乡土情结的环境治理效应——基于官员异质性视角的实证考察
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摘要
环境污染是制约中国经济高质量发展的关键因素,已有研究更多关注的是规制政策效果,忽略了政策执行力的经济影响。在收集、整理地方官员特征及排污费数据的基础上,实证分析官员特征与环境治理力度之间的关联。研究发现,当省长为"本地"人时,地区排污费征收力度有加大的趋势,并且这一趋势在欠发达地区表现更为明显。考虑变量衡量误差等问题之后,相应研究结论依旧成立。由此认为,为了改善地区环境质量,中国政府在加强规制部门独立性之余,可以适度利用乡土情结等非正式制度的影响,铸就"绿水青山"中国梦。
Environmental pollution is a key factor restricting the high-quality development of China's economy. Research has paid more attention to the effects of regulatory policies and ignored the economic impact of policy implementation. Based on the collection of local officials' characteristics and pollutant discharge fees,this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between official characteristics and environmental governance. The study shows that when the governor is a "local"person,the levying force of pollutant discharge fees of the region tends to be increased,and this trend is more obvious in underdeveloped areas. By taking variables error and other factors into consideration,the corresponding research conclusions are still valid. Therefore,in order to improve the environmental quality of the region,Chinese government can use the impacts of informal system appropriately while strengthening the independence of regulation departments,so as to build the Chinese dream of "green mountains and clear waters".
Environmental pollution is a key factor restricting the high-quality development of China's economy. Research has paid more attention to the effects of regulatory policies and ignored the economic impact of policy implementation. Based on the collection of local officials' characteristics and pollutant discharge fees,this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between official characteristics and environmental governance. The study shows that when the governor is a "local"person,the levying force of pollutant discharge fees of the region tends to be increased,and this trend is more obvious in underdeveloped areas. By taking variables error and other factors into consideration,the corresponding research conclusions are still valid. Therefore,in order to improve the environmental quality of the region,Chinese government can use the impacts of informal system appropriately while strengthening the independence of regulation departments,so as to build the Chinese dream of "green mountains and clear waters".
引文
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[23]高翔,龙小宁.省级行政区划造成的文化分割会影响区域经济吗?[J].经济学(季刊),2016,(1):647-674.
[24] Hansen B E. Threshold Effects in Non-dynamic Panels:Estimation,Testing,and Inference[J]. Journal of Econometrics,1999,93(2):345-368.
[25] Hansen B E. Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation[J]. Econometrica,2000,68(3):575-603.
[2]刘郁,陈钊.中国的环境规制:政策及其成效[J].经济社会体制比较,2016,(1):164-173.
[3]韩超,刘鑫颖,王海.规制官员激励与行为偏好——独立性缺失下环境规制失效新解[J].管理世界,2016,(2):82-94.
[4]王海,许冠南.政策协同、官员更替与企业创新——来自战略性新兴产业政策文本的经验证据[J].财经问题研究,2017,(1):33-40.
[5]钱先航,曹廷求,李维安.晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为[J].经济研究,2011,(12):72-85.
[6]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[7]孙晓梅,田文静.我国注册会计师审计失败与独立性缺失分析——基于证监会处罚报告的思考[J].经济问题探索,2009,(7):58-64.
[8]王海.乡土情结与企业创新[Z].大连:东北财经大学工作论文,2017.
[9]张昌荣,陈晗婧.中国人情社会与官员腐败的治理[C].北京:中国犯罪学学会年会论文集,2014.
[10] Allen F,Qian j,Qian M. Law,Finance,and Economic Growth in China[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[11]张海钟,姜永志.和谐社会建设视野的中国区域文化心理差异研究[J].理论研究,2010,(3):19
[12]戴亦一,肖金利,潘越.“乡音”能否降低公司代理成本?——基于方言视角的研究[J].经济研究,2016,(12):147-160,186.
[13]张平,赵国昌,罗知.中央官员来源与地方经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),2012,(2):613-634.
[14]范子英,李欣.部长的政治关联效应与财政转移支付分配[J].经济研究,2014,(6):129-141.
[15]范子英,彭飞,刘冲.政治关联与经济增长——基于卫星灯光数据的研究[J].经济研究,2016,(1):114-126.
[16]王贤彬,徐现祥,李郇.地方官员更替与经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),2009,(3):1301-1328.
[17]郑思齐,万广华,孙伟增,等.公众诉求与城市环境治理[J].管理世界,2013,(6):72-84.
[18] Lin L. Enforcement of Pollution Levies in China[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2013,(98):32-43.
[19] Wang H. Pollution Regulation and Abatement Efforts:Evidence From China[J]. Ecological Economics,2002,41(1):85-94.
[20] Wang H,Wheeler D. Financial Incentives and Endogenous Enforcement in China’s Pollution Levy System[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2005,49(1):174-196.
[21]刘毓芸,徐现祥,肖泽凯.劳动力跨方言流动的倒U型模式[J].经济研究,2015,(10):134-146.
[22]徐现祥,刘毓芸,肖泽凯.方言与经济增长[J].经济学报,2015,(2):1-32.
[23]高翔,龙小宁.省级行政区划造成的文化分割会影响区域经济吗?[J].经济学(季刊),2016,(1):647-674.
[24] Hansen B E. Threshold Effects in Non-dynamic Panels:Estimation,Testing,and Inference[J]. Journal of Econometrics,1999,93(2):345-368.
[25] Hansen B E. Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation[J]. Econometrica,2000,68(3):575-603.
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