我国机构投资者与上市公司治理的实证研究
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摘要
机构投资者不仅是各国证券市场发展的中坚力量,而且也是优化公司治理的重要因素。本文以我国机构投资者持股上市公司为对象,研究机构投资者参与公司治理的行为以及在机构投资者参与下上市公司的行为反应。主要内容如下:
第一章首先分析证券市场中机构投资者的独特地位,接着考察了机构投资者参与公司治理的国际差异,梳理了我国机构投资者发展的制度轨迹。在此基础上,剖析了学术界关于机构投资者参与公司治理研究的局限,从而为整个命题的阐述奠定了重要的理论基础、制度基础和文献基础。虽然机构投资者参与公司治理是市场竞争的结果,但是却离不开相应制度的支撑。我国机构投资者的发展也得益于法律的逐步健全,法律的健全为我国机构投资者参与公司治理提供了制度保障。然而,国内外对我国特定环境中机构投资者参与公司治理的行为及其效果的研究还很少。
第二章主要寻找我国证券市场中机构投资者参与公司治理的直接证据和间接证据。虽然我国证券市场的发展时间较短,机构投资者的发展时间更短,但是机构投资者参与公司治理的事件时有发生,表现出参与公司治理的强烈愿望,这是直接证据。我们通过检验机构投资者持股量与第一大股东持股量的关系,发现了机构投资者参与公司治理的意愿,这是间接证据。这些证据有力的支持了机构投资者参与了上市公司治理这个结论。
第三章主要研究我国机构投资者参与公司治理的途径。由于机构投资者在公司治理中的特殊地位,因此机构投资者参与公司治理的行为存在着两种选择:一种是股东积极行动主义,另一种是消极主义。寻着这个思路,我们探究了机构投资者参与公司治理的公开建议、行业组织监督、组成机构投资者联盟和诉讼、行使投票权、提交股东提案、征集委托投票权、与管理层沟通以及解释函等九种途径。针对机构投资者在参与公司治理途径方面存在的局限,我们提出建设公司治理生态的主张,即机构投资者应该积极参与关于公司治理的制度建设,如会计准则、公司治理准则的建设,其目的是更好的参与公司治理,保护包括机构投资者自身在内的中小股东的利益。
第四章着重研究在机构投资者参与下上市公司的行为反应。本章在一般分析机构投资者参与公司治理后对上市公司行为影响的基础上,重点考察了机构投资者对上市公司筹资行为、信息披露行为、盈余管理行为等三大行为的影响。实证结果发现,机构投资者参与后对上市公司的筹资行为、信息披露行为、盈余管理行为都具有较大影响,上市公司在采取行动时,充分考虑了机构投资者的意愿。同时,我们发现了在不同市场环境中机构投资者不同行为的证据。例如,在牛市和熊市中,机构投资者对上市公司是否提前披露年报的影响不同;在牛市中,机构投资者自身的盈利压力比较小,从而向上市公司管理层施压进行盈余管理的倾向就比较小,在熊市中,机构投资者和上市公司管理层都需要通过盈余管理来吸引投资者的注意力,机构投资者促使上市公司进行盈余管理的倾向就比较明显。这些发现为研究机构投资者在不同市场环境中的行为提供了难得的证据,也为管理部门制定政策等提供了依据。
第五章实证研究了机构投资者的参与对上市公司业绩的影响程度。研究发现构投资者持股量与上市公司的Tobin`Q在5%的水平上显著正相关,与CoreROA除了个别年份外也都是显著正相关。说明了机构投资者对上市公司业绩产生了较大影响。研究结果显示,机构投资者持股量与公司的Tobin`Q值之间存在倒“U”型关系,表明我国证券市场具有较强的投机性。另外,研究发现股权集中能够提高公司的业绩;市场虽然看好负债的杠杆作用,但刚性负债制度却给企业的经营带来沉重的负担。
最后在第六章我们得出结论以及提出发展机构投资者的建议。
Institutional investors are not only the nucleus of the development of security market every country, but also the important factor for the optimization of corporate governance. The dissertation aims at the listed companies which institutional investors hold in China, and makes a study of the behavior that institutional investors participate in corporate governance and the behavior reaction of listed companies. The main contents are as follows:
Chapter one firstly analyzes the unique position of institutional investors in security market, then explores the international differences which occur when institutional investors participate in corporate governance, and hackles the system track of the development of institutional investors in China. Hereon, it further analyzes the study limitation of institutional investors` participation in corporate governance in academia, thus laying foundation for the theory, system and literature of this dissertation. Although that institutional investors participate in corporate governance is the result of market competition, the support of relevant systems is necessary. The development of institutional investors in China benefits from the gradual healthiness of law, which provides a system guarantee for institutional investors` participation in corporate governance in China. However, few people make a study of the behavior of institutional investors` participation in corporate governance in Chinese specific situation at home and abroad.
