会计师事务所声誉与投资者保护
摘要
审计质量是审计研究的核心，声誉机制是保证审计质量的最重要、最基础和最有效的方法（夏立军，2006）。审计作为降低代理成本和缓解信息不对称的重要机制，可以起到保护投资者的作用。因此，研究在投资者保护中，会计师事务所声誉是否发挥作用以及如何发挥作用具有十分重要的意义。我国审计市场的建立时间不长，且主要由政府推动发展，对于事务所声誉是否能够发挥作用存在很大争议，特别是证券市场上缺乏对投资者利益的保护，凸显了本文研究的重要性。
本文构建了事务所声誉和审计质量的模型，对影响事务所声誉作用机制的因素进行了分析。在探讨事务所声誉如何认定后，采用多种衡量指标，以资本市场上市场份额前十、前二十的事务所，事务所总收入为前十、前二十的事务所，四大及政府行政认可的事务所作为有声誉的事务所，发现资本市场上市场份额为前十、事务所总收入为前十的事务所能提供更高的审计质量；而资本市场上市场份额为前二十、事务所总收入为前二十的事务所没有提供更高的审计质量。本文发现政府行政认可的事务所提供了更高的审计质量，没有发现四大提供更高审计质量的证据。
本文也实证检验了事务所声誉对大股东资金占用和对监管部门监督的影响，扩展了审计声誉研究的范围。以A股市场2007年到2010年的上市公司数据为样本，本文发现，对大股东的资金占用行为，事务所能出具非标审计意见；事务所声誉越高，越倾向出具非标意见；并且在上年度上市公司收到非标意见的情况下，事务所声誉越高，越能够导致本年度大股东资金占用的减少。另外，非标意见引起了监管部门对上市公司的处罚；且声誉越高的事务所出具的非标审计意见更容易导致监管部门对上市公司处罚。公司遭到处罚后，有声誉的事务所能提高对投资者的保护。研究表明，事务所声誉机制发挥了对投资者的保护作用。
本文的贡献主要体现在：一是构建了事务所声誉和审计质量的模型，对影响事务所声誉作用机制的因素进行了研究；二是采用多种指标来衡量事务所声誉；三是研究了事务所声誉对大股东和监管部门的影响，从而扩展了事务所声誉作用机制的研究。
The audit quality is the core for audit research. The reputation mechanism is the mostimportant, the most fundamental and the most useful method to ensure the auditquality (Xia,2006).Audit is a very important mechanism to reduce the agencyproblem and information problem, and it can protect investors. Whether auditreputation and how audit reputation works to protect investors are very meaningfultopics. In China, the audit market has just been set up for a short time, and thegovernment has played a very important role in it. As to whether audit works is a heattopic. However, there is not enough protection for investors, which makes theresearch more important.
This paper provides researching the mechanism of audit reputation, and analyzes theinfluential factors of the mechanism from the cost and efficency angle. The auditmechanism works by motivation and restriction, and it works within the limitations ofa number of factors. After exploring how to measure the audit reputation, this paperuses lots of indexes to measure the CPA firm’s reputation. The indexes are: the top10and the top20measured both by the market share and the CPA firm’s revenue, big4and the granted reputable CPA firm by government. This paper establishes that thetop10CPA firms both based on the market share and on the firm revenue work toprotect the investors, which shows reputation works. However, the top20CPA firmsdon’t protect the investors very well. In addtion, this paper supports that reputableCPA firms do protect investors, but big4don’t show a good audit quality.This paper also explores whether the reputable audit firms have influences on both thelarge shareholder’s expropriation and the regulator’s probe. Using a sample from2007to2010in the A-share market, this paper finds out that on average CPA firmswill issue qualified reports to expriporiation and the CPA firm with a higherreputation will be more likely to issue the qualified reports. The next year’sexpropriation will be reduceing if the audit firm is reputable. In addtion, the regulatorsuse the qualified audit reports. The higher the reputation of the CPA firm, the more attention paid by the regulators, and the more probes lauched by the regulators.Furthermore, after the government probed, the accounting information quality will beimproved on the firms audited by the reputable CPA firm, while the expropriation willdecrease on the firms audited by the repuatable CPA firms. This paper supports thatthe reputable CPA firms can protect investors theoretically and empirically.The contribution of this paper are the following: firstly this paper explores how tomeasure the reputable CPA firms, secondly the paper studys the factors that will haveinfluence on the reputation mechanism,finally the paper studies the shareholders’expropriation and regulators’ attentions to the repuatable CPA firm.
