关键高管薪酬差距、市场竞争与战略差异——基于锦标赛理论的视角
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摘要
基于锦标赛理论,以2006-2016年我国上市公司为样本,检验CEO与关键下属高管之间的薪酬差距对战略差异的影响,研究发现:CEO与关键下属高管之间的薪酬差距越大,公司资源配置偏离行业主流趋势的程度越大,即战略差异程度越大;薪酬差距对战略差异的影响会因市场竞争强度的高低而产生差异,即市场竞争强度越低,薪酬差距对公司战略差异的影响越显著。进一步研究发现:相较于CEO与所有高管之间的薪酬差距,CEO与关键下属高管之间的薪酬差距对战略差异的作用更明显;薪酬差距可以通过增加公司的战略差异程度来改善公司价值。
Based on the tournament theory, selecting the A-share listed companies(2006-2016) in China as samples to test the impact of the pay gap between the CEO and key subordinate executives(key pay gap)on strategic deviance, it is found that the key pay gap is positively related to the degree of strategic deviance, in other words, the degree of deviation between the company's resource allocation and the industry's mainstream trends would be greater. Meanwhile, the significance of the association between the key pay gap and strategic deviance would be enhanced by the decrease of market competition. Further results found that the key pay gap has a greater impact on strategic deviance than the pay gap between the CEO and other executives. In addition, the key pay gap can improve firm value by increasing strategic deviance.
Based on the tournament theory, selecting the A-share listed companies(2006-2016) in China as samples to test the impact of the pay gap between the CEO and key subordinate executives(key pay gap)on strategic deviance, it is found that the key pay gap is positively related to the degree of strategic deviance, in other words, the degree of deviation between the company's resource allocation and the industry's mainstream trends would be greater. Meanwhile, the significance of the association between the key pay gap and strategic deviance would be enhanced by the decrease of market competition. Further results found that the key pay gap has a greater impact on strategic deviance than the pay gap between the CEO and other executives. In addition, the key pay gap can improve firm value by increasing strategic deviance.
引文
[1] Jensen M C,Murphy K J. CEO incentives-it's not how much you pay,but how[J]. Harvard Business Review,1990,68(3):138-149.
[2] 林浚清,黄祖辉,孙永祥. 高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J]. 经济研究,2003(4):31-40.
[3] 张正堂. 企业内部薪酬差距对组织未来绩效影响的实证研究[J]. 会计研究,2008(9):81-87.
[4] Tang J,Crossan M,Rowe W G. Dominant CEO,deviant strategy,and extreme performance:the moderating role of a powerful board[J]. Journal of Management Studies,2011,48(7):1479-1503.
[5] Hiller N J,Hambrick D C. Conceptualizing executive hubris:the role of (hyper-)core self-evaluations in strategic decision-making[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2010,26(4):297-319.
[6] Wei C,Yermack D. Investor reactions to CEOs' inside debt incentives[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(11):3813-3840.
[7] 诸波,干胜道. 市场竞争程度、经营战略与业绩评价指标选择[J]. 会计研究,2015(2):51-57.
[8] Lazear E P,Rosen S. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J]. Nber Working Papers,1981,89(5):841-864.
[9] 张瑞君,李小荣,许年行. 货币薪酬能激励高管承担风险吗[J]. 经济理论与经济管理,2013(8):84-100.
[10] 张兆国,刘亚伟,亓小林. 管理者背景特征、晋升激励与过度投资研究[J]. 南开管理评论,2013,16(4):32-42.
[11] 孔东民,徐茗丽,孔高文. 企业内部薪酬差距与创新[J]. 经济研究,2017(10):10-17.
[12] 黎文靖,胡玉明. 国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁?[J]. 经济研究,2012(12):125-136.
[13] 鲁海帆. 高管团队内薪酬差距、风险与公司业绩——基于锦标赛理论的实证研究[J]. 经济管理,2011(12):93-99.
[14] 张正堂,李欣. 高层管理团队核心成员薪酬差距与企业绩效的关系[J]. 经济管理,2007(2):16-25.
[15] Hambrick D C,Mason P A. Upper echelons[J]. Automatic Control & Computer Sciences,1984,41(1):39-43.
[16] Goel A M,Thakor A V. Overconfidence,CEO selection,and corporate governance[J]. Journal of Finance,2008,63(6):2737-2784.
[17] Holmstrom B,Tirole J. Transfer pricing and organizational form[J]. Journal of Law Economics & Organization,1991,7(2):201-228.
[18] Song Xue,Surjit Tinaikar. Product market competition and earnings management: some international evidence[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2009,15(3):78-85.
[19] 王化成,张修平,侯粲然,等. 企业战略差异与权益资本成本——基于经营风险和信息不对称的中介效应研究[J]. 中国软科学,2017(9):99-113.
