地方政府竞争、环境规制与绿色发展效率
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摘要
绿色发展效率是新时代中国特色社会主义经济转向高质量发展的重要衡量指标,政府主导的中国经济发展体制决定了地方政府竞争和环境规制是影响绿色发展效率的主要影响因素。文章在识别地方政府竞争、环境规制对于绿色发展效率的作用机制的基础上,基于2001—2015年中国30个省级区域面板数据,利用SBM-DEA方向性距离函数测算了包含能源消耗与非期望产出的2001—2015年省级区域绿色发展效率,并使用动态面板GMM模型进行了实证分析。结果显示:环境规制对于绿色发展效率的提高具有促进作用,环境规制对于保护环境、促进经济高质量发展,具有正向推动作用。地方政府竞争对绿色发展效率的提高具有抑制作用,地方政府间的经济赶超、官员的晋升激励,导致地方以破坏生态环境为代价更快地发展经济。地方政府竞争与环境规制的共同作用对于绿色发展效率的提高具有抑制作用,地方政府在发展经济与保护环境之间,更多地选择了更快发展经济,而忽视了经济发展的质量,破坏了生态环境。地方政府在经济赶超与环境规制之间的选择摇摆不定,导致地方政府的政策不具有持续性,进一步导致绿色发展效率在一个低水平上持续波动。东、中、西部地区均存在由于地方政府竞争所引致的环境规制力度不足,环境规制政策存在着波动性,进而抑制了绿色发展效率的提高。因此应当进一步完善地方政府官员的考核体系,引导建立起以高质量发展为导向的地方政府竞争制度,加强环境规制的力度,加强对企业技术创新的支持,鼓励企业发展绿色技术,提高绿色发展效率。
Green development efficiency is an important indicator for the transformation of socialist economy with Chinese characteristics into high-quality development in the new era. In the government-led Chinese economic development system,and environmental regulation are the determinants of the green development efficiency. Based on the recognition,as well as environmental regulation on green development efficiency,this paper used the SBM-DEA directional distance function to calculate the green development efficiency on panel data for 30 provinces in China over the period 2001-2015,including energy consumption and undesired output. In addition,an empirical analysis was carried out by using the dynamic panel GMM model. The results showed that environmental regulation had a positive effect on improving green development efficiency,protecting environment and promoting highquality development of economy; the competition among local governments had a retraining effect on improving green development efficiency; the economic surpassing among local governments and the promotion incentive of officials resulted in the outcome that local governments chased high-speed economic development at the cost of environment; the joint effect of competition among local governments and environmental regulation had a restraining effect on the improvement of green development efficiency. The local governments chose to chase high-speed economic development while neglecting the quality of economic development,and destroying the ecological environment. Moreover,the local governments vacillated between economic overtaking and environmental protection,leading to the unsustainability of local policies and caused continuous volatility of green development efficiency at a lower level. Insufficient force of environmental regulation caused by the competition among local governments existed in eastern,central and western regions in China,and environmental regulation policy had volatility,thus restraining the improvement of green development efficiency. Therefore,we should improve the assessment criteria of local government officials,guide the establishment of a competitive development-oriented local government system,strengthen the strength of environmental regulation,strengthen the support for technological innovation of enterprises,encourage enterprises to develop green technology and improve the efficiency of green development.
Green development efficiency is an important indicator for the transformation of socialist economy with Chinese characteristics into high-quality development in the new era. In the government-led Chinese economic development system,and environmental regulation are the determinants of the green development efficiency. Based on the recognition,as well as environmental regulation on green development efficiency,this paper used the SBM-DEA directional distance function to calculate the green development efficiency on panel data for 30 provinces in China over the period 2001-2015,including energy consumption and undesired output. In addition,an empirical analysis was carried out by using the dynamic panel GMM model. The results showed that environmental regulation had a positive effect on improving green development efficiency,protecting environment and promoting highquality development of economy; the competition among local governments had a retraining effect on improving green development efficiency; the economic surpassing among local governments and the promotion incentive of officials resulted in the outcome that local governments chased high-speed economic development at the cost of environment; the joint effect of competition among local governments and environmental regulation had a restraining effect on the improvement of green development efficiency. The local governments chose to chase high-speed economic development while neglecting the quality of economic development,and destroying the ecological environment. Moreover,the local governments vacillated between economic overtaking and environmental protection,leading to the unsustainability of local policies and caused continuous volatility of green development efficiency at a lower level. Insufficient force of environmental regulation caused by the competition among local governments existed in eastern,central and western regions in China,and environmental regulation policy had volatility,thus restraining the improvement of green development efficiency. Therefore,we should improve the assessment criteria of local government officials,guide the establishment of a competitive development-oriented local government system,strengthen the strength of environmental regulation,strengthen the support for technological innovation of enterprises,encourage enterprises to develop green technology and improve the efficiency of green development.
