股权结构、公司治理与公司绩效
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摘要
公司治理结构对其经营绩效有重大的影响,而公司的股权结构是公司治理结构的重要组成部分,它对于公司的经营激励,收购兼并,代理权竞争与监督等诸多方面均有较大影响。从某种意义上讲,公司股权结构是治理结构的深层次问题,西方学者对此研究已经很深入,但在国内,这方面的研究还较欠缺。在我国企业普遍实行现代企业制度改革以及我国资本市场不断扩展,上市公司数量不断增加的今天,深入探讨股权结构的作用机理,进行最佳股权结构设计,是一项非常有意的工作。
本文首先介绍了关于股权结构、公司治理机制与公司价值关系的国内外研究状况。其次,简单讨论了股权结构的内涵及其对公司治理的影响;接着介绍了本文实证部分主要用到的面板数据模型的建模及检验方法,为下文的实证研究打下基础。再次,分析了目前我国上市公司股权结构的现状并指出与国际上其他国家相比可能存在的问题。在下面的实证研究部分,以1998年—2005年的上市公司的面板数据作为研究样本,在考虑上市公司行业因素的基础上,选取具有显著行业差异特征的五类代表性行业进行分析,本文克服已有文献采用混合最小二乘估计进行回归分析可能忽略样本间的个体差异得到错误结论的不足,综合利用混合数据模型和面板数据的变截距模型(固定效应模型和随机效应模型)进行分析以求最大程度上反映数据之间真实有效的关系。然后根据设定的模型分别进行总样本和分行业子样本的相关性分析和面板数据模型的回归分析,在此基础上得到本文结论并提出建议。本文主要结论如下:
1.从相关性分析结果看来,管理层持股比例在一定程度上与公司绩效具有正的相关性,说明管理层持股有利于其更好的进行公司的治理。从面板数据的回归结果来看,董事会持股比例与公司绩效总体上不显著,高管人员持股比例与公司绩效整体正相关,分行业却不显著。结果的不一致,说明了我国管理层持股对公司绩效的提高功能难以发挥。
2.在其他条件相同的情况下,有一定的集中度,有相对控股股东并且公司大股东持股比例之间的差距较小的情况下有利于公司治理机制的发挥,从而提高企业的绩效。股权构成对公司绩效有显著影响,但其影响效果因行业而异,单纯的总样本分析,可能会掩盖两者之间真实关系的行业差异性,因此进行分行业的样本研究以求更准确的反映两者之间的关系是必要的。
The governance structure has a significant influence on the firm performance, and the ownership structure is an important component of the governance structure. The ownership structure has a more tremendous influence on the management incentive, the purchase annexation, the power of attorney competition and the surveillance and many other aspects. In a sense, the ownership structure is the deep-seated problem of the governance structure. The western scholars have studied on this very thoroughly, but in domestic, this aspect research was comparatively short of. Today, China’s enterprises extensively carry out the modern enterprise system reform, our country’s capital market continues to expand, and the number of listed companies unceasingly increases. To delve into the mechanism of ownership structure and the best ownership structure design is a very meaningful work.
Firstly, in this paper the domestic and foreign research situation of the relationship among the ownership structure, the governance structure and the corporate value is introduced. Next, the ownership structure connotation and its impact on corporate governance are simply discussed. Then, the method of the panel data modeling and the test procedure, which built the foundation for the empirical analysis, is introduced. In addition, the present situation of ownership structure of the listed companies is analyzed; the possible problems compared with other countries are pointed out. In the following empirical study, this paper uses the panel data from listed companies in China from year 1998 to 2005, chooses five typical industries as samples, and uses a panel data methodology to carry out the study. The literature using the pooled least squares regression to analyze the panel data may neglect the characteristics of the panel data. This paper overcomes the shortcomings, using the panel data model analysis method to analyze, in order to reflect real and effective relationship in the greatest degree. Then, the total sample and the industry-related sub-sample correlation analysis and the panel data model regression analysis are separately carried on. The conclusion of this paper is obtained on this foundation and the proposals are put forward. The main conclusions are as follows:
1. From the correlation analysis, the management shareholding ratio has the positive relevance with the firm performance in a certain degree. From the panel data regression analysis, a different result is obtained. The inconsistent result implies that, in China, the function that the management level holds the stock to enhance the firm performance is difficult to display.
2. The results offer evidence of a positive effect of the degree of control with regard to the firm performance. We also find a significant relationship between the ownership structure and the firm performance ,but the empirical results varies in the 5 sample industries ,in order to find a real connection between them ,more mini-sample analyses are necessary.
