官员访问与公司雇员
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摘要
与以往很多从企业的角度出发,探讨企业建立政治关联以寻求政府保护的文献不同,本文从政府角度出发,研究政府官员如何主动通过访问企业来实现其就业目标。通过考察世界各国政府官员对Fortune公布的最新世界500强公司的访问情况,发现不同于西方市场经济国家,我国政府官员频繁访问企业,使得官员访问具有"中国特色"。具体到就业问题,实证结果表明,我国政府官员倾向于访问吸纳劳动力强的企业,访问后企业的雇员规模显著增加,尤其是大专以下的雇员数,从而导致员工冗余。在国有企业中,这种正相关关系更为突出,官员访问的雇员效应在就业目标较高的地区更为显著。
The relationship between government and enterprises has always been an important issue in academic research. In transition economies, how the government transforms its functions and how to build a new type of government-enterprise relationship have received wide attention. Since the financial crisis in 2008, most countries have fallen into recession. In order to boost the economy, governments of many countries have introduced various measures to strengthen the regulation of the market economy. Keynesianism and state interventionism have re-emerged. As a result, the academic community has implemented many new researches about the relationship between government and market. The boundary between government's macroeconomic regulation and the free market has once again become a research hot spot. Under such circumstance, it is more practical to study the relationship between government and enterprises. There are many theoretical references on political connections which represent the relationship between government and enterprises. However, due to the fact that the relationship between government and enterprises is difficult to measure, there are few researches on this problem. And most political connections researches examine how companies affect government policy making or resource allocation through executives with government background. These researches are from the perspective of enterprises. Since current government officials are not allowed to serve in the enterprise, the executives who measure political connections in previous researches are actually retired government officials. But actual controllers of resources are current government officials. Accordingly, it can be speculated that the reliability of the conclusions of such documents depends on the impact that retired or outgoing government officials can exert on the current government. With the advancement of political and economic reforms, the mobility of government officialsor local governors' turnover has increased, and rotations across places have become common phenomena. The occupational risks of government officials have also increased. The news about officials being downgraded, dismissed and even expelled have been reported frequently from time to time. In such cases, the impact of retired or outgoing government officials on the current government department is yet to be verified. Fortunately, official visits with Chinese characteristics have provided us with a new perspective to study the political connections from government side. At present, there are a few papers studying Chinese official visits. They still proceed on enterprise side to investigate the benefits of official visits to enterprises from the perspectives of government subsidies, corporate alliances and corporate innovations. In this paper we start from the government side to study the reason that Chinese government officials visit companies frequently, and whether official visits will bring burdens to companies.Different from the papers which discuss how to seek protection of government by political connections from the angle of the companies, this paper studies how to achieve the social goals by official visits from the angle of government. Based on the comparison of government official visits from all over the world, this paper studies how Chinese government officials achieve political employment goals by visiting enterprises. The contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following five points. First, previous researches only pay attention to domestic official visits, and has not yet carried out comparative analysis from international level, and the description of Chinese official inspection is relatively simple. Through the official visits statistics of Fortune 500 global corporations, This paper presents a detailed description from the aspects of types, reasons and annual changes of official visits. By comparing official visits from all over the world, it is found that government officials in developed market economies rarely visit enterprises, but Chinese officials visit enterprises frequently, forming "Chinese Characteristics" visit phenomenon. From the institutional level, an in-depth analysis is presented why official visits have Chinese characteristics, that is, they shoulder heavy employment goals. Second, this paper uses employment goals as an entry point to examine the motivation of official visits from the perspective of the government. Measuring the labor absorption capacity by the employment elasticity coefficient, it is found that government officials tend to choose enterprises with strong labor absorption capacity as the target of visit. In addition, enterprises with large number of employees are also the targets of government officials, even if the potential of such enterprises to increase labor is limited. However, stabilizing the size of its existing staff, reducing or even eliminating layoffs, will also play a vital role in stabilizing employment in the region. Third, companies that arevisited by officials have the responsibility to help government achieve its social goals in labor employment, which is manifested by the recruitment of a large number of low-skilled employees. The rapid increase in the number of low-skilled employees exceeds the need for business expansion, resulting in employee redundancy. Fourth, when government officials visit state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprise executives are more motivated to complete this political task in order to obtain political promotion. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, this positive correlation between official visits and employee scale is more prominent in state-owned enterprises. Fifth, in areas with higher employment goals, government officials are subject to greater employment pressure, and the employee effect and redundancy effect of official visits are more significant.In conclusion, developed market economies officials rarely visit enterprises, but Chinese officials visit enterprises frequently, forming "Chinese Characteristics" visit phenomenon. As to employment issue, the empirical findings show that the officials are inclined to visit the corporations which can absorb more employees. Official visits can increase the number of employees, especially for employees with college degree or below, thus incurring redundant employee. This relation is much stronger in state-owned enterprises and provinces with high employment goals. The results of this paper show that while government officials set macroeconomic goals such as increasing employment rates, they must also consider the labor allocation efficiency of enterprises in order to better develop China's labor market.
The relationship between government and enterprises has always been an important issue in academic research. In transition economies, how the government transforms its functions and how to build a new type of government-enterprise relationship have received wide attention. Since the financial crisis in 2008, most countries have fallen into recession. In order to boost the economy, governments of many countries have introduced various measures to strengthen the regulation of the market economy. Keynesianism and state interventionism have re-emerged. As a result, the academic community has implemented many new researches about the relationship between government and market. The boundary between government's macroeconomic regulation and the free market has once again become a research hot spot. Under such circumstance, it is more practical to study the relationship between government and enterprises. There are many theoretical references on political connections which represent the relationship between government and enterprises. However, due to the fact that the relationship between government and enterprises is difficult to measure, there are few researches on this problem. And most political connections researches examine how companies affect government policy making or resource allocation through executives with government background. These researches are from the perspective of enterprises. Since current government officials are not allowed to serve in the enterprise, the executives who measure political connections in previous researches are actually retired government officials. But actual controllers of resources are current government officials. Accordingly, it can be speculated that the reliability of the conclusions of such documents depends on the impact that retired or outgoing government officials can exert on the current government. With the advancement of political and economic reforms, the mobility of government officialsor local governors' turnover has increased, and rotations across places have become common phenomena. The occupational risks of government officials have also increased. The news about officials being downgraded, dismissed and even expelled have been reported frequently from time to time. In such cases, the impact of retired or outgoing government officials on the current government department is yet to be verified. Fortunately, official visits with Chinese characteristics have provided us with a new perspective to study the political connections from government side. At present, there are a few papers studying Chinese official visits. They still proceed on enterprise side to investigate the benefits of official visits to enterprises from the perspectives of government subsidies, corporate alliances and corporate innovations. In this paper we start from the government side to study the reason that Chinese government officials visit companies frequently, and whether official visits will bring burdens to companies.Different from the papers which discuss how to seek protection of government by political connections from the angle of the companies, this paper studies how to achieve the social goals by official visits from the angle of government. Based on the comparison of government official visits from all over the world, this paper studies how Chinese government officials achieve political employment goals by visiting enterprises. The contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following five points. First, previous researches only pay attention to domestic official visits, and has not yet carried out comparative analysis from international level, and the description of Chinese official inspection is relatively simple. Through the official visits statistics of Fortune 500 global corporations, This paper presents a detailed description from the aspects of types, reasons and annual changes of official visits. By comparing official visits from all over the world, it is found that government officials in developed market economies rarely visit enterprises, but Chinese officials visit enterprises frequently, forming "Chinese Characteristics" visit phenomenon. From the institutional level, an in-depth analysis is presented why official visits have Chinese characteristics, that is, they shoulder heavy employment goals. Second, this paper uses employment goals as an entry point to examine the motivation of official visits from the perspective of the government. Measuring the labor absorption capacity by the employment elasticity coefficient, it is found that government officials tend to choose