宏观审慎框架下的银行业逆周期监管策略研究
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摘要
本次金融危机的爆发带给全球经济前所未有的冲击,促使人们对金融行为模式及金融监管制度的全面反思。金融体系的顺周期行为是导致金融危机,至少是导致金融体系脆弱性的主要原因之一。银行业的顺周期性是金融体系顺周期行为发生的主要组成部分,研究银行业顺周期行为的产生原因并且缓解其行为的顺周期性以及减少银行顺周期行为带给整体经济的不良冲击,是本文的侧重点和落脚点。
银行业顺周期性行为产生的原因既具有不可消除的内生性原因,也与现行资本要求、拨备计提要求、公允价值会计准则和盯市原则以及新资本协议的潜在顺周期性等监管政策所造成的外部原因有很大关系。怎样建立逆周期的金融监管机制来缓解金融体系顺周期问题已经成为宏观审慎管理框架的首要问题。各国相关监管当局已经在建立资本缓冲、实施动态拨备、改进公允价值计量、修订新资本协议等方面做出了努力。然而银行业内生的顺周期因素很难消除,使用逆周期监管工具只能从理论上缓解产生顺周期性的外部原因。任何逆周期监管工具都存在弊端,在实际应用中也面临着各种问题。确定合理的资本缓冲在技术上非常困难,动态拨备制度也存在着争议,改变会计准则的顺周期性也并没有改变经济的实质,这些解决办法都存在着争议。因此,设计逆周期工具是一项较为复杂的工作,需要相关部门共同合作,不仅要做好逆周期工具的设计,更要明确不同工具的缺点和联系,具体问题具体分析,有选择性地综合运用更多的审慎工具,加强风险的管理能力,同时监管者也要提高对经济变化和风险变化的敏感能力。
基于以上问题的考虑,本文共分为四个部分：第一部分概括了本文的选题背景和意义,结合国内外文献资料总结了关于宏观审慎管理的概念和目标以及银行业顺周期现象和逆周期的监管策略；第二部分根据银行业顺周期性的表现说明顺周期波动的特点,通过顺周期现象分析了其产生的不可避免的内在原因和由于传统监管策略引发的外在原因,为后文提出关于顺周期性的解决办法埋下伏笔；第三部分结合国际上针对顺周期性的缓释办法,吸收有效的意见并提出实施这些办法的困难和挑战,从而得出相应的借鉴意义；第四部分根据我国自身国情提出构建宏观审慎框架的基本原则,宏观审慎监管要与货币政策、财政政策共同协调才能充分发挥出逆周期监管和宏观政策的完美效果,最后总结得出我国银行业逆周期监管的具体措施。本文的创新意义在于选题角度新颖,之前大多数学者是从宏观审慎视角缺失方面对经济波动的巨大影响进行阐述并提出相关对策建议,本文则更加进一步地从宏观审慎监管的一个维度,即时间维度来分析银行业顺周期现象产生机制,并将其分为内、外两大类别,结合国际上提出的解决办法都比以往更加全面、完整。最后分析我国国情有针对性地提出解决我国银行业顺周期问题的监管办法。
The outbreak of the global financial crisis to the impact of the economic is unprecedented, encouraging people to financial behavior model and comprehensive reflection of the financial regulatory system.The cycle of the financial system behavior is to cause financial crisis,at least is one of the main reasons to lead to financial system vulnerability.The banking industry is the financial system periodically the cycle of the main components of the action. Studying the cycle of the banking act causes and easing their behavior and reducing the cyclical behavior brings along the banks of the overall economy cycle adverse impact is the emphasis and the foothold of the paper.
The banking industry periodic behavior causes that is not ease of endogenous reason, also with the current capital requirements,a provision requirement,fair value accounting standards and principles and the new capital at city of the periodic potential agreement and regulatory policy caused by external reason has the very big relations.The periodic relief and the establishment of the inverse cycle,be consistent regulatory mechanism that is macro prudent regulatory framework,and an important part of international regulatory reform has become an important content.All the relevant supervisory authorities have in a capital buffer, and a dynamic reserve improvement for the fair value measurement,and amended new capital accord,etc make efforts.However the cycle of banking endogenous factor is very difficult to eliminate,the use of inverse cycle regulatory tools can theoretically produce the periodic relief external cause. Any inverse cycle regulatory tool has shortcomings in practical application and faces various kinds of problems.The determination of reasonable capital buffer in technology is very difficult,and dynamic dial system for there is controversy.Change of accounting standards and the periodic does not change the essence of the economy and these solutions are always debated. Therefore, using inverse cycle tools for supervision is a systematic work. Relevant departments should not only do inverse cycle of regulatory instrument design,but aslo to different tools to the disadvantages of and connection. According to actual condition, selective comprehensive useful and more prudential tools,strengthen risk management capability,while regulators are to improve to economic change and risk chang of sensitive ability.