Chapter two mainly seeks for the direct and indirect evidence of institutional investors` participation in corporate governance in Chinese security market. Although the time for the development of Chinese security market is comparatively short, and the development of institutional investors even shorter, institutional investors now and then participate in corporate governance with their strong desire, as can be seen as direct evidence. By analyzing the relationship of the amount of stocks held by institutional investors and No. 1 stockholder, we penetrate the will of institutional investors` participation in corporate governance, as can be seen as indirect evidence. All above can prove that institutional investors participate in corporate governance of listed companies.
In Chapter three, the approaches by which institutional investors participate in corporate governance are explored. Due to the particular position of institutional investors in corporate governance, there are two behaviors for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance: one is shareholder`s activism; the other is pessimism. In this way, we explore nine approaches with which institutional investors participate in the corporate governance. These approaches are open suggestion, trade supervising, organizing the alliance of institutional investors, lawsuits, exerting rights of vote, putting in resolution of stockholders, collecting rights of vote via attorney, communicating with manager and letters for explanation. In view of the limitation of these above approaches, we bring forward ecological ideas of corporate governance, that is, institutional investors should take an active part in system construction of corporate governance, such as accounting standard, corporate governance`s standard, which purposely help institutional investors participate in corporate governance better and protect the rights of small and medium sized stockholders, who include institutional investors themselves.
In Chapter four, a focus is on the behavior reaction of listed companies that institutional investors participate in. Institutional investors` participation in corporate governance influences the behaviors of listed companies, especially three main behaviors: fundraising behavior; information disclosure behavior and earnings management. Institutional investors give a deep influence on those behaviors. When listed companies take action, they think much of institutional investors` will. Meanwhile, we find out that institutional investors have different behaviors in different market situation. For example, in Bull stock market and Bear stock market, institutional investors influence listed companies differently. In Bull stock market, the pressure of payoff for them is comparatively small, so their tendency to give pressure to manager on earning management is small. In Bear stock market, both institutional investors and manager of listed companies need to attract investors by earning management, thus the tendency to give pressure to manager on earning management is relatively clear. These findings help provide scare evidence for exploring institutional investors` behaviors in different market situation and provide a good foundation for management department to set down policies.
Chapter five analyzes the influences of listed companies` achievement because of the institutional investors` participation. The study finds out that the share of institutional investors is obvious positive relativity with Tobin`Q of listed companies at 5% the level, also same with CoreROA except for specific years. All can be used to prove institutional investors` influences on the achievement of listed companies. The findings show that the reverse“U”type relationship exist between the share of institutional investors and Tobin`Q, which shows that security market in China has a comparatively strong speculation. Besides, the convergence of share can improve achievement of corporate; although market does favor to the effect of financial leverage, the rigidity of debt leaves a heavy load for company`s running.
The last Chapter draws a conclusion and gives suggestions for the development of institutional investors.
第一章首先分析证券市场中机构投资者的独特地位,接着考察了机构投资者参与公司治理的国际差异,梳理了我国机构投资者发展的制度轨迹。在此基础上,剖析了学术界关于机构投资者参与公司治理研究的局限,从而为整个命题的阐述奠定了重要的理论基础、制度基础和文献基础。虽然机构投资者参与公司治理是市场竞争的结果,但是却离不开相应制度的支撑。我国机构投资者的发展也得益于法律的逐步健全,法律的健全为我国机构投资者参与公司治理提供了制度保障。然而,国内外对我国特定环境中机构投资者参与公司治理的行为及其效果的研究还很少。
第二章主要寻找我国证券市场中机构投资者参与公司治理的直接证据和间接证据。虽然我国证券市场的发展时间较短,机构投资者的发展时间更短,但是机构投资者参与公司治理的事件时有发生,表现出参与公司治理的强烈愿望,这是直接证据。我们通过检验机构投资者持股量与第一大股东持股量的关系,发现了机构投资者参与公司治理的意愿,这是间接证据。这些证据有力的支持了机构投资者参与了上市公司治理这个结论。
第三章主要研究我国机构投资者参与公司治理的途径。由于机构投资者在公司治理中的特殊地位,因此机构投资者参与公司治理的行为存在着两种选择:一种是股东积极行动主义,另一种是消极主义。寻着这个思路,我们探究了机构投资者参与公司治理的公开建议、行业组织监督、组成机构投资者联盟和诉讼、行使投票权、提交股东提案、征集委托投票权、与管理层沟通以及解释函等九种途径。针对机构投资者在参与公司治理途径方面存在的局限,我们提出建设公司治理生态的主张,即机构投资者应该积极参与关于公司治理的制度建设,如会计准则、公司治理准则的建设,其目的是更好的参与公司治理,保护包括机构投资者自身在内的中小股东的利益。
第四章着重研究在机构投资者参与下上市公司的行为反应。本章在一般分析机构投资者参与公司治理后对上市公司行为影响的基础上,重点考察了机构投资者对上市公司筹资行为、信息披露行为、盈余管理行为等三大行为的影响。实证结果发现,机构投资者参与后对上市公司的筹资行为、信息披露行为、盈余管理行为都具有较大影响,上市公司在采取行动时,充分考虑了机构投资者的意愿。同时,我们发现了在不同市场环境中机构投资者不同行为的证据。例如,在牛市和熊市中,机构投资者对上市公司是否提前披露年报的影响不同;在牛市中,机构投资者自身的盈利压力比较小,从而向上市公司管理层施压进行盈余管理的倾向就比较小,在熊市中,机构投资者和上市公司管理层都需要通过盈余管理来吸引投资者的注意力,机构投资者促使上市公司进行盈余管理的倾向就比较明显。这些发现为研究机构投资者在不同市场环境中的行为提供了难得的证据,也为管理部门制定政策等提供了依据。
第五章实证研究了机构投资者的参与对上市公司业绩的影响程度。研究发现构投资者持股量与上市公司的Tobin`Q在5%的水平上显著正相关,与CoreROA除了个别年份外也都是显著正相关。说明了机构投资者对上市公司业绩产生了较大影响。研究结果显示,机构投资者持股量与公司的Tobin`Q值之间存在倒“U”型关系,表明我国证券市场具有较强的投机性。另外,研究发现股权集中能够提高公司的业绩;市场虽然看好负债的杠杆作用,但刚性负债制度却给企业的经营带来沉重的负担。
最后在第六章我们得出结论以及提出发展机构投资者的建议。
