跨区域森林生态补偿的演化博弈分析——基于主体功能区的视角
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摘要
新常态下,我国的森林生态环境承载力已经达到或接近上限,森林资源存在乱砍乱伐现象和林区政府监管乏力问题,究其根源是缺乏森林保护和补偿的驱动机制。在中央政府投入大量物力和财力的同时,其他利益相关主体却存在不同利益诉求和行为导向冲突,跨区域森林生态补偿难以实现,因此利用演化博弈模型厘清森林生态环境保护与补偿行动中保护主体、受益主体和中央政府的关系,有助于突破跨区域森林生态保护补偿困境,形成良好的行动机制。分析主体功能区利益群体逻辑关系的基础上,构建保护地区政府和受益地区政府的演化博弈模型,分别研究未引入"约束-激励"机制和引入"约束-激励"机制下的主体行为特征及其影响因素,剖析不同情形地方政府间的博弈决策行为。研究结果表明,在未引入中央政府"约束-激励"机制的情况下,跨区域生态补偿无法实现,保护地区政府会通过权衡保护森林资源收益和机会成本进行策略选择,当保护森林资源的净收益为正时,即使没有受益地区生态补偿,保护地区政府仍然有足够的激励保护森林资源,当保护森林资源的净收益为负时,两类政府群体容易陷入森林生态治理的"囚徒困境",而"约束-激励"机制的引入可以实现森林生态保护补偿的帕累托改进,通过中央政府惩罚、奖励金额的限制能够实现最优稳定均衡策略。
Under the new normal, China′s forest ecological environment bearing capacity has reached to the upper limit. Forest resources have the problem of suffer from deforestation and a lack of government supervision caused by the lack of a driving mechanism for forest protection and compensation. Although the central government has invested considerable resources, other stakeholders have different interests, which leads to conflict. Cross-regional forest ecological compensation is difficult to realize. However, the evolutionary game model can be used to clarify the relationship between the protective body, the beneficiary subject, and the central government for the protection and compensation of forest ecological environments. This will aid in breaking through the dilemma of ecological protection and compensation and forming effective action mechanisms. In the present study, we developed an evolutionary game model representing the interactions between the protecting regional government and the benefiting regional government based on an analysis of the logical relationships between interest groups in functional areas. We analyzed the game decision-making behavior among local governments under different scenarios with and without the "constraint-motivation" mechanism. The results indicated that cross-regional ecological compensation cannot be achieved without the introduction of the central government′s "restriction-incentive" mechanism. In the scenario without the restriction-incentive mechanism, the protecting government chose its strategy by comparing the income from and cost of protecting forest resources. When the net income from protecting forest resources is positive, the regional government still has sufficient incentive to protect forest resources, even if there is no ecological compensation. When the net income of protecting forest resources is negative, the two government groups are likely to fall into the Prisoner′s Dilemma of regulatory strategies. The introduction of the "restriction-incentive" mechanism can realize Pareto efficiency of forest ecological protection compensation, and an optimal stable equilibrium strategy can be achieved through the limitation of punishments and rewards from the central government.
Under the new normal, China′s forest ecological environment bearing capacity has reached to the upper limit. Forest resources have the problem of suffer from deforestation and a lack of government supervision caused by the lack of a driving mechanism for forest protection and compensation. Although the central government has invested considerable resources, other stakeholders have different interests, which leads to conflict. Cross-regional forest ecological compensation is difficult to realize. However, the evolutionary game model can be used to clarify the relationship between the protective body, the beneficiary subject, and the central government for the protection and compensation of forest ecological environments. This will aid in breaking through the dilemma of ecological protection and compensation and forming effective action mechanisms. In the present study, we developed an evolutionary game model representing the interactions between the protecting regional government and the benefiting regional government based on an analysis of the logical relationships between interest groups in functional areas. We analyzed the game decision-making behavior among local governments under different scenarios with and without the "constraint-motivation" mechanism. The results indicated that cross-regional ecological compensation cannot be achieved without the introduction of the central government′s "restriction-incentive" mechanism. In the scenario without the restriction-incentive mechanism, the protecting government chose its strategy by comparing the income from and cost of protecting forest resources. When the net income from protecting forest resources is positive, the regional government still has sufficient incentive to protect forest resources, even if there is no ecological compensation. When the net income of protecting forest resources is negative, the two government groups are likely to fall into the Prisoner′s Dilemma of regulatory strategies. The introduction of the "restriction-incentive" mechanism can realize Pareto efficiency of forest ecological protection compensation, and an optimal stable equilibrium strategy can be achieved through the limitation of punishments and rewards from the central government.
