我国国有企业高管政治关联研究
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摘要
在经历三十余年波澜壮阔的改革开放后,中国已经成为世界上最富于活力的经济体。就经济领域而言,国有企业的改革被公认为是经济体制改革的中心环节,逐步走出了一条以渐进改革为基调,辅之以相机激进改革的混合型改革路径(杨丹,1999)。国企改革的进展对于推动经济体制从计划经济逐步向社会主义市场经济转型起到了关键作用。伴随着市场化进程的深入,国有企业逐步摆脱计划经济时代的种种弊端,焕发出蓬勃的生机和活力。但是毋庸讳言,国企改革在取得巨大成绩的同时,也面临着众多挑战。鉴于我国由计划经济向市场经济的转型过程中,政府支配资源的方式和手段没有发生根本性的变化(周黎安,2007),在经济生活中政府仍然发挥着难以小觑的控制力和影响力,各种企业特别是国企的经营都会不可避免的受到政府干预的影响。应对国企未来各种挑战的具体策略可能不同,但是在转型中国的大背景下,国企问题的解决总是无法绕开政府干预特别是政企关系。
政府干预对于国有企业存在多样化的影响途径,本论文中我们将研究视角聚焦于政府通过人事途径对国企所施加的干预上来。据中国企业家调查系统(2003)的调查结果发现,国企中政府通过行政方式指派和任命高管的比例要大大高于其他市场化方式,这一结果反映出在转型经济的制度背景下,对于国企的所谓行政性任命模式并未被打破。伴随着行政性任命而来的,是相当一部分的国企高管具有政治关联,同政府部门保持着密切的联系。早前的研究中如Fan等(2007)的研究中就发现有近三成的研究样本中首席执行官曾担任或现任行政领导职务。我们有理由相信,广泛存在的国企高管政治关联现象反映的是国企与政府之间存在的密切互动。就政府来说,能够通过政治关联高管这个抓手,更为方便的向国企施加干预和影响；就国企来说,需要通过政治关联高管的渠道与政府保持沟通和协调,建立和维护双方之间的良好关系。
具体而言,本论文将集中探讨国有企业中政治关联高管对于企业的影响。一方面,政治关联高管们具有官员的实质特征。我国各种国企按照规模、行业地位和影响力等因素被划分为不同行政级别,高管也具有相应的行政级别。在行政性任命模式下,国企高管的选拔参照的是政府官员的标准,并享受相应的待遇。他们能够与同一级别的官员交流使用,重要国企中的高管能够被任命为地方省市中的关键官员。但是一旦高管们的职务被罢免,他们将面临名誉和社会地位的急剧下降,体制外他们将很难再获得理想的工作,这使得他们存在所谓的“锁住效应”(周黎安,2007),非常关注自己的政绩和政治地位的提升,将尽全力保住职位并力求在所谓的政治晋升锦标赛中获胜；另一方面,政治关联高管们也具有商人的特征。高管们身处国企生产经营一线,熟悉国有企业的各种业务。搞好企业的生产经营、使企业在激烈的市场竞争中胜出是高管们身上义不容辞的责任。曾经的行政经历使得他们能够更加准确的把握政策的出台背景和动向,能够更有效便捷的与政府进行协调沟通,这对企业经营活动的顺利开展也是必不可少的。总而言之,政治关联型高管们亦官亦商的特质使得他们与一般意义上的经理人区别开来,他们对于国有企业的经营具有怎样的影响正是本文所关注的核心问题,值得深入加以考察。
本文主要内容共分为八章,其中：第一章是导论；第二章是制度背景分析；第三章是理论回顾和文献综述；第四章是政治关联与政府干预动机；第五章是政治关联与隐性便利；第六章是政治关联与双重成本；第七章是政治关联与公司业绩；第八章是研究结论。各章的研究内容分别为：
第一章给出导论。导论介绍了本文的选题背景和研究意义,阐明了本文的研究思路和研究方法,给出了本文的总体结构。
第二章是制度背景分析。结合本文的研究内容,制度背景分析分国企改革历程和政府干预行为两个部分展开。在国企改革历程部分,本文介绍了国企改革的由来,分阶段对国企三十余年的改革历程进行分阶段简要的梳理回顾；在总结国企改革经验的基础上,对国企未来可能面临的挑战进行了展望；在国企面临的政府干预行为部分,本文就中央政府和地方政府关系、地方政府之间的竞争、政府官员的政治晋升锦标赛、政府主导下的国企高管任命等内容展开分析。本章主要是对后文可能涉及到的制度背景情况进行必要的介绍和铺垫,以利于阅读以及实证研究的展开。
第三章,理论回顾和文献综述。本部分首先回顾了本文赖以开展研究的基础理论,接下来总结了国企改革中的重要理论问题,然后对国有企业和政府干预、政治关联的相关经验研究展开综述,利于把握以往的研究脉络。
第四章是政治关联与政府干预动机。实证研究从本章开始。对国企而言,政治关联是国企与政府之间众多天然联系中的一种,通过研究国企政治关联现象在一定程度上能够追溯政府干预的动机。在借鉴以往研究成果的基础上,本文将国企关联背后的政府干预动机区分为政治动机和经济动机,通过实证模型加以检验,并考察了中央政府和地方政府干预动机可能存在的差异。
第五章是政治关联与隐性便利。本文将政治关联能够帮助国企获得的各种实际存在但不便明言的好处称之为隐性便利。篇幅所限,对隐性便利的探讨本文将集中于银行融资视角。本文检验了政治关联组和无政治关联组的融资约束是否存在显著差异,考察了政治关联对于获取贷款以及贷款期限结构的影响,区分了中央政府和地方政府干预行为对融资的影响。此外,本文还发现了市场化进程对政治关联获取融资便利性存在一定的制约作用。
第六章,政治关联与双重成本。政治关联带来种种便利的同时,国企实际上也付出了相应的代价。本文将国企付出的代价区分为双重成本,即政治成本和代理成本,试图回答政治关联是否会给企业带来更多的双重成本?通过结合第五章和第六章的研究,本文试图较为全面的展现政治关联给企业带来的复杂影响,进而揭示转轨条件下政府干预与企业的微妙关系。
第七章,政治关联与公司业绩。本章探讨政治关联的经济后果,通过实证确认了政治关联对于企业业绩存在的总体消极影响。进一步的,政治关联对于公司业绩存在不利影响的根源何在?本文发现,总体而言,政治关联给企业带来了更多的非生产性支出,这很可能正是政治关联损害公司业绩的根源。
第八章是研究结论。本章回顾了研究结论,分析了相应的政策启示,介绍了研究贡献,说明了研究局限以及未来将要致力的方向。
本文的主要研究结论如下：
1.政治关联高管的本质是各级政府从人事控制途径推进国企改革,将政府政治和经济意图内部化至国企的关键抓手。国企中普遍存在的高管政治关联现象,实际上是政府干预在国有企业人事领域的具体体现。总体说来,政治关联高管背后反映出政府出于政治和经济动机干预国企人事任命的意图。具体而言,中央企业中的高管政治关联更多的体现了中央政府对于国企改革的整体布局,特别是对国企进行抓大放小和战略性调整的政治动机,而地方企业中的高管政治关联则更多的体现出地方政府为发展当地经济增加财税收入的经济动机。
2.本文着重从银行融资的角度考察了隐性便利。我们发现：首先,存在高管政治关联的国企面临的融资约束显著小于无政治关联企业；其次,政治关联的确有助于获取银行借款。进一步的,我们将国企划分为高融资约束组和低融资约束组,分组实证结果表明,政治关联更有助于高融资约束组的获取银行贷款,客观上具有一定的积极作用；再次,将银行借款区分为长期借款和短期借款后我们发现,国企高管的政治关联对于获取短期借款的效果不明显,但的确能够帮助企业获得更多的长期借款；第四,地方政府控制下的国企能够通过政治关联帮助获得更多的长期借款,但这一结论在中央政府控制下国企组中不成立。最后,企业外部市场化进程的演进在一定程度上制约了政治关联高管获取银行融资便利。
3.本文考察了国企高管政治关联与双重成本之间存在的密切联系。政治成本层面,我们着重考察政治关联对企业冗员的影响,代理成本方面我们则重点考察其对于企业管理费用和在职消费情况的影响。研究发现：首先,政治关联给国企的确带来严重的政治成本和代理成本问题。其次,分样本回归结果显示,中央企业和地方企业均存在不同程度的双重成本问题,在地方企业中尤为严重。
