上市公司高管人员组合激励模型研究
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摘要
公司所有权与控制权分离使得对高管人员的激励成为公司治理的核心问题。如何依据经济环境、社会文化以及企业内部条件设计科学的组合激励模式,激励上市公司高管人员按照制度提供的信息,在自利的内在激励下的决策行为与公司目标一致,从而提高公司业绩和价值,成为当前理论研究的焦点。
本研究从人性假设理论与心理契约理论入手,在现有文献研究和定性访谈的基础上,提出了复式需求的概念并进行了特征剖析。开发了具有良好信度与效度的测量题项,并基于上市公司调查样本进行了实证检验。根据实证结果识别了复式需求的维度架构,提出了复式需求维度模型。研究进一步根据熵权法、离差最大化的原理进行复式需求维度的重要度的集成计算及重要度排序。研究表明,满足生存需求依然是目前高管人员努力工作的重要动因之一,高管人员同时也追求与职位相适应的管理权力、良好的职业声誉以及能力提升、和谐的人际关系与职业阶层的归属感。上市公司高管人员的各种需求之间并不是相互独立的,而是互相融合的。
运用博弈论的方法确定上市公司高管人员组合激励的前提假设与约束条件,基于复式需求多角度构建组合激励模型。构建了基于薪酬、显性控制权与隐性控制权的高管人员组合激励委托—代理优化模型。围绕高管人员隐性价值和隐性需求,构建了基于创新激励政策的公司高管人员组合激励模型,构建基于复式需求的同步组合激励模型。通过模型分析,提出基于激励成本预算下的显性与隐性激励的组合激励模式、上市公司高管人员同步组合激励模式,以最大限度地激发高管人员的创新意识与创新精神,提高工作积极性与努力程度,从而提高公司的绩效。
通过对高管激励现状的统计分析根据同步组合激励模型并结合我国上市公司内部特征和外部环境条件提出组合激励对策。首先,采用2006年度1026家上市公司样本通过描述性分析研究我国上市公司高管人员组合激励行业差异状况;其次,以公司所处行业、公司规模、公司类型等作为调节变量进行高管激励与绩效的相关性分析,根据同步组合激励模型和线性分组回归结果提出上市公司高管人员组合激励对策:报酬体系设计体现现期保险收入与短期、长期风险收入的动态组合;上市公司应综合考虑其公司特征因素权变地确定高管人员的组合激励;控制权激励注重合理与稳定;高管人员声誉激励机制市场化;提供面向创新的激励政策安排;创造良好的企业文化环境以增加高管人员的责任感和使命感等;最后,就相关政策层面提出必要的建议。
The incentive to top managers has become the core question in corporate governance because of separation of ownership and control rights.How to establish a scientific combined incentive model according to economic environment,social culture and interior situation of corporate has been current academic focus,which may improve corporate performance and value by inciting top managers to make decisions in accord with corporate goal.
Founded on human hypothesis theory and psychological contract theory,the comprehensive need is put forward and the characteristics are analyzed on the basis of existing documentation and conversation.Measure items with good reliability and validity are developed and tested by investigation samples of listed companies.The dimensions are recognized in term of the empirical result and the dimension model of comprehensive need is established.The importance degrees of four factors are calculated and ordered by both methods of entropy and maximizing deviations.It indicates that existence need is still one of the important motives for top managers to work hard.At the same time,the power to the appointed positions,harmonious relationship,belonged to professional class,good reputation and capability promotion are also their pursuits.The different needs are compatible rather than independent.
The premise and restriction of combined incentives to top managers is determined on game theory.Combined incentive models are established all around.The optimizing model of principal-agent on salary,monetary and latent control is developed.The combined model of incentives is founded on innovative policy in the view of the top managers' latent value and needs.The combined model of synchronous incentive is built ground on comprehensive need. Through model analysis both the combined mode of incentive on cost budget and the combined mode of synchronous incentive are proposed in order to inspirit innovative consciousness as much as possible,to improve enthusiasm and endeavors so as to increase performance of company.
Through empirical study on status quo of incentives to top managers,the combined countermeasure of incentive is proposed on the combined model of synchronous incentive and interior characteristics and exterior environment.Firstly,industry difference of combined incentives to top managers is studied by describe analysis with 1026 samples of listed companies in 2006.Secondly,the regression analysis between incentives to top managers and corporate performance is made by taking industry,size and ultimate controlling shareholder as regulation variables.Combined countermeasures of incentive are brought forward in accordance with the combined model of synchronous incentive and liner result.The reward system should incarnate dynamic combination including current insurance income and short-time as well as long-time risk income.Listed company should determinate flexibly combined incentives to top managers considering corporate characteristics.The control incentive should emphasized ration and stability.Reputation incentive mechanism should be market-oriented.Incentive policies to innovation should be set up.Harmonious culture environment should be created in order to cultivate sense of responsibility and mission.Finally, on the basis of foregoing study,a political suggestion on combined incentives to top managers in listed company in china is proposed to intensify incentive effect.
