基于区域生态补偿的跨界污染治理微分对策研究
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摘要
近年来,以水域和大气等为代表的跨界污染问题层出不穷,在地区之间呈现出单向或交叉的外溢性。传统的行政手段已不是解决跨界污染问题的最为有效管理工具,急需建立一个由地方补偿为主,中央财政给予支持的横向生态补偿机制来弥补跨界治理合作中部分地区的治污损失,实现区域间发展权力的平衡。本文将跨界污染视为典型的区间外溢性公共物品,构建一个由生态补偿方和受偿方在有限时间内存在污染越界传输问题的微分对策模型。考虑补偿方依据受偿方治污投资力度的大小决定其补偿比例;探讨不同决策情形下双方反馈均衡策略、状态变量最优轨迹及其福利水平的动态变化情况;采用讨价还价模型设计出合理的福利分配机制;结合我国新安江流域生态补偿试点建设的应用和数值仿真方法,验证相关策略结果的合理性。研究发现:非合作博弈状态下受偿方的最优均衡策略对补偿方的策略选择具有重要影响;两种决策情形下治污投资累积量的动态变化趋势均呈现单调递减特性,而污染物存量的最优轨迹则呈现多样化的变动趋势;博弈参与主体的联合决策有助于促使双方分得的最优福利"帕累托"最优,且该福利净现值的大小与具体的分配协议有关。虽然科斯式的地区自愿协商策略被认为是解决跨界污染传输问题的有效途径之一,但实践中考虑到政策、信息及技术等因素的影响和制约,地区间相互独立的策略选择比联合决策在实践中更具普适性。因此,当区域间存在污染外溢时,如何有效发挥生态补偿机制作为协调补偿方与受偿方利益平衡的手段具有重要的现实意义。
In recent years,the transboundary pollution issues represented by water and air pollution have emerged in an endless stream,with unidirectional or crossed overflowing between regions. Traditional administrative measures are no longer one of the most effective management tools for solving transboundary pollution problems. It is urgent to establish a horizontal ecological compensation mechanism based on local compensation and supported by the central government,so as to make up the pollution control losses in partial regions in environmental cooperation and realize the balance of power among regions. This study treats transboundary pollution as a typical range of spillover public goods,then a differential game model for the pollution cross-border trousmissiou issue encompassed by one ecological compensation party and one compensated party within a limited time is constructed. Considering that the compensation party determines the compensation ratio based on the degree of pollution governance investments from the compensated party; the dynamic changes of feedback equilibrium strategies,the optimal trajectories of state variables,and the welfare level of two parties under different decision scenarios are discussed separately; then the bargaining model is adopted to design a reasonable welfare distribution mechanism; by combining the practical application of the ecological compensation pilot of Xin'an River Basin in China with numerical simulation methods,the rationality of the relevant strategy results is further verified. As indicated. As indicated in the results,in the state of independent decision-making,the optimal equilibrium strategy of the compensated region critically impacts the choice of the compensating region; the pollution accumulation investment are monotone decreasing in dynamic variation under both cases,and the optimal trajectory of pollutant accumulation presents a diversified trend; and the joint decision-making is able to promote the optimal value shared by both two game parties to reach Pareto optimality,and such net present value of the welfare is related to the specific distribution agreement. Although the Coase-style regional voluntary negotiation strategy is considered to be one of the effective ways to solve the transboundary pollution transmission problem,but in practice,taking into account the influence and constraints of policies,information,and technology,the independent strategic choices among regions are more universal than the joint decisions. Therefore,when there exists pollution spillover between regions,it is of great practical significance to give full play to the ecological compensation mechanism as a means in balancing the interests of the compensation and the compensated party.
In recent years,the transboundary pollution issues represented by water and air pollution have emerged in an endless stream,with unidirectional or crossed overflowing between regions. Traditional administrative measures are no longer one of the most effective management tools for solving transboundary pollution problems. It is urgent to establish a horizontal ecological compensation mechanism based on local compensation and supported by the central government,so as to make up the pollution control losses in partial regions in environmental cooperation and realize the balance of power among regions. This study treats transboundary pollution as a typical range of spillover public goods,then a differential game model for the pollution cross-border trousmissiou issue encompassed by one ecological compensation party and one compensated party within a limited time is constructed. Considering that the compensation party determines the compensation ratio based on the degree of pollution governance investments from the compensated party; the dynamic changes of feedback equilibrium strategies,the optimal trajectories of state variables,and the welfare level of two parties under different decision scenarios are discussed separately; then the bargaining model is adopted to design a reasonable welfare distribution mechanism; by combining the practical application of the ecological compensation pilot of Xin'an River Basin in China with numerical simulation methods,the rationality of the relevant strategy results is further verified. As indicated. As indicated in the results,in the state of independent decision-making,the optimal equilibrium strategy of the compensated region critically impacts the choice of the compensating region; the pollution accumulation investment are monotone decreasing in dynamic variation under both cases,and the optimal trajectory of pollutant accumulation presents a diversified trend; and the joint decision-making is able to promote the optimal value shared by both two game parties to reach Pareto optimality,and such net present value of the welfare is related to the specific distribution agreement. Although the Coase-style regional voluntary negotiation strategy is considered to be one of the effective ways to solve the transboundary pollution transmission problem,but in practice,taking into account the influence and constraints of policies,information,and technology,the independent strategic choices among regions are more universal than the joint decisions. Therefore,when there exists pollution spillover between regions,it is of great practical significance to give full play to the ecological compensation mechanism as a means in balancing the interests of the compensation and the compensated party.
