员工持股计划与财务信息质量
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摘要
本文以A股非金融上市企业为样本,发现员工持股与公司应计盈余管理水平呈显著正相关。进一步研究发现,员工在企业中的重要性强、员工持股计划资金来源包含杠杆(借款)、企业资产透明度低、企业股权集中度低时,上述正相关关系更明显。另外,盈余管理水平在员工持股结束前一年显著更高。该正相关关系在利用工具变量和倾向得分匹配进行估计解决内生性问题后仍旧成立,并对控制机构投资者持股和高管股权激励等因素稳健。上述研究结果说明,管理层有"讨好"员工的动机,为了让员工股解禁时套现更多,管理层进行正向盈余管理以求推高股价,从而降低了财务信息质量。
Employee stock ownership plans(ESOP) refer to programs that provide a company's common employees with an ownership interest in the company, thus turning employees(workforce)into shareholders. ESOP in China dates back to 1980 s, in the same pace with the shareholding reform. It underwent twists and turns along the 30 years of development. Previous literature focused on the effect of ESOP on corporate performance, emphasizing on how it changes the incentives of employees. In this paper we take a different perspective, paying attention to how ESOP affects managers' incentives and behaviors. More specifically, we analyze how ESOP affects earnings management in A-share-listed non-financial firms during 1998-2005 and 2014-2016. We construct the ownership share of common employees as indicated in the ownership changes history records to proxy for employee stock ownership, and calculated discretionary accruals with modified Jones model to proxy for earnings management. Simple regressions show that the probability of positive earnings management and the size of it are both positively correlated with employee stock ownership. Additional evidence shows that this positive correlation is stronger when(1) employees are more important with higher bargaining power,(2) ESOP leverages borrowed funds,(3) the corporate assets are less transparent, and(4) the ownership is less concentrated. Moreover, earnings management is severe right before the end of ESOP, while returning to normal levels when ESOP expires. The results still hold when using instrument variables and propensity score matched sample regressions to overcome endogeneity problem, and are robust to controlling other factors like institutional investors' ownership and high management stock incentives. The results show that, consistent with the "enjoying the quiet life" theory, managers have incentives to please employees. With employee ownership, managers conduct positive earnings management to boost stock price so that the employees can gain more from selling their stocks once the ESOP expires, which deteriorates accounting information quality.
Employee stock ownership plans(ESOP) refer to programs that provide a company's common employees with an ownership interest in the company, thus turning employees(workforce)into shareholders. ESOP in China dates back to 1980 s, in the same pace with the shareholding reform. It underwent twists and turns along the 30 years of development. Previous literature focused on the effect of ESOP on corporate performance, emphasizing on how it changes the incentives of employees. In this paper we take a different perspective, paying attention to how ESOP affects managers' incentives and behaviors. More specifically, we analyze how ESOP affects earnings management in A-share-listed non-financial firms during 1998-2005 and 2014-2016. We construct the ownership share of common employees as indicated in the ownership changes history records to proxy for employee stock ownership, and calculated discretionary accruals with modified Jones model to proxy for earnings management. Simple regressions show that the probability of positive earnings management and the size of it are both positively correlated with employee stock ownership. Additional evidence shows that this positive correlation is stronger when(1) employees are more important with higher bargaining power,(2) ESOP leverages borrowed funds,(3) the corporate assets are less transparent, and(4) the ownership is less concentrated. Moreover, earnings management is severe right before the end of ESOP, while returning to normal levels when ESOP expires. The results still hold when using instrument variables and propensity score matched sample regressions to overcome endogeneity problem, and are robust to controlling other factors like institutional investors' ownership and high management stock incentives. The results show that, consistent with the "enjoying the quiet life" theory, managers have incentives to please employees. With employee ownership, managers conduct positive earnings management to boost stock price so that the employees can gain more from selling their stocks once the ESOP expires, which deteriorates accounting information quality.
引文
[1]中国证监会.证监会公告[2014]33号:《关于上市公司实施员工持股计划试点的指导意见.》 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/shanghai/xxfw/gfxwj/201407/t20140711_257690.htm,[2017-03-21].
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[30]蔡春,黄益建,赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据.审计研究, 2005,(2):3-10.
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[35] Jones, D. C., Kato, T., Pliskin, J.. Profit Sharing and Gainsharing:A Review of Theory, Incidence, and Effects. Working Paper,1994.
[36] Kruse, D., Blasi, J.. Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes,and Firm Performance. National Bureau of Economic Research,2005.
[37] Beatty, A.. An Empirical Analysis of the Corporate Control, Tax and Incentive Motivations for Adopting Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Managerial&Decision Economics,1994, 15(4):299-315.
