stock ownership incentive. In view of this,this paper sums up literatures at home and abroad,compares different opinions about how can executive stock ownership incentive influence firm performance,financing cost,investment orientation and executives' turn-over rate,financial fraud events or resisting the firm from being taken over. On the above basis,this paper discusses further study directions such as to study the profound influence of executive stock ownership incentive on executives' motivation,to address endogenous problems in stock ownership incentive studies,to compare different effects of different stock ownership incentive modes and to further discuss extensive effects of executive stock ownership incentive on a country's macroeconomy.
引文
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