财务冗余对企业业绩的影响——基于A股上市公司的视角

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英文篇名：The Impact of Financial Redundancy on Corporate Performance——from on the Perspective of A-share Listed Companies 作者：张小连 英文作者：ZHANG Xiao-lian;Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics; 关键词：现金冗余 ; 负债冗余 ; 企业业绩 英文关键词：cash redundancy;;liabilities redundancy of liabilities;;corporate performance 中文刊名：TJCM 英文刊名：Journal of Tianjin College of Commerce 机构：新疆财经大学; 出版日期：2019-06-15 出版单位：天津商务职业学院学报 年：2019 期：v.7;No.37 语种：中文; 页：TJCM201903006 页数：7 CN：03 ISSN：12-1434/F 分类号：41-47

摘要

本文通过2008-2017年A股非金融保险业上市公司的相关数据对财务冗余与企业业绩之间的关系进行检验。将财务冗余分为现金冗余和负债冗余,发现现金冗余与企业业绩之间呈U型关系,表明过多或过少的现金冗余都会对企业业绩起促进作用,而适当的现金冗余会损害企业业绩的增长;负债冗余与企业业绩之间呈倒U型关系,表明企业持有的负债冗余的边际收益大于边际成本时,有利于提升企业业绩;但若持有负债冗余的边际收益小于边际成本,则会导致企业业绩不断下滑。以此为企业制定投融资决策、提高企业资源配置效率提供参考。
        By analyzing the relevant data of A-share listed non-financial insurance companies from 2008 to 2017 and the relationship between financial redundancy and corporate performance, this paper divides financial redundancy into cash redundancy and liabilities redundancy. The author finds that there is a u-shaped relationship between cash redundancy and corporate performance, indicating that too much or too little cash redundancy will promote corporate performance, while appropriate cash redundancy will harm the growth of corporate performance.There is an inverted u-shaped relationship between liabilities redundancy and enterprise performance, indicating that when the marginal revenue of liabilities redundancy held by enterprises is greater than the marginal cost, it is conducive to improving enterprise performance.However, if the marginal revenue of holding liabilities redundancy is less than the marginal cost,the enterprise performance will decline continuously. In this paper, the author puts forward investment and financing suggestions, in hope of providing a reference for enterprises to improve the efficiency of resource allocation.

引文

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