基于网络中介信息的电子商务税收遵从与征管研究
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摘要
近几年来，我国电子商务一直保持着快速发展态势，电子商务税收征管日益成为一个不可忽视的问题。目前，由于我国对电子商务还缺乏有效的税收征管措施，导致电子商务中纳税人的遵从水平大大降低，引起了相当可观的税收流失。电子商务税收遵从与征管问题产生的一个重要原因是由于电子商务中税务机关和纳税人之间的信息不对称相比传统商务更加突出，从而严重妨碍了税务机关的征管能力。本文正是在这样的背景下，主要从信息和管理的角度，采用定性分析与定量建模相结合的方法研究电子商务税收遵从与征管问题。主要研究内容如下：
分析了电子商务税收遵从与征管中的纳税信息，根据税务机关的纳税信息获取渠道分析了电子商务中税务机关和纳税人之间的纳税信息不对称及变化，并分析了电子商务纳税信息不对称变化的技术原因。提出了纳税信息不对称度的定义，并比较了B2B、B2C和C2C三种类型电子商务的纳税信息不对称度。
建立了一个信息不对称变化对电子商务税收遵从与征管的影响模型。分析结论表明，信息不对称度的增大，将导致电子商务中纳税人遵从率降低，税务机关征管收入和征管效率下降，税收流失增大。当信息不对称度非常大时，例如目前大多数C2C电子商务，纳税人将完全不遵从，税务机关则放弃征管。
分析了网络中介信息共享的作用和网络中介没有积极地与税务机关进行信息共享的原因。建立了一个基于双边市场理论的网络中介信息共享行为分析模型。分析结论表明，由于网络中介信息共享将导致其市场份额和利润降低，因此在没有法律强制的条件下，网络中介不会积极进行信息共享。指出网络中介信息共享的应用条件是要首先解决相关的法律问题，并逐步建立网络中介信息报告制度。
建立了一个基于网络中介信息的电子商务税收遵从模型。分析结论表明，网络中介信息的使用能够降低税务机关对L类型纳税人的稽查率，但可能增加或减少纳税人的不遵从，这取决于网络中介信息与纳税人应税收入的相关度的大小，税务机关应选择与纳税人应税收入相关度大的网络中介信息，这样既降低了纳税人的不遵从率又增加了税务机关的净收入。并以eBay为例说明了网络中介信息的应用情况，
证实了模型分析的结论。
分析了网络中介信息共享系统的框架以及建立在其基础上的网络中介信息评估系统的结构和运行机理。建立了一个基于网络中介信息评估系统的电子商务税收遵从模型。分析结论表明，网络中介信息评估系统的应用可以使税务机关降低对L类型纳税人的稽查率，在罚款率足够高的条件下，还可以降低电子商务税收不遵从率和征管成本，提高电子商务税收净收入和征管效率。最后指出网络中介信息评估系统的应用效果主要取决于评估系统的准确度和罚款率两个因素，并对它们进行了分析。
In the past few years, Electronic Commerce(EC) in China has been maintaining momentum of rapid development and tax administration in EC has increasingly become a innegligible problem. Nowadays the compliance level of taxpayers in EC has greatly decreased and considerable tax loss has arisen in China due to lack of effective measures of tax administration in EC. An important reason causing tax compliance and administration problems is that more serious information asymmetry between tax agency and taxpayers in EC compared with that in traditional commerce badly hampered the taxation capability of tax agency. Under the background, the dissertation uses the methodology combining qualitative analysis and quantitive models to investigate the problems of tax compliance and administration in EC primarily from the viewpoints of information and management. Main findings of the dissertation are outlined as follow:
Information in EC tax compliance and administration is investigated, the information asymmetry and its transformation between tax agency and taxpayers in EC are analyzed according to channels of tax information acquisition of tax agency, and technology reasons inducing the transformation of tax information asymmetry in EC are discussed. The degree of tax information asymmetry is defined, and the degree of tax information asymmetry in B2B、B2C and C2C are compared.
A model is established to analyze the impacts of transformation of information asymmetry on tax compliance and administration in EC. Conclusions show that greater degree of information asymmetry would lead the decline of tax compliance probability, tax revenue and administration efficiency, and the increase of tax loss. When the degree of information asymmetry is very large, such as the case in C2C, taxpayers would not comply at all and tax agency would give up administration.
The role of cybermediaries' information sharing and the reason that cybermediaries don't actively share information with tax agency are analyzed. A model based on the theory of two-sided markets is established to study the behaviors of cybermediaries' information sharing. Conclusions show that cybermediaries wouldn't like to take an active part in information sharing without the force of law because it would induce the decrease of market profit and share. It is pointed out that application condition of cybermediaries' information sharing is to firstly solve relative law problems and gradually set up cybermediaries information reporting institutions.
An EC tax compliance model based on cybermediaries' information is established. Conclusions show that the use of cybermediaries' information can low the audit probability to L-type taxpayers but may increase or decrease taxpayers' noncompliance subject to the correlativity of cybermediaries' information and taxable income, thus tax agency should choose cybermediaries' information owning high correlation with taxable income to not only decline tax noncompliance probability but also enhance net revenue of tax agency. Taking eBay as an example to illuminate the application of cybermediaries' information and approve the conclusions of model analysis.
