高管在职消费与产品市场竞争的公司治理效应:替代还是互补?
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摘要
目前鲜有文献关注高管在职消费隐性激励机制与外部产品市场竞争监督机制之间关于公司治理效应的相互关系。基于此,文章首先将产品市场竞争引入管理层在职消费问题的理论框架中,推导发现无论是在纯寡头亦或混合寡头市场结构中,高管在职消费与产品市场竞争之间的公司治理效应均存在明显的替代性。其次,文章选择2003—2015年中国沪深两市A股上市公司的大样本数据进行实证分析,结果表明,高管在职消费与产品市场竞争均能有效提升公司绩效,并且这两种机制间的公司治理效应存在显著的替代关系。进一步研究发现,上述结论在国有企业和民营企业中均成立,但仅存在于低薪酬和小规模企业中。最后通过机理分析发现,产品市场竞争机制主要通过信息冲突效应、市场掠夺风险效应、竞争淘汰效应三个路径弱化在职消费的激励效用。文章的研究结论丰富了公司治理机制的相关研究,为进一步完善公司治理体系提供了理论和经验证据支持。
Little research has been conducted on the substitutability between executive perquisite consumption and product market competition. This paper first incorporates the mechanism of product market competition into the theoretical framework of perquisite consumption. The result shows that, there is a significant substitutability between the executive perquisite consumption and product market competition both in pure and mixed oligopoly market structures. And then, this paper employs a large sample dataset of the Chinese listed companies from 2003—2015. We find that, both the executive perquisite consumption and the product market competition can increase firm performance. Specifically, significant substitutability has been found between the above two governance mechanisms. This result is not affected by firm ownership, but only exists in low compensation and small-scale firms. Finally, we show how the product market competition affects the incentive effect of perquisite consumption through message conflicting effect, market plunder risk effect, and competition eliminating effect. The research enriches studies on corporate governance mechanisms and provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the further improvement of internal corporate governance framework.
Little research has been conducted on the substitutability between executive perquisite consumption and product market competition. This paper first incorporates the mechanism of product market competition into the theoretical framework of perquisite consumption. The result shows that, there is a significant substitutability between the executive perquisite consumption and product market competition both in pure and mixed oligopoly market structures. And then, this paper employs a large sample dataset of the Chinese listed companies from 2003—2015. We find that, both the executive perquisite consumption and the product market competition can increase firm performance. Specifically, significant substitutability has been found between the above two governance mechanisms. This result is not affected by firm ownership, but only exists in low compensation and small-scale firms. Finally, we show how the product market competition affects the incentive effect of perquisite consumption through message conflicting effect, market plunder risk effect, and competition eliminating effect. The research enriches studies on corporate governance mechanisms and provides theoretical and empirical evidence for the further improvement of internal corporate governance framework.
引文
[1]王明虎,荣益辰.政治背景、廉政建设信号传递与在职消费[J].商业经济与管理,2018(5):87-97.
[2]陈晓珊.异质性企业高管在职消费与货币薪酬的治理效应研究——兼论在职消费的“代理观”与“效率观”[J].云南财经大学学报,2017(1):115-125.
[3]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[4]YERMACK D.Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets,CEO Perquisites,and Inferior Shareholder Returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[5]EDGERTON J.Agency Problems in Public Firms:Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts[J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(6):2187-2213.
[6]XU N,LI X,YUAN Q.Excess Perks and Stock Price Crash Risk:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,25:419-434.
[7]LUO W,ZHANG Y,ZHU N.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from an Emerging Market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
[8]郝颖,谢光华,石锐.外部监管、在职消费与企业绩效[J].会计研究,2018(8):42-48.
[9]禇剑,方军雄.政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?[J].会计研究,2016(9):82-89.
[10]翟胜宝,徐亚琴,杨德明.媒体能监督国有企业高管在职消费么?[J].会计研究,2015(5):57-63.
[11]HIRSCH F.Social Limits to Growth[M].Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press,1976:88.
[12]HENDERSON M T,SPINDLER J C.Corporate Heroin:A Defense of Perks,Executive Loans,Conspicuous Consumption[J].Georgetown Law Journal,2005,93(6):1835-1883.
[13]RAJAN R G,WULF J.Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):1-33.
[14]ADITHIPYANGKUL P,ALON I,ZHANG T.Executive Perks:Compensation and Corporate Performance in China[J].Asia-pacific Journal of Management,2011,28(2):401-425.