引文
[1] Costanza R,Groot R D,Sutton P,van der Ploeg S,Anderson S J,Kubiszewski I,Farber S,Turner R K.Changes in the global value of ecosystem services.Global Environmental Change,2014,26:152- 158.
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[5] 许玲燕,杜建国,汪文丽.农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析.中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(5):17- 26.
[6] 胡振通,孔德帅,靳乐山.草原生态补偿:弱监管下的博弈分析.农业经济问题,2016,37(1):95- 102.
[7] 曲富国,孙宇飞.基于政府间博弈的流域生态补偿机制研究.中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(11):83- 88.
[8] 张彰.生态功能区财政补偿资金来源负担归属研究——基于微观经济学的博弈分析.中央财经大学学报,2016,(11):19- 27.
[9] 黄凯南.主观博弈论与制度内生演化.经济研究,2010,45(4):134- 146.
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[12] 胡振华,刘景月,钟美瑞,洪开荣.基于演化博弈的跨界流域生态补偿利益均衡分析——以漓江流域为例.经济地理,2016,36(6):42- 49.
[13] 李昌峰,张娈英,赵广川,莫李娟.基于演化博弈理论的流域生态补偿研究——以太湖流域为例.中国人口资源与环境,2014,24(1):171- 176.
[14] 宗鑫,赵龙,王光耀,韦惠兰.生态补偿的复制动态及其进化稳定策略研究——以黄河流域上游青藏高原区为分析背景.干旱区资源与环境,2016,30(9):32- 37.
[15] Jones L,Norton L,Austin Z,Browne A L,Donovan D,Emmett B A,Grabowski Z J,Howard D C,Jones J P G,Kenter J O,Manley W,Morris C,Robinson D A,Short C,Siriwardena G M,Stevens C J,Storkey J,Waters R D,Willis G F.Stocks and flows of natural and human-derived capital in ecosystem services.Land Use Policy,2016,52:151- 162.
[16] B?sch M,Elsasser P,Franz K,Lorenz M,Moning C,Olschewski R,R?dl A,Schneider H,Schr?ppel B,Weller P.Forest ecosystem services in rural areas of Germany:Insights from the national TEEB study.Ecosystem Services,2018,31:77- 83.
[17] 温薇,田国双.生态文明时代的跨区域生态补偿协调机制研究.经济问题,2017,(5):84- 88.
[18] 尹振东,汤玉刚.专项转移支付与地方财政支出行为——以农村义务教育补助为例.经济研究,2016,51(4):47- 59.
[19] 李涛,刘思玥.分权体制下辖区竞争、策略性财政政策对雾霾污染治理的影响.中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(6):120- 129.
[20] 潘峰,西宝,王琳.地方政府间环境规制策略的演化博弈分析.中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(6):97- 102.
[21] 廖晓慧,李松森.完善主体功能区生态补偿财政转移支付制度研究.经济纵横,2016,(1):108- 113.
[22] 彭皓玥.公众权益与跨区域生态规制策略研究——相邻地方政府间的演化博弈行为分析.科技进步与对策,2016,33(7):42- 47.
[23] 郑洁,付才辉,张彩虹.财政分权与环境污染——基于新结构经济学视角.财政研究,2018,(3):57- 70.