引文
[1]黄策,王雯,刘蓉.中国地区间跨界污染治理的两阶段多边补偿机制研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(3):138-145.
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[9]YU B,XU L.Review of ecological compensation in hydropower development[J].Renewable and sustainable energy reviews,2016,55:729-738.
[10]胡震云,陈晨,王慧敏,等.水污染治理的微分博弈及策略研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(5):93-101.
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[12]LI S.Dynamic optimal control of pollution abatement investment under emission permits[J].Operations research letters,2016,44(3):348-353.
[13]BENCHEKROUN H,MARTN-HERRN G.The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game[J].European journal of operational research,2016,251(1):300-309.
[14]YEUNG D W K.Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution[J].Journal of optimization theory and applications,2007,134(1):143-160.
[15]JRGENSEN S,MARTN-HERRN G,ZACCOUR G.Dynamic games in the economics and management of pollution[J].Environmental modeling&assessment,2010,15(6):433-467.
[16]OUARDIGHI F E,SIM J E,KIM B.Pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain[J].European journal of operational research,2016,248(3):982-996.
[17]JRGENSEN S,ZACCOUR G.Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control[J].Automatica,2001,37(1):29-36.
[18]BRETON M L,ZACCOUR G,ZAHAF M.A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects[J].Automatica,2005,41(10):1737-1749.
[19]LI S.A differential game of transboundary industrial pollution with emission permits trading[J].Journal of optimization theory and applications,2014,163(2):642-659.
[20]YEUNG D W K,PETROSYAN L A.A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution[J].Automatica,2008,44(6):1532-1544.
[21]BRETON M,SOKRI A,ZACCOUR G.Incentive equilibrium in an overlapping-generations environmental game[J].European journal of operational research,2008,185(2):687-699.
[22]YEUNG D W K.A differential game of industrial pollution management[J].Annals of operations research,1992,37(1):297-311.
[23]RUBINSTEIN A.Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J].Econometrica,2010,50:97-109.
[2]李明全,王奇.基于双主体博弈的地方政府任期对区域环境合作稳定性影响研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(3):83-88.
[3]陶然,陆曦,苏福兵,等.地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思[J].经济研究,2009(7):21-33.
[4]STIGLER G J.Perfect competition,historically contemplated[J].Journal of political economy,1957,65(1):1-17.
[5]SILVA E C D,CAPLAN A J.Transboundary pollution control in federal systems[J].Journal of environmental economics and management,1997,34(2):173-186.
[6]BANZHAF H S,CHUPP B A.Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities:new results and an application to USair pollution[J].Journal of public economics,2012,96(5-6):449-464.
[7]MURADIAN R,CORBERA E,PASCUAL U,et al.Reconciling theory and practice:an alternative conceptual framework for understanding payments for environmental services[J].Ecological economics,2010,69(6):1202-1208.
[8]GUAN X,LIU W,CHEN M.Study on the ecological compensation standard for river basin water environment based on total pollutants control[J].Ecological indicators,2016,69:446-452.
[9]YU B,XU L.Review of ecological compensation in hydropower development[J].Renewable and sustainable energy reviews,2016,55:729-738.
[10]胡震云,陈晨,王慧敏,等.水污染治理的微分博弈及策略研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(5):93-101.
[11]DOCKNER E J,LONG N V.International pollution control:cooperative versus noncooperative strategies[J].Journal of environmental economics and management,1993,25(1):13-29.
[12]LI S.Dynamic optimal control of pollution abatement investment under emission permits[J].Operations research letters,2016,44(3):348-353.
[13]BENCHEKROUN H,MARTN-HERRN G.The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game[J].European journal of operational research,2016,251(1):300-309.
[14]YEUNG D W K.Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution[J].Journal of optimization theory and applications,2007,134(1):143-160.
[15]JRGENSEN S,MARTN-HERRN G,ZACCOUR G.Dynamic games in the economics and management of pollution[J].Environmental modeling&assessment,2010,15(6):433-467.
[16]OUARDIGHI F E,SIM J E,KIM B.Pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain[J].European journal of operational research,2016,248(3):982-996.
[17]JRGENSEN S,ZACCOUR G.Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control[J].Automatica,2001,37(1):29-36.
[18]BRETON M L,ZACCOUR G,ZAHAF M.A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects[J].Automatica,2005,41(10):1737-1749.
[19]LI S.A differential game of transboundary industrial pollution with emission permits trading[J].Journal of optimization theory and applications,2014,163(2):642-659.
[20]YEUNG D W K,PETROSYAN L A.A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution[J].Automatica,2008,44(6):1532-1544.
[21]BRETON M,SOKRI A,ZACCOUR G.Incentive equilibrium in an overlapping-generations environmental game[J].European journal of operational research,2008,185(2):687-699.
[22]YEUNG D W K.A differential game of industrial pollution management[J].Annals of operations research,1992,37(1):297-311.
[23]RUBINSTEIN A.Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J].Econometrica,2010,50:97-109.
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