[15]CHEN D,LI O Z,LIANG S.Perk Consumption as a Suboptimal Outcome under Pay Regulations[J].Asia-pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics,2015,23(4):373-399.
[16]孙世敏,柳绿,陈怡秀.在职消费经济效应形成机理及公司治理对其影响[J].中国工业经济,2016(1):37-51.
[17]FAMA E F.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[18]姜付秀,黄磊,张敏.产品市场竞争、公司治理与代理成本[J].世界经济,2009(10):46-59.
[19]刘志强.CEO权力、产品市场竞争与在职消费[J].云南财经大学学报,2015(6):124-134.
[20]陈晓珊.公司内外联合治理、在职消费与公司绩效——基于国企改革视角的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2016(4):107-116.
[21]MARION A M,ZáBOJNíK J.Work-Related Perks,Agency Problems,and Optimal Incentive Contracts[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2008,39(2):565-585.
[22]AGHA M.Agency Costs,Executive Incentives and Corporate Financial Decisions[J].Australian Journal of Management,2016,41(3):425-458.
[23]吴昊旻,杨兴全,魏卉.产品市场竞争与公司股票特质性风险——基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2012(6):101-115.
[24]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[25]CAI H,FANG H,XU L C.Eat,Drink,Firms,Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms[J].The Journal of Law and Economics,2011,54(1):55-78.
[26]黎文靖,池勤伟.高管职务消费对企业业绩影响机理研究[J].中国工业经济,2015(4):122-134.
[27]ANG G S,COLE R A,LIN J W.Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):81-106.
[28]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007(1):102-113.
[29]SINGH M,DAVIDSON W N.Agency Costs,Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Mechanisms[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2003,27(5):793-816.
[30]AGHION P,DEWATRIPONT M,DU L,etc.Industrial Policy and Competition[R].Cambridge:NBER Working Paper,2012.
[31]GRIFFITH R.Product Market Competition,Efficiency and Agency Costs:An Empirical Analysis[R].London:IFS Working Paper,2001.
[32]施东辉.转轨经济中的所有权与竞争:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2003(8):46-54.
[33]牛建波,李维安.产品市场竞争和公司治理的交互关系研究——基于中国制造业上市公司1998—2003年数据的实证分析[J].南大商学评论,2007(1):83-103.
[34]陈晓珊.高管薪酬激励与产品市场竞争的公司治理效应:替代还是互补[J].人文杂志,2017(9):46-57.
[35]张樱.社会资本、产品市场竞争与银行贷款融资[J].山西财经大学学报,2017(1):28-39.
[36]GUADALUPE M,PéREZ-GONZáLEZ F.Competition and Private Benefits of Control[R].New York:Columbia University Working Paper,2010.
[37]HERMALIN B.The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1992,23(3):350-365.
(1)在职消费一般是指企业高管人员,尤其是国有企业管理层,利用职务之便和工作需要所获得的除正常工资报酬外的额外收益,包括公款餐饮娱乐、豪华办公室、专用交通工具、豪华住房津贴、公费报销等一系列公款消费行为。
(2)产品市场竞争是指公司主营业务所在的同一行业中生产或者销售存在一定替代性的产品或服务的企业,为了获取客户、原料、劳动力等同种资源而展开的较量过程或者争夺行为。
(3)考虑到产品市场竞争可能与因变量之间存在内生性,本文同时进行异方差稳健的DWH检验和稳健的内生性检验,结果显示,Durbin检验的χ2(1)统计量为0.352,其p值为0.5529,Wu-Hausman检验的χ2(1)统计量为0.351,其p值为0.5531,充分表明产品市场竞争变量lerner与被解释变量TobinQ之间并不存在明显的内生性。
[2]陈晓珊.异质性企业高管在职消费与货币薪酬的治理效应研究——兼论在职消费的“代理观”与“效率观”[J].云南财经大学学报,2017(1):115-125.
[3]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[4]YERMACK D.Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets,CEO Perquisites,and Inferior Shareholder Returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[5]EDGERTON J.Agency Problems in Public Firms:Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts[J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(6):2187-2213.
[6]XU N,LI X,YUAN Q.Excess Perks and Stock Price Crash Risk:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,25:419-434.
[7]LUO W,ZHANG Y,ZHU N.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from an Emerging Market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
[8]郝颖,谢光华,石锐.外部监管、在职消费与企业绩效[J].会计研究,2018(8):42-48.
