存在纵向一体化成员的专利联盟效应研究
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摘要
在知识经济和全球一体化的背景下,专利联盟正在促进行业技术标准形成,推动行业技术发展等方面发挥着举足轻重的作用,也正因此专利联盟日益受到跨国公司的青睐,并成为其发挥知识优势、垄断许可市场、构筑技术壁垒的有力工具。经过多年的发展,专利联盟的组织形式和运行机制正在发生着变化,当前的专利联盟已不再仅仅是单纯的专利许可机构,更在相关产品生产领域发挥着领导者地位。同时,存在大量纵向一体化成员的专利联盟正在成为当前联盟的主体,这一变化的出现深刻地改变着专利联盟在许可和创新两个方面的表现,为此十分有必要从理论和实证的角度对上述问题进行深入研究,这对于中国政府和企业,加大专利联盟认识,掌握联盟运行规律,进而有效规制跨国专利联盟,组建以中国企业为主的专利联盟,并通过有效的组织和运行实现许可收益和创新产出的持续增加都具有重要的理论和实现意义。
本文旨在将纵向结构引入到对专利联盟的理论研究中来,研究存在纵向一体化成员的专利联盟效应问题,通过对现有研究的综述识别当前研究存在的不足,并在对专利联盟概念界定的基础上进行了两方面的研究。首先,将纵向结构引入到联盟许可价格博弈中来,并通过构建理论模型求解行业不同许可结构下的均衡许可价格、行业产量和产品价格,实现对许可效应相关问题的研究。其次,通过分析联盟建立预期、许可收益分配、独立许可限制等影响因素的考察,研究联盟建立前后的创新产出变化情况,并通过比较不同条件下联盟成员和外部企业的创新激励问题,研究专利联盟的创新效应问题。
通过分析,本文的主要结论包括:
(1)专利联盟能将外部性内部化可有效避免专利权人间“囚徒困境”,从而许可价格更低;
(2)当不存在专利联盟时,纵向一体化企业排挤专业生产者,同时受到产品生产环节影响许可价格低于专业研发者,而当存在专利联盟时,不存在排挤现象,且均衡条件下,许可价格更低,产品价格更低,行业产量更大。
(3)在专利价值差异情况下,联盟建立预期能够显著提升行业创新产出水平,并且相比而言,对希望加入联盟的企业而言影响更大。而当联盟建立后,企业的创新激励都会受到许可收益分配方式和独立许可条件影响,同时也与联盟拥有专利数量有关。
(4)不同类型间成员存在创新差异,且它们之间的创新投入存在互补关系。
In the knowledge-based economy and global integration, patent pools have played a very important role in the standard setting, and become to be one of the most important factors of industrial technology development. Because of those reasons, patent pools has been used as a effective tools by the multinational companies to demonstrate their comparative advantage in IPR, monopolize the patent licensing market and form technology barriers. After many years of development, the type of organization and operating mechanism of the patent pools had changed a lot, nowadays the patent pools is not only a patent licensing organization but also the leader of the production market, the patent pools which have vertical integrated company has become to be the main body of the patent pools. This has caused remarkable changes in the licensing and innovation of the patent pools, so it is necessary to study the question both in theoretical and empirical field. I hope by doing this can make both Chinese government and enterprises raise the awareness of patent pools, understand the running rules, and know how to deal with the challenge caused by the international patent pools, and it has important theoretical and practical significance for Chinese enterprises to use patent pools as a useful tool to achieve license revenue and continued increase of innovation output.
This article aimed to put vertical structure into the theory study, and analyzed the effect of patent pools which have vertical integrated company. On the bases of a review of current research, and according to the shortcomings of current research, we defined the concept of the patent pools and analyzed two main problems. Firstly, I introduced the vertical integrated structure into the license pricing setting games, and by building a theoretical model to solve the equilibrium licensing price, industry output and product prices under different licensing structures. Secondly, by analyzing the establish expectation, licensing income distribution, license restrictions and so on, we studied the difference between before and after the pools establishment, and by comparing the Alliance members' and external enterprise' incentives to innovate under different conditions, we study the innovative effects of patent pools.
According to my analysis, the main results are as follow:
(1) By internalize the externalities, patent pools can effectively avoid the "prisoner's dilemma" between the patent owners and decrease the license price.
