行业异质性、高管薪酬与环境绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
作为生产的主体,企业行为直接关系到污染排放的多少与环保工作的成败。本文以2006-2015年中国沪深两市2081家A股民营上市公司为研究对象,采用环境违规记录衡量企业环境绩效,检验高管薪酬对环境绩效的影响,并从污染程度、竞争类型、行业周期三个角度检验行业异质性对高管薪酬与环境绩效关系的影响。研究发现:整体而言,高管薪酬与企业环境违规概率呈显著的正相关关系。进一步地,行业异质性显著影响着高管薪酬与环境绩效之间的关系:在重污染行业,由于治污成本较高,高管更倾向于为了追逐高薪酬而实施环境违规行为;与非竞争型行业相比,竞争型企业的高管更容易为了获得高薪酬而实施环境违规行为;与成熟型行业相比,成长型企业较高的高管薪酬会显著提高环境违规概率。因此,要想从微观企业的角度促成企业绿色生产方式的转变,提高环境绩效,一方面要完善市场机制,形成企业环境行为与市场价值的有效反馈机制,让环境绩效更加及时、准确、充分地反映在市场机制中;另一方面则要充分考虑行业异质性,针对行业特征制定差异化的环境经济政策和差异化的高管薪酬制度,实现精准发力、精准施策、精准治污。
As the main part of production, corporate behavior is directly related to the pollutant emission and the success in environmental protection. Taking A-listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchange during 2006 to 2015 as our research objects, the impact of executive compensation on environmental performance represented by environmental violation record was tested. Also the impact of industry heterogeneity including pollution degree, competition type and industry cycle on the relationship between executive compensation and environmental performance. Our results found that there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and enterprise environmental violation on the whole. Industry heterogeneity significantly affects the relationship between executive compensation and environmental performance. In heavy polluting industries, executive compensation has a greater impact on corporate environmental violation. Compared with noncompetitive industries, executives in competitive enterprises are more likely to enforce environmental irregularities in order to get high salaries in fierce market competition. Compared with the mature industry, the growing enterprise's higher executive compensation will significantly increase the probability of environmental violation. Therefore, to promote the transformation of enterprise green production mode and improve the enterprise environmental performance from the perspective of micro enterprise, we should improve the market mechanism to form a positive feedback mechanism to make their environmental behavior be reflected in the market. Also, we should consider the industry heterogeneity, according to the characteristics of the industry, different environmental and economic policies should be made to achieve precise measure, precise strategy and precise pollution control.
As the main part of production, corporate behavior is directly related to the pollutant emission and the success in environmental protection. Taking A-listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchange during 2006 to 2015 as our research objects, the impact of executive compensation on environmental performance represented by environmental violation record was tested. Also the impact of industry heterogeneity including pollution degree, competition type and industry cycle on the relationship between executive compensation and environmental performance. Our results found that there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and enterprise environmental violation on the whole. Industry heterogeneity significantly affects the relationship between executive compensation and environmental performance. In heavy polluting industries, executive compensation has a greater impact on corporate environmental violation. Compared with noncompetitive industries, executives in competitive enterprises are more likely to enforce environmental irregularities in order to get high salaries in fierce market competition. Compared with the mature industry, the growing enterprise's higher executive compensation will significantly increase the probability of environmental violation. Therefore, to promote the transformation of enterprise green production mode and improve the enterprise environmental performance from the perspective of micro enterprise, we should improve the market mechanism to form a positive feedback mechanism to make their environmental behavior be reflected in the market. Also, we should consider the industry heterogeneity, according to the characteristics of the industry, different environmental and economic policies should be made to achieve precise measure, precise strategy and precise pollution control.
引文
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[12]Hart, S. L. and G. Ahuja. Does it Pay to be Green? An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Emission Reduction and Firm Performance[J]. Business Strategy & the Environment, 1996, 5(1): 30-37.
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[14]Klassen, R. D. and C. P. McLaughlin. The Impact of Environmental Management on Firm Performance[J]. Management Science, 1996, 42(8): 1199-1214.
