排污权初始分配研究
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摘要
补偿政策、基于率的排污权交易以及总量控制型排污权交易(CAT)是排污权交易政策的三种基本模式。其中,只有CAT是需要进行排污权初始分配的。在已有的CAT实践中,酸雨计划和区域清洁激励市场计划(R计划)以其卓越的减排成就和减排成本控制效能成为CAT的经典案例。国内对它们的研究甚少,对它们的排污权初始分配方案研究更少。鉴于此,本文将把它们作为分析对象,从中找出排污权初始分配方案设计的一般规律,服务中国的排污权交易实践。
对排污权的定义是确立排污权初始分配方案的基础,但国内许多学者认为排污权是物权,这种观点有待商榷。因此,本文首先需要在中国的语境下重新定义排污权。通过研究发现排污权具有以下两点权力属性:(1)排污权不是私人财产,所以不是“神圣不可侵犯”,为了公众的健康和福利,在法定条件下可以对排污权的使用作出限制甚至是修改;(2)在特定的法律框架下允许排污权交易且排污权交易受到保护。以此为基础在中国的语境下对排污权做如下定义:排污权是指政府通过行政许可授予行政相对人的一种公权利,而不是物权,这种公权利是在法律一般禁止以及优先保障民众健康和福利的前提下,为了发展经济,政府免除企业相应减排责任的有限授权。
接着,通过研究酸雨计划的排污权初始分配结构,发现需要从公平﹑减排压力适当﹑供求关系平衡三个方面去设计排污权初始分配方案。通过研究加州电力危机下的R计划,发现排污权初始分配方案可能存在结构性的问题,在外部关联市场发生动荡时,该问题可能被激发出来,导致市场失灵,为应对市场失灵的危局,需从以下三方面进行风险控制:(1)强化技术减排;(2)增加市场透明度;(3)设置调整机制。
最后,在上述研究的基础上,针对渐进式减排战略指导下的CAT,分纵向结构设计和横向结构设计两部分,提出了一种具有通用性的排污权初始分配结构设计框架。该设计框架在纵向结构设计阶段将CAT分为一阶段CAT和两阶段CAT,分别给出了各自的排污权初始分配方法,具有普遍的适用性,将帮助中国的环境管理者有效地解决排污权初始分配的难题。
There are three basic models: offset policy, rate-based emission trading and cap-and-trade policy(CAT). Initial allocation of emission rights has to be done only in CAT. In the existing CAT practice, the Acid Rain Program and the Regional Clean Incentive Marketing Plan (R Plan) for its outstanding achievements and abatement costs of control performance to become a classic case of CAT. There is little research on their country, and less on their initial allocation of emission rights scheme. In view of this, they will be analyzed in the paper to find out the general rules of design on the initial allocation of emission rights and to servise China's emission trading practice.
Design idea on initial allocation scheme of emission rights is based on a knowledge of emission rights, but the knowledge of emission rights in china is not built on the basis of abundant emission trading practices. Therefore, this paper will rebuild the basic concept of emission right. By studying the U.S. understanding of emission right, emission rights in the United States that has the following two characteristics: (1)Permits are not private property, so it is not "sacred" .For public health and welfare, the use of emission rights can be restricted or even modified in the statutory conditions; (2)Emissions trading will be allowed and protected in a specific legal framework. Based on this, emission right in the context of Chinese is definited a public right granted by government, not property rights.
Then, by studying initial allocation structure of emission rights in the acid rain program, it is finded that the emission trading policy desighers have to think of the initial allocation of emission rights from the market's point of view. While the emission right market is a market of the strong administration sense, and it is necessary to establish appropriate Institutional arrangements for market supply. By studying R plan when the California electricity crisis hit it, it is found that may there may be structural problems in the initial allocation scheme of emission rights. Associated in the external market turmoil, these problems may be excited. This time there are the following three aspects of risk control: (1) strengthen the technical emission reduction; (2) to increase market transparency; (3) set adjustment mechanism.
Finally, on the basis of these studies, a universal design framework for initial allocation structure of emission rights is developed. The design framework is universally applicable of CAT for the gradual reduction strategy, and it will help China's environmental managers to effectively solve the problem of initial allocation of emission rights.
对排污权的定义是确立排污权初始分配方案的基础,但国内许多学者认为排污权是物权,这种观点有待商榷。因此,本文首先需要在中国的语境下重新定义排污权。通过研究发现排污权具有以下两点权力属性:(1)排污权不是私人财产,所以不是“神圣不可侵犯”,为了公众的健康和福利,在法定条件下可以对排污权的使用作出限制甚至是修改;(2)在特定的法律框架下允许排污权交易且排污权交易受到保护。以此为基础在中国的语境下对排污权做如下定义:排污权是指政府通过行政许可授予行政相对人的一种公权利,而不是物权,这种公权利是在法律一般禁止以及优先保障民众健康和福利的前提下,为了发展经济,政府免除企业相应减排责任的有限授权。
接着,通过研究酸雨计划的排污权初始分配结构,发现需要从公平﹑减排压力适当﹑供求关系平衡三个方面去设计排污权初始分配方案。通过研究加州电力危机下的R计划,发现排污权初始分配方案可能存在结构性的问题,在外部关联市场发生动荡时,该问题可能被激发出来,导致市场失灵,为应对市场失灵的危局,需从以下三方面进行风险控制:(1)强化技术减排;(2)增加市场透明度;(3)设置调整机制。
最后,在上述研究的基础上,针对渐进式减排战略指导下的CAT,分纵向结构设计和横向结构设计两部分,提出了一种具有通用性的排污权初始分配结构设计框架。该设计框架在纵向结构设计阶段将CAT分为一阶段CAT和两阶段CAT,分别给出了各自的排污权初始分配方法,具有普遍的适用性,将帮助中国的环境管理者有效地解决排污权初始分配的难题。
There are three basic models: offset policy, rate-based emission trading and cap-and-trade policy(CAT). Initial allocation of emission rights has to be done only in CAT. In the existing CAT practice, the Acid Rain Program and the Regional Clean Incentive Marketing Plan (R Plan) for its outstanding achievements and abatement costs of control performance to become a classic case of CAT. There is little research on their country, and less on their initial allocation of emission rights scheme. In view of this, they will be analyzed in the paper to find out the general rules of design on the initial allocation of emission rights and to servise China's emission trading practice.