4.本文中我们探讨了政治关联最终对公司业绩的总体影响以及可能的影响途径。我们发现,国企高管的政治关联的确损害了公司业绩,地方企业受害尤甚。进一步的,本文引入非生产性支出的框架来解释高管政治关联损害公司业绩的可能途径。我们发现,政治关联的确给国企带来了更多的非生产型支出,在地方国企中情况更加不容乐观。
总体而言,本文为政治关联领域的研究提供了新的增量经验证据。具体说来,本研究的主要改进和创新体现在以下四个方面：
第一,本文拓展了对于转型经济背景下的国企政治关联现象及其政府干预动机的理解。民营企业构建政治关联往往是出于企业政治战略的需要,通过建立和维护政府关系,进而获取政府政策的倾斜。区别于民营企业的政治关联动机,国企高管的政治关联内生于企业与政府之间千丝万缕的天然联系。从政治关联是政府干预在国企人事领域的体现和抓手的观点出发,本文考察了国有上市公司高管政治关联背后政府干预的政治动机和经济动机,并进一步揭示了中央政府和地方政府干预动机可能存在的差异。
第二,本文提出了国企隐性便利的概念,从融资的角度深化了我们对政治关联影响隐性便利的认识。正如陈信元等(2009)所指出的,对于中国经济问题的研究,不能忽视某些纷乱复杂但秘而不宣的规则,对于政治关联而言正是如此。国企高管的政治关联无疑能够给企业带来某些便利,国有企业堂而皇之可以享受这些便利,政府对此也心知肚明,但在各种规章制度和政策文件中往往难以见到对于这些便利的正式规定和依据,这些便利更多的是一种隐蔽的形式存在。我们将这些不便明言的便利称之为隐性便利。本文从融资约束、融资期限结构、中央政府和地方政府干预行为、市场化的影响等多个方面考察了政治关联与融资便利的关系,相关研究结论在有助于理解国企融资影响因素的同时,也为我们反思我国金融体系存在的金融歧视问题提供了借鉴和参考。
第三,本文揭示了政治关联与双重成本问题的紧密联系。政治关联在帮助国有企业获取各种便利性的同时,也使得国有企业背上了额外的负担,付出了一定的代价。从政治成本理论和代理理论出发,本文将国企付出的代价划分为政治成本和代理成本,实证检验了政治关联与两者之间的关系,并考察了中央企业和地方企业在双重成本上的差异。本文的研究结论揭示了政治关联给国有企业带来的政策性负担和代理问题,同时加深了我们对政府干预给国有企业带来微妙影响的理解。
最后,本文重新验证了政治关联对于公司业绩的损害,并引入了新的框架来解释政治关联对公司业绩的损害途径。以往的研究如Wu等(2010)、王庆文和吴世农(2008)、Fan等(2007)已经发现国企中的政治联系会损害公司业绩。考虑到样本和变量设定上的差异,这些结论有待于进一步检验。本文重新设定了政治关联变量,同时通过引入市场业绩和会计业绩的多个变量,重新检验了政治关联对公司业绩的损害作用,证实了总体而言政治关联更多的扮演了掠夺之手的不良角色,最终损害了国有企业的资源配置效率。进一步的,在借鉴已有研究的基础上,本文试图通过非生产性支出这一框架来解释政治关联对公司业绩的损害途径。相关的研究结论确认了政府干预对国企干预存在的不利影响,在一定程度上拓展和更新了我们对于政治关联损害公司业绩途径的认识。
The magnificent reform and opening up has been proceeding for more than thirty years, now china is the most vigorous economy entity in the world. As for economic field, the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is generally accepted as center link of the reform in economy system, we have found a mixed reform method basing on gradual reform, supply with radical reform if needed (Yang Dan,1999). The proceeding of SOEs reform has played a key role in promoting economy system transforming from planning system into socialism market economy. With the advancement of marketing process, SOEs have solved many problems in the central planning economy era, showing their great potential. But we have to admit that SOEs still facing many chanllenges while gained great achievement.In light of governments didn't change their way to allocate social resources fundamentally during the transformation period(Zhou,2007), they still played a key role in the economy life, all companies including SOEs will affected by government inevitably. With strategies to solve specific problems maybe different, but to solve the problems of SOEs we must take their relation with governments into consideration.
The government intervention behaviors have various ways to affect SOEs, in this paper we will focus on the personnel path. According to survey result of china enterprise survey system (2003), governments use administrative ways to appoint top executives much more often than other market ways, this shows the so called administrative appoint model still existed in transforming china. With the administrative appointment phenomenon, many top executives in SOEs have political connections, with a close relation with government. Previous research like Fan et al.(2007) had found in their research nearly30%CEOs have political connections.We have many reasons to believe, the widely existing political connections phenomenon reflecting frequent interaction between SOEs and governments. As for governments, through political connected top executives, they can intervene SOEs in a more convenient way; as for SOEs, they can build and maintain fine relationship with governments through channels of political connected top executives.