[20] 殷治平,张兆国. 管理者任期、内部控制与战略差异[J]. 中国软科学,2016(12):132-143.
[21] 温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等.中介效应检验程度及其应用[J].心理学报,2004(5):614-620.
① 作为公司未来CEO的候选人,关键下属高管在投资决策时会更加注重公司的长期利益,而且CEO福利与公司现金流也极大程度受其努力程度的影响。因此,CEO在做出重要决策时也必须考虑他们的意见(Allen and Gale,2000)。
② 传统概念是指CEO与高管团队整体之间的“薪酬差距”。根据这个概念确定的变量,在不同公司之间缺乏一定的可比性(张正堂,2007),以致削弱检验结果的可靠性。
③ 张正堂和李欣(2007)认为应当以核心高管的薪酬作为度量基准,故而使用了排名前三的高管薪酬来估计“核心成员”的薪酬,亦存在着一定偏差。鉴于此,本文在构建该指标时纳入了“关键下属高管”的概念,以期提供更加准确的度量。
[2] 林浚清,黄祖辉,孙永祥. 高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J]. 经济研究,2003(4):31-40.
[3] 张正堂. 企业内部薪酬差距对组织未来绩效影响的实证研究[J]. 会计研究,2008(9):81-87.
[4] Tang J,Crossan M,Rowe W G. Dominant CEO,deviant strategy,and extreme performance:the moderating role of a powerful board[J]. Journal of Management Studies,2011,48(7):1479-1503.
[5] Hiller N J,Hambrick D C. Conceptualizing executive hubris:the role of (hyper-)core self-evaluations in strategic decision-making[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2010,26(4):297-319.
[6] Wei C,Yermack D. Investor reactions to CEOs' inside debt incentives[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(11):3813-3840.
[7] 诸波,干胜道. 市场竞争程度、经营战略与业绩评价指标选择[J]. 会计研究,2015(2):51-57.
[8] Lazear E P,Rosen S. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J]. Nber Working Papers,1981,89(5):841-864.
[9] 张瑞君,李小荣,许年行. 货币薪酬能激励高管承担风险吗[J]. 经济理论与经济管理,2013(8):84-100.
[10] 张兆国,刘亚伟,亓小林. 管理者背景特征、晋升激励与过度投资研究[J]. 南开管理评论,2013,16(4):32-42.
[11] 孔东民,徐茗丽,孔高文. 企业内部薪酬差距与创新[J]. 经济研究,2017(10):10-17.
[12] 黎文靖,胡玉明. 国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁?[J]. 经济研究,2012(12):125-136.
[13] 鲁海帆. 高管团队内薪酬差距、风险与公司业绩——基于锦标赛理论的实证研究[J]. 经济管理,2011(12):93-99.
[14] 张正堂,李欣. 高层管理团队核心成员薪酬差距与企业绩效的关系[J]. 经济管理,2007(2):16-25.
[15] Hambrick D C,Mason P A. Upper echelons[J]. Automatic Control & Computer Sciences,1984,41(1):39-43.
[16] Goel A M,Thakor A V. Overconfidence,CEO selection,and corporate governance[J]. Journal of Finance,2008,63(6):2737-2784.
[17] Holmstrom B,Tirole J. Transfer pricing and organizational form[J]. Journal of Law Economics & Organization,1991,7(2):201-228.
[18] Song Xue,Surjit Tinaikar. Product market competition and earnings management: some international evidence[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2009,15(3):78-85.
[19] 王化成,张修平,侯粲然,等. 企业战略差异与权益资本成本——基于经营风险和信息不对称的中介效应研究[J]. 中国软科学,2017(9):99-113.
[20] 殷治平,张兆国. 管理者任期、内部控制与战略差异[J]. 中国软科学,2016(12):132-143.
[21] 温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等.中介效应检验程度及其应用[J].心理学报,2004(5):614-620.
① 作为公司未来CEO的候选人,关键下属高管在投资决策时会更加注重公司的长期利益,而且CEO福利与公司现金流也极大程度受其努力程度的影响。因此,CEO在做出重要决策时也必须考虑他们的意见(Allen and Gale,2000)。
② 传统概念是指CEO与高管团队整体之间的“薪酬差距”。根据这个概念确定的变量,在不同公司之间缺乏一定的可比性(张正堂,2007),以致削弱检验结果的可靠性。
③ 张正堂和李欣(2007)认为应当以核心高管的薪酬作为度量基准,故而使用了排名前三的高管薪酬来估计“核心成员”的薪酬,亦存在着一定偏差。鉴于此,本文在构建该指标时纳入了“关键下属高管”的概念,以期提供更加准确的度量。
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