enterprises with strong labor absorption capacity as the target of visit. In addition, enterprises with large number of employees are also the targets of government officials, even if the potential of such enterprises to increase labor is limited. However, stabilizing the size of its existing staff, reducing or even eliminating layoffs, will also play a vital role in stabilizing employment in the region. Third, companies that arevisited by officials have the responsibility to help government achieve its social goals in labor employment, which is manifested by the recruitment of a large number of low-skilled employees. The rapid increase in the number of low-skilled employees exceeds the need for business expansion, resulting in employee redundancy. Fourth, when government officials visit state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprise executives are more motivated to complete this political task in order to obtain political promotion. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, this positive correlation between official visits and employee scale is more prominent in state-owned enterprises. Fifth, in areas with higher employment goals, government officials are subject to greater employment pressure, and the employee effect and redundancy effect of official visits are more significant.In conclusion, developed market economies officials rarely visit enterprises, but Chinese officials visit enterprises frequently, forming "Chinese Characteristics" visit phenomenon. As to employment issue, the empirical findings show that the officials are inclined to visit the corporations which can absorb more employees. Official visits can increase the number of employees, especially for employees with college degree or below, thus incurring redundant employee. This relation is much stronger in state-owned enterprises and provinces with high employment goals. The results of this paper show that while government officials set macroeconomic goals such as increasing employment rates, they must also consider the labor allocation efficiency of enterprises in order to better develop China's labor market.
引文
[1] 吴敬琏.中国增长模式抉择 [M].上海:上海远东出版社,2008.Wu Jinglian.The choice of China growth mode [M].Shanghai:Shanghai Far East Publishers,2008.
[2] Li H,Zhou L A.Political turnover and economic performance:The incentive role of personnel control in China [J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89 (9-10):1743-1762.
[3] 张维迎.市场的逻辑 [M].上海:上海人民出版社,2012.Zhang Weiying.The logic of the market [M].Shanghai:Shanghai People′s Publishing House,2012.
[4] 王建民.中国地方政府机构绩效考评目标模式研究 [J].管理世界,2005(10):67-73.Wang Jianmin.Research on target pattern of performance evaluation of Chinese local governments [J].Management World,2005(10):67-73.
[5] Shleifer A,Vishny R.Politicians and firms [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109 (4):995-1025.
[6] 余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性 [J].经济研究,2010 (3):65-77.Yu Minggui,Hui Yafu,Pan Hongbo.Political connections,rent seeking,and the fiscal subsidy efficiency of local governments [J].Economic Research Journal,2010 (3):65-77.
[7] 刘慧龙,张敏,王亚平,吴联生.政治关联、薪酬激励与员工配置效率 [J].经济研究,2010 (9):109-121.Liu Huilong,Zhang Min,Wang Yaping,Wu Liansheng.Political connections,compensation incentive,and employee allocation efficiency [J].Economic Research Journal,2010 (9):109-121.
[8] 罗党论,应千伟.政企关系、官员视察与企业绩效——来自中国制造业上市企业的经验证据 [J].南开管理评论,2012,15 (5):74-83.Luo Danglun,Ying Qianwei.Political connection,official inspection and firm performance:The empirical evidences come from Chinese manufacturing listed companies [J].Nankai Business Review,2012,15 (5):74-83.
[9] 罗党论,李晓霞.官员视察与企业联盟——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验证据 [J].会计与经济研究,2014,28 (3):03-20.Luo Danglun,Li Xiaoxia.Government officials inspections and enterprise alliance:Empirical evidence from listed manufacturing enterprises in China [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2014,28 (3):03-20.
[10] 杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华.准官员的晋升机制——来自中国央企的证据 [J].管理世界,2013 (3):23-33.Yang Ruilong,Wang Yuan,Nie Huihua.The political promotion for quasi-government officers:Evidence from central state-owned enterprises in China [J].Management World,2013 (3):23-33.
[11] Heckman J,Ichimura H,Todd P.Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator:Evidence from evaluating a Job Training Programme [J].The Review of Economic Studies,1997,64(4):605-654.
[12] Smith J,Todd P.Does matching overcome LaLonde′s critique of nonexperimental estimators [J].Journal of Econometrics,2005,125(1):305-353.
