基于演化博弈论的PPP项目再谈判策略分析
|
摘要
PPP项目周期长和可变因素多等原因导致后期存在较多争议项需要进行再谈判,为解决PPP项目再谈判策略选择问题,以PPP项目的两个主要参与方即政府方和社会资本方为博弈主体。综合考虑再谈判可能发生的利益、风险以及再谈判结果的社会影响等因素,运用演化博弈理论,建立二者动态博弈的适应度函数并求解复制动态方程,分析模型主要参数与再谈判演化稳定策略的关系,得出影响双方选择强硬或妥协策略的关键参数,并据此深入了解PPP项目的特性,提出有效的再谈判诉求,完善再谈判的解决机制等建议,为促进PPP项目再谈判有效进行和PPP项目整体顺利推进提供了理论依据。
Due to the long duration and various variables in PPP project,many disputed items need to be renegotiated in the later stage. To solve the strategy selection problem of PPP project renegotiation,two main participants of the PPP project, namely the government party and the social capital party,are taken as game-agent. Considering factors such as the possible benefits, risks, and the social impact of renegotiation,this paper employs the evolutionary game theory to build the fitness function of the dynamic games and solve the replication dynamic equation. Then the paper analyzes the relationship between the main parameters and the renegotiation evolution strategy,indentifying key parameters that influence players' tough or soft strategy choice. Accordingly,this paper obtains the characteristics of the PPP project, provides effective renegotiation appeals, and improves solution mechanism of renegotiation. The results will provide theoretical basis for promoting the renegotiation of PPP projects and the progress of PPP projects effectively.
Due to the long duration and various variables in PPP project,many disputed items need to be renegotiated in the later stage. To solve the strategy selection problem of PPP project renegotiation,two main participants of the PPP project, namely the government party and the social capital party,are taken as game-agent. Considering factors such as the possible benefits, risks, and the social impact of renegotiation,this paper employs the evolutionary game theory to build the fitness function of the dynamic games and solve the replication dynamic equation. Then the paper analyzes the relationship between the main parameters and the renegotiation evolution strategy,indentifying key parameters that influence players' tough or soft strategy choice. Accordingly,this paper obtains the characteristics of the PPP project, provides effective renegotiation appeals, and improves solution mechanism of renegotiation. The results will provide theoretical basis for promoting the renegotiation of PPP projects and the progress of PPP projects effectively.
引文
[1]Ho S P.Model for financial renegotiation in public-private partnership projects and its policy implications:Game theoretic view[J].Journal of construction engineering and management,2006,132(7):678-688.
[2]Ping Ho S,Levitt R,Tsui C W,et al.Opportunism-focused transaction cost analysis of public-private partnerships[J].Journal of management in engineering,2015,31(6):04015007.
[3]Domingues S,Zlatkovic D.RenegotiatingPPPcontracts:reinforcing the‘p’in partnership[J].Transport Reviews,2015,35(2):204-225.
[4]Lohmann C,R?tzel P G.The Outcome of Renegotiations between Institutionalized Public-Private Partnerships and Their Public Clients:Data on the Public-Private Partnerships of the German Federal Armed Forces[J].International Journal of Public Administration,2018,41(9):735-745.
[5]Sharafi A,Taleizadeh A A,Amalnick M S.Fair Allocation in Financial Disputes Between Public-Private Partnership Stakeholders Using Game Theory[J].Service Science,2018,10(1):1-11.
[6]孙慧,孙晓鹏,等.PPP项目的再谈判比较分析及启示[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版),2011(4):294-297.
[7]陈富良,刘红艳.基础设施特许经营中承诺与再谈判研究综述[J].经济与管理研究,2015,36(1):88-96.
[8]刘婷,赵桐,等.基于案例的我国PPP项目再谈判情况研究[J].建筑经济,2016,37(9):31-34.
[9]居佳,郝生跃,等.基于不同发起者的PPP项目再谈判博弈模型研究[J].工程管理学报,2017,31(4):40-45.
[10]夏立明,王丝丝,张成宝.PPP项目再谈判过程的影响因素内在逻辑研究--基于扎根理论[J].软科学,2017,31(1):136-140.
[11]贺静文,刘婷婷.PPP项目争端谈判的关键影响因素[J].土木工程与管理学报,2017,34(4):125-131.
[2]Ping Ho S,Levitt R,Tsui C W,et al.Opportunism-focused transaction cost analysis of public-private partnerships[J].Journal of management in engineering,2015,31(6):04015007.
[3]Domingues S,Zlatkovic D.RenegotiatingPPPcontracts:reinforcing the‘p’in partnership[J].Transport Reviews,2015,35(2):204-225.
[4]Lohmann C,R?tzel P G.The Outcome of Renegotiations between Institutionalized Public-Private Partnerships and Their Public Clients:Data on the Public-Private Partnerships of the German Federal Armed Forces[J].International Journal of Public Administration,2018,41(9):735-745.
[5]Sharafi A,Taleizadeh A A,Amalnick M S.Fair Allocation in Financial Disputes Between Public-Private Partnership Stakeholders Using Game Theory[J].Service Science,2018,10(1):1-11.
[6]孙慧,孙晓鹏,等.PPP项目的再谈判比较分析及启示[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版),2011(4):294-297.
[7]陈富良,刘红艳.基础设施特许经营中承诺与再谈判研究综述[J].经济与管理研究,2015,36(1):88-96.
[8]刘婷,赵桐,等.基于案例的我国PPP项目再谈判情况研究[J].建筑经济,2016,37(9):31-34.
[9]居佳,郝生跃,等.基于不同发起者的PPP项目再谈判博弈模型研究[J].工程管理学报,2017,31(4):40-45.
[10]夏立明,王丝丝,张成宝.PPP项目再谈判过程的影响因素内在逻辑研究--基于扎根理论[J].软科学,2017,31(1):136-140.
[11]贺静文,刘婷婷.PPP项目争端谈判的关键影响因素[J].土木工程与管理学报,2017,34(4):125-131.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |