区域协调发展政策的公司治理作用——城市经济协调会的准自然实验证据
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摘要
实施区域协调发展战略是国家在新时代的重大战略之一,长三角城市经济协调会作为一项重要的"区域一体化"政策,在区域协调发展中具有十分重要的作用。现有研究主要从政府间合作方式、协调发展策略、宏观影响等方面来考察其作用,但对其影响微观经济主体行为的机制还缺乏深入研究和全面认识。文章利用长三角区域不同城市在不同时间加入经济协调会产生的准自然实验情境,以中国资本市场上市公司2008-2016年的数据为研究样本,考察区域协调发展政策影响公司治理的一项重要机制-高管薪酬激励。双重差分方法的检验结果显示,加入长三角城市经济协调会导致上市公司的高管超额薪酬降低11.6%,而且这种影响对于那些高管网络中心度大、信息环境差、全要素生产率低的公司更加明显。文章不仅从微观经济主体治理机制的角度为区域协调发展政策的经济后果提供了新的经验证据,而且对于国家的区域协调发展战略与经济发展、公司的最优薪酬合同设计等具有一定的启示。
As an important regional integration policy,the mechanism of the Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Committee's(ECC)influence on micro-economic entities has not been thoroughly studied. In fact,through cooperation forums,cooperation topics,business service alliances,etc.,ECC provides a communication platform for companies,and forms communication and cooperation between governments and companies. The information spillover generated by ECC can have an impact on the company's behavior.This paper focuses on the impact of regional coordinated development policies on the executive compensation incentive in corporate governance. Especially,in view of the phenomenon of excess executive compensation prevailing in companies in recent years,this paper specifically examines whether ECC can help to reduce the excess executive compensation,and how can ECC play a governance role through the information spillover? Using different cities joining ECC at different times as a quasi-natural experimental situation,based on the data of listed companies in China's capital market from 2008 to 2016 as the research sample,this paper examines how joining ECC affects excess executive compensation by using the difference-in-differences method. This method compares the difference of the change of executive compensation around joining ECC between companies registered in the member cities of ECC and companies registered in other cities. It comes to the following conclusions:First,after controlling the year fixed effect and the company fixed effect,the results of the difference-in-differences method show that joining ECC can significantly reduce excess executive compensation. The result is also of great economic significance. On average,after the company's city joining ECC,its executive's excess compensation drops by 11.6%. Second,since the reduction of the executive's excess compensation is caused by the improvement of the corporate governance mechanism and the reduction of agency problems after the information spillover,the effect is more pronounced for those companies with higher network centrality of the executive,worse information environment and lower total factor productivity. This paper provides new empirical evidence for the economic consequences of regional coordinated development policies from the governance mechanism of micro-economic entities. It has certain enlightenment significance for the national regional coordinated development strategy,economic development,the design of the company's optimal compensation contract and so on.Generally speaking,this paper extends the existing research from three aspects:First,it contributes to the analysis of the economic effects of regional integration and urban economic coordination,and supplements the empirical evidence of how regional coordinated development policies affect micro-economic entities. Second,it contributes to the related research on excess executive compensation and corporate governance,which shows that the information spillover generated by ECC will lead to the reduction of excess executive compensation,and helps to promote the design of optimal executive compensation. Third,the quasi-natural experiment used in this paper can effectively alleviate the interference of endogenous problems,and help to better identify the causal effect of ECC on the excess executive compensation.