[9]禇剑,方军雄.政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?[J].会计研究,2016(9):82-89.
[10]翟胜宝,徐亚琴,杨德明.媒体能监督国有企业高管在职消费么?[J].会计研究,2015(5):57-63.
[11]HIRSCH F.Social Limits to Growth[M].Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press,1976:88.
[12]HENDERSON M T,SPINDLER J C.Corporate Heroin:A Defense of Perks,Executive Loans,Conspicuous Consumption[J].Georgetown Law Journal,2005,93(6):1835-1883.
[13]RAJAN R G,WULF J.Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):1-33.
[14]ADITHIPYANGKUL P,ALON I,ZHANG T.Executive Perks:Compensation and Corporate Performance in China[J].Asia-pacific Journal of Management,2011,28(2):401-425.
[15]CHEN D,LI O Z,LIANG S.Perk Consumption as a Suboptimal Outcome under Pay Regulations[J].Asia-pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics,2015,23(4):373-399.
[16]孙世敏,柳绿,陈怡秀.在职消费经济效应形成机理及公司治理对其影响[J].中国工业经济,2016(1):37-51.
[17]FAMA E F.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[18]姜付秀,黄磊,张敏.产品市场竞争、公司治理与代理成本[J].世界经济,2009(10):46-59.
[19]刘志强.CEO权力、产品市场竞争与在职消费[J].云南财经大学学报,2015(6):124-134.
[20]陈晓珊.公司内外联合治理、在职消费与公司绩效——基于国企改革视角的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2016(4):107-116.
[21]MARION A M,ZáBOJNíK J.Work-Related Perks,Agency Problems,and Optimal Incentive Contracts[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2008,39(2):565-585.
[22]AGHA M.Agency Costs,Executive Incentives and Corporate Financial Decisions[J].Australian Journal of Management,2016,41(3):425-458.
[23]吴昊旻,杨兴全,魏卉.产品市场竞争与公司股票特质性风险——基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2012(6):101-115.
[24]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[25]CAI H,FANG H,XU L C.Eat,Drink,Firms,Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms[J].The Journal of Law and Economics,2011,54(1):55-78.
[26]黎文靖,池勤伟.高管职务消费对企业业绩影响机理研究[J].中国工业经济,2015(4):122-134.
[27]ANG G S,COLE R A,LIN J W.Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):81-106.
[28]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007(1):102-113.
[29]SINGH M,DAVIDSON W N.Agency Costs,Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Mechanisms[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2003,27(5):793-816.
[30]AGHION P,DEWATRIPONT M,DU L,etc.Industrial Policy and Competition[R].Cambridge:NBER Working Paper,2012.
[31]GRIFFITH R.Product Market Competition,Efficiency and Agency Costs:An Empirical Analysis[R].London:IFS Working Paper,2001.
[32]施东辉.转轨经济中的所有权与竞争:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2003(8):46-54.
[33]牛建波,李维安.产品市场竞争和公司治理的交互关系研究——基于中国制造业上市公司1998—2003年数据的实证分析[J].南大商学评论,2007(1):83-103.
[34]陈晓珊.高管薪酬激励与产品市场竞争的公司治理效应:替代还是互补[J].人文杂志,2017(9):46-57.
[35]张樱.社会资本、产品市场竞争与银行贷款融资[J].山西财经大学学报,2017(1):28-39.
[36]GUADALUPE M,PéREZ-GONZáLEZ F.Competition and Private Benefits of Control[R].New York:Columbia University Working Paper,2010.
[37]HERMALIN B.The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1992,23(3):350-365.
(1)在职消费一般是指企业高管人员,尤其是国有企业管理层,利用职务之便和工作需要所获得的除正常工资报酬外的额外收益,包括公款餐饮娱乐、豪华办公室、专用交通工具、豪华住房津贴、公费报销等一系列公款消费行为。
(2)产品市场竞争是指公司主营业务所在的同一行业中生产或者销售存在一定替代性的产品或服务的企业,为了获取客户、原料、劳动力等同种资源而展开的较量过程或者争夺行为。
(3)考虑到产品市场竞争可能与因变量之间存在内生性,本文同时进行异方差稳健的DWH检验和稳健的内生性检验,结果显示,Durbin检验的χ2(1)统计量为0.352,其p值为0.5529,Wu-Hausman检验的χ2(1)统计量为0.351,其p值为0.5531,充分表明产品市场竞争变量lerner与被解释变量TobinQ之间并不存在明显的内生性。
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