[38] Chang, S.. Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Shareholder Wealth:An Empirical Investigation. Financial Management,1990, 19(1):48-58.
[39] Chaplinsky, S., Niehaus, G.. The Role of ESOPs in Takeover Contests. The Journal of Finance, 1994, 49(4):1451-1470.
[40] Gordon, L. A., Pound, J.. ESOPs and Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(2):525-555.
[41] Pugh, W. N., Jahera Jr, J. S., Oswald, S. L.. ESOP Adoption and Corporate Performance:Does Motive Really Matter? The Journal of Business and Economic Studies, 2005, 1(11):76.
[42] Rosen, C., Quarrey, Q.. How Well is Employee Ownership Working? Harvard Business Review, 1998, 65(5):126-132.
[43] Chang, S., Mayers, D.. Managerial Vote Ownership and Shareholder Wealth:Evidence from Employee Stock Ownership Plans.Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, 32(1):103-131.
[44] Iqbal, Z., Hamid, S. A.. Stock Price and Operating Performance of ESOP Firms:A Time-series Analysis. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 2000, 39(3):25-47.
[45] Bova, F., Dou, Y., Hope, O.. Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2015, 32(2):639-673.
[46]张小宁.经营者报酬、员工持股与上市公司绩效分析.世界经济,2002,(10):57-64.
[47]黄桂田,张悦.企业改革30年:管理层激励效应——基于上市公司的样本分析.金融研究, 2008,(12):101-112.
[48] Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T.. CEO Incentives and Earnings Management. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 80(3):511-529.
[49]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理.经济研究,2010,(11):88-100.
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[51]蔡宁,魏明海.“大小非”减持中的盈余管理.审计研究, 2009,(2):40-49.
[52]肖淑芳,张晨宇,张超,轩然.股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.南开管理评论, 2009,12(4):113-119.
[53] Yeo, G. H. H., Tan, P. M. S., Ho, K. W., Chen, S.. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting, 2002, 29(7&8):1023-1046.
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[55] Chung, R., Firth, M., Kim, J.. Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earnings Management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2002, 8(1):29-48.
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[2]Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.. Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20(1):293-315.
[3]王晋斌,李振仲.内部职工持股计划与企业绩效——对西方和我国企业案例的考察.经济研究, 1998,(5):66-73.
[4]马克思,恩格斯.马克思恩格斯选集.人民出版社, 1972.
[5]Kelso, L. O., Kelso, P. H.. Two-factor Theory:The Economics of Reality:How to Turn Eighty Million Workers into Capitalists on Borrowed Money, and Other Proposals. New York:Vintage Books, 1967.
[6]Weitzman, M. L.. The Share Economy:Conquering Stagflation.Harvard University Press, 1984.
[7]Weitzman, M. L., Kruse, D.. Profit Sharing and Productivity. In Blinder, A. S.(Ed.). Paying for Productivity:A Look at the Evidence. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution, 1990:95-142.
[8]Grossman, S. J., Hart, O. D.. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4):691-719.
[9]Milgrom, P., Roberts, J.. Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice-Hall International, 1992.
[10] Ben-Ner, A., Jones, D. C.. Employee Participation, Ownership,and Productivity:A Theoretical Framework. Industrial Relations:A Journal of Economy and Society, 1995, 34(4):532-554.
[11]张维迎.所有制、治理结构及委托—代理关系——兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点.经济研究, 1996,(9):3-15.
[12]蒋一苇.职工主体论.中国劳动科学, 1991,(9):3-8.
[13]方竹兰.人力资本所有者拥有企业所有权是一个趋势——兼与张维迎博士商榷.经济研究, 1997,(6):36-40.
[14]赵立新.员工持股是构建现代企业制度的有效途径.经济学动态, 2000,(4):12-18.
[15]丹尼尔·托马斯.任正非:华为绝不上市. http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001056050,[2017-03-21].
[16]高基元.员工持股计划乱象. http://stock.hexun.com/2015-03-09/173871870.html,[2017-03-21].
[17]刘增禄.“馅饼”还是“陷阱”谨慎看待员工持股计划. http://sc.stock.cnfol.com/gushizhibo/20160703/23003236.shtml,[2017-03-21].
[18] Aggarwal, R. K., Samwick, A. A.. Empire-builders and Shirkers:Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006, 12(3):489-515.
[19] Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S.. Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 111(5):1043-1075.
[20]孙即,万丽梅.员工持股计划在上市公司实践的效果、问题和建议.证监会研究报告, 2015.
[21] Dunbar, A. E., Kumbhakar, S. C.. An Empirical Investigation of the Association of Productivity with Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 1992,14(1):22.
[22] Jones, D. C., Kato, T.. The Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-ownership Plans and Bonuses:Evidence from Japanese Panel Data. The American Economic Review, 1995, 85(3):391-414.