As an important regional integration policy,the mechanism of the Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordination Committee's(ECC)influence on micro-economic entities has not been thoroughly studied. In fact,through cooperation forums,cooperation topics,business service alliances,etc.,ECC provides a communication platform for companies,and forms communication and cooperation between governments and companies. The information spillover generated by ECC can have an impact on the company's behavior.This paper focuses on the impact of regional coordinated development policies on the executive compensation incentive in corporate governance. Especially,in view of the phenomenon of excess executive compensation prevailing in companies in recent years,this paper specifically examines whether ECC can help to reduce the excess executive compensation,and how can ECC play a governance role through the information spillover? Using different cities joining ECC at different times as a quasi-natural experimental situation,based on the data of listed companies in China's capital market from 2008 to 2016 as the research sample,this paper examines how joining ECC affects excess executive compensation by using the difference-in-differences method. This method compares the difference of the change of executive compensation around joining ECC between companies registered in the member cities of ECC and companies registered in other cities. It comes to the following conclusions:First,after controlling the year fixed effect and the company fixed effect,the results of the difference-in-differences method show that joining ECC can significantly reduce excess executive compensation. The result is also of great economic significance. On average,after the company's city joining ECC,its executive's excess compensation drops by 11.6%. Second,since the reduction of the executive's excess compensation is caused by the improvement of the corporate governance mechanism and the reduction of agency problems after the information spillover,the effect is more pronounced for those companies with higher network centrality of the executive,worse information environment and lower total factor productivity. This paper provides new empirical evidence for the economic consequences of regional coordinated development policies from the governance mechanism of micro-economic entities. It has certain enlightenment significance for the national regional coordinated development strategy,economic development,the design of the company's optimal compensation contract and so on.Generally speaking,this paper extends the existing research from three aspects:First,it contributes to the analysis of the economic effects of regional integration and urban economic coordination,and supplements the empirical evidence of how regional coordinated development policies affect micro-economic entities. Second,it contributes to the related research on excess executive compensation and corporate governance,which shows that the information spillover generated by ECC will lead to the reduction of excess executive compensation,and helps to promote the design of optimal executive compensation. Third,the quasi-natural experiment used in this paper can effectively alleviate the interference of endogenous problems,and help to better identify the causal effect of ECC on the excess executive compensation.
引文
[1]陈胜蓝,卢锐.股权分置改革、盈余管理与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].金融研究,2012,(10):180-192.
[2]吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010,(3):117-126.
[3]徐现祥,李郇.市场一体化与区域协调发展[J].经济研究,2005,(12):57-67.
[4]张学良,李培鑫,李丽霞.政府合作、市场整合与城市群经济绩效-基于长三角城市经济协调会的实证检验[J].经济学(季刊),2017,(4):1563-1582.
[5]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M.Executive compensation as an agency problem[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[6]Bertrand M,Mullainathan S.Enjoying the quiet life?Corporate governance and managerial preferences[J].Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[7]Bizjak J,Lemmon M,Nguyen T.Are all CEOs above Average?An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,100(3):538-555.
[8]Chen T,Harford J,Lin C.Do analysts matter for governance?Evidence from natural experiments[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(2):383-410.
[9]Christoffersen S E K,Sarkissian S.City size and fund performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(2):252-275.
[10]Core J E,Holthausen R W,Larcker D F.Corporate governance,chief executive officer compensation,and firm performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51(3):371-406.
[11]Dessaint O,Golubov A,Volpin P.Employment protection and takeovers[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2017,125(2):369-388.
[12]Duranton G,Puga D.Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies[J].Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,2004,4:2063-2117.
[13]Faulkender M,Yang J.Inside the black box:The role and composition of compensation peer groups[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(2):257-270.
[14]Francis B B,Hasan I,John K,et al.Urban Agglomeration and CEO Compensation[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2016,51(6):1925-1953.
[15]Frydman C,Papanikolaou D.In search of ideas:Technological innovation and executive pay inequality[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2018,130(1):1-24.
[16]Giannetti M,Liao G M,Yu X Y.The brain gain of corporate boards:Evidence from China[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,70(4):1629-1682.
[17]Phua J K,Tham T M,Wei C S.Do equity analysts learn from their colleagues?[R].Working Paper,2018.
[18]Roberts M R,Whited T M.Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance[J].Handbook of the Economics of Finance,2013,2:493-572.
[19]Sauerwald S,Lin Z A,Peng M W.Board social capital and excess CEO returns[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(3):498-520.
