财政分权、地方政府激励与环境污染——基于省级动态面板模型分析
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摘要
论文利用2007年—2015年28个省份动态面板数据和GMM估计法对财政分权与环境污染之间关系进行探讨。结果发现,首先,财政分权对环境污染的影响同时受到地方政府生产性支出激励和服务性支出激励的影响,在生产性支出激励下,财政分权与环境污染呈正相关,在服务性支出激励下,财政分权与环境污染呈负相关;其次,整体上财政分权与环境污染呈现正相关关系,财政分权度越高,环境污染越严重;再次,东部、中部和西部在整体上财政分权都对环境污染有正向作用,但每个地区的大小不一样;最后,在服务性支出激励小于生产性支出的激励下,中央政府转移支付会强化地方政府生产性支出偏向行为,从而加剧环境污染。为此,论文提出,财政分权不必然会加剧环境污染,要从根本上解决环境污染,应从对地方政府的激励约束入手,逐步提高地方政府绩效考核中环境因素所占比例,同时适度增加辖区居民对本地公共事务的参与度,进而增加地方政府服务性支出激励,改变其支出偏向行为和加速发展方式的转变,实现经济增长与环境治理的双重目标。
Using the dynamic panel data of 28 provinces from 2007 to 2015 and GMM estimation methods, this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution and come to four conclusions. First, the impacts of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution is influenced by local government's productive expenditures incentives and service expenditures incentives at the same time. Under the stimulation of productive expenditures, fiscal decentralization is positively correlated with environmental pollution, but under the incentive of service expenditures, fiscal decentralization is negatively correlated to environmental pollution. Secondly, there is a positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution overall, the degree of fiscal decentralization is higher, the environmental pollution is more serious. Thirdly, in the east, central and west, fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on environmental pollution as a whole, but the magnitude is different. Fourth, because of the less incentives for service expenditure incentives, central government transfer payments will reinforce the local government's productive expenditures, and exacerbate environmentalpollution. Therefore, the essay proposes that fiscal decentralization will not exacerbate environmental pollution. To solve environmental pollution fundamentally, it is necessary to increase the proportion of environmental factors in local government performance appraisal gradually. In the same time, residents' participation in local public affairs will increase local government service expenditure incentives and change the local government' biased behavior, and accelerate the changes of their development methods.
Using the dynamic panel data of 28 provinces from 2007 to 2015 and GMM estimation methods, this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution and come to four conclusions. First, the impacts of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution is influenced by local government's productive expenditures incentives and service expenditures incentives at the same time. Under the stimulation of productive expenditures, fiscal decentralization is positively correlated with environmental pollution, but under the incentive of service expenditures, fiscal decentralization is negatively correlated to environmental pollution. Secondly, there is a positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution overall, the degree of fiscal decentralization is higher, the environmental pollution is more serious. Thirdly, in the east, central and west, fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on environmental pollution as a whole, but the magnitude is different. Fourth, because of the less incentives for service expenditure incentives, central government transfer payments will reinforce the local government's productive expenditures, and exacerbate environmentalpollution. Therefore, the essay proposes that fiscal decentralization will not exacerbate environmental pollution. To solve environmental pollution fundamentally, it is necessary to increase the proportion of environmental factors in local government performance appraisal gradually. In the same time, residents' participation in local public affairs will increase local government service expenditure incentives and change the local government' biased behavior, and accelerate the changes of their development methods.
引文
[1]王敏,黄滢.中国的环境污染与经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),2015(2):557-578.
[2]郭志仪,郑周胜.财政分权、晋升激励与环境污染:基于1997-2010年省级面板数据分析[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2013(3):103-107.
[3]TIEBOUT C M.A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures[J].Journal of Political Economy,1956,64(5):416-424.
[4]郑周胜,黄慧婷.地方政府行为与环境污染的空间面板分析[J].统计与信息论坛,2011(10):52-57.
[5]闫文娟,钟茂初.中国式财政分权会增加环境污染吗[J].财经论丛,2012(5):32-37.
[6]薛钢,潘孝珍.财政分权对中国环境污染影响程度的实证分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012(1):77-83.
[7]郑洁,付才辉,张彩虹.财政分权与环境污染--基于新结构经济学视角[J].财政研究,2018(3):57-70.
[8]周靖,胡秋红.对外开放、财政分权与中国环境污染[J].江汉论坛,2018(3):45-50.
[9]韩国高,张超.财政分权和晋升激励对城市环境污染的影响--兼论绿色考核对我国环境治理的重要性[J].城市问题,2018(2):25-35.
[10]蔡昉,都阳,王美艳.经济发展方式转变与节能减排内在动力[J].经济研究,2008(6):4-10.
[11]尹恒,朱虹.县级财政生产性支出偏向研究[J].中国社会科学,2011(1):89-101.
[12]谢芬,肖育才.财政分权、地方政府行为与基本公共服务均等化[J].财政研究,2013(11):2-6.
[13]后小仙,郑田丹.晋升激励、政府偏好与区域经济增长[J].财贸研究,2016(4):68-100.