[23] Conte, M. A., Blasi, J., Kruse, D., Jampani, R.. Financial Returns of Public ESOP Companies:Investor Effects Vs. Manager Effects. Financial Analysts Journal, 1996, 52(4):51-61.
[24] Meng, R., Ning, X., Zhou, X., Zhu, H.. Do ESOPs Enhance Firm Performance? Evidence from China`s Reform Experiment. Journal of Banking&Finance, 2011, 35(6):1541-1551.
[25] Kim, E. H., Ouimet, P.. Broad-based Employee Stock Ownership:Motives and Outcomes. The Journal of Finance, 2014,69(3):1273-1319.
[26]李常青,管连云.股权结构与盈余管理关系的实证研究.商业研究, 2004,(19):48-53.
[27] Cheng, Q., Warfield, T. D.. Equity Incentives and Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 2005, 80(2):441-476.
[28] Cornett, M., Marcus, A., Tehranian, H.. Corporate Governance and Pay-for-performance:The Impact of Earnings Management.Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 87(2):357-373.
[29] Cheng, C. A., Wang, J., Wei, S. X.. State Ownership and Earnings Management around Initial Public Offerings:Evidence from China. Journal of International Accounting Research, 2015,14(2):89-116.
[30]蔡春,黄益建,赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据.审计研究, 2005,(2):3-10.
[31]胡奕明,唐松莲.独立董事与上市公司盈余信息质量.管理世界,2008,(9):149-160.
[32]李增福,曾庆意,魏下海.债务契约、控制人性质与盈余管理.经济评论, 2011,(6):88-96.
[33]陈晓,戴翠玉. A股亏损公司的盈余管理行为与手段研究.中国会计评论, 2004,(2):299-310.
[34] Gamble, J. E.. ESOPs:Financial Performance and Federal Tax Incentives. Journal of Labor Research, 1998, 19(3):529-541.
[35] Jones, D. C., Kato, T., Pliskin, J.. Profit Sharing and Gainsharing:A Review of Theory, Incidence, and Effects. Working Paper,1994.
[36] Kruse, D., Blasi, J.. Employee Ownership, Employee Attitudes,and Firm Performance. National Bureau of Economic Research,2005.
[37] Beatty, A.. An Empirical Analysis of the Corporate Control, Tax and Incentive Motivations for Adopting Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Managerial&Decision Economics,1994, 15(4):299-315.
[38] Chang, S.. Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Shareholder Wealth:An Empirical Investigation. Financial Management,1990, 19(1):48-58.
[39] Chaplinsky, S., Niehaus, G.. The Role of ESOPs in Takeover Contests. The Journal of Finance, 1994, 49(4):1451-1470.
[40] Gordon, L. A., Pound, J.. ESOPs and Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(2):525-555.
[41] Pugh, W. N., Jahera Jr, J. S., Oswald, S. L.. ESOP Adoption and Corporate Performance:Does Motive Really Matter? The Journal of Business and Economic Studies, 2005, 1(11):76.
[42] Rosen, C., Quarrey, Q.. How Well is Employee Ownership Working? Harvard Business Review, 1998, 65(5):126-132.
[43] Chang, S., Mayers, D.. Managerial Vote Ownership and Shareholder Wealth:Evidence from Employee Stock Ownership Plans.Journal of Financial Economics, 1992, 32(1):103-131.
[44] Iqbal, Z., Hamid, S. A.. Stock Price and Operating Performance of ESOP Firms:A Time-series Analysis. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 2000, 39(3):25-47.
[45] Bova, F., Dou, Y., Hope, O.. Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2015, 32(2):639-673.
[46]张小宁.经营者报酬、员工持股与上市公司绩效分析.世界经济,2002,(10):57-64.
[47]黄桂田,张悦.企业改革30年:管理层激励效应——基于上市公司的样本分析.金融研究, 2008,(12):101-112.
[48] Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T.. CEO Incentives and Earnings Management. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 80(3):511-529.
[49]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理.经济研究,2010,(11):88-100.
[50]林大庞,苏冬蔚.股权激励与公司业绩——基于盈余管理视角的新研究.金融研究, 2011,(9):162-177.
[51]蔡宁,魏明海.“大小非”减持中的盈余管理.审计研究, 2009,(2):40-49.
[52]肖淑芳,张晨宇,张超,轩然.股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.南开管理评论, 2009,12(4):113-119.
[53] Yeo, G. H. H., Tan, P. M. S., Ho, K. W., Chen, S.. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting, 2002, 29(7&8):1023-1046.
[54] Sánchez-Ballesta, J. P., García-Meca, E.. Ownership Structure,Discretionary Accruals and the Informativeness of Earnings.Corporate Governance:An International Review, 2007, 15(4):677-691.
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