幼儿反事实思维的发展及其与心理理论的关系研究
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摘要
在心理上对过去已经发生的事件进行否定进而建构一种可能性假设的思维活动,称为反事实思维(counterfactual thinking)。它是人类意识的一个重要特性。以往关于反事实思维的研究其研究对象大部分来自成人。近年来学前儿童的反事实思维也日益引起研究者的关注。我国对此方面的研究几近空白。本研究首先介绍了反事实思维的概念与类型、产生过程及功能;然后对国外有关儿童反事实思维的发展及其与心理理论等其他心理活动之间的关系等方面的研究成果、主要理论观点及研究方法进行了较为详尽的文献综述;接下来分析了该领域的研究所存在的问题;最后在此基础上进行了两项研究,对3-5儿童反事实思维的发展及其与心理理论的关系进行了探讨。
有关研究表明,部分年幼儿童不能进行反事实推理,而且出现所谓的“现实错误”。已有研究尚不能对出现这种“现实错误”的原因做出明确回答。鉴于此,研究一进行了4个系列实验,层层推进,从执行性功能的角度(主要是抑制控制和工作记忆两个方面)对幼儿在反事实推理中出现错误的原因进行了系统探讨,以期进一步揭示其内部机制。实验1首先验证了幼儿在反事实推理中是否真正出现所谓的“现实错误”。实验2进一步探究如果幼儿出现了所谓的“现实错误”,那么不能抑制现实的优势信息是否是幼儿出现现实错误的原因。实验3改善了反事实替代物的相对可利用性,维持幼儿获取的现实信息不变,而以此来判定反事实替代物的高利用性是否可以使其更容易抑制现实而影响幼儿反事实推理的表现。实验4对执行性功能中的另一重要成分——工作记忆与反事实思维的关系进行了探究,从而对“幼儿之所以不能进行反事实推理可能就是其工作记忆资源的有限性所致”这一假设进行了验证。
幼儿反事实思维的发展与其心理理论能力的关系近年来逐步成为发展心理学比较关注的问题。幼儿反事实思维是否是其心理理论产生的基础、两者有没有共同的发展主题、还是两者根本不存在任何联系,对此目前尚无定论。鉴于此,研究二引入了新的研究方法——连环画法,连同已往的故事法对两种不同类型的反事实推理(结果反事实推理和前提反事实推理)与心理理论的关系进行了全面考察。
上述两项研究的结果表明:
(1) 幼儿在反事实推理中的确会出现现实错误。在现实错误之外,幼儿在三种选择任务中也会选择现实和正确答案之外的第三个选项。
(2) 幼儿在反事实推理任务中出现的错误反映了反事实推理中所特有的困难,而不是由于幼儿不能抑制现实的优势信息所致。
(3) 反事实替代情境的改善(提高反事实替代的可利用性)并没有提高幼儿反事实推理能力的表现。
(4) 反事实推理任务与数数命名和敲击命名两个工作记忆任务之间呈显著的正相关,
Counterfactual thinking, generally, refers to an understanding of events that are "counter to reality" or false and involves comparing reality to an imagined alternative. It is an important characteristic of human consciousness. Counterfactual thinking in adult cognition has been a topic of great interest to researchers for many years. Recently researchers began to focus on its development in young children. However, there was seldom research on China's young children. In the present thesis, first, a briefly introduction was made on the conception, classification, underlying process, and function of counterfactual thinking. Then a comprehensive review was conducted with regard to the important empirical findings, theoretical explanations, as well as the methodology (e.g. the development of young children's counterfactual thinking and its relations to theory of mind) in overseas young children's counterfactual thinking. A further analysis was executed focusing on the limitations of the previous research. On the basis of these, two related studies were presented to explore the development of 3-to 5-year-old children's counterfactual thinking and its relationship with their theory of mind competence.It is known that very young children always make realist errors. But previous research could not name the reason why they met with difficulties in counterfactual reasoning. So in study 1, a series of experiments were made from the sight of executive function (especially IC and working memory). Experiment 1 manifested whether the errors in counterfactual tasks could accurately be described as "realist" errors. Experiment 2 further studied whether the errors occurred due to a general difficulty inhibiting a response to current reality if young children had indeed made realist errors. Experiment 3 examined if higher availability of the counterfactual alternative could facilitate young children's performance in counterfactual tasks via easier inhibition of current reality. Experiment 4 tested the hypothesis that "limitations of working memory can explain young children's incapability of counterfactual reasoning".Developmental psychologists have focused on the development of young children's counterfactual thinking and its relations to theory of mind recently. But there had no definite conclusions at present. Study 2 adopted a new method called "storybook", along with the storytelling method, to comprehensively analyze the relationship between different counterfactual reasoning (both consequent counterfactual reasoning and antecedent counterfactual reasoning) and theory of mind.The findings through the above two studies are as follows:(1) Young children indeed made realist error in counterfactual reasoning. But they also chose the third location as their answers in 3-choice task.