Specifically, this paper will focus on how political connected top executives affect SOEs. On the one hand, top executives with political connections have some substantial character of government officers. SOEs in china can be divided into different administrative rank according to their size, industrial position and their influence, top executives of them have the same administrative rank. Under the administrative appointment model, the choose and appointment of top executives is basing on standards of government officers, with relevant treatment.They can be exchanged as the government officers with same administrative rank, even used as key leaders in provinces. But once dismissed, they will face a sudden drop of then-reputation and social position, it will be hard for them to find a fine job in political system, this is the so called "lock-in effect"(Zhou,2007). So they usually pay great attention to their political achievement and political position, they will try their best to keep their position and get fine result in the so called political promotion champagne race. On the other hand, they have characters of merchants as well. They are very familiar with business of SOEs, as they are on the frontline of market competition. It is their responsibility to ensure the companies get a fine result in furious market competition. Previous officer experience will make them understand policy better, having fine communication ability with the governments, both are necessary for the business of SOEs. All in all, politically connected top executives have the character both government officers and merchants, this distinguish them from usual managers. How will they affect the SOEs is the key problem.this paper tries to explore..
This paper can be divided into eight chapters, including:chapter one, introduction; chapter two, institution background analysis; chapter three, theory retrosepct and literature review; chapter four, political connection and the incentive of government intervention; chapter five, political connection and recessive convenience; chapter six, political connection and double cost; chapter seven is political connection and corporate performance; the last chapter is research conclusion. Specifically:
Chapter one is research introduction. This part analyzed research background and significance, introduces research thought and method, showing the total research structure of the whole paper.
Chapter two is institutional background analysis. This chapter can be divided into two main parts:SOEs reform retrospect and government intervention behavior. In the SOEs reform retrospect part, we introduce the original of SOEs reform, then retrospect different stages of thirty years SOES reforms, and analysis important argument and advancement, finally we analyze future challenges SOEs may face basing on summary the experiences of SOEs reform. In the intervenetion behavior part, we analyze the relationship between central government and local governments, competition between local governments, political promotion champagne race between government officers, and the government control of SOEs. This chapter plays a role of bedding for empirical research.