本文构建了事务所声誉和审计质量的模型，对影响事务所声誉作用机制的因素进行了分析。在探讨事务所声誉如何认定后，采用多种衡量指标，以资本市场上市场份额前十、前二十的事务所，事务所总收入为前十、前二十的事务所，四大及政府行政认可的事务所作为有声誉的事务所，发现资本市场上市场份额为前十、事务所总收入为前十的事务所能提供更高的审计质量；而资本市场上市场份额为前二十、事务所总收入为前二十的事务所没有提供更高的审计质量。本文发现政府行政认可的事务所提供了更高的审计质量，没有发现四大提供更高审计质量的证据。
本文也实证检验了事务所声誉对大股东资金占用和对监管部门监督的影响，扩展了审计声誉研究的范围。以A股市场2007年到2010年的上市公司数据为样本，本文发现，对大股东的资金占用行为，事务所能出具非标审计意见；事务所声誉越高，越倾向出具非标意见；并且在上年度上市公司收到非标意见的情况下，事务所声誉越高，越能够导致本年度大股东资金占用的减少。另外，非标意见引起了监管部门对上市公司的处罚；且声誉越高的事务所出具的非标审计意见更容易导致监管部门对上市公司处罚。公司遭到处罚后，有声誉的事务所能提高对投资者的保护。研究表明，事务所声誉机制发挥了对投资者的保护作用。
本文的贡献主要体现在：一是构建了事务所声誉和审计质量的模型，对影响事务所声誉作用机制的因素进行了研究；二是采用多种指标来衡量事务所声誉；三是研究了事务所声誉对大股东和监管部门的影响，从而扩展了事务所声誉作用机制的研究。
The audit quality is the core for audit research. The reputation mechanism is the mostimportant, the most fundamental and the most useful method to ensure the auditquality (Xia,2006).Audit is a very important mechanism to reduce the agencyproblem and information problem, and it can protect investors. Whether auditreputation and how audit reputation works to protect investors are very meaningfultopics. In China, the audit market has just been set up for a short time, and thegovernment has played a very important role in it. As to whether audit works is a heattopic. However, there is not enough protection for investors, which makes theresearch more important.
This paper provides researching the mechanism of audit reputation, and analyzes theinfluential factors of the mechanism from the cost and efficency angle. The auditmechanism works by motivation and restriction, and it works within the limitations ofa number of factors. After exploring how to measure the audit reputation, this paperuses lots of indexes to measure the CPA firm’s reputation. The indexes are: the top10and the top20measured both by the market share and the CPA firm’s revenue, big4and the granted reputable CPA firm by government. This paper establishes that thetop10CPA firms both based on the market share and on the firm revenue work toprotect the investors, which shows reputation works. However, the top20CPA firmsdon’t protect the investors very well. In addtion, this paper supports that reputableCPA firms do protect investors, but big4don’t show a good audit quality.This paper also explores whether the reputable audit firms have influences on both thelarge shareholder’s expropriation and the regulator’s probe. Using a sample from2007to2010in the A-share market, this paper finds out that on average CPA firmswill issue qualified reports to expriporiation and the CPA firm with a higherreputation will be more likely to issue the qualified reports. The next year’sexpropriation will be reduceing if the audit firm is reputable. In addtion, the regulatorsuse the qualified audit reports. The higher the reputation of the CPA firm, the more attention paid by the regulators, and the more probes lauched by the regulators.Furthermore, after the government probed, the accounting information quality will beimproved on the firms audited by the reputable CPA firm, while the expropriation willdecrease on the firms audited by the repuatable CPA firms. This paper supports thatthe reputable CPA firms can protect investors theoretically and empirically.The contribution of this paper are the following: firstly this paper explores how tomeasure the reputable CPA firms, secondly the paper studys the factors that will haveinfluence on the reputation mechanism,finally the paper studies the shareholders’expropriation and regulators’ attentions to the repuatable CPA firm.