Design idea on initial allocation scheme of emission rights is based on a knowledge of emission rights, but the knowledge of emission rights in china is not built on the basis of abundant emission trading practices. Therefore, this paper will rebuild the basic concept of emission right. By studying the U.S. understanding of emission right, emission rights in the United States that has the following two characteristics: (1)Permits are not private property, so it is not "sacred" .For public health and welfare, the use of emission rights can be restricted or even modified in the statutory conditions; (2)Emissions trading will be allowed and protected in a specific legal framework. Based on this, emission right in the context of Chinese is definited a public right granted by government, not property rights.
Then, by studying initial allocation structure of emission rights in the acid rain program, it is finded that the emission trading policy desighers have to think of the initial allocation of emission rights from the market's point of view. While the emission right market is a market of the strong administration sense, and it is necessary to establish appropriate Institutional arrangements for market supply. By studying R plan when the California electricity crisis hit it, it is found that may there may be structural problems in the initial allocation scheme of emission rights. Associated in the external market turmoil, these problems may be excited. This time there are the following three aspects of risk control: (1) strengthen the technical emission reduction; (2) to increase market transparency; (3) set adjustment mechanism.
Finally, on the basis of these studies, a universal design framework for initial allocation structure of emission rights is developed. The design framework is universally applicable of CAT for the gradual reduction strategy, and it will help China's environmental managers to effectively solve the problem of initial allocation of emission rights.
引文
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[7]吴健,马中.美国排污权交易政策的演进及其对中国的启示[J].北京:环境保护,2004(8): 59-64.
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[2] Coase, The Problem of Social Cost[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics, 1960(3).
[3]吴健.排污权交易:环境容量管理制度创新[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005:137-142.
[4]傅佳慧.环境保护法中经济引导机制的研究[D].北京:中国地质大学,2008.
[5]张艳阳.基于环境会计的排污权交易制度研究[D].北京:北京交通大学,2006.
[6]安丽.基于可持续发展的排污权交易有效性研究[D].天津:天津大学,2009.
[7]吴健,马中.美国排污权交易政策的演进及其对中国的启示[J].北京:环境保护,2004(8): 59-64.
[8]吴志春,杜雨祥.规范排污权交易促进可持续发展[J].上海:上海环境科学,2001,20(12): 580-581.
[9]王金南等.二氧化硫排放交易:中国的可行性[M].北京:中国环境科学出版社,2009.
[10]蒋静秋.太原市二氧化硫排污交易计量方法研究[J].太原:科技情报开发与经济,2005, 15(20):180-182.
[11]徐学勤.嘉兴市排污权交易的实践与思考[J].北京:现代商业,2010(9):185-186.
[12]金浩波.江苏太湖流域排污权交易试点实践[J].北京:环境保护,2010(19):50-52.
[13]宁晓伟.我国排污权交易与排污收费制度整合问题研究[D].郑州:河南大学,2010.
[14]王金南,董战峰等.排污交易制度的最新实践与展望[J].北京:环境经济,2008(10):31-45.
[15]王小龙.排污权交易研究:一个环境法学的视角[M].北京:法律出版社,2008.
[16]谢芳成.环境监测制度探析[J].济南:科技信息,2006(8):94-95.
[17]洛克.政府论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2009.
[18]孟德斯鸠.论法的精神[M].西安:陕西人民出版社,2001.
[19]周辉.行政法的使命与核心——以“特权”理论和特别权力关系理论的嬗变为视角[EB/OL]. http://kbs.cnki.net/forums/22570/ShowThread.aspx,2007-4-28/2011-4-18.
[20] Reich. The New Property[J]. The Yale Law Journal, 1964,73(5):733-788.
[21] Dale, J. H. Land, Water and Ownership[J].Canadian Journal of Economics, 1968(1): 791 -804.
[22] SCAQMD. Over a Dozen Years of RECLAIM Implementation Key Lessons Learned in California’s First Air Pollution Cap-and-Trade Program [EB/OL].(2007-6)[2011-4-19].http:// normanswei.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/reclaim-policy_paper_part1.pdf: I-3-1-I-3-12.
[23]韩铁.美国法律史研究中有关私人产权的几个问题[EB/OL].( 2008-9-27)[2011-4-19] http: //www.how2usa.com/ ContentDetail/301994993.html.
[24]邓海峰.排污权:一种基于私法语境下的解读[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2008.
[25] A.Denny Ellerman.Considerations for Designing a Tradeable Permit System to Control SO2 Emissions in China [R/OL].(2006-8-3)[2011-4-19].http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/publications/workingpapers/2001-009.pdf:13.
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[27] EPA.Acid Rain Program:Annual Progress Report,1996[R/OL].(1997-6)[2011-4-11].http:// www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/docs/1996report.pdf:11.
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