Chapter three, theory retrospect and literature review, this part first retrospects basic theory necessary for our research, then it sums up important theory issues in the SOEs reform; then we review related research in SOEs and government intervene, political connections. The main aim of this part is to help readers to get a brief impression of previous research.
Chapter four, political connections and the incentive of government intervention:Empirical study begins at this chapter. Previous research about political connection usually base on the private companies, explore their incentives to build political connection. Considering the political connection is only one kind of many connections between government and SOEs, using previous research for reference, our paper divided the government intervene incentive into economic incentive and political incentive, using empirical models to test hypothesis, and explores the intervene behavior diffemence between central and local government.
Chapter five, political connections and recessive convienences.In this paper we call these convenience brought by political connections recessive convenience, we focus on finance convenience in this chapter. We tests whether significant difference exists between political connected group and non-political connected group. We affirm that political connection will affect the period structure of bank loan, we explored the difference of recessive convenience in central SOEs and local SOEs. Furthermore, we check will the advancement of market economy restrict the political connection.
Chapter six, political connections and double cost.Political connection make SOEs pays while gains recessive convenience. This part main discuss the negative effect of political connection. We divide the cost SOEs paid into political cost and agency cost, we try to see if political connection will bring more double cost to SOEs.Combining the research of chapter five and chapter six, we try to reveal the complex effect of political connections, to show the subtle relation between government and SOEs.
Chapter seven is political connection and corporate performance. We confirm the negative effect of political connection, further more, why political connections bring negative effect? Our paper finds political connections do bring more non-productive expenditure to SOEs, it is quite possible the root of its negative effect.
Chapter eight is research conclusion. We review research conclusion, analyze the policy meaning, illustrate research limit and point out future direction.
Using the data of SOEs listed companies, main research conclusion are as follows:
1. Political connection and government intervention incentive. The nature of political connected top executives is all government promote their policy and considerations from personnel path, it's a key hand grab for government to internalize their goals to SOEs. The widely existing political connections, is a reflection of government intervention in personnel field of SOEs. Specifically, political connections in central government mainly reflects its strategy consideration, including keep the big and let the small go, and adjust the SOEs strategically, while in the local SOEs, politicall connections mainly reflect economic incentive of local government to develop local economy and get more tax income.
2. Political connection and recessive convenience. Our paper focuses on financing recessive convenience. Firstly, We find that SOEs with political connections facing smaller finance restrict compare with non political connections; secondly,we divided our samples into high financing restrict group and low financing group, we find political connections do helps companies in high financing restrict group to get more bank loan; thirdly, we divide bank loan into long term loan and short term loan, we find political connection do help firms get more long term bank loan, while this is not significant in short term loan group; Fourthly, empirical results shows, local SOEs do get more long term bank loans, but in the central government SOEs we did not find the same conclusion; finally, we find the advancement of external market do restrict the political connections to get finance convenience.
3. Political connections and double cost. Specifically, we explore the close relationship between political connection and double cost. For political cost, we foucs on redundant staffs; for agency cost, we focus on management fee and non-peculiar consumption. We find political connections do bring severe political cost and agency cost to SOEs, secondly, double cost problems exist in both central and local SOEs, while in local SOEs double cost problem is more severe.
4. Political connections and corporate performance. In our paper we will discuss the overall effect of political connection to SOEs and its possible influence path. We find that the political connections in SOEs do harmed the corporate performance, especially in the local SOEs group. Furthermore, we bring in framework of non-productive expenditure to explain possible influence path of political connection. We find political connections do bring more non productive expenditure in SOEs, and in local SOEs the situation is even worse.
The main improvement and innovation of this study can be summary as the following four aspects:
First of all, from the viewpoint that political connection is the reflection and grab hand in SOEs personnel field, we expand our understanding of political connection and government intervene incentive under transformation china. Private firms build political connection to reach their aim of political strategies, in order to get policy favor. Different from the incentive of private firms, the political connections in SOEs is just one kind of these many close relationships between SOEs and government. Using previous research for reference, our paper defines political incentive and economic incentive of government intervention, explores possible differences between central and local governments.
Secondly, this paper deepens our understanding between political connection and recessive convenience. As Chen et al.(2005) point out, as for the research of china economy, we cannot ignore some complex and recessive rules, for political connection it is just proper to say this. The political connections can bring SOEs some convenience, SOEs can enjoy them, and government knows it, but in all rules and policy files we seldom see the description of them, these convenience exists in a hidden way, we call them recessive conveniences. This paper explores the relationship between political connections and financing convenience from financing restriction, financing period structure, influence of advancement of market economy, intervene difference between central and local governments. Our research conclusion will help us to understand the influence factor, to rethink the finance discrimination in our finance system.
Thirdly, this paper reveals the close relationship between political connection and double cost. Political connection make SOEs get more burdens while bring them conveniences. Basing on political cost and agency cost theory, we divide the cost SOEs paid into political cost and agency cost, we check the relation between political connection and double cost empirically, and discuss the difference in central SOEs and local SOEs. The research conclusion reveals the policy burden and agency problem, and it also help us to understand the subtle effects of government intervene bring to SOEs.