This paper is divided into four parts:The first part of this paper summarized to choose a background and significance, combining domestic and foreign literature summarizes the macro prudent management about the concept and goals and the banking industry cyclical phenomenon and the inverse cycle regulatory strategy.The second part according to the cyclical banking showed the characteristics of the fluctuating period,through the cycle phenomenon,analysis its inevitable inner reasons and the traditional regulation strategies of external factors for the proposed after about the periodic solution lay the basis.The third part on the combination of the periodic release way, absorb the effective opinions and implementation of these measures put forward the difficulties and challenges, and concluded that the corresponding reference.The fourth part according to China's national conditions put forward the framework of macro prudent basic principles. Macro prudent supervision should be coordination with monetary policy to bring into full play the inverse cycle regulatory and macro policy perfect effect.Finally concludes that Chinese banking supervision measures of inverse cycle. This paper innovation significance is the more comprehensive conclusion and analyze the international banking on the solution of the problem the cyclical slow-release measures, and with China's national conditions seeking common ground while putting aside differences, and puts forward the solution of China's banking industry periodic solution to the problem.
银行业顺周期性行为产生的原因既具有不可消除的内生性原因,也与现行资本要求、拨备计提要求、公允价值会计准则和盯市原则以及新资本协议的潜在顺周期性等监管政策所造成的外部原因有很大关系。怎样建立逆周期的金融监管机制来缓解金融体系顺周期问题已经成为宏观审慎管理框架的首要问题。各国相关监管当局已经在建立资本缓冲、实施动态拨备、改进公允价值计量、修订新资本协议等方面做出了努力。然而银行业内生的顺周期因素很难消除,使用逆周期监管工具只能从理论上缓解产生顺周期性的外部原因。任何逆周期监管工具都存在弊端,在实际应用中也面临着各种问题。确定合理的资本缓冲在技术上非常困难,动态拨备制度也存在着争议,改变会计准则的顺周期性也并没有改变经济的实质,这些解决办法都存在着争议。因此,设计逆周期工具是一项较为复杂的工作,需要相关部门共同合作,不仅要做好逆周期工具的设计,更要明确不同工具的缺点和联系,具体问题具体分析,有选择性地综合运用更多的审慎工具,加强风险的管理能力,同时监管者也要提高对经济变化和风险变化的敏感能力。
基于以上问题的考虑,本文共分为四个部分：第一部分概括了本文的选题背景和意义,结合国内外文献资料总结了关于宏观审慎管理的概念和目标以及银行业顺周期现象和逆周期的监管策略；第二部分根据银行业顺周期性的表现说明顺周期波动的特点,通过顺周期现象分析了其产生的不可避免的内在原因和由于传统监管策略引发的外在原因,为后文提出关于顺周期性的解决办法埋下伏笔；第三部分结合国际上针对顺周期性的缓释办法,吸收有效的意见并提出实施这些办法的困难和挑战,从而得出相应的借鉴意义；第四部分根据我国自身国情提出构建宏观审慎框架的基本原则,宏观审慎监管要与货币政策、财政政策共同协调才能充分发挥出逆周期监管和宏观政策的完美效果,最后总结得出我国银行业逆周期监管的具体措施。本文的创新意义在于选题角度新颖,之前大多数学者是从宏观审慎视角缺失方面对经济波动的巨大影响进行阐述并提出相关对策建议,本文则更加进一步地从宏观审慎监管的一个维度,即时间维度来分析银行业顺周期现象产生机制,并将其分为内、外两大类别,结合国际上提出的解决办法都比以往更加全面、完整。最后分析我国国情有针对性地提出解决我国银行业顺周期问题的监管办法。
The outbreak of the global financial crisis to the impact of the economic is unprecedented, encouraging people to financial behavior model and comprehensive reflection of the financial regulatory system.The cycle of the financial system behavior is to cause financial crisis,at least is one of the main reasons to lead to financial system vulnerability.The banking industry is the financial system periodically the cycle of the main components of the action. Studying the cycle of the banking act causes and easing their behavior and reducing the cyclical behavior brings along the banks of the overall economy cycle adverse impact is the emphasis and the foothold of the paper.