(2) Young children's difficulty in handling counterfactual situations was not primarily due to difficulty in avoiding a response to current reality, but seemed to consequence in their particular difficulty in counterfactual reasoning.(3) Increasing the availability of the counterfactual alternative could not facilitate young children's performance in counterfactual tasks.(4) There was positive correlation between two working memory tasks (tapping/labeling task and counting/labeling task) and counterfactual thinking. The correlation was still robust even if the age factor had been controlled. Further regression analysis revealed that young children's performance in working memory was the significant predictor of their counterfactual thinking.(5) Young children's performance in counterfactual thinking manifested the ideas of the mental model theory. Explicit construction of counterfactual alternatives to factual situations increased the demand on working memory. But it seemed far beyond what the very young children had. However, counterfactual reasoning would come into young children's mind along with the increasing of their working memory capacity.(6) There was significant age difference in young children's consequent counterfactual reasoning and antecede
有关研究表明,部分年幼儿童不能进行反事实推理,而且出现所谓的“现实错误”。已有研究尚不能对出现这种“现实错误”的原因做出明确回答。鉴于此,研究一进行了4个系列实验,层层推进,从执行性功能的角度(主要是抑制控制和工作记忆两个方面)对幼儿在反事实推理中出现错误的原因进行了系统探讨,以期进一步揭示其内部机制。实验1首先验证了幼儿在反事实推理中是否真正出现所谓的“现实错误”。实验2进一步探究如果幼儿出现了所谓的“现实错误”,那么不能抑制现实的优势信息是否是幼儿出现现实错误的原因。实验3改善了反事实替代物的相对可利用性,维持幼儿获取的现实信息不变,而以此来判定反事实替代物的高利用性是否可以使其更容易抑制现实而影响幼儿反事实推理的表现。实验4对执行性功能中的另一重要成分——工作记忆与反事实思维的关系进行了探究,从而对“幼儿之所以不能进行反事实推理可能就是其工作记忆资源的有限性所致”这一假设进行了验证。
幼儿反事实思维的发展与其心理理论能力的关系近年来逐步成为发展心理学比较关注的问题。幼儿反事实思维是否是其心理理论产生的基础、两者有没有共同的发展主题、还是两者根本不存在任何联系,对此目前尚无定论。鉴于此,研究二引入了新的研究方法——连环画法,连同已往的故事法对两种不同类型的反事实推理(结果反事实推理和前提反事实推理)与心理理论的关系进行了全面考察。
上述两项研究的结果表明:
(1) 幼儿在反事实推理中的确会出现现实错误。在现实错误之外,幼儿在三种选择任务中也会选择现实和正确答案之外的第三个选项。
(2) 幼儿在反事实推理任务中出现的错误反映了反事实推理中所特有的困难,而不是由于幼儿不能抑制现实的优势信息所致。
(3) 反事实替代情境的改善(提高反事实替代的可利用性)并没有提高幼儿反事实推理能力的表现。
(4) 反事实推理任务与数数命名和敲击命名两个工作记忆任务之间呈显著的正相关,
Counterfactual thinking, generally, refers to an understanding of events that are "counter to reality" or false and involves comparing reality to an imagined alternative. It is an important characteristic of human consciousness. Counterfactual thinking in adult cognition has been a topic of great interest to researchers for many years. Recently researchers began to focus on its development in young children. However, there was seldom research on China's young children. In the present thesis, first, a briefly introduction was made on the conception, classification, underlying process, and function of counterfactual thinking. Then a comprehensive review was conducted with regard to the important empirical findings, theoretical explanations, as well as the methodology (e.g. the development of young children's counterfactual thinking and its relations to theory of mind) in overseas young children's counterfactual thinking. A further analysis was executed focusing on the limitations of the previous research. On the basis of these, two related studies were presented to explore the development of 3-to 5-year-old children's counterfactual thinking and its relationship with their theory of mind competence.It is known that very young children always make realist errors. But previous research could not name the reason why they met with difficulties in counterfactual reasoning. So in study 1, a series of experiments were made from the sight of executive function (especially IC and working memory). Experiment 1 manifested whether the errors in counterfactual tasks could accurately be described as "realist" errors. Experiment 2 further studied whether the errors occurred due to a general difficulty inhibiting a response to current reality if young children had indeed made realist errors. Experiment 3 examined if higher availability of the counterfactual alternative could facilitate young children's performance in counterfactual tasks via easier inhibition of current reality. Experiment 4 tested the hypothesis that "limitations of working memory can explain young children's incapability of counterfactual reasoning".Developmental psychologists have focused on the development of young children's counterfactual thinking and its relations to theory of mind recently. But there had no definite conclusions at present. Study 2 adopted a new method called "storybook", along with the storytelling method, to comprehensively analyze the relationship between different counterfactual reasoning (both consequent counterfactual reasoning and antecedent counterfactual reasoning) and theory of mind.The findings through the above two studies are as follows:(1) Young children indeed made realist error in counterfactual reasoning. But they also chose the third location as their answers in 3-choice task.
(2) Young children's difficulty in handling counterfactual situations was not primarily due to difficulty in avoiding a response to current reality, but seemed to consequence in their particular difficulty in counterfactual reasoning.(3) Increasing the availability of the counterfactual alternative could not facilitate young children's performance in counterfactual tasks.(4) There was positive correlation between two working memory tasks (tapping/labeling task and counting/labeling task) and counterfactual thinking. The correlation was still robust even if the age factor had been controlled. Further regression analysis revealed that young children's performance in working memory was the significant predictor of their counterfactual thinking.(5) Young children's performance in counterfactual thinking manifested the ideas of the mental model theory. Explicit construction of counterfactual alternatives to factual situations increased the demand on working memory. But it seemed far beyond what the very young children had. However, counterfactual reasoning would come into young children's mind along with the increasing of their working memory capacity.(6) There was significant age difference in young children's consequent counterfactual reasoning and antecede
引文
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