[2] 伏润民,缪小林.中国生态功能区财政转移支付制度体系重构——基于拓展的能值模型衡量的生态外溢价值.经济研究,2015,50(3):47- 61.
[3] Lu H F,Campbell E T,Campbell D E,Wang C W,Ren H.Dynamics of ecosystem services provided by subtropical forests in Southeast China during succession as measured by donor and receiver value.Ecosystem Services,2017,23:248- 258.
[4] 姜珂,游达明.基于央地分权视角的环境规制策略演化博弈分析.中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(9):139- 148.
[5] 许玲燕,杜建国,汪文丽.农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析.中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(5):17- 26.
[6] 胡振通,孔德帅,靳乐山.草原生态补偿:弱监管下的博弈分析.农业经济问题,2016,37(1):95- 102.
[7] 曲富国,孙宇飞.基于政府间博弈的流域生态补偿机制研究.中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(11):83- 88.
[8] 张彰.生态功能区财政补偿资金来源负担归属研究——基于微观经济学的博弈分析.中央财经大学学报,2016,(11):19- 27.
[9] 黄凯南.主观博弈论与制度内生演化.经济研究,2010,45(4):134- 146.
[10] Sheng J C,Wu Y,Zhang M Y,Miao Z.An evolutionary modeling approach for designing a contractual REDD+ payment scheme.Ecological Indicators,2017,79:276- 285.
[11] Li F,Pan B,Wu Y Z,Shan L P.Application of game model for stakeholder management in construction of ecological corridors:A case study on Yangtze River Basin in China.Habitat International,2017,63:113- 121.
[12] 胡振华,刘景月,钟美瑞,洪开荣.基于演化博弈的跨界流域生态补偿利益均衡分析——以漓江流域为例.经济地理,2016,36(6):42- 49.
[13] 李昌峰,张娈英,赵广川,莫李娟.基于演化博弈理论的流域生态补偿研究——以太湖流域为例.中国人口资源与环境,2014,24(1):171- 176.
[14] 宗鑫,赵龙,王光耀,韦惠兰.生态补偿的复制动态及其进化稳定策略研究——以黄河流域上游青藏高原区为分析背景.干旱区资源与环境,2016,30(9):32- 37.
[15] Jones L,Norton L,Austin Z,Browne A L,Donovan D,Emmett B A,Grabowski Z J,Howard D C,Jones J P G,Kenter J O,Manley W,Morris C,Robinson D A,Short C,Siriwardena G M,Stevens C J,Storkey J,Waters R D,Willis G F.Stocks and flows of natural and human-derived capital in ecosystem services.Land Use Policy,2016,52:151- 162.
[16] B?sch M,Elsasser P,Franz K,Lorenz M,Moning C,Olschewski R,R?dl A,Schneider H,Schr?ppel B,Weller P.Forest ecosystem services in rural areas of Germany:Insights from the national TEEB study.Ecosystem Services,2018,31:77- 83.
[17] 温薇,田国双.生态文明时代的跨区域生态补偿协调机制研究.经济问题,2017,(5):84- 88.
[18] 尹振东,汤玉刚.专项转移支付与地方财政支出行为——以农村义务教育补助为例.经济研究,2016,51(4):47- 59.
[19] 李涛,刘思玥.分权体制下辖区竞争、策略性财政政策对雾霾污染治理的影响.中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(6):120- 129.
[20] 潘峰,西宝,王琳.地方政府间环境规制策略的演化博弈分析.中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(6):97- 102.
[21] 廖晓慧,李松森.完善主体功能区生态补偿财政转移支付制度研究.经济纵横,2016,(1):108- 113.
[22] 彭皓玥.公众权益与跨区域生态规制策略研究——相邻地方政府间的演化博弈行为分析.科技进步与对策,2016,33(7):42- 47.
[23] 郑洁,付才辉,张彩虹.财政分权与环境污染——基于新结构经济学视角.财政研究,2018,(3):57- 70.
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