本文首先介绍了关于股权结构、公司治理机制与公司价值关系的国内外研究状况。其次,简单讨论了股权结构的内涵及其对公司治理的影响;接着介绍了本文实证部分主要用到的面板数据模型的建模及检验方法,为下文的实证研究打下基础。再次,分析了目前我国上市公司股权结构的现状并指出与国际上其他国家相比可能存在的问题。在下面的实证研究部分,以1998年—2005年的上市公司的面板数据作为研究样本,在考虑上市公司行业因素的基础上,选取具有显著行业差异特征的五类代表性行业进行分析,本文克服已有文献采用混合最小二乘估计进行回归分析可能忽略样本间的个体差异得到错误结论的不足,综合利用混合数据模型和面板数据的变截距模型(固定效应模型和随机效应模型)进行分析以求最大程度上反映数据之间真实有效的关系。然后根据设定的模型分别进行总样本和分行业子样本的相关性分析和面板数据模型的回归分析,在此基础上得到本文结论并提出建议。本文主要结论如下:
1.从相关性分析结果看来,管理层持股比例在一定程度上与公司绩效具有正的相关性,说明管理层持股有利于其更好的进行公司的治理。从面板数据的回归结果来看,董事会持股比例与公司绩效总体上不显著,高管人员持股比例与公司绩效整体正相关,分行业却不显著。结果的不一致,说明了我国管理层持股对公司绩效的提高功能难以发挥。
2.在其他条件相同的情况下,有一定的集中度,有相对控股股东并且公司大股东持股比例之间的差距较小的情况下有利于公司治理机制的发挥,从而提高企业的绩效。股权构成对公司绩效有显著影响,但其影响效果因行业而异,单纯的总样本分析,可能会掩盖两者之间真实关系的行业差异性,因此进行分行业的样本研究以求更准确的反映两者之间的关系是必要的。
The governance structure has a significant influence on the firm performance, and the ownership structure is an important component of the governance structure. The ownership structure has a more tremendous influence on the management incentive, the purchase annexation, the power of attorney competition and the surveillance and many other aspects. In a sense, the ownership structure is the deep-seated problem of the governance structure. The western scholars have studied on this very thoroughly, but in domestic, this aspect research was comparatively short of. Today, China’s enterprises extensively carry out the modern enterprise system reform, our country’s capital market continues to expand, and the number of listed companies unceasingly increases. To delve into the mechanism of ownership structure and the best ownership structure design is a very meaningful work.
Firstly, in this paper the domestic and foreign research situation of the relationship among the ownership structure, the governance structure and the corporate value is introduced. Next, the ownership structure connotation and its impact on corporate governance are simply discussed. Then, the method of the panel data modeling and the test procedure, which built the foundation for the empirical analysis, is introduced. In addition, the present situation of ownership structure of the listed companies is analyzed; the possible problems compared with other countries are pointed out. In the following empirical study, this paper uses the panel data from listed companies in China from year 1998 to 2005, chooses five typical industries as samples, and uses a panel data methodology to carry out the study. The literature using the pooled least squares regression to analyze the panel data may neglect the characteristics of the panel data. This paper overcomes the shortcomings, using the panel data model analysis method to analyze, in order to reflect real and effective relationship in the greatest degree. Then, the total sample and the industry-related sub-sample correlation analysis and the panel data model regression analysis are separately carried on. The conclusion of this paper is obtained on this foundation and the proposals are put forward. The main conclusions are as follows:
1. From the correlation analysis, the management shareholding ratio has the positive relevance with the firm performance in a certain degree. From the panel data regression analysis, a different result is obtained. The inconsistent result implies that, in China, the function that the management level holds the stock to enhance the firm performance is difficult to display.
2. The results offer evidence of a positive effect of the degree of control with regard to the firm performance. We also find a significant relationship between the ownership structure and the firm performance ,but the empirical results varies in the 5 sample industries ,in order to find a real connection between them ,more mini-sample analyses are necessary.