The structure and process mechanism of cybermediaries' information evaluation system and the framework of cybermediaries' information sharing system which is the basis of evaluation system are investigated. An EC tax compliance model based on cybermediaries' information evaluation system is established. Conclusions show that cybermediaries' information evaluation system can low the audit probability to L-type taxpayers and when penalty rate is high enough it can decrease EC tax noncompliance probability and administration cost, and increase EC net tax revenue and administration efficiency. It is pointed out that the application effect of cybermediaries' information evaluation system is dependent on two factors including precision level of evaluation system and penalty rate, and the factors are analyzed.
分析了电子商务税收遵从与征管中的纳税信息，根据税务机关的纳税信息获取渠道分析了电子商务中税务机关和纳税人之间的纳税信息不对称及变化，并分析了电子商务纳税信息不对称变化的技术原因。提出了纳税信息不对称度的定义，并比较了B2B、B2C和C2C三种类型电子商务的纳税信息不对称度。
建立了一个信息不对称变化对电子商务税收遵从与征管的影响模型。分析结论表明，信息不对称度的增大，将导致电子商务中纳税人遵从率降低，税务机关征管收入和征管效率下降，税收流失增大。当信息不对称度非常大时，例如目前大多数C2C电子商务，纳税人将完全不遵从，税务机关则放弃征管。
分析了网络中介信息共享的作用和网络中介没有积极地与税务机关进行信息共享的原因。建立了一个基于双边市场理论的网络中介信息共享行为分析模型。分析结论表明，由于网络中介信息共享将导致其市场份额和利润降低，因此在没有法律强制的条件下，网络中介不会积极进行信息共享。指出网络中介信息共享的应用条件是要首先解决相关的法律问题，并逐步建立网络中介信息报告制度。
建立了一个基于网络中介信息的电子商务税收遵从模型。分析结论表明，网络中介信息的使用能够降低税务机关对L类型纳税人的稽查率，但可能增加或减少纳税人的不遵从，这取决于网络中介信息与纳税人应税收入的相关度的大小，税务机关应选择与纳税人应税收入相关度大的网络中介信息，这样既降低了纳税人的不遵从率又增加了税务机关的净收入。并以eBay为例说明了网络中介信息的应用情况，
证实了模型分析的结论。
分析了网络中介信息共享系统的框架以及建立在其基础上的网络中介信息评估系统的结构和运行机理。建立了一个基于网络中介信息评估系统的电子商务税收遵从模型。分析结论表明，网络中介信息评估系统的应用可以使税务机关降低对L类型纳税人的稽查率，在罚款率足够高的条件下，还可以降低电子商务税收不遵从率和征管成本，提高电子商务税收净收入和征管效率。最后指出网络中介信息评估系统的应用效果主要取决于评估系统的准确度和罚款率两个因素，并对它们进行了分析。
In the past few years, Electronic Commerce(EC) in China has been maintaining momentum of rapid development and tax administration in EC has increasingly become a innegligible problem. Nowadays the compliance level of taxpayers in EC has greatly decreased and considerable tax loss has arisen in China due to lack of effective measures of tax administration in EC. An important reason causing tax compliance and administration problems is that more serious information asymmetry between tax agency and taxpayers in EC compared with that in traditional commerce badly hampered the taxation capability of tax agency. Under the background, the dissertation uses the methodology combining qualitative analysis and quantitive models to investigate the problems of tax compliance and administration in EC primarily from the viewpoints of information and management. Main findings of the dissertation are outlined as follow:
Information in EC tax compliance and administration is investigated, the information asymmetry and its transformation between tax agency and taxpayers in EC are analyzed according to channels of tax information acquisition of tax agency, and technology reasons inducing the transformation of tax information asymmetry in EC are discussed. The degree of tax information asymmetry is defined, and the degree of tax information asymmetry in B2B、B2C and C2C are compared.
A model is established to analyze the impacts of transformation of information asymmetry on tax compliance and administration in EC. Conclusions show that greater degree of information asymmetry would lead the decline of tax compliance probability, tax revenue and administration efficiency, and the increase of tax loss. When the degree of information asymmetry is very large, such as the case in C2C, taxpayers would not comply at all and tax agency would give up administration.
The role of cybermediaries' information sharing and the reason that cybermediaries don't actively share information with tax agency are analyzed. A model based on the theory of two-sided markets is established to study the behaviors of cybermediaries' information sharing. Conclusions show that cybermediaries wouldn't like to take an active part in information sharing without the force of law because it would induce the decrease of market profit and share. It is pointed out that application condition of cybermediaries' information sharing is to firstly solve relative law problems and gradually set up cybermediaries information reporting institutions.
An EC tax compliance model based on cybermediaries' information is established. Conclusions show that the use of cybermediaries' information can low the audit probability to L-type taxpayers but may increase or decrease taxpayers' noncompliance subject to the correlativity of cybermediaries' information and taxable income, thus tax agency should choose cybermediaries' information owning high correlation with taxable income to not only decline tax noncompliance probability but also enhance net revenue of tax agency. Taking eBay as an example to illuminate the application of cybermediaries' information and approve the conclusions of model analysis.
The structure and process mechanism of cybermediaries' information evaluation system and the framework of cybermediaries' information sharing system which is the basis of evaluation system are investigated. An EC tax compliance model based on cybermediaries' information evaluation system is established. Conclusions show that cybermediaries' information evaluation system can low the audit probability to L-type taxpayers and when penalty rate is high enough it can decrease EC tax noncompliance probability and administration cost, and increase EC net tax revenue and administration efficiency. It is pointed out that the application effect of cybermediaries' information evaluation system is dependent on two factors including precision level of evaluation system and penalty rate, and the factors are analyzed.
引文
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