[20]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
(1)例如,2013年召开的第13次市长联席会议设立了创新驱动合作论坛,邀请了各成员城市的知名企业家以及高等院校、科研院所的代表参会;2017年第17次市长联席会议决定成立长三角协调会企业服务联盟;2018年9月21日成立了长三角城市经济协调会产业特色小镇发展联盟。
(1)例如,黄新飞等(2014)利用长三角15个城市的数据,测算了市场分割程度,估计了长三角地区两省一市之间的边界效应。孟庆国和罗杭(2017)基于长三角城市经济协调会之间的合作,用社会网络模型演绎城市群中各城市政府决策者之间的交互关系,为促进城市群政府合作和区域一体化进程提供了决策依据和政策参考。
(2)这场争论涵盖了经济学中的几个重要话题,如契约理论、公司财务、收入不平等和劳动经济学等(Edmans和Gabaix,2016)。
(3)对于高管超额薪酬的关注引发了一些国家的监管改革。例如,2010年美国通过了《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank)以限制金融高管的薪酬;2013年欧盟限制了银行人员的奖金水平,规定其应与工资保持一致;2013年美国证监会通过了一项规定,要求公司披露CEO薪酬与员工薪酬中值的比率;2015年中国颁布了《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》,对央企高管薪酬采用差异化薪酬管控的办法,以进一步抑制高管超额薪酬。
(1)2010年加入长三角城市经济协调会的城市有合肥、盐城、马鞍山、金华、淮安、衢州等6个;2013年加入长三角城市经济协调会的城市有徐州、芜湖、滁州、淮南、丽水、温州、宿迁、连云港等8个。
(2)由于横截面检验中高管的网络数据从2008年开始,因此本文的样本起始年份为2008年。
(3)在稳健性检验中,本文也对2016年前所有加入长三角城市经济协调会的城市(1997年、2003年、2010年和2013年四次加入协调会的城市)进行了全样本的测试,结果符合预期。
(1)限于篇幅,本文没有给出变量的描述性统计表。如有需要,可向作者索取。
(1)若两个公司的高管同时在同一政府部门任职,则这两个高管之间就形成了联系,由此构成本文所使用的由政府关系为联系基础形成的高管网络。
(1)最短路径是指连接i与j的最短路径的条数;当i与所有其他节点毗邻时,指标的最大值等于(n-1)-1。
(1)限于篇幅,本文没有给出稳健性检验的图表。如有需要,可向作者索取。
(2)为了有效降低处理组和控制组之间的差异,可以使用1∶n的配比方式,即1个处理组样本配比与其倾向得分最接近的n个控制组样本(Rosenbaum,1989;Ming和Rosenbaum,2000)。考虑到本文的处理组样本较少,为了有效降低处理组与控制组之间的差异,本文使用了1 ∶5的配比方式。另外,本文还使用了1∶1的配比方式,也能得到类似的结果。
[2]吴联生,林景艺,王亚平.薪酬外部公平性、股权性质与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2010,(3):117-126.
[3]徐现祥,李郇.市场一体化与区域协调发展[J].经济研究,2005,(12):57-67.
[4]张学良,李培鑫,李丽霞.政府合作、市场整合与城市群经济绩效-基于长三角城市经济协调会的实证检验[J].经济学(季刊),2017,(4):1563-1582.
[5]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M.Executive compensation as an agency problem[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[6]Bertrand M,Mullainathan S.Enjoying the quiet life?Corporate governance and managerial preferences[J].Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[7]Bizjak J,Lemmon M,Nguyen T.Are all CEOs above Average?An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,100(3):538-555.
[8]Chen T,Harford J,Lin C.Do analysts matter for governance?Evidence from natural experiments[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,115(2):383-410.
[9]Christoffersen S E K,Sarkissian S.City size and fund performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,92(2):252-275.
[10]Core J E,Holthausen R W,Larcker D F.Corporate governance,chief executive officer compensation,and firm performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51(3):371-406.