引文
[1]傅强,朱浩.中央政府主导下的地方政府竞争机制——解释中国经济增长的制度视角[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(1):19-30,138.
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[7]王文普.环境规制竞争对经济增长效率的影响:基于省级面板数据分析[J].当代财经,2011(9):22-34.
[8]黄万华,王娟,何立华,等.环境规制竞争对区域环境质量影响机理的博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2015(22):58-60.
[9]刘建民,陈霞,吴金光.财政分权、地方政府竞争与环境污染——基于272个城市数据的异质性与动态效应分析[J].财政研究,2015(9):36-43.
[10]张华.地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释[J].中国工业经济,2016(7):74-90.
[11]傅强,马青,SODNOMDARGIA B.地方政府竞争与环境规制:基于区域开放的异质性研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(3):69-75.
[12]钱争鸣,刘晓晨.环境管制与绿色经济效率[J].统计研究,2015,32(7):12-18.
[13]高志刚,尤济红.环境规制强度与中国全要素能源效率研究[J].经济社会体制比较,2015(6):111-123.
[14]张子龙,王开泳,陈兴鹏.中国生态效率演变与环境规制的关系——基于SBM模型和省际面板数据估计[J].经济经纬,2015,32(3):126-131.
[15]李胜兰,初善冰,申晨.地方政府竞争、环境规制与区域生态效率[J].世界经济,2014,37(4):88-110.
[16]王兵,黄人杰.中国区域绿色发展效率与绿色全要素生产率:2000-2010:基于参数共同边界的实证研究[J].产经评论,2014,5(1):16-35.
[17]李斌,彭星,欧阳铭珂.环境规制、绿色全要素生产率与中国工业发展方式转变——基于36个工业行业数据的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2013(4):56-68.
[18]韩晶,刘远,张新闻.市场化、环境规制与中国经济绿色增长[J].经济社会体制比较,2017(5):105-115.
[19]蔡乌赶,周小亮.中国环境规制对绿色全要素生产率的双重效应[J].经济学家,2017(9):27-35.
[20]李晓龙,徐鲲.地方政府竞争、环境质量与空间效应[J].软科学,2016,30(3):31-35.
[21]罗能生,王玉泽.财政分权、环境规制与区域生态效率——基于动态空间杜宾模型的实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(4):110-118.
[22]陈刚.FDI竞争、环境规制与污染避难所——对中国式分权的反思[J].世界经济研究,2009(6):3-7,43,87.
[23]李猛.中国环境破坏事件频发的成因与对策——基于区域间环境竞争的视角[J].财贸经济,2009(9):82-88.
[24]闫文娟.财政分权、政府竞争与环境治理投资[J].财贸研究,2012,23(5):91-97.
[25]王兵,刘光天.节能减排与中国绿色经济增长——基于全要素生产率的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(5):57-69.
[26]高彦彦,郑江淮,孙军.从城市偏向到城乡协调发展的政治经济逻辑[J].当代经济科学,2010,32(5):23-31,124.
[27]王娟茹,张渝.环境规制、绿色技术创新意愿与绿色技术创新行为[J].科学学研究,2018,36(2):352-360.
[28]杨俊,邵汉华,胡军.中国环境效率评价及其影响因素实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(2):49-55.
[29]涂正革.环境、资源与工业增长的协调性[J].经济研究,2008(2):93-105.
[30]张子龙,薛冰,陈兴鹏,李勇进.中国工业环境效率及其空间差异的收敛性[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(2):30-38.
[31]TONE K,SAHOO B K.Scale,indivisibilities and production function in data envelopment analysis[J].International journal of production economics,2003,84(2):165-192.
[32]单豪杰.中国资本存量K的再估算:1952-2006年[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2008,25(10):17-31.
[33]缪小林,王婷,高跃光.转移支付对城乡公共服务差距的影响——不同经济赶超省份的分组比较[J].经济研究,2017,52(2):52-66.