(2) Vertically integrated companies also have an impact on the social effects, that is when the patent pool does not exist, Vertically integrated companies tend to exclude the professional producers and set a lower license price compared to the professional R&D organization. When there is patent pools, under some certain conditions, there is a lower license price, production price, industrial production, and compared to professional R&D organization, Vertically integrated companies have more incentive to join the patent pools.
(3) When there is difference whether the patent can be one of the patent pools'. The establishment of patent pools will raise the speed of innovation output of the industry, and comparatively speaking, it has a heavier effect of the companies which want to be one of the members. After the formation of the pools, the innovation incentive will be effected by the distribution model of the licensing revenue, independent licensing and the number of the patent pools' patents.
(4) There are differences between different kinds of companies, and there is a strategy complementary relationship between different companies' innovation investment.
本文旨在将纵向结构引入到对专利联盟的理论研究中来,研究存在纵向一体化成员的专利联盟效应问题,通过对现有研究的综述识别当前研究存在的不足,并在对专利联盟概念界定的基础上进行了两方面的研究。首先,将纵向结构引入到联盟许可价格博弈中来,并通过构建理论模型求解行业不同许可结构下的均衡许可价格、行业产量和产品价格,实现对许可效应相关问题的研究。其次,通过分析联盟建立预期、许可收益分配、独立许可限制等影响因素的考察,研究联盟建立前后的创新产出变化情况,并通过比较不同条件下联盟成员和外部企业的创新激励问题,研究专利联盟的创新效应问题。
通过分析,本文的主要结论包括:
(1)专利联盟能将外部性内部化可有效避免专利权人间“囚徒困境”,从而许可价格更低;
(2)当不存在专利联盟时,纵向一体化企业排挤专业生产者,同时受到产品生产环节影响许可价格低于专业研发者,而当存在专利联盟时,不存在排挤现象,且均衡条件下,许可价格更低,产品价格更低,行业产量更大。
(3)在专利价值差异情况下,联盟建立预期能够显著提升行业创新产出水平,并且相比而言,对希望加入联盟的企业而言影响更大。而当联盟建立后,企业的创新激励都会受到许可收益分配方式和独立许可条件影响,同时也与联盟拥有专利数量有关。
(4)不同类型间成员存在创新差异,且它们之间的创新投入存在互补关系。
In the knowledge-based economy and global integration, patent pools have played a very important role in the standard setting, and become to be one of the most important factors of industrial technology development. Because of those reasons, patent pools has been used as a effective tools by the multinational companies to demonstrate their comparative advantage in IPR, monopolize the patent licensing market and form technology barriers. After many years of development, the type of organization and operating mechanism of the patent pools had changed a lot, nowadays the patent pools is not only a patent licensing organization but also the leader of the production market, the patent pools which have vertical integrated company has become to be the main body of the patent pools. This has caused remarkable changes in the licensing and innovation of the patent pools, so it is necessary to study the question both in theoretical and empirical field. I hope by doing this can make both Chinese government and enterprises raise the awareness of patent pools, understand the running rules, and know how to deal with the challenge caused by the international patent pools, and it has important theoretical and practical significance for Chinese enterprises to use patent pools as a useful tool to achieve license revenue and continued increase of innovation output.
This article aimed to put vertical structure into the theory study, and analyzed the effect of patent pools which have vertical integrated company. On the bases of a review of current research, and according to the shortcomings of current research, we defined the concept of the patent pools and analyzed two main problems. Firstly, I introduced the vertical integrated structure into the license pricing setting games, and by building a theoretical model to solve the equilibrium licensing price, industry output and product prices under different licensing structures. Secondly, by analyzing the establish expectation, licensing income distribution, license restrictions and so on, we studied the difference between before and after the pools establishment, and by comparing the Alliance members' and external enterprise' incentives to innovate under different conditions, we study the innovative effects of patent pools.
According to my analysis, the main results are as follow:
(1) By internalize the externalities, patent pools can effectively avoid the "prisoner's dilemma" between the patent owners and decrease the license price.
(2) Vertically integrated companies also have an impact on the social effects, that is when the patent pool does not exist, Vertically integrated companies tend to exclude the professional producers and set a lower license price compared to the professional R&D organization. When there is patent pools, under some certain conditions, there is a lower license price, production price, industrial production, and compared to professional R&D organization, Vertically integrated companies have more incentive to join the patent pools.