[14]刘建民,王蓓,陈霞.财政分权对环境污染的非线性效应研究--基于中国272个地级市面板数据的PSTR模型分析[J].经济学动态,2015(3):82-89.
[15]谭志雄,张阳阳.财政分权与环境污染关系实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(4):110-117.
[16]张欣怡.财政分权下地方政府行为与环境污染问题研究--基于我国省级面板数据的分析[J].经济问题探索,2015(3):32-41.
[17]ARELLANO M,BOND S.Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data:Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations[J].Review of Economic Studies,1991(2):277-297.
[18]李群峰.动态面板数据模型的GMM估计及其应用[J].统计与决策,2010(16):161-163.
[19]张晏,龚六堂.分税制改革、财政分权与中国经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),2005(1):75-107.
[20]傅勇.财政分权、政府治理与非经济性公共物品供给[J].经济研究,2010(8):4-15.
[21]林春.财政分权与中国经济增长质量关系--基于全要素生产率视角[J].财政研究,2017(4):73-97.
[22]GROSSMAN G M,KRUEGER A B.Economic Growth and the Environment[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,110(2):353-377.
[23]范丽红,李芸达,程呈.财政分权视角下经济增长与环境保护协调发展研究[J].经济纵横,2015(6):59-62.
[24]李香菊,刘浩.区域差异视角下财政分权与地方环境污染治理的困境研究--基于污染物外溢性属性分析[J].财贸经济,2016(2):41-54.
[25]步丹璐,石翔燕,狄灵瑜.晋升压力、资本市场效率与产能过剩[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2017(1):8-18.
[26]李猛.财政分权与环境污染--对环境库兹涅茨假说的修正[J].经济评论,2009(5):54-59.
[2]郭志仪,郑周胜.财政分权、晋升激励与环境污染:基于1997-2010年省级面板数据分析[J].西南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2013(3):103-107.
[3]TIEBOUT C M.A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures[J].Journal of Political Economy,1956,64(5):416-424.
[4]郑周胜,黄慧婷.地方政府行为与环境污染的空间面板分析[J].统计与信息论坛,2011(10):52-57.
[5]闫文娟,钟茂初.中国式财政分权会增加环境污染吗[J].财经论丛,2012(5):32-37.
[6]薛钢,潘孝珍.财政分权对中国环境污染影响程度的实证分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012(1):77-83.
[7]郑洁,付才辉,张彩虹.财政分权与环境污染--基于新结构经济学视角[J].财政研究,2018(3):57-70.
[8]周靖,胡秋红.对外开放、财政分权与中国环境污染[J].江汉论坛,2018(3):45-50.
[9]韩国高,张超.财政分权和晋升激励对城市环境污染的影响--兼论绿色考核对我国环境治理的重要性[J].城市问题,2018(2):25-35.
[10]蔡昉,都阳,王美艳.经济发展方式转变与节能减排内在动力[J].经济研究,2008(6):4-10.
[11]尹恒,朱虹.县级财政生产性支出偏向研究[J].中国社会科学,2011(1):89-101.
[12]谢芬,肖育才.财政分权、地方政府行为与基本公共服务均等化[J].财政研究,2013(11):2-6.
[13]后小仙,郑田丹.晋升激励、政府偏好与区域经济增长[J].财贸研究,2016(4):68-100.
[14]刘建民,王蓓,陈霞.财政分权对环境污染的非线性效应研究--基于中国272个地级市面板数据的PSTR模型分析[J].经济学动态,2015(3):82-89.
[15]谭志雄,张阳阳.财政分权与环境污染关系实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(4):110-117.
[16]张欣怡.财政分权下地方政府行为与环境污染问题研究--基于我国省级面板数据的分析[J].经济问题探索,2015(3):32-41.
[17]ARELLANO M,BOND S.Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data:Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations[J].Review of Economic Studies,1991(2):277-297.
[18]李群峰.动态面板数据模型的GMM估计及其应用[J].统计与决策,2010(16):161-163.
[19]张晏,龚六堂.分税制改革、财政分权与中国经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),2005(1):75-107.
[20]傅勇.财政分权、政府治理与非经济性公共物品供给[J].经济研究,2010(8):4-15.
[21]林春.财政分权与中国经济增长质量关系--基于全要素生产率视角[J].财政研究,2017(4):73-97.
[22]GROSSMAN G M,KRUEGER A B.Economic Growth and the Environment[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1995,110(2):353-377.
[23]范丽红,李芸达,程呈.财政分权视角下经济增长与环境保护协调发展研究[J].经济纵横,2015(6):59-62.
[24]李香菊,刘浩.区域差异视角下财政分权与地方环境污染治理的困境研究--基于污染物外溢性属性分析[J].财贸经济,2016(2):41-54.
[25]步丹璐,石翔燕,狄灵瑜.晋升压力、资本市场效率与产能过剩[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2017(1):8-18.
[26]李猛.财政分权与环境污染--对环境库兹涅茨假说的修正[J].经济评论,2009(5):54-59.