[2]刘志彪.为高质量发展而竞争:地方政府竞争问题的新解析[J].河海大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2018,20(2):1-6,89.
[3]张华.“绿色悖论”之谜:地方政府竞争视角的解读[J].财经研究,2014,40(12):114-127.
[4]HEYES A.Is environmental regulation bad for competition?a survey[J].Journal of regulatory economics,2009,36(1):1-28.
[5]PORTER M E,VAN D L C.Green and competitive:ending the statement[J].Harvard business review,1995,28(6):128-129.
[6]杨海生,陈少凌,周永章.地方政府竞争与环境政策——来自中国省份数据的证据[J].南方经济,2008(6):15-30.
[7]王文普.环境规制竞争对经济增长效率的影响:基于省级面板数据分析[J].当代财经,2011(9):22-34.
[8]黄万华,王娟,何立华,等.环境规制竞争对区域环境质量影响机理的博弈分析[J].统计与决策,2015(22):58-60.
[9]刘建民,陈霞,吴金光.财政分权、地方政府竞争与环境污染——基于272个城市数据的异质性与动态效应分析[J].财政研究,2015(9):36-43.
[10]张华.地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释[J].中国工业经济,2016(7):74-90.
[11]傅强,马青,SODNOMDARGIA B.地方政府竞争与环境规制:基于区域开放的异质性研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(3):69-75.
[12]钱争鸣,刘晓晨.环境管制与绿色经济效率[J].统计研究,2015,32(7):12-18.
[13]高志刚,尤济红.环境规制强度与中国全要素能源效率研究[J].经济社会体制比较,2015(6):111-123.
[14]张子龙,王开泳,陈兴鹏.中国生态效率演变与环境规制的关系——基于SBM模型和省际面板数据估计[J].经济经纬,2015,32(3):126-131.
[15]李胜兰,初善冰,申晨.地方政府竞争、环境规制与区域生态效率[J].世界经济,2014,37(4):88-110.
[16]王兵,黄人杰.中国区域绿色发展效率与绿色全要素生产率:2000-2010:基于参数共同边界的实证研究[J].产经评论,2014,5(1):16-35.
[17]李斌,彭星,欧阳铭珂.环境规制、绿色全要素生产率与中国工业发展方式转变——基于36个工业行业数据的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2013(4):56-68.
[18]韩晶,刘远,张新闻.市场化、环境规制与中国经济绿色增长[J].经济社会体制比较,2017(5):105-115.
[19]蔡乌赶,周小亮.中国环境规制对绿色全要素生产率的双重效应[J].经济学家,2017(9):27-35.
[20]李晓龙,徐鲲.地方政府竞争、环境质量与空间效应[J].软科学,2016,30(3):31-35.
[21]罗能生,王玉泽.财政分权、环境规制与区域生态效率——基于动态空间杜宾模型的实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(4):110-118.
[22]陈刚.FDI竞争、环境规制与污染避难所——对中国式分权的反思[J].世界经济研究,2009(6):3-7,43,87.
[23]李猛.中国环境破坏事件频发的成因与对策——基于区域间环境竞争的视角[J].财贸经济,2009(9):82-88.
[24]闫文娟.财政分权、政府竞争与环境治理投资[J].财贸研究,2012,23(5):91-97.
[25]王兵,刘光天.节能减排与中国绿色经济增长——基于全要素生产率的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(5):57-69.
[26]高彦彦,郑江淮,孙军.从城市偏向到城乡协调发展的政治经济逻辑[J].当代经济科学,2010,32(5):23-31,124.
[27]王娟茹,张渝.环境规制、绿色技术创新意愿与绿色技术创新行为[J].科学学研究,2018,36(2):352-360.
[28]杨俊,邵汉华,胡军.中国环境效率评价及其影响因素实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(2):49-55.
[29]涂正革.环境、资源与工业增长的协调性[J].经济研究,2008(2):93-105.
[30]张子龙,薛冰,陈兴鹏,李勇进.中国工业环境效率及其空间差异的收敛性[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(2):30-38.
[31]TONE K,SAHOO B K.Scale,indivisibilities and production function in data envelopment analysis[J].International journal of production economics,2003,84(2):165-192.
[32]单豪杰.中国资本存量K的再估算:1952-2006年[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2008,25(10):17-31.
[33]缪小林,王婷,高跃光.转移支付对城乡公共服务差距的影响——不同经济赶超省份的分组比较[J].经济研究,2017,52(2):52-66.
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