(3) When there is difference whether the patent can be one of the patent pools'. The establishment of patent pools will raise the speed of innovation output of the industry, and comparatively speaking, it has a heavier effect of the companies which want to be one of the members. After the formation of the pools, the innovation incentive will be effected by the distribution model of the licensing revenue, independent licensing and the number of the patent pools' patents.
(4) There are differences between different kinds of companies, and there is a strategy complementary relationship between different companies' innovation investment.
引文
[1]Anne Layne-Farrar,Josh Lerner.To join or not to join:examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules[J].http://ssrn.com/abstract=945189.
[2]顾保国,缪荣.专利联盟:提升中国企业竞争力的重要战略[J].求是,2007(11):27-29.
[3]詹映,朱雪忠.标准和专利战的主角——专利池解析[J].研究与发展管理,2007,19(1):92-99.
[4]刘林青,谭力文,赵浩兴.专利丛林、专利组合和专利联盟[J].研究与发展管理,2006,18(4):83-89.
[5]Shapiro C.Navigating the Patent Thicket Cross Licenses:Patent Pools and Standard Setting[C].Innov -ation Policy and the Economy,Volume I,MIT Press,2001.
[6]Heller M A,Eisenberg R S.Can patents deter innovations? The anticommons in biomedical research [J].Science,1998,280:698-701.
[7]Arundel,A.,van de Paal,G.,Soete,L..Innovation Strategies of Europeans Larges Industrial Firms:Results ofthe PACE Survey 23,European Innovation Monitoring System[J].European Commission,Brussels,1995.
[8]Cohen,W.,Nelson,R.R.,Walsh,J..Protecting their intellectual assets:appropriability conditions and why U.S.manufacturing firms patent(or not).NBER Working Paper,7552.Cambridge,MA,2000.
[9]Schalk et al.Wissensverbreitung und Diffusionsdynamik im Spannungsfeld zwischen innovierenden und imitierenden Unternehmen[J/OL],M(u|¨)nchen:Ifo-Institut f(u|¨)r Wirtschaftsforschung,1999.
[10]Blind K,Edler J,Frietsch R,Schmoch U.Motives to patent:empirical evidence from Germany [J].Research Policy,2006(35):655-667.
[11]Robert P,Merges.Institutions for intellectual property transactions the case of patent pools[EB/OL].Working Paper,1999.http://www.kw.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools pdf.
[12]Lerner J,Jean T.Efficient patent pools[J].American Economic Review,2004(94):691-711.
[13]Lerner et al.The design of patent pools:the determinants of licensing rules[J].The Rand Journal of Economics,2007,38(3):610-625.
[14]Kato A.Patent pool enhances market competition[J].International Review of Law and Economics,2004,24(2):255-268.
[15]Brenner S.Stable Patent pools[C].Berlin:IM-Research Paper,2004.
[16]Brenner S.Optimal formation rules for patent pools[C].Berlin:Humboldt University Berlin,2006.
[17]Reiko,Sadao.Coalition formation for a consortium standard through a standard body and a patent pool:theory and evidence from MPEG2,DVD and 3G[J].IIR working Paper,2005.
[18]Shapiro.Patent holdup and royalty stacking[J].texas law review,2006,85:2164-2173.
[19]Choi.Patent pools and cross-licensing in the shadow of patent litigation[J/OL].http://www.msu.edu/chiojay,2003.
[20]Nanyun Zhang.Incomplete patent pools[J].Preliminary Working Paper,2004.http://www.msu.edu/chiojay,2003.
[21]Kim.Vertical Structure and patent pools[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2004(25):231-250.
[22]杜晓君,梅开.基于纵向一体化结构的专利联盟效应分析[J].预测,2009,28(2):37-41.
[23]Schmidt K M.Complementary patents and market structure[J].GESY working papers,2008.
[24]Richard E.The Rationale for Patent Pools and Their Effect on Competition[D],Faculty of Law University of Lund,2003.
[25]李玉剑.专利联盟:战略联盟研究的新领域[M].上海,复旦大学出版社,2006.
