反驳扎尔塔的对象理论与假装理论的融合方案

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英文篇名：Against Zalta's Road Between Object Theory and Pretense Theory 作者：彭杉杉 英文作者：PENG Shan-shan;College of Marxism,Jilin Normal University; 关键词：虚构名称 ; 虚构对象 ; 假装理论 ; 抽象对象理论 ; 性质模式 英文关键词：fictional names;;fictional objects;;pretense theory;;abstract object theory;;pattern of properties 中文刊名：自然辩证法研究 英文刊名：Studies in Dialectics of Nature 机构：吉林师范大学马克思主义学院; 出版日期：2019-03-18 出版单位：自然辩证法研究 年：2019 期：03 基金：2017年度国家社会科学基金重大项目“当代逻辑哲学重大前沿问题研究”(17ZDA024)之子课题“意义和指称问题研究”的阶段性成果 语种：中文; 页：5-10 页数：6 CN：11-1649/B ISSN：1000-8934 分类号：B08

摘要

在有关虚构名称与虚构对象问题的讨论中,虽然作为实在论的抽象对象理论与作为反实在论的假装理论在本体论承诺上不同,但扎尔塔主张这两个理论可以融合。他引进了性质模式的方案用以论证沃尔顿承认虚构对象是抽象实体,假装理论的相关概念可以在对象理论的框架内被系统化定义。然而假装理论的核心是:虚构对象并不存在,我们仅仅假想虚构对象存在。这在本体论上与扎尔塔所主张的虚构对象是抽象对象的观点相悖,扎尔塔融合方案的论证存在缺陷。然而这并不代表对象理论与假装理论完全背道而驰。通过对两个理论哲学背景的探究得出,二者融合的本体论共识是:虚构对象是具有虚构性质的非实存对象。
        In the discussions of fictional names and fictional objects,the abstract object theory is a realism theory,and the pretend theory is an anti-realism theory. Although their ontological commitments are different,E. Zalta advocates that the differences can be reconciled. He introduced the pattern of properties to argue that K. Walton admits fictional entities exist and fictional objects are abstract objects. Based on this claim,Zalta showed how pretense-theoretic notions can be systematized within the framework of the abstract object theory. But the core of pretense theory is that we just make believe fictional objects exist. Walton does not admit fictional objects are abstract entities,this is different from Zalta's view that fictional objects are abstract objects. Although there are flaws in Zalta's demonstration,this does not mean the object theory and the pretense theory are totally different. By exploring the philosophical background of the two theories,it demonstrated the ontological consensus for these two theories is that fictional objects are objects with pretense properties and they do not real exist.

引文

[1]Zalta,E.Abstract Objects:An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics[M].Dordrecht:Reidel,1983.
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