预算软约束下地方政府财政支出竞争策略的空间经济效应

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英文篇名：Spatial Economic Effects of Local Government Expenditure Competition Strategy under the Background of Budget Soft Constraint 作者：李承怡 英文作者：LI Chengyi;Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences; 关键词：财政支出竞争 ; 地方政府 ; 预算软约束 ; 要素流动 ; 财政分权 ; 资源错配 英文关键词：government expenditure competition;;local government;;budget soft constraint;;factor flow;;fiscal decentralization;;misallocation of resources 中文刊名：经济地理 英文刊名：Economic Geography 机构：中国财政科学研究院; 出版日期：2019-09-26 出版单位：经济地理 年：2019 期：09 基金：国家自然科学基金项目(71873045) 语种：中文; 页：26-32 页数：7 CN：43-1126/K ISSN：1000-8462 分类号：F812.45

摘要

财政支出竞争作为地方政府争夺要素资源的主要方式之一,一方面有效地促进地方经济的快速发展,但另一方面也造成要素资源空间配置效率的损失。文章构建一个软预算约束条件下的地方政府间财政支出竞争模型,并基于2009—2017年的省级面板数据,运用空间杜宾模型实证分析不同类型财政支出竞争策略的空间经济效应。研究发现:公共投资与公共服务两类支出均能吸引资本等要素的流入,因而各地区表现出财政支出的"逐底竞争"。其中,公共投资竞争策略相较于公共服务策略,对资本要素的吸引力更强,这也是造成我国地方政府财政支出"重基建、轻民生"的结构扭曲的原因之一。
        Government expenditure competition is a major way for local governments to compete for factor resources. On the one hand, it has effectively promoted the rapid growth of local economy, but on the other hand, it has also caused the loss of efficiency in the spatial allocation of factor resources. This paper constructs the expenditure competition model among the local governments from the perspective of budget soft constraints, and empirically analyzes the spatial economic effects of different types of government expenditure competition strategies applying the Spatial Durbin Model based on the provincial panel data from 2009 to 2017. The study finds that both public investment and public service expenditures can attract the inflow of capital and other factors, so each region shows a "race-to-bottom competition" on government expenditure. Moreover, compared with the public service, the public investment competition strategy is more attractive to capital inflow, which explain the reasons for the structural distortion of "emphasizing infrastructure and neglecting people's livelihood" of local government expenditure.

引文

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