[26]Daniel.Research vs.Development:Patent Pooling,Innovation and Standardization in the Software Industry[J].Marshall Review,2002.
[27]Farrar et al.Pricing patents in standard setting organisations:making sense of FRAND commitment [J].CFPR Discussion Paper no.6025,2006.
[28]Richard J,Gilber M L,Katz.Should good patents come in small packages? A welfare analysis of Intellectual property bunding[J].Institute of Business and Economic Research,2007(1):1-39.
[29]徐明华,陈锦其.专利联盟许可费分配模式研究:一个电路模型[J].科研管理,2007,28(6):143-148.
[30]Aoki R,Nagaoka S.The consortium standard and patent pools[J].The Economic Review,2005,55(4):346-356.
[31]Vianney D,Bruno V.Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D[J].Document Detravail Working Paper,2007.
[32]Kwon et al.Effects Of Patent Pools On Innovation Investment-Ex Ante Perspectives[J].Journal of Business and Rconomics Research,2008,6(7):27-42.
[33]Serafino D.Survey of patent pools demonstrates Variety of purposes and management structures[J].KEI Research Note,2007.
[34]任声策,宣国良专利联盟中的组织学习与技术能力提升[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2006(9):96-102.
[35]Farrar L,Lerner J.To join or not to join:examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules [J/OL].(2008,1,7).http://ssrn.com/abstract=945189.
[36]Ryan L et al.Do patent pools encourage innovation? evidence from the 19th century sewing machine industry[J].NEBR Working Paper 15061,2009.
[37]Klein J.Cross-licensing and antitrust law,address before the American intellectual property law association[J/OL].(2004,04,17).Http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1118him,
[38]Jeanne et al.Patent Pools:A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents?[J].USPTO Working Paper,2000.
[39]David S.Survey of patent pools demonstrates variety of purposes and management structures[J].KEI Research Note,2007.
[40]任声策.专利联盟中的企业专利战略[D].上海:上海交通大学,2007.
[4l]胡春民.DVD3C联盟遭中国企业起诉[EB/OL].(2005,1,20).http://pdf.cena.com.cn/aspimages/2005pdf/050120/JD0220.Pdf
[42]朱雪忠,詹映,蒋逊明.技术标准下的专利池对我国自主创新的影响研究[J].科研管理,2007,28(2):180-186.
[43]冯震宇,李文贤,张荣吉等.产业标准与专利授权之研究[EB/OL].(2005,03,13).http://tim.nccu.edu.iw/mmot/seminar/92/IPR3.pdf.
[2]顾保国,缪荣.专利联盟:提升中国企业竞争力的重要战略[J].求是,2007(11):27-29.
[3]詹映,朱雪忠.标准和专利战的主角——专利池解析[J].研究与发展管理,2007,19(1):92-99.
[4]刘林青,谭力文,赵浩兴.专利丛林、专利组合和专利联盟[J].研究与发展管理,2006,18(4):83-89.
[5]Shapiro C.Navigating the Patent Thicket Cross Licenses:Patent Pools and Standard Setting[C].Innov -ation Policy and the Economy,Volume I,MIT Press,2001.
[6]Heller M A,Eisenberg R S.Can patents deter innovations? The anticommons in biomedical research [J].Science,1998,280:698-701.
[7]Arundel,A.,van de Paal,G.,Soete,L..Innovation Strategies of Europeans Larges Industrial Firms:Results ofthe PACE Survey 23,European Innovation Monitoring System[J].European Commission,Brussels,1995.
[8]Cohen,W.,Nelson,R.R.,Walsh,J..Protecting their intellectual assets:appropriability conditions and why U.S.manufacturing firms patent(or not).NBER Working Paper,7552.Cambridge,MA,2000.
[9]Schalk et al.Wissensverbreitung und Diffusionsdynamik im Spannungsfeld zwischen innovierenden und imitierenden Unternehmen[J/OL],M(u|¨)nchen:Ifo-Institut f(u|¨)r Wirtschaftsforschung,1999.
[10]Blind K,Edler J,Frietsch R,Schmoch U.Motives to patent:empirical evidence from Germany [J].Research Policy,2006(35):655-667.
[11]Robert P,Merges.Institutions for intellectual property transactions the case of patent pools[EB/OL].Working Paper,1999.http://www.kw.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools pdf.