Finally, I check the harmness political connections bring to corporate performance, and we introduce new framework to analyze the influence path. Previous research like Wu et al.(2010), Wang and Wu (2008), Fan et al.(2007) find the political connections will harm the corporate performance. Considering differences in samples and variables, these conclusions need to be further checked. Our paper define political connections in our own way, and use market performance as well as accounting performance, testifiy will the political connection harm the corporate performance. And basing on previous research, we use the non productive expenditure to explain the influence path. Our conclusion confirms the negative effect political connection brings, and it renews our cognition of how political connections harm corporate performance.
政府干预对于国有企业存在多样化的影响途径,本论文中我们将研究视角聚焦于政府通过人事途径对国企所施加的干预上来。据中国企业家调查系统(2003)的调查结果发现,国企中政府通过行政方式指派和任命高管的比例要大大高于其他市场化方式,这一结果反映出在转型经济的制度背景下,对于国企的所谓行政性任命模式并未被打破。伴随着行政性任命而来的,是相当一部分的国企高管具有政治关联,同政府部门保持着密切的联系。早前的研究中如Fan等(2007)的研究中就发现有近三成的研究样本中首席执行官曾担任或现任行政领导职务。我们有理由相信,广泛存在的国企高管政治关联现象反映的是国企与政府之间存在的密切互动。就政府来说,能够通过政治关联高管这个抓手,更为方便的向国企施加干预和影响；就国企来说,需要通过政治关联高管的渠道与政府保持沟通和协调,建立和维护双方之间的良好关系。
具体而言,本论文将集中探讨国有企业中政治关联高管对于企业的影响。一方面,政治关联高管们具有官员的实质特征。我国各种国企按照规模、行业地位和影响力等因素被划分为不同行政级别,高管也具有相应的行政级别。在行政性任命模式下,国企高管的选拔参照的是政府官员的标准,并享受相应的待遇。他们能够与同一级别的官员交流使用,重要国企中的高管能够被任命为地方省市中的关键官员。但是一旦高管们的职务被罢免,他们将面临名誉和社会地位的急剧下降,体制外他们将很难再获得理想的工作,这使得他们存在所谓的“锁住效应”(周黎安,2007),非常关注自己的政绩和政治地位的提升,将尽全力保住职位并力求在所谓的政治晋升锦标赛中获胜；另一方面,政治关联高管们也具有商人的特征。高管们身处国企生产经营一线,熟悉国有企业的各种业务。搞好企业的生产经营、使企业在激烈的市场竞争中胜出是高管们身上义不容辞的责任。曾经的行政经历使得他们能够更加准确的把握政策的出台背景和动向,能够更有效便捷的与政府进行协调沟通,这对企业经营活动的顺利开展也是必不可少的。总而言之,政治关联型高管们亦官亦商的特质使得他们与一般意义上的经理人区别开来,他们对于国有企业的经营具有怎样的影响正是本文所关注的核心问题,值得深入加以考察。
本文主要内容共分为八章,其中：第一章是导论；第二章是制度背景分析；第三章是理论回顾和文献综述；第四章是政治关联与政府干预动机；第五章是政治关联与隐性便利；第六章是政治关联与双重成本；第七章是政治关联与公司业绩；第八章是研究结论。各章的研究内容分别为：
第一章给出导论。导论介绍了本文的选题背景和研究意义,阐明了本文的研究思路和研究方法,给出了本文的总体结构。
第二章是制度背景分析。结合本文的研究内容,制度背景分析分国企改革历程和政府干预行为两个部分展开。在国企改革历程部分,本文介绍了国企改革的由来,分阶段对国企三十余年的改革历程进行分阶段简要的梳理回顾；在总结国企改革经验的基础上,对国企未来可能面临的挑战进行了展望；在国企面临的政府干预行为部分,本文就中央政府和地方政府关系、地方政府之间的竞争、政府官员的政治晋升锦标赛、政府主导下的国企高管任命等内容展开分析。本章主要是对后文可能涉及到的制度背景情况进行必要的介绍和铺垫,以利于阅读以及实证研究的展开。
第三章,理论回顾和文献综述。本部分首先回顾了本文赖以开展研究的基础理论,接下来总结了国企改革中的重要理论问题,然后对国有企业和政府干预、政治关联的相关经验研究展开综述,利于把握以往的研究脉络。
第四章是政治关联与政府干预动机。实证研究从本章开始。对国企而言,政治关联是国企与政府之间众多天然联系中的一种,通过研究国企政治关联现象在一定程度上能够追溯政府干预的动机。在借鉴以往研究成果的基础上,本文将国企关联背后的政府干预动机区分为政治动机和经济动机,通过实证模型加以检验,并考察了中央政府和地方政府干预动机可能存在的差异。
第五章是政治关联与隐性便利。本文将政治关联能够帮助国企获得的各种实际存在但不便明言的好处称之为隐性便利。篇幅所限,对隐性便利的探讨本文将集中于银行融资视角。本文检验了政治关联组和无政治关联组的融资约束是否存在显著差异,考察了政治关联对于获取贷款以及贷款期限结构的影响,区分了中央政府和地方政府干预行为对融资的影响。此外,本文还发现了市场化进程对政治关联获取融资便利性存在一定的制约作用。
第六章,政治关联与双重成本。政治关联带来种种便利的同时,国企实际上也付出了相应的代价。本文将国企付出的代价区分为双重成本,即政治成本和代理成本,试图回答政治关联是否会给企业带来更多的双重成本?通过结合第五章和第六章的研究,本文试图较为全面的展现政治关联给企业带来的复杂影响,进而揭示转轨条件下政府干预与企业的微妙关系。
第七章,政治关联与公司业绩。本章探讨政治关联的经济后果,通过实证确认了政治关联对于企业业绩存在的总体消极影响。进一步的,政治关联对于公司业绩存在不利影响的根源何在?本文发现,总体而言,政治关联给企业带来了更多的非生产性支出,这很可能正是政治关联损害公司业绩的根源。
第八章是研究结论。本章回顾了研究结论,分析了相应的政策启示,介绍了研究贡献,说明了研究局限以及未来将要致力的方向。
本文的主要研究结论如下：
1.政治关联高管的本质是各级政府从人事控制途径推进国企改革,将政府政治和经济意图内部化至国企的关键抓手。国企中普遍存在的高管政治关联现象,实际上是政府干预在国有企业人事领域的具体体现。总体说来,政治关联高管背后反映出政府出于政治和经济动机干预国企人事任命的意图。具体而言,中央企业中的高管政治关联更多的体现了中央政府对于国企改革的整体布局,特别是对国企进行抓大放小和战略性调整的政治动机,而地方企业中的高管政治关联则更多的体现出地方政府为发展当地经济增加财税收入的经济动机。
2.本文着重从银行融资的角度考察了隐性便利。我们发现：首先,存在高管政治关联的国企面临的融资约束显著小于无政治关联企业；其次,政治关联的确有助于获取银行借款。进一步的,我们将国企划分为高融资约束组和低融资约束组,分组实证结果表明,政治关联更有助于高融资约束组的获取银行贷款,客观上具有一定的积极作用；再次,将银行借款区分为长期借款和短期借款后我们发现,国企高管的政治关联对于获取短期借款的效果不明显,但的确能够帮助企业获得更多的长期借款；第四,地方政府控制下的国企能够通过政治关联帮助获得更多的长期借款,但这一结论在中央政府控制下国企组中不成立。最后,企业外部市场化进程的演进在一定程度上制约了政治关联高管获取银行融资便利。
3.本文考察了国企高管政治关联与双重成本之间存在的密切联系。政治成本层面,我们着重考察政治关联对企业冗员的影响,代理成本方面我们则重点考察其对于企业管理费用和在职消费情况的影响。研究发现：首先,政治关联给国企的确带来严重的政治成本和代理成本问题。其次,分样本回归结果显示,中央企业和地方企业均存在不同程度的双重成本问题,在地方企业中尤为严重。
4.本文中我们探讨了政治关联最终对公司业绩的总体影响以及可能的影响途径。我们发现,国企高管的政治关联的确损害了公司业绩,地方企业受害尤甚。进一步的,本文引入非生产性支出的框架来解释高管政治关联损害公司业绩的可能途径。我们发现,政治关联的确给国企带来了更多的非生产型支出,在地方国企中情况更加不容乐观。