The banking industry periodic behavior causes that is not ease of endogenous reason, also with the current capital requirements,a provision requirement,fair value accounting standards and principles and the new capital at city of the periodic potential agreement and regulatory policy caused by external reason has the very big relations.The periodic relief and the establishment of the inverse cycle,be consistent regulatory mechanism that is macro prudent regulatory framework,and an important part of international regulatory reform has become an important content.All the relevant supervisory authorities have in a capital buffer, and a dynamic reserve improvement for the fair value measurement,and amended new capital accord,etc make efforts.However the cycle of banking endogenous factor is very difficult to eliminate,the use of inverse cycle regulatory tools can theoretically produce the periodic relief external cause. Any inverse cycle regulatory tool has shortcomings in practical application and faces various kinds of problems.The determination of reasonable capital buffer in technology is very difficult,and dynamic dial system for there is controversy.Change of accounting standards and the periodic does not change the essence of the economy and these solutions are always debated. Therefore, using inverse cycle tools for supervision is a systematic work. Relevant departments should not only do inverse cycle of regulatory instrument design,but aslo to different tools to the disadvantages of and connection. According to actual condition, selective comprehensive useful and more prudential tools,strengthen risk management capability,while regulators are to improve to economic change and risk chang of sensitive ability.
This paper is divided into four parts:The first part of this paper summarized to choose a background and significance, combining domestic and foreign literature summarizes the macro prudent management about the concept and goals and the banking industry cyclical phenomenon and the inverse cycle regulatory strategy.The second part according to the cyclical banking showed the characteristics of the fluctuating period,through the cycle phenomenon,analysis its inevitable inner reasons and the traditional regulation strategies of external factors for the proposed after about the periodic solution lay the basis.The third part on the combination of the periodic release way, absorb the effective opinions and implementation of these measures put forward the difficulties and challenges, and concluded that the corresponding reference.The fourth part according to China's national conditions put forward the framework of macro prudent basic principles. Macro prudent supervision should be coordination with monetary policy to bring into full play the inverse cycle regulatory and macro policy perfect effect.Finally concludes that Chinese banking supervision measures of inverse cycle. This paper innovation significance is the more comprehensive conclusion and analyze the international banking on the solution of the problem the cyclical slow-release measures, and with China's national conditions seeking common ground while putting aside differences, and puts forward the solution of China's banking industry periodic solution to the problem.
引文
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[2]陈颖,尹一婷.逆经济周期的审慎监管制度：动态准备金及其实践[J].商业银行经营管理,2009,(1)：48-51.
[3]陈华,刘宁.银行业顺周期形成机理与逆周期监管工具研究[J].金融教学与研究,2011,(1)：2-9.
[4]陈璐.银行信贷的顺周期性与逆周期政策选择[J].商业银行经营管理,2010,(1)：34-40.
[5]付刚.宏观审慎管理与系统性金融风险防范思考[J].金融发展研究,2010,(10)：60-63.
[6]高志勇.系统性风险与宏观审慎监管——基于美国银行业的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2010,(5)：12-18.
[7]郭田勇.逆周期管理是金融宏观审慎管理制度重要内容[N].金融时报,2010-11-15(001).
[8]何嘉萍.会计准则顺周期效应的逆周期操作——基于金融危机背景下的研究[J].上海金融,2010,(5)：36-42.
[9]黄世忠.公允价值会计的顺周期效应及其应对策略[J].会计研究,2009(11)：23-29.
[10][韩]金亨泰.危机后的金融体系框架—全球金融改革及其对韩国的意义[J].金融评论,2009：15-18.
[11]刘春航、李文泓.关于建立宏观审慎监管框架与逆周期政策机制的思考[J],比较,2009,(4)：23-26.
[12]刘训敏.浅议金融监管顺周期性[J].合作经济与科技,2010,(2)：74-75.
[13]刘泽云.宏观审慎监管与宏观调控政策的协调[J].中国财政,2011,(11)：72-74.
[14]李文泓.关于宏观审慎监管框架下逆周期政策的探讨[J].金融研究,2009,(7)：7-24.
[15]李祥、李娟.我国银行业发展中的顺周期性研究[J].金融实务,2010,(10)： 49-50.
[16]李瑞红.逆周期监管工具、机制与中国的选择[J].金融与经济,2010, (2)：64-66.
[17]李东卫.经济下行视角下的逆周期监管[J].现代乡镇,2009,(8)：24-28.
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