引文
[1] Berle, A. and G. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Macmillan,New York , 1932
[2] Jensen,M. C. and W. H. Meckling. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure. [J] Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3,305- 360
[3] Fama,E. and Jensen, M. Separation of ownership and control. [J] Journal of Law and Economics. 1983, 26, 301-325
[4] Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, [J].Journal of Political Economy, 1985.93, 1155- 1177
[5] Shleifer.A and Vishny. R. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, [J] Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94, 461-488
[6] Stulz, R. Managerial control of voting rights: financial policies and the market for corporate control, [J] Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20, 25-54
[7] Holderness, C. and Sheehan, D. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations, [J] Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20, 317-346
[8] Morck, R. and Shleifer, A. and vishny, R. Management of ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis, [J] Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20, 293-315
[9] McConnell, J. and Servaes, H. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, [J] Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27, 595-612
[10] Leech, D & Leahy, J. Ownership structure, control type classifications and the performance of large British companies, [J] The Economic Journal, 101,1991,418– 1437
[11] Cochran, P. and Wartick, S. Corporate governance-A review of literature. International Corporate Governance, Prentice Hall,1998
[12] Mudambi, R. and Nicosia, C. Ownership structure and firm performance:Evidence from the UK financial services industry. Applied Financial Economics.1998,175– 180
[13] Wiblin, M& Woo L. A. Are all agency resolution mechanisms performance enhancing? Paper presented at the 6th Multinational Finance Society Congress, Toronto.1999
[14] Wang X Z, Xu L X, Zhu T. State-owned enterprises going public: The case of China[Z].Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,2001
[15] Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste. Multiple large shareholders and firm value. [J] Journal of Banking & Finance 29, 2005, 1813–1834
[16] Hong Zou, Jason Zezhong Xiao. The financing behavior of listed Chinese firms. [J] Journal of Multinational Financial Management. 16, 2006, 64– 88
[17] James S. Ang, David K. Ding. Government ownership and the performance of government-linked companies: The case of Singapore. [J]The British Accounting Review 38,2006,239–258
[18] Antonio M?′nguez-Vera a, Juan Francisco Mart?′n-Ugedo. Does ownership structure affect value? A panel data analysis for the Spanish market. [J] International Review of Financial Analysis 16, 2007, 81–98
[19] Chen, Jian. Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, [J] Economics of Planning, 2001 Vol 34, No 1
[20]林毅夫等,国有企业改革的核心是创造竞争环境,改革,1995,3
[21]费方域,什么是公司治理结构,上海经济研究,1995,5
[22]费方域,控制内部控制人控制——国企改革中的治理机制研究,经济研究,1996,6
[23]张维迎,所有制、治理结构与委托—代理关系,经济研究,1996,9
[24]张维迎,从公司治理结构看中国国有企业改革,企业理论与中国企业改革,1999,1
[25]李子奈,叶阿忠,高等计量经济学,北京:清华大学出版社,2000,132-154
[26]施东晖,股权结构、公司治理与绩效表现,世界经济, 2000, (12)37-44
[27]张红军,中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析,经济科学, 2000, (4)34-44
[28]孙永祥,公司治理结构:理论与实证研究,上海:上海人民出版社,2002,1-13,118-136
[29]宾国强,舒元,股权分割、公司业绩与投资者保护,管理世界,2003,5,101-108
[30]李亚静,公司治理与价值创造,成都:西南交通大学出版社,2004, 56-61,123-151
[31]北京市法学会经济法研究会,公司治理结构的理论与实践,北京:机械工业出版社,2004,104-179
[32]杨华,上市公司监管和价值创造,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004,177-195
[33]王克敏,陈井勇,股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效,管理世界,2004, (7)
[34] Cheng Hsiao,面板数据分析,北京:北京大学出版社,2005,1-67
[35]余鹏翼,金天,张学斌.沪市上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的实证分析,系统工程, 2005,3, 43-46
[36]黄晓波.股权结构与公司绩效实证研究的发现及其评价,经济与管理, 2006, 4,73-75
[37]陈志远,梁彤缨.行业特征、股权结构与公司绩效的实证分析,系统工程,2006,2,72-77
[38]王永海,毛洪安.股权结构、行业特征与公司绩效,财会通讯,2006,1,3-7
[39]胡鞍钢,胡光宇.公司治理中外比较.北京:新华出版社.2004,1
[40]卢纹岱,朱一力等,SPSS for Windows从入门到精通.北京:电子工业出版社.1997,6
[41]李维安.公司治理学.北京:高等教育出版社.2005,5
[42]徐锡意,中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效关系实证研究,(硕士学位论文),西南财经大学.2004