总体而言,本文为政治关联领域的研究提供了新的增量经验证据。具体说来,本研究的主要改进和创新体现在以下四个方面：
第一,本文拓展了对于转型经济背景下的国企政治关联现象及其政府干预动机的理解。民营企业构建政治关联往往是出于企业政治战略的需要,通过建立和维护政府关系,进而获取政府政策的倾斜。区别于民营企业的政治关联动机,国企高管的政治关联内生于企业与政府之间千丝万缕的天然联系。从政治关联是政府干预在国企人事领域的体现和抓手的观点出发,本文考察了国有上市公司高管政治关联背后政府干预的政治动机和经济动机,并进一步揭示了中央政府和地方政府干预动机可能存在的差异。
第二,本文提出了国企隐性便利的概念,从融资的角度深化了我们对政治关联影响隐性便利的认识。正如陈信元等(2009)所指出的,对于中国经济问题的研究,不能忽视某些纷乱复杂但秘而不宣的规则,对于政治关联而言正是如此。国企高管的政治关联无疑能够给企业带来某些便利,国有企业堂而皇之可以享受这些便利,政府对此也心知肚明,但在各种规章制度和政策文件中往往难以见到对于这些便利的正式规定和依据,这些便利更多的是一种隐蔽的形式存在。我们将这些不便明言的便利称之为隐性便利。本文从融资约束、融资期限结构、中央政府和地方政府干预行为、市场化的影响等多个方面考察了政治关联与融资便利的关系,相关研究结论在有助于理解国企融资影响因素的同时,也为我们反思我国金融体系存在的金融歧视问题提供了借鉴和参考。
第三,本文揭示了政治关联与双重成本问题的紧密联系。政治关联在帮助国有企业获取各种便利性的同时,也使得国有企业背上了额外的负担,付出了一定的代价。从政治成本理论和代理理论出发,本文将国企付出的代价划分为政治成本和代理成本,实证检验了政治关联与两者之间的关系,并考察了中央企业和地方企业在双重成本上的差异。本文的研究结论揭示了政治关联给国有企业带来的政策性负担和代理问题,同时加深了我们对政府干预给国有企业带来微妙影响的理解。
最后,本文重新验证了政治关联对于公司业绩的损害,并引入了新的框架来解释政治关联对公司业绩的损害途径。以往的研究如Wu等(2010)、王庆文和吴世农(2008)、Fan等(2007)已经发现国企中的政治联系会损害公司业绩。考虑到样本和变量设定上的差异,这些结论有待于进一步检验。本文重新设定了政治关联变量,同时通过引入市场业绩和会计业绩的多个变量,重新检验了政治关联对公司业绩的损害作用,证实了总体而言政治关联更多的扮演了掠夺之手的不良角色,最终损害了国有企业的资源配置效率。进一步的,在借鉴已有研究的基础上,本文试图通过非生产性支出这一框架来解释政治关联对公司业绩的损害途径。相关的研究结论确认了政府干预对国企干预存在的不利影响,在一定程度上拓展和更新了我们对于政治关联损害公司业绩途径的认识。
The magnificent reform and opening up has been proceeding for more than thirty years, now china is the most vigorous economy entity in the world. As for economic field, the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is generally accepted as center link of the reform in economy system, we have found a mixed reform method basing on gradual reform, supply with radical reform if needed (Yang Dan,1999). The proceeding of SOEs reform has played a key role in promoting economy system transforming from planning system into socialism market economy. With the advancement of marketing process, SOEs have solved many problems in the central planning economy era, showing their great potential. But we have to admit that SOEs still facing many chanllenges while gained great achievement.In light of governments didn't change their way to allocate social resources fundamentally during the transformation period(Zhou,2007), they still played a key role in the economy life, all companies including SOEs will affected by government inevitably. With strategies to solve specific problems maybe different, but to solve the problems of SOEs we must take their relation with governments into consideration.
The government intervention behaviors have various ways to affect SOEs, in this paper we will focus on the personnel path. According to survey result of china enterprise survey system (2003), governments use administrative ways to appoint top executives much more often than other market ways, this shows the so called administrative appoint model still existed in transforming china. With the administrative appointment phenomenon, many top executives in SOEs have political connections, with a close relation with government. Previous research like Fan et al.(2007) had found in their research nearly30%CEOs have political connections.We have many reasons to believe, the widely existing political connections phenomenon reflecting frequent interaction between SOEs and governments. As for governments, through political connected top executives, they can intervene SOEs in a more convenient way; as for SOEs, they can build and maintain fine relationship with governments through channels of political connected top executives.
