BOT项目实物期权决策模型研究
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摘要
BOT模式是实现基础设施建设投资多元化及缓解政府财政压力的有效途径,但实践中众多项目由于政府承担过多责任或投资者主动放弃等原因导致实施效果并不理想。特别是由于特许期长和特许定价高等原因,导致投资者获得了超额回报,极大增加了社会负担,引起舆论的广泛关注,甚至导致了社会对BOT模式合理性的质疑。因此,对BOT项目的价值决策、协议优化以及项目治理等方面进行研究有重要的理论和实践价值。
利用实物期权的方法,针对BOT项目价值不确定性的基本特征,提出了三个关键问题,即不确定情形下BOT项目实物期权价值决策问题,风险偏好与努力程度下政府与投资者风险收益最优决策问题,信息不对称下BOT项目监管治理问题；阐述了BOT项目的界定、分类、风险识别与风险分担,比较了实物期权方法与传统评价方法的异同；归纳了实物期权方法在BOT项目决策领域的应用现状,提出了现有研究不足以及重点研究方向。
建立了BOT项目单一实物期权价值决策模型。针对BOT项目特征,提出了影响实物期权价值的影响因素,并分别综述了特许期决策模型和特许价格决策模型的研究成果；在参数假设的基础上构建了BOT项目实物期权价值决策模型,考虑了建设期、波动率、漂移率、无风险利率等相关因素对BOT项目决策的影响,分别进行了参数假设,数值分析结果表明,采用实物期权方法计算得到的项目价值高于采用传统的评价方法计算得到的价值,通过实际案例求解与影响参数敏感性分析,证明了模型的有效性。
建立了基于复合实物期权的BOT项目多阶段决策模型。在政府最低收益保证下,在对重新谈判对应的决策期实物期权参数进行量化基础上,采用二叉树模型,通过迭代方法得到BOT项目的实物期权价值,并且分别就步长为1和大于1的两种情况分别推导出对应的解；数值分析分别在政府最低收益保证下,讨论了波动率、特许期、漂移率、初始投资、无风险利率对于项目价值的影响,分析结论证明了模型的有效性。
建立了基于实物期权契约的BOT项目收益风险匹配决策模型。针对BOT项目特许协议柔性契约特征,考虑了最低收益保证等影响因素在协议制定中的作用,提出特许权许协议的基本模型,分别求解投资者和政府对于生产或服务量的最优解；并在考虑风险偏好和主观努力等影响因素情形下,分别建立基于风险偏好的决策模型和基于主观努力的决策模型,通过优化特许协议使投资者、政府和协议总体达到效益最大化的决策目标。数值分析结果表明,最低收益保证可以有效转移项目风险,提高政府和投资者的期望收益,但在考虑主观努力因素下,投资者单独决策与协议最优化结果一致,但政府最优的努力水平与协议最优化结果矛盾,协议最优化目标实现的关键取决于政府的努力程度。
建立了基于实物期权博弈的BOT项目监管决策模型。BOT项目投资者和政府之间的利益冲突与信息不对称成为了委托代理关系,项目特征决定了项目的经营权和监督权的分离；在考虑信息对称和信息不对称两种情形影响下,采用于实物期权博弈方法,分别建立信息对称和信息不对称下的决策模型；研究表明,在成本与收入二维信息不对称下,政府应该依据观测到项目经营收益和成本来计算对应的投资阈值,并据以制订与代理人之间的合同,在最优投资阈值的特许权协议框架下提供相应的保证,合理的特许协议可以激励投资者实现BOT项目效益最大化目标；数值分析证明了模型的有效性。
The mode of BOT is an effective way to realize the diversification of infrastructure construction investment and ease the financial pressure, but in practice the implementation effect is not ideal, for the government assumes too much responsibility or the investors give up. Especially because of a long concession period and high concession price, the investors win the excess return. It will greatly increase the burden on society, causing widespread public concern, and even lead to question the soundness of BOT model. Therefore, it has important theoretical and practical value to study on the value of the BOT projects decision-making, agreement optimization and project management.
Based on the method of real options and the basic characteristics of the uncertainty of the BOT projects value, this paper puts forward three key problems:decision-making problems of real options value under uncertain circumstances, optimal decision-making problems of the government and investors'risk-benefit under risk appetite and effort, the governance problem of BOT projects supervision with asymmetric information. It compares the real options method with the traditional evaluation method, concludes the present situation of real options in BOT projects decision-making areas, and proposes the existing lack of research and research focus.