[43]何罡,我国上市公司股权结构与企业绩效研究,(硕士学位论文),西南财经大学.2004
[2] Jensen,M. C. and W. H. Meckling. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure. [J] Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3,305- 360
[3] Fama,E. and Jensen, M. Separation of ownership and control. [J] Journal of Law and Economics. 1983, 26, 301-325
[4] Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, [J].Journal of Political Economy, 1985.93, 1155- 1177
[5] Shleifer.A and Vishny. R. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, [J] Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94, 461-488
[6] Stulz, R. Managerial control of voting rights: financial policies and the market for corporate control, [J] Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20, 25-54
[7] Holderness, C. and Sheehan, D. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations, [J] Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20, 317-346
[8] Morck, R. and Shleifer, A. and vishny, R. Management of ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis, [J] Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20, 293-315
[9] McConnell, J. and Servaes, H. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, [J] Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27, 595-612
[10] Leech, D & Leahy, J. Ownership structure, control type classifications and the performance of large British companies, [J] The Economic Journal, 101,1991,418– 1437
[11] Cochran, P. and Wartick, S. Corporate governance-A review of literature. International Corporate Governance, Prentice Hall,1998
[12] Mudambi, R. and Nicosia, C. Ownership structure and firm performance:Evidence from the UK financial services industry. Applied Financial Economics.1998,175– 180
[13] Wiblin, M& Woo L. A. Are all agency resolution mechanisms performance enhancing? Paper presented at the 6th Multinational Finance Society Congress, Toronto.1999
[14] Wang X Z, Xu L X, Zhu T. State-owned enterprises going public: The case of China[Z].Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,2001
[15] Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste. Multiple large shareholders and firm value. [J] Journal of Banking & Finance 29, 2005, 1813–1834
[16] Hong Zou, Jason Zezhong Xiao. The financing behavior of listed Chinese firms. [J] Journal of Multinational Financial Management. 16, 2006, 64– 88
[17] James S. Ang, David K. Ding. Government ownership and the performance of government-linked companies: The case of Singapore. [J]The British Accounting Review 38,2006,239–258
[18] Antonio M?′nguez-Vera a, Juan Francisco Mart?′n-Ugedo. Does ownership structure affect value? A panel data analysis for the Spanish market. [J] International Review of Financial Analysis 16, 2007, 81–98
[19] Chen, Jian. Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, [J] Economics of Planning, 2001 Vol 34, No 1
[20]林毅夫等,国有企业改革的核心是创造竞争环境,改革,1995,3
[21]费方域,什么是公司治理结构,上海经济研究,1995,5
[22]费方域,控制内部控制人控制——国企改革中的治理机制研究,经济研究,1996,6
[23]张维迎,所有制、治理结构与委托—代理关系,经济研究,1996,9
[24]张维迎,从公司治理结构看中国国有企业改革,企业理论与中国企业改革,1999,1
[25]李子奈,叶阿忠,高等计量经济学,北京:清华大学出版社,2000,132-154
[26]施东晖,股权结构、公司治理与绩效表现,世界经济, 2000, (12)37-44
[27]张红军,中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析,经济科学, 2000, (4)34-44
[28]孙永祥,公司治理结构:理论与实证研究,上海:上海人民出版社,2002,1-13,118-136
[29]宾国强,舒元,股权分割、公司业绩与投资者保护,管理世界,2003,5,101-108
[30]李亚静,公司治理与价值创造,成都:西南交通大学出版社,2004, 56-61,123-151
[31]北京市法学会经济法研究会,公司治理结构的理论与实践,北京:机械工业出版社,2004,104-179
[32]杨华,上市公司监管和价值创造,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004,177-195
[33]王克敏,陈井勇,股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效,管理世界,2004, (7)
[34] Cheng Hsiao,面板数据分析,北京:北京大学出版社,2005,1-67
[35]余鹏翼,金天,张学斌.沪市上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的实证分析,系统工程, 2005,3, 43-46
[36]黄晓波.股权结构与公司绩效实证研究的发现及其评价,经济与管理, 2006, 4,73-75
[37]陈志远,梁彤缨.行业特征、股权结构与公司绩效的实证分析,系统工程,2006,2,72-77
[38]王永海,毛洪安.股权结构、行业特征与公司绩效,财会通讯,2006,1,3-7
[39]胡鞍钢,胡光宇.公司治理中外比较.北京:新华出版社.2004,1
[40]卢纹岱,朱一力等,SPSS for Windows从入门到精通.北京:电子工业出版社.1997,6
[41]李维安.公司治理学.北京:高等教育出版社.2005,5
[42]徐锡意,中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效关系实证研究,(硕士学位论文),西南财经大学.2004
[43]何罡,我国上市公司股权结构与企业绩效研究,(硕士学位论文),西南财经大学.2004