[11]Dessaint O,Golubov A,Volpin P.Employment protection and takeovers[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2017,125(2):369-388.
[12]Duranton G,Puga D.Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies[J].Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,2004,4:2063-2117.
[13]Faulkender M,Yang J.Inside the black box:The role and composition of compensation peer groups[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(2):257-270.
[14]Francis B B,Hasan I,John K,et al.Urban Agglomeration and CEO Compensation[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2016,51(6):1925-1953.
[15]Frydman C,Papanikolaou D.In search of ideas:Technological innovation and executive pay inequality[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2018,130(1):1-24.
[16]Giannetti M,Liao G M,Yu X Y.The brain gain of corporate boards:Evidence from China[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,70(4):1629-1682.
[17]Phua J K,Tham T M,Wei C S.Do equity analysts learn from their colleagues?[R].Working Paper,2018.
[18]Roberts M R,Whited T M.Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance[J].Handbook of the Economics of Finance,2013,2:493-572.
[19]Sauerwald S,Lin Z A,Peng M W.Board social capital and excess CEO returns[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,37(3):498-520.
[20]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
(1)例如,2013年召开的第13次市长联席会议设立了创新驱动合作论坛,邀请了各成员城市的知名企业家以及高等院校、科研院所的代表参会;2017年第17次市长联席会议决定成立长三角协调会企业服务联盟;2018年9月21日成立了长三角城市经济协调会产业特色小镇发展联盟。
(1)例如,黄新飞等(2014)利用长三角15个城市的数据,测算了市场分割程度,估计了长三角地区两省一市之间的边界效应。孟庆国和罗杭(2017)基于长三角城市经济协调会之间的合作,用社会网络模型演绎城市群中各城市政府决策者之间的交互关系,为促进城市群政府合作和区域一体化进程提供了决策依据和政策参考。
(2)这场争论涵盖了经济学中的几个重要话题,如契约理论、公司财务、收入不平等和劳动经济学等(Edmans和Gabaix,2016)。
(3)对于高管超额薪酬的关注引发了一些国家的监管改革。例如,2010年美国通过了《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank)以限制金融高管的薪酬;2013年欧盟限制了银行人员的奖金水平,规定其应与工资保持一致;2013年美国证监会通过了一项规定,要求公司披露CEO薪酬与员工薪酬中值的比率;2015年中国颁布了《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》,对央企高管薪酬采用差异化薪酬管控的办法,以进一步抑制高管超额薪酬。
(1)2010年加入长三角城市经济协调会的城市有合肥、盐城、马鞍山、金华、淮安、衢州等6个;2013年加入长三角城市经济协调会的城市有徐州、芜湖、滁州、淮南、丽水、温州、宿迁、连云港等8个。
(2)由于横截面检验中高管的网络数据从2008年开始,因此本文的样本起始年份为2008年。
(3)在稳健性检验中,本文也对2016年前所有加入长三角城市经济协调会的城市(1997年、2003年、2010年和2013年四次加入协调会的城市)进行了全样本的测试,结果符合预期。
(1)限于篇幅,本文没有给出变量的描述性统计表。如有需要,可向作者索取。
(1)若两个公司的高管同时在同一政府部门任职,则这两个高管之间就形成了联系,由此构成本文所使用的由政府关系为联系基础形成的高管网络。
(1)最短路径是指连接i与j的最短路径的条数;当i与所有其他节点毗邻时,指标的最大值等于(n-1)-1。
(1)限于篇幅,本文没有给出稳健性检验的图表。如有需要,可向作者索取。
(2)为了有效降低处理组和控制组之间的差异,可以使用1∶n的配比方式,即1个处理组样本配比与其倾向得分最接近的n个控制组样本(Rosenbaum,1989;Ming和Rosenbaum,2000)。考虑到本文的处理组样本较少,为了有效降低处理组与控制组之间的差异,本文使用了1 ∶5的配比方式。另外,本文还使用了1∶1的配比方式,也能得到类似的结果。
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