[12]Lerner J,Jean T.Efficient patent pools[J].American Economic Review,2004(94):691-711.
[13]Lerner et al.The design of patent pools:the determinants of licensing rules[J].The Rand Journal of Economics,2007,38(3):610-625.
[14]Kato A.Patent pool enhances market competition[J].International Review of Law and Economics,2004,24(2):255-268.
[15]Brenner S.Stable Patent pools[C].Berlin:IM-Research Paper,2004.
[16]Brenner S.Optimal formation rules for patent pools[C].Berlin:Humboldt University Berlin,2006.
[17]Reiko,Sadao.Coalition formation for a consortium standard through a standard body and a patent pool:theory and evidence from MPEG2,DVD and 3G[J].IIR working Paper,2005.
[18]Shapiro.Patent holdup and royalty stacking[J].texas law review,2006,85:2164-2173.
[19]Choi.Patent pools and cross-licensing in the shadow of patent litigation[J/OL].http://www.msu.edu/chiojay,2003.
[20]Nanyun Zhang.Incomplete patent pools[J].Preliminary Working Paper,2004.http://www.msu.edu/chiojay,2003.
[21]Kim.Vertical Structure and patent pools[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2004(25):231-250.
[22]杜晓君,梅开.基于纵向一体化结构的专利联盟效应分析[J].预测,2009,28(2):37-41.
[23]Schmidt K M.Complementary patents and market structure[J].GESY working papers,2008.
[24]Richard E.The Rationale for Patent Pools and Their Effect on Competition[D],Faculty of Law University of Lund,2003.
[25]李玉剑.专利联盟:战略联盟研究的新领域[M].上海,复旦大学出版社,2006.
[26]Daniel.Research vs.Development:Patent Pooling,Innovation and Standardization in the Software Industry[J].Marshall Review,2002.
[27]Farrar et al.Pricing patents in standard setting organisations:making sense of FRAND commitment [J].CFPR Discussion Paper no.6025,2006.
[28]Richard J,Gilber M L,Katz.Should good patents come in small packages? A welfare analysis of Intellectual property bunding[J].Institute of Business and Economic Research,2007(1):1-39.
[29]徐明华,陈锦其.专利联盟许可费分配模式研究:一个电路模型[J].科研管理,2007,28(6):143-148.
[30]Aoki R,Nagaoka S.The consortium standard and patent pools[J].The Economic Review,2005,55(4):346-356.
[31]Vianney D,Bruno V.Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D[J].Document Detravail Working Paper,2007.
[32]Kwon et al.Effects Of Patent Pools On Innovation Investment-Ex Ante Perspectives[J].Journal of Business and Rconomics Research,2008,6(7):27-42.
[33]Serafino D.Survey of patent pools demonstrates Variety of purposes and management structures[J].KEI Research Note,2007.
[34]任声策,宣国良专利联盟中的组织学习与技术能力提升[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2006(9):96-102.
[35]Farrar L,Lerner J.To join or not to join:examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules [J/OL].(2008,1,7).http://ssrn.com/abstract=945189.
[36]Ryan L et al.Do patent pools encourage innovation? evidence from the 19th century sewing machine industry[J].NEBR Working Paper 15061,2009.
[37]Klein J.Cross-licensing and antitrust law,address before the American intellectual property law association[J/OL].(2004,04,17).Http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1118him,
[38]Jeanne et al.Patent Pools:A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents?[J].USPTO Working Paper,2000.
[39]David S.Survey of patent pools demonstrates variety of purposes and management structures[J].KEI Research Note,2007.
[40]任声策.专利联盟中的企业专利战略[D].上海:上海交通大学,2007.
[4l]胡春民.DVD3C联盟遭中国企业起诉[EB/OL].(2005,1,20).http://pdf.cena.com.cn/aspimages/2005pdf/050120/JD0220.Pdf
[42]朱雪忠,詹映,蒋逊明.技术标准下的专利池对我国自主创新的影响研究[J].科研管理,2007,28(2):180-186.
[43]冯震宇,李文贤,张荣吉等.产业标准与专利授权之研究[EB/OL].(2005,03,13).http://tim.nccu.edu.iw/mmot/seminar/92/IPR3.pdf.
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