引文
1本文研究的是会计师事务所声誉。为行文方便，对会计师、审计师、会计师事务所并不严格加以区分。
2纠错包括调挤利润水分，发掘隐匿利润，调减虚假资产，挖出隐匿资产，警示可疑交易等。
3事务所声誉机制至少包括声誉形成机制和声誉作用机制。本文研究的是声誉作用机制与投资者保护的关系。
4国内许多研究发现大股东侵占小股东利益在中国市场是很普遍的现象，如李增泉等（2004），贺建刚等（2008）。
5为行文方便，文中的中小股东、中小投资者指的都是小股东。
6本文并不研究其他利益相关方和潜在投资者，虽然高质量审计服务带来的高信息披露质量也起到了保护他们的作用。
7本文的实证部分直接采用资金占用的说法。
8五大指安侯建业、勤业、资诚、众信、致远。
9为跨国公司提供服务的事务所既包括四大，也包括非四大；但在审计市场上产生重要影响的为四大。
10普华永道1978年在北京设立代表处，接着1981年在上海设立代表处。1981年安永在北京设立代表处，1983年德勤和毕马威在北京设立代表处。
11该文明确规定了事务所申请证券资格需满足的条件：具有证券资格的注册会计师不得少于20人；60周岁以内的注册会计师不少于40人；上年度业务收入不少于800万元；有限责任事务所实收资本不得低于200万元、合伙会计师事务所净资产不得低于100万元。
12仅2008年就发生6起涉及证券期货业务资格事务所之间的合并。1月16日，中瑞华恒信会计师和岳华会计师事务所合并为中瑞岳华会计师事务所。2月，北京五洲联合与万隆松德宣布合并为五洲松德联合会计师事务所。4月，河北华安、光大、永正得三家合并为河北光华会计师事务所。11月下旬，天健光华与重庆天健合并形成新的天健光华会计师事务所。12月，5家国内百强所中接连发生两起较大的合并。20日，安徽华普、辽宁天健、北京高商万达三家宣布合并成为华普天健高商会计师事务所；次日，北京京都与天华会计师事务所宣布合并，成立北京京都天华会计师事务所。
13中注协秘书长陈毓圭表示，这次转制的复杂性和影响面将不亚于1999年完成的“脱钩改制”。他指出，特殊普通合伙的引入，无疑为会计师事务所做大做强提供了有效的制度框架，也是中国注册会计师行业在会计师事务所组织形式上的国际趋同。
142003年，中国证监会在《中国证监会股票发行审核标准备忘录第16号—首次公开发行股票的
15刘桂良,谢璟.公司治理对审计师选择权的影响分析[J].湖南大学学报（自然科学版）:2011,8:88-92.
16本文并不研究其他利益相关方和潜在投资者，虽然高质量审计服务带来的高信息披露质量也起到了保护他们的作用。
18根据一些学者的研究，在我国大股东对中小股东的利益剥夺具有普遍性（李增泉等，2004；贺建刚等，2008）。
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2纠错包括调挤利润水分，发掘隐匿利润，调减虚假资产，挖出隐匿资产，警示可疑交易等。
3事务所声誉机制至少包括声誉形成机制和声誉作用机制。本文研究的是声誉作用机制与投资者保护的关系。
4国内许多研究发现大股东侵占小股东利益在中国市场是很普遍的现象，如李增泉等（2004），贺建刚等（2008）。
5为行文方便，文中的中小股东、中小投资者指的都是小股东。
6本文并不研究其他利益相关方和潜在投资者，虽然高质量审计服务带来的高信息披露质量也起到了保护他们的作用。
7本文的实证部分直接采用资金占用的说法。
8五大指安侯建业、勤业、资诚、众信、致远。
9为跨国公司提供服务的事务所既包括四大，也包括非四大；但在审计市场上产生重要影响的为四大。
10普华永道1978年在北京设立代表处，接着1981年在上海设立代表处。1981年安永在北京设立代表处，1983年德勤和毕马威在北京设立代表处。
11该文明确规定了事务所申请证券资格需满足的条件：具有证券资格的注册会计师不得少于20人；60周岁以内的注册会计师不少于40人；上年度业务收入不少于800万元；有限责任事务所实收资本不得低于200万元、合伙会计师事务所净资产不得低于100万元。
12仅2008年就发生6起涉及证券期货业务资格事务所之间的合并。1月16日，中瑞华恒信会计师和岳华会计师事务所合并为中瑞岳华会计师事务所。2月，北京五洲联合与万隆松德宣布合并为五洲松德联合会计师事务所。4月，河北华安、光大、永正得三家合并为河北光华会计师事务所。11月下旬，天健光华与重庆天健合并形成新的天健光华会计师事务所。12月，5家国内百强所中接连发生两起较大的合并。20日，安徽华普、辽宁天健、北京高商万达三家宣布合并成为华普天健高商会计师事务所；次日，北京京都与天华会计师事务所宣布合并，成立北京京都天华会计师事务所。
13中注协秘书长陈毓圭表示，这次转制的复杂性和影响面将不亚于1999年完成的“脱钩改制”。他指出，特殊普通合伙的引入，无疑为会计师事务所做大做强提供了有效的制度框架，也是中国注册会计师行业在会计师事务所组织形式上的国际趋同。
142003年，中国证监会在《中国证监会股票发行审核标准备忘录第16号—首次公开发行股票的
15刘桂良,谢璟.公司治理对审计师选择权的影响分析[J].湖南大学学报（自然科学版）:2011,8:88-92.
16本文并不研究其他利益相关方和潜在投资者，虽然高质量审计服务带来的高信息披露质量也起到了保护他们的作用。
18根据一些学者的研究，在我国大股东对中小股东的利益剥夺具有普遍性（李增泉等，2004；贺建刚等，2008）。
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