Institutional investors are not only the nucleus of the development of security market every country, but also the important factor for the optimization of corporate governance. The dissertation aims at the listed companies which institutional investors hold in China, and makes a study of the behavior that institutional investors participate in corporate governance and the behavior reaction of listed companies. The main contents are as follows:
Chapter one firstly analyzes the unique position of institutional investors in security market, then explores the international differences which occur when institutional investors participate in corporate governance, and hackles the system track of the development of institutional investors in China. Hereon, it further analyzes the study limitation of institutional investors` participation in corporate governance in academia, thus laying foundation for the theory, system and literature of this dissertation. Although that institutional investors participate in corporate governance is the result of market competition, the support of relevant systems is necessary. The development of institutional investors in China benefits from the gradual healthiness of law, which provides a system guarantee for institutional investors` participation in corporate governance in China. However, few people make a study of the behavior of institutional investors` participation in corporate governance in Chinese specific situation at home and abroad.
Chapter two mainly seeks for the direct and indirect evidence of institutional investors` participation in corporate governance in Chinese security market. Although the time for the development of Chinese security market is comparatively short, and the development of institutional investors even shorter, institutional investors now and then participate in corporate governance with their strong desire, as can be seen as direct evidence. By analyzing the relationship of the amount of stocks held by institutional investors and No. 1 stockholder, we penetrate the will of institutional investors` participation in corporate governance, as can be seen as indirect evidence. All above can prove that institutional investors participate in corporate governance of listed companies.
In Chapter three, the approaches by which institutional investors participate in corporate governance are explored. Due to the particular position of institutional investors in corporate governance, there are two behaviors for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance: one is shareholder`s activism; the other is pessimism. In this way, we explore nine approaches with which institutional investors participate in the corporate governance. These approaches are open suggestion, trade supervising, organizing the alliance of institutional investors, lawsuits, exerting rights of vote, putting in resolution of stockholders, collecting rights of vote via attorney, communicating with manager and letters for explanation. In view of the limitation of these above approaches, we bring forward ecological ideas of corporate governance, that is, institutional investors should take an active part in system construction of corporate governance, such as accounting standard, corporate governance`s standard, which purposely help institutional investors participate in corporate governance better and protect the rights of small and medium sized stockholders, who include institutional investors themselves.
In Chapter four, a focus is on the behavior reaction of listed companies that institutional investors participate in. Institutional investors` participation in corporate governance influences the behaviors of listed companies, especially three main behaviors: fundraising behavior; information disclosure behavior and earnings management. Institutional investors give a deep influence on those behaviors. When listed companies take action, they think much of institutional investors` will. Meanwhile, we find out that institutional investors have different behaviors in different market situation. For example, in Bull stock market and Bear stock market, institutional investors influence listed companies differently. In Bull stock market, the pressure of payoff for them is comparatively small, so their tendency to give pressure to manager on earning management is small. In Bear stock market, both institutional investors and manager of listed companies need to attract investors by earning management, thus the tendency to give pressure to manager on earning management is relatively clear. These findings help provide scare evidence for exploring institutional investors` behaviors in different market situation and provide a good foundation for management department to set down policies.
Chapter five analyzes the influences of listed companies` achievement because of the institutional investors` participation. The study finds out that the share of institutional investors is obvious positive relativity with Tobin`Q of listed companies at 5% the level, also same with CoreROA except for specific years. All can be used to prove institutional investors` influences on the achievement of listed companies. The findings show that the reverse“U”type relationship exist between the share of institutional investors and Tobin`Q, which shows that security market in China has a comparatively strong speculation. Besides, the convergence of share can improve achievement of corporate; although market does favor to the effect of financial leverage, the rigidity of debt leaves a heavy load for company`s running.
The last Chapter draws a conclusion and gives suggestions for the development of institutional investors.
引文
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