A real options value decision-making model of BOT projects is established. For the characteristics of BOT projects, this paper proposes the influence factors of real options value and also summarizes the research of decision-making model on Concession Term and decision-making model with concession price. It builds the real options value decision-making model of BOT projects, based on parameter hypothesis. Considering these factors related to BOT projects decision-making influence including construction period, volatility, drifting rate, and risk-free rate, the paper makes the parameter hypothesis respectively. Numerical analysis results shows that the real options method used to get the project value is higher than using the traditional method of evaluation. This paper proves the effectiveness of the model by actual cases and the parameter sensitivity analysis.
A renegotiating decision-making model of BOT projects is established. On the basis of the quantization of real options parameters in the decision period corresponding to renegotiating with the lowest income security in the government, this paper uses the binary tree model to get real options value of BOT projects through the Iterative Method and respectively deduces the corresponding solution with two kinds of cases which is the step of1 and the step of greater than1. The case uses the numerical analysis to discuss the influence of the value of the project including volatility, Concession Term, drifting rate, initial investment and risk-free rate under the lowest income security of the government, which proves the effectiveness of the model.
A decision-making model of BOT projects'risk-return matching is established. Due to the flexible contract features of concession agreement on BOT projects, considering the role of the lowest income security factors in agreement, this paper puts forward the basic model of concession agreement and finds the optimal solution of production or service volume respectively from investors and the government; In addition, considering the influence of risk preference and subjective efforts respectively, the paper establishes a decision-making model based on risk preference and a decision-making model based on subjective efforts, optimizing concession agreement to achieve the decision goal of maximizing social benefits. Numerical analysis results show that the lowest income security can be effective to transfer project risk and improve the government and investors expected return, but in considering subjective efforts factors, the decision-making of individual investors and is consistent with the optimizing result of agreement, but the optimal level of government's efforts is contradicted with the optimizing result, the key of realizing the goal of optimizing agreement depends on the government's efforts
An intendance game decision-making model of BOT projects is established. The interest conflicts and information asymmetry between the investors of BOT projects and the government become principal-agent relationship. The characteristics of BOT projects lead to separation of management and supervision. Considering the respective effects of symmetric and asymmetric information, this paper adopts real options game method to establish respectively symmetric information decision model and asymmetric information decision model. The research shows that in two-dimensional asymmetric information of costs and revenues, the government should infer the value of projects and operating costs according to the observed investment threshold. Then the government works out the contracts with agents, providing the corresponding guarantee at the concession agreement of the optimal investment threshold, motivating investors to achieve maximum benefits of BOT projects. Through numerical analysis, the effectiveness of the model is proved.
利用实物期权的方法,针对BOT项目价值不确定性的基本特征,提出了三个关键问题,即不确定情形下BOT项目实物期权价值决策问题,风险偏好与努力程度下政府与投资者风险收益最优决策问题,信息不对称下BOT项目监管治理问题；阐述了BOT项目的界定、分类、风险识别与风险分担,比较了实物期权方法与传统评价方法的异同；归纳了实物期权方法在BOT项目决策领域的应用现状,提出了现有研究不足以及重点研究方向。
建立了BOT项目单一实物期权价值决策模型。针对BOT项目特征,提出了影响实物期权价值的影响因素,并分别综述了特许期决策模型和特许价格决策模型的研究成果；在参数假设的基础上构建了BOT项目实物期权价值决策模型,考虑了建设期、波动率、漂移率、无风险利率等相关因素对BOT项目决策的影响,分别进行了参数假设,数值分析结果表明,采用实物期权方法计算得到的项目价值高于采用传统的评价方法计算得到的价值,通过实际案例求解与影响参数敏感性分析,证明了模型的有效性。
建立了基于复合实物期权的BOT项目多阶段决策模型。在政府最低收益保证下,在对重新谈判对应的决策期实物期权参数进行量化基础上,采用二叉树模型,通过迭代方法得到BOT项目的实物期权价值,并且分别就步长为1和大于1的两种情况分别推导出对应的解；数值分析分别在政府最低收益保证下,讨论了波动率、特许期、漂移率、初始投资、无风险利率对于项目价值的影响,分析结论证明了模型的有效性。
建立了基于实物期权契约的BOT项目收益风险匹配决策模型。针对BOT项目特许协议柔性契约特征,考虑了最低收益保证等影响因素在协议制定中的作用,提出特许权许协议的基本模型,分别求解投资者和政府对于生产或服务量的最优解；并在考虑风险偏好和主观努力等影响因素情形下,分别建立基于风险偏好的决策模型和基于主观努力的决策模型,通过优化特许协议使投资者、政府和协议总体达到效益最大化的决策目标。数值分析结果表明,最低收益保证可以有效转移项目风险,提高政府和投资者的期望收益,但在考虑主观努力因素下,投资者单独决策与协议最优化结果一致,但政府最优的努力水平与协议最优化结果矛盾,协议最优化目标实现的关键取决于政府的努力程度。
建立了基于实物期权博弈的BOT项目监管决策模型。BOT项目投资者和政府之间的利益冲突与信息不对称成为了委托代理关系,项目特征决定了项目的经营权和监督权的分离；在考虑信息对称和信息不对称两种情形影响下,采用于实物期权博弈方法,分别建立信息对称和信息不对称下的决策模型；研究表明,在成本与收入二维信息不对称下,政府应该依据观测到项目经营收益和成本来计算对应的投资阈值,并据以制订与代理人之间的合同,在最优投资阈值的特许权协议框架下提供相应的保证,合理的特许协议可以激励投资者实现BOT项目效益最大化目标；数值分析证明了模型的有效性。