[15]Kock, C. J., J. Santaló, and L. Diestre. Corporate Governance and the Environment: What Type of Governance Creates Greener Companies? [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2012, 49(3): 492-514.
[16]Mahoney, L. S. and L. Thorn. An Examination of the Structure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canadian Investigation[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2006, 69(2): 149-162.
[17]Miles, P. C. and G. Miles. Corporate Social Responsibility and Executive Compensation: Exploring the Link[J]. Social Responsibility Journal, 2013, 9(1): 76-90.
[18]Villiers, C. D., V. Naiker, and C. J. V. Staden. The Effect of Board Characteristics on Firm Environmental Performance[J]. Journal of Management, 2011, 37(6):1636-1663.
[19]Walls, J. L., P. Berrone, and P. H. Phan. Corporate Governance and Environmental Performance: Is There Really a Link?[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2012, 33(8): 885-913.
[20]Zou, H. L., S. X. Zeng, H. Lin, and X. M. Xie. Top Executives’ Compensation, Industrial Competition, and Corporate Environmental Performance: Evidence from China[J]. Management Decision, 2015, 53(9): 2036-2059.
[2]杜雯翠,牛海鹏,张平淡. 企业产权多元化对环境污染的门槛效应检验[J]. 财贸经济,2017,(12):145-158.
[3]范从来,袁静. 成长性、成熟性和衰退性产业上市公司并购绩效的实证分析[J]. 中国工业经济,2002,(8):65-72.
[4]李平,黄嘉慧,王玉乾. 公司治理影响环境绩效的实证研究[J]. 管理现代化,2015,(2):81-83.
[5]梅波. 行业周期、治理环境与自由现金流代理成本[J]. 经济与管理研究,2012,(11):61-68.
[6]苏东水. 产业经济学[M]. 北京:高等教育出版社,2010.
[7]吴德军,黄丹丹. 高管特征与公司环境绩效[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报,2013,(5):109-114.
[8]周晖,邓舒. 高管薪酬与环境绩效——基于上市公司外部治理环境的视角[J]. 上海财经大学学报,2017,(5):27-39.
[9]Berrone, P. and L. R. Gomez-Mejia. Environmental Performance and Executive Compensation: An Integrated Agency-Institutional Perspective[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2009, 52(1): 103-126.
[10]Cordano, M. and I. H. Frieze. Pollution Reduction Preferences of U. S. Environmental Managers: Applying Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2000, 43(4): 627-641.
[11]Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 51(3): 371-406.
[12]Hart, S. L. and G. Ahuja. Does it Pay to be Green? An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Emission Reduction and Firm Performance[J]. Business Strategy & the Environment, 1996, 5(1): 30-37.
[13]Keck, S. L. Top Management Team Structure: Differential Effects by Environmental Context[J]. Organization Science, 1997, 8(2): 143-156.
[14]Klassen, R. D. and C. P. McLaughlin. The Impact of Environmental Management on Firm Performance[J]. Management Science, 1996, 42(8): 1199-1214.
[15]Kock, C. J., J. Santaló, and L. Diestre. Corporate Governance and the Environment: What Type of Governance Creates Greener Companies? [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2012, 49(3): 492-514.
[16]Mahoney, L. S. and L. Thorn. An Examination of the Structure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canadian Investigation[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2006, 69(2): 149-162.
[17]Miles, P. C. and G. Miles. Corporate Social Responsibility and Executive Compensation: Exploring the Link[J]. Social Responsibility Journal, 2013, 9(1): 76-90.
[18]Villiers, C. D., V. Naiker, and C. J. V. Staden. The Effect of Board Characteristics on Firm Environmental Performance[J]. Journal of Management, 2011, 37(6):1636-1663.
[19]Walls, J. L., P. Berrone, and P. H. Phan. Corporate Governance and Environmental Performance: Is There Really a Link?[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2012, 33(8): 885-913.
[20]Zou, H. L., S. X. Zeng, H. Lin, and X. M. Xie. Top Executives’ Compensation, Industrial Competition, and Corporate Environmental Performance: Evidence from China[J]. Management Decision, 2015, 53(9): 2036-2059.
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