[13] Oi J C.Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporation in China [J].World Polices,1992,45 (1):99-126.
[14] Faccio M.The characteristics of politically connected firms [R].Working Paper,Purdue University,2007.
[15] Faccio M,Masulis R W,McGonnell J J.Political connections and corporate bailouts [J].Journal of Finance,2006 (61):2597-2635.
[16] Claessens S,Feijen E,Laeven L.Political connections and preferential access to finance:The role of campaign contributions [J].Journal of Financial Economies,2008,88 (3):554-580.
①搜集了《Fortune》公布的最新世界500强公司在2012年受到各国官员访问的新闻,并剔除上榜公司数量低于3个的国家或无英文网站的公司,本文最终得到来自17个国家426个公司的2436条官员来访的新闻报道。
[2] Li H,Zhou L A.Political turnover and economic performance:The incentive role of personnel control in China [J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89 (9-10):1743-1762.
[3] 张维迎.市场的逻辑 [M].上海:上海人民出版社,2012.Zhang Weiying.The logic of the market [M].Shanghai:Shanghai People′s Publishing House,2012.
[4] 王建民.中国地方政府机构绩效考评目标模式研究 [J].管理世界,2005(10):67-73.Wang Jianmin.Research on target pattern of performance evaluation of Chinese local governments [J].Management World,2005(10):67-73.
[5] Shleifer A,Vishny R.Politicians and firms [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109 (4):995-1025.
[6] 余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性 [J].经济研究,2010 (3):65-77.Yu Minggui,Hui Yafu,Pan Hongbo.Political connections,rent seeking,and the fiscal subsidy efficiency of local governments [J].Economic Research Journal,2010 (3):65-77.
[7] 刘慧龙,张敏,王亚平,吴联生.政治关联、薪酬激励与员工配置效率 [J].经济研究,2010 (9):109-121.Liu Huilong,Zhang Min,Wang Yaping,Wu Liansheng.Political connections,compensation incentive,and employee allocation efficiency [J].Economic Research Journal,2010 (9):109-121.
[8] 罗党论,应千伟.政企关系、官员视察与企业绩效——来自中国制造业上市企业的经验证据 [J].南开管理评论,2012,15 (5):74-83.Luo Danglun,Ying Qianwei.Political connection,official inspection and firm performance:The empirical evidences come from Chinese manufacturing listed companies [J].Nankai Business Review,2012,15 (5):74-83.
[9] 罗党论,李晓霞.官员视察与企业联盟——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验证据 [J].会计与经济研究,2014,28 (3):03-20.Luo Danglun,Li Xiaoxia.Government officials inspections and enterprise alliance:Empirical evidence from listed manufacturing enterprises in China [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2014,28 (3):03-20.
[10] 杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华.准官员的晋升机制——来自中国央企的证据 [J].管理世界,2013 (3):23-33.Yang Ruilong,Wang Yuan,Nie Huihua.The political promotion for quasi-government officers:Evidence from central state-owned enterprises in China [J].Management World,2013 (3):23-33.
[11] Heckman J,Ichimura H,Todd P.Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator:Evidence from evaluating a Job Training Programme [J].The Review of Economic Studies,1997,64(4):605-654.
[12] Smith J,Todd P.Does matching overcome LaLonde′s critique of nonexperimental estimators [J].Journal of Econometrics,2005,125(1):305-353.
[13] Oi J C.Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporation in China [J].World Polices,1992,45 (1):99-126.
[14] Faccio M.The characteristics of politically connected firms [R].Working Paper,Purdue University,2007.
[15] Faccio M,Masulis R W,McGonnell J J.Political connections and corporate bailouts [J].Journal of Finance,2006 (61):2597-2635.
[16] Claessens S,Feijen E,Laeven L.Political connections and preferential access to finance:The role of campaign contributions [J].Journal of Financial Economies,2008,88 (3):554-580.
①搜集了《Fortune》公布的最新世界500强公司在2012年受到各国官员访问的新闻,并剔除上榜公司数量低于3个的国家或无英文网站的公司,本文最终得到来自17个国家426个公司的2436条官员来访的新闻报道。
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