Specifically, this paper will focus on how political connected top executives affect SOEs. On the one hand, top executives with political connections have some substantial character of government officers. SOEs in china can be divided into different administrative rank according to their size, industrial position and their influence, top executives of them have the same administrative rank. Under the administrative appointment model, the choose and appointment of top executives is basing on standards of government officers, with relevant treatment.They can be exchanged as the government officers with same administrative rank, even used as key leaders in provinces. But once dismissed, they will face a sudden drop of then-reputation and social position, it will be hard for them to find a fine job in political system, this is the so called "lock-in effect"(Zhou,2007). So they usually pay great attention to their political achievement and political position, they will try their best to keep their position and get fine result in the so called political promotion champagne race. On the other hand, they have characters of merchants as well. They are very familiar with business of SOEs, as they are on the frontline of market competition. It is their responsibility to ensure the companies get a fine result in furious market competition. Previous officer experience will make them understand policy better, having fine communication ability with the governments, both are necessary for the business of SOEs. All in all, politically connected top executives have the character both government officers and merchants, this distinguish them from usual managers. How will they affect the SOEs is the key problem.this paper tries to explore..
This paper can be divided into eight chapters, including:chapter one, introduction; chapter two, institution background analysis; chapter three, theory retrosepct and literature review; chapter four, political connection and the incentive of government intervention; chapter five, political connection and recessive convenience; chapter six, political connection and double cost; chapter seven is political connection and corporate performance; the last chapter is research conclusion. Specifically:
Chapter one is research introduction. This part analyzed research background and significance, introduces research thought and method, showing the total research structure of the whole paper.
Chapter two is institutional background analysis. This chapter can be divided into two main parts:SOEs reform retrospect and government intervention behavior. In the SOEs reform retrospect part, we introduce the original of SOEs reform, then retrospect different stages of thirty years SOES reforms, and analysis important argument and advancement, finally we analyze future challenges SOEs may face basing on summary the experiences of SOEs reform. In the intervenetion behavior part, we analyze the relationship between central government and local governments, competition between local governments, political promotion champagne race between government officers, and the government control of SOEs. This chapter plays a role of bedding for empirical research.
Chapter three, theory retrospect and literature review, this part first retrospects basic theory necessary for our research, then it sums up important theory issues in the SOEs reform; then we review related research in SOEs and government intervene, political connections. The main aim of this part is to help readers to get a brief impression of previous research.
Chapter four, political connections and the incentive of government intervention:Empirical study begins at this chapter. Previous research about political connection usually base on the private companies, explore their incentives to build political connection. Considering the political connection is only one kind of many connections between government and SOEs, using previous research for reference, our paper divided the government intervene incentive into economic incentive and political incentive, using empirical models to test hypothesis, and explores the intervene behavior diffemence between central and local government.