The mode of BOT is an effective way to realize the diversification of infrastructure construction investment and ease the financial pressure, but in practice the implementation effect is not ideal, for the government assumes too much responsibility or the investors give up. Especially because of a long concession period and high concession price, the investors win the excess return. It will greatly increase the burden on society, causing widespread public concern, and even lead to question the soundness of BOT model. Therefore, it has important theoretical and practical value to study on the value of the BOT projects decision-making, agreement optimization and project management.
Based on the method of real options and the basic characteristics of the uncertainty of the BOT projects value, this paper puts forward three key problems:decision-making problems of real options value under uncertain circumstances, optimal decision-making problems of the government and investors'risk-benefit under risk appetite and effort, the governance problem of BOT projects supervision with asymmetric information. It compares the real options method with the traditional evaluation method, concludes the present situation of real options in BOT projects decision-making areas, and proposes the existing lack of research and research focus.
A real options value decision-making model of BOT projects is established. For the characteristics of BOT projects, this paper proposes the influence factors of real options value and also summarizes the research of decision-making model on Concession Term and decision-making model with concession price. It builds the real options value decision-making model of BOT projects, based on parameter hypothesis. Considering these factors related to BOT projects decision-making influence including construction period, volatility, drifting rate, and risk-free rate, the paper makes the parameter hypothesis respectively. Numerical analysis results shows that the real options method used to get the project value is higher than using the traditional method of evaluation. This paper proves the effectiveness of the model by actual cases and the parameter sensitivity analysis.
A renegotiating decision-making model of BOT projects is established. On the basis of the quantization of real options parameters in the decision period corresponding to renegotiating with the lowest income security in the government, this paper uses the binary tree model to get real options value of BOT projects through the Iterative Method and respectively deduces the corresponding solution with two kinds of cases which is the step of1 and the step of greater than1. The case uses the numerical analysis to discuss the influence of the value of the project including volatility, Concession Term, drifting rate, initial investment and risk-free rate under the lowest income security of the government, which proves the effectiveness of the model.
A decision-making model of BOT projects'risk-return matching is established. Due to the flexible contract features of concession agreement on BOT projects, considering the role of the lowest income security factors in agreement, this paper puts forward the basic model of concession agreement and finds the optimal solution of production or service volume respectively from investors and the government; In addition, considering the influence of risk preference and subjective efforts respectively, the paper establishes a decision-making model based on risk preference and a decision-making model based on subjective efforts, optimizing concession agreement to achieve the decision goal of maximizing social benefits. Numerical analysis results show that the lowest income security can be effective to transfer project risk and improve the government and investors expected return, but in considering subjective efforts factors, the decision-making of individual investors and is consistent with the optimizing result of agreement, but the optimal level of government's efforts is contradicted with the optimizing result, the key of realizing the goal of optimizing agreement depends on the government's efforts
An intendance game decision-making model of BOT projects is established. The interest conflicts and information asymmetry between the investors of BOT projects and the government become principal-agent relationship. The characteristics of BOT projects lead to separation of management and supervision. Considering the respective effects of symmetric and asymmetric information, this paper adopts real options game method to establish respectively symmetric information decision model and asymmetric information decision model. The research shows that in two-dimensional asymmetric information of costs and revenues, the government should infer the value of projects and operating costs according to the observed investment threshold. Then the government works out the contracts with agents, providing the corresponding guarantee at the concession agreement of the optimal investment threshold, motivating investors to achieve maximum benefits of BOT projects. Through numerical analysis, the effectiveness of the model is proved.
引文
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