怀疑论视域下的日常语言与文学语言——斯坦利·卡维尔论语言的“在地性”与“生活形式”
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摘要
20世纪"语言学转向"之下的"语言学模式"与"逻辑学模式"对于认识的"直观"基础存在着根本性争议。斯坦利·卡维尔在日常语言分析中通过对怀疑论视角的批判与吸纳,超越了两种模式的直接对立,并通过"在地性""标准"(Criteria)与"一般对象"(generic object)等概念阐明了一种由先验的"生活形式"奠基的日常语言与日常理性。一方面指出了怀疑论的"乞题"本性,另一方面也主动地将怀疑论作为对外部权威的免疫因素吸纳进日常语言的原则当中,使得日常成为一种鲜明的自主性与革命性的理性范畴。以此为基础,他进一步揭示出文学语言何以使得文学写作成为一种极致而决然的对于自我与外部世界的反思活动。
引文
(1)安托尼亚·苏莱:《1935年和1937年巴黎会议对维也纳学派的接受,或“纽拉特风格”》,米歇尔·比特博尔、让·伽永编:《法国认识论1830-1970》,北京:商务印书馆,2011年,第31页。
(2)康德:《任何一种能够作为科学出现的未来形而上学导论》,北京:商务印书馆,1997年,第43页。
(3)卡勒:《结构主义诗学》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1991年,第16页。
(1)卡勒:《结构主义诗学》,第51页。
(2)Paul Guyer,Kant and the Claims of Knowledge,New York:Cambridge University Press,1987,p.352.
(3)Stanley Cavell,Themes Out of School,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1988,pp.209-210.
(4)Benson Mates,On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language,Inquiry,vol.1,no.1,1958,p.162.
(5)赖尔:《心的概念》,北京:商务印书馆,1992年,第22页。
(6)赖尔:《心的概念》,第73页。
(7)Benson Mates,On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary language,Inquiry,vol.1,no.1,1958,p.170.
(1)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,New York:Cambridge University Press,2000,pp.4-6.
(2)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,p.7.
(3)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,pp.13-14.
(4)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,pp.9-10.
(5)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,p.20.
(1)George Picher,The Philosophy of Wittgenstein,NJ:Prentice Hall,1964,p.252.
(2)Donald Gustafson,On Pitcher's Account of Investigations§43,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,vol.28,no.2,1967,pp.253-254.
(3)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,New York:Oxford University Press,1999,p.172.
(4)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.172.
(5)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.178.
(1)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.27.
(2)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.14.
(3)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.29.
(4)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.30.
(1)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.45.
(2)J.L.Austin,Philosophy Passage,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1979,p.84.
(3)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.52.
(4)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.53.
(1)Stanley Cavell,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1990,p.44.
(2)Stanley Cavell,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism,p.45.
(3)Stanley Cavell,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism,p.47.
(4)Stanley Cavell,The Sense of Walden,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992,p.64.
(5)Stanley Cavell,The Sense of Walden,p.8.
(6)Stanley Cavell,The Sense of Walden,p.11.
(1)享利·戴维·梭罗著,杰弗里·S.克莱默注:《瓦尔登湖》,杜先菊译,上海:华东师范大学出版社,2015年,第95页。
(2)Stanley Cavell,The Sense of Walden,p.15.
(3)Russell B.Goodman(ed),Contending with Stanley Cavell.New York:Oxford University Press,2005,p.3.
(4)Rosine Kelz,The Non-sovereign Self,Responsibility,and Otherness:Hannah Arendt,Judith Butler,and Stanley Cavell on Moral Philosophy and Political Agency,Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan,2016,p.65.
(5)Peter Dula,Cavell,Companionship,and Christian Theology,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.163.
(2)康德:《任何一种能够作为科学出现的未来形而上学导论》,北京:商务印书馆,1997年,第43页。
(3)卡勒:《结构主义诗学》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1991年,第16页。
(1)卡勒:《结构主义诗学》,第51页。
(2)Paul Guyer,Kant and the Claims of Knowledge,New York:Cambridge University Press,1987,p.352.
(3)Stanley Cavell,Themes Out of School,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1988,pp.209-210.
(4)Benson Mates,On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language,Inquiry,vol.1,no.1,1958,p.162.
(5)赖尔:《心的概念》,北京:商务印书馆,1992年,第22页。
(6)赖尔:《心的概念》,第73页。
(7)Benson Mates,On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary language,Inquiry,vol.1,no.1,1958,p.170.
(1)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,New York:Cambridge University Press,2000,pp.4-6.
(2)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,p.7.
(3)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,pp.13-14.
(4)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,pp.9-10.
(5)Stanley Cavell,Must We Mean What We Say,p.20.
(1)George Picher,The Philosophy of Wittgenstein,NJ:Prentice Hall,1964,p.252.
(2)Donald Gustafson,On Pitcher's Account of Investigations§43,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,vol.28,no.2,1967,pp.253-254.
(3)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,New York:Oxford University Press,1999,p.172.
(4)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.172.
(5)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.178.
(1)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.27.
(2)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.14.
(3)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.29.
(4)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.30.
(1)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.45.
(2)J.L.Austin,Philosophy Passage,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1979,p.84.
(3)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.52.
(4)Stanley Cavell,The Claim of Reason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,and Tragedy,p.53.
(1)Stanley Cavell,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1990,p.44.
(2)Stanley Cavell,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism,p.45.
(3)Stanley Cavell,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism,p.47.
(4)Stanley Cavell,The Sense of Walden,Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992,p.64.
(5)Stanley Cavell,The Sense of Walden,p.8.
(6)Stanley Cavell,The Sense of Walden,p.11.
(1)享利·戴维·梭罗著,杰弗里·S.克莱默注:《瓦尔登湖》,杜先菊译,上海:华东师范大学出版社,2015年,第95页。
(2)Stanley Cavell,The Sense of Walden,p.15.
(3)Russell B.Goodman(ed),Contending with Stanley Cavell.New York:Oxford University Press,2005,p.3.
(4)Rosine Kelz,The Non-sovereign Self,Responsibility,and Otherness:Hannah Arendt,Judith Butler,and Stanley Cavell on Moral Philosophy and Political Agency,Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan,2016,p.65.
(5)Peter Dula,Cavell,Companionship,and Christian Theology,New York:Oxford University Press,2011,p.163.