Chapter five, political connections and recessive convienences.In this paper we call these convenience brought by political connections recessive convenience, we focus on finance convenience in this chapter. We tests whether significant difference exists between political connected group and non-political connected group. We affirm that political connection will affect the period structure of bank loan, we explored the difference of recessive convenience in central SOEs and local SOEs. Furthermore, we check will the advancement of market economy restrict the political connection.
Chapter six, political connections and double cost.Political connection make SOEs pays while gains recessive convenience. This part main discuss the negative effect of political connection. We divide the cost SOEs paid into political cost and agency cost, we try to see if political connection will bring more double cost to SOEs.Combining the research of chapter five and chapter six, we try to reveal the complex effect of political connections, to show the subtle relation between government and SOEs.
Chapter seven is political connection and corporate performance. We confirm the negative effect of political connection, further more, why political connections bring negative effect? Our paper finds political connections do bring more non-productive expenditure to SOEs, it is quite possible the root of its negative effect.
Chapter eight is research conclusion. We review research conclusion, analyze the policy meaning, illustrate research limit and point out future direction.
Using the data of SOEs listed companies, main research conclusion are as follows:
1. Political connection and government intervention incentive. The nature of political connected top executives is all government promote their policy and considerations from personnel path, it's a key hand grab for government to internalize their goals to SOEs. The widely existing political connections, is a reflection of government intervention in personnel field of SOEs. Specifically, political connections in central government mainly reflects its strategy consideration, including keep the big and let the small go, and adjust the SOEs strategically, while in the local SOEs, politicall connections mainly reflect economic incentive of local government to develop local economy and get more tax income.
2. Political connection and recessive convenience. Our paper focuses on financing recessive convenience. Firstly, We find that SOEs with political connections facing smaller finance restrict compare with non political connections; secondly,we divided our samples into high financing restrict group and low financing group, we find political connections do helps companies in high financing restrict group to get more bank loan; thirdly, we divide bank loan into long term loan and short term loan, we find political connection do help firms get more long term bank loan, while this is not significant in short term loan group; Fourthly, empirical results shows, local SOEs do get more long term bank loans, but in the central government SOEs we did not find the same conclusion; finally, we find the advancement of external market do restrict the political connections to get finance convenience.
3. Political connections and double cost. Specifically, we explore the close relationship between political connection and double cost. For political cost, we foucs on redundant staffs; for agency cost, we focus on management fee and non-peculiar consumption. We find political connections do bring severe political cost and agency cost to SOEs, secondly, double cost problems exist in both central and local SOEs, while in local SOEs double cost problem is more severe.
4. Political connections and corporate performance. In our paper we will discuss the overall effect of political connection to SOEs and its possible influence path. We find that the political connections in SOEs do harmed the corporate performance, especially in the local SOEs group. Furthermore, we bring in framework of non-productive expenditure to explain possible influence path of political connection. We find political connections do bring more non productive expenditure in SOEs, and in local SOEs the situation is even worse.
The main improvement and innovation of this study can be summary as the following four aspects:
First of all, from the viewpoint that political connection is the reflection and grab hand in SOEs personnel field, we expand our understanding of political connection and government intervene incentive under transformation china. Private firms build political connection to reach their aim of political strategies, in order to get policy favor. Different from the incentive of private firms, the political connections in SOEs is just one kind of these many close relationships between SOEs and government. Using previous research for reference, our paper defines political incentive and economic incentive of government intervention, explores possible differences between central and local governments.
Secondly, this paper deepens our understanding between political connection and recessive convenience. As Chen et al.(2005) point out, as for the research of china economy, we cannot ignore some complex and recessive rules, for political connection it is just proper to say this. The political connections can bring SOEs some convenience, SOEs can enjoy them, and government knows it, but in all rules and policy files we seldom see the description of them, these convenience exists in a hidden way, we call them recessive conveniences. This paper explores the relationship between political connections and financing convenience from financing restriction, financing period structure, influence of advancement of market economy, intervene difference between central and local governments. Our research conclusion will help us to understand the influence factor, to rethink the finance discrimination in our finance system.
Thirdly, this paper reveals the close relationship between political connection and double cost. Political connection make SOEs get more burdens while bring them conveniences. Basing on political cost and agency cost theory, we divide the cost SOEs paid into political cost and agency cost, we check the relation between political connection and double cost empirically, and discuss the difference in central SOEs and local SOEs. The research conclusion reveals the policy burden and agency problem, and it also help us to understand the subtle effects of government intervene bring to SOEs.
Finally, I check the harmness political connections bring to corporate performance, and we introduce new framework to analyze the influence path. Previous research like Wu et al.(2010), Wang and Wu (2008), Fan et al.(2007) find the political connections will harm the corporate performance. Considering differences in samples and variables, these conclusions need to be further checked. Our paper define political connections in our own way, and use market performance as well as accounting performance, testifiy will the political connection harm the corporate performance. And basing on previous research, we use the non productive expenditure to explain the influence path. Our conclusion confirms the negative effect political connection brings, and it renews our cognition of how political connections harm corporate performance.
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