本研究从人性假设理论与心理契约理论入手,在现有文献研究和定性访谈的基础上,提出了复式需求的概念并进行了特征剖析。开发了具有良好信度与效度的测量题项,并基于上市公司调查样本进行了实证检验。根据实证结果识别了复式需求的维度架构,提出了复式需求维度模型。研究进一步根据熵权法、离差最大化的原理进行复式需求维度的重要度的集成计算及重要度排序。研究表明,满足生存需求依然是目前高管人员努力工作的重要动因之一,高管人员同时也追求与职位相适应的管理权力、良好的职业声誉以及能力提升、和谐的人际关系与职业阶层的归属感。上市公司高管人员的各种需求之间并不是相互独立的,而是互相融合的。
运用博弈论的方法确定上市公司高管人员组合激励的前提假设与约束条件,基于复式需求多角度构建组合激励模型。构建了基于薪酬、显性控制权与隐性控制权的高管人员组合激励委托—代理优化模型。围绕高管人员隐性价值和隐性需求,构建了基于创新激励政策的公司高管人员组合激励模型,构建基于复式需求的同步组合激励模型。通过模型分析,提出基于激励成本预算下的显性与隐性激励的组合激励模式、上市公司高管人员同步组合激励模式,以最大限度地激发高管人员的创新意识与创新精神,提高工作积极性与努力程度,从而提高公司的绩效。
通过对高管激励现状的统计分析根据同步组合激励模型并结合我国上市公司内部特征和外部环境条件提出组合激励对策。首先,采用2006年度1026家上市公司样本通过描述性分析研究我国上市公司高管人员组合激励行业差异状况;其次,以公司所处行业、公司规模、公司类型等作为调节变量进行高管激励与绩效的相关性分析,根据同步组合激励模型和线性分组回归结果提出上市公司高管人员组合激励对策:报酬体系设计体现现期保险收入与短期、长期风险收入的动态组合;上市公司应综合考虑其公司特征因素权变地确定高管人员的组合激励;控制权激励注重合理与稳定;高管人员声誉激励机制市场化;提供面向创新的激励政策安排;创造良好的企业文化环境以增加高管人员的责任感和使命感等;最后,就相关政策层面提出必要的建议。
The incentive to top managers has become the core question in corporate governance because of separation of ownership and control rights.How to establish a scientific combined incentive model according to economic environment,social culture and interior situation of corporate has been current academic focus,which may improve corporate performance and value by inciting top managers to make decisions in accord with corporate goal.
Founded on human hypothesis theory and psychological contract theory,the comprehensive need is put forward and the characteristics are analyzed on the basis of existing documentation and conversation.Measure items with good reliability and validity are developed and tested by investigation samples of listed companies.The dimensions are recognized in term of the empirical result and the dimension model of comprehensive need is established.The importance degrees of four factors are calculated and ordered by both methods of entropy and maximizing deviations.It indicates that existence need is still one of the important motives for top managers to work hard.At the same time,the power to the appointed positions,harmonious relationship,belonged to professional class,good reputation and capability promotion are also their pursuits.The different needs are compatible rather than independent.
The premise and restriction of combined incentives to top managers is determined on game theory.Combined incentive models are established all around.The optimizing model of principal-agent on salary,monetary and latent control is developed.The combined model of incentives is founded on innovative policy in the view of the top managers' latent value and needs.The combined model of synchronous incentive is built ground on comprehensive need. Through model analysis both the combined mode of incentive on cost budget and the combined mode of synchronous incentive are proposed in order to inspirit innovative consciousness as much as possible,to improve enthusiasm and endeavors so as to increase performance of company.
Through empirical study on status quo of incentives to top managers,the combined countermeasure of incentive is proposed on the combined model of synchronous incentive and interior characteristics and exterior environment.Firstly,industry difference of combined incentives to top managers is studied by describe analysis with 1026 samples of listed companies in 2006.Secondly,the regression analysis between incentives to top managers and corporate performance is made by taking industry,size and ultimate controlling shareholder as regulation variables.Combined countermeasures of incentive are brought forward in accordance with the combined model of synchronous incentive and liner result.The reward system should incarnate dynamic combination including current insurance income and short-time as well as long-time risk income.Listed company should determinate flexibly combined incentives to top managers considering corporate characteristics.The control incentive should emphasized ration and stability.Reputation incentive mechanism should be market-oriented.Incentive policies to innovation should be set up.Harmonious culture environment should be created in order to cultivate sense of responsibility and mission.Finally, on the basis of foregoing study,a political suggestion on combined incentives to top managers in listed company in china is proposed to intensify incentive effect.
引文
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