基于公司治理的会计政策选择研究
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摘要
根据利益相关者理论,公司治理中利益相关者都应分享公司所有权,并拥有明确的公司控制权和收益权。会计政策选择权是剩余控制权的一种,会计政策选择权属于利益相关者。会计政策选择权受到内、外两种机制的制约。内在约束机制为公司治理结构,外在约束机制为利益相关者利益委员会。本文从公司治理的角度,深入探讨会计政策选择与公司治理的关系及不同公司治理模式下会计政策选择的特点,并对TCL集团具体会计政策选择进行了案例分析,以求丰富公司治理及会计政策选择的理论,完善公司治理结构,提高会计政策选择的效率性。
本文分为五个部分:
本文的第一部分,前言。包括研究背景,文献回顾及评析,研究方法,研究思路及本文结构。这部分内容是下文写作的基础。本文通过对会计政策选择及公司治理的文献回顾,发现从公司治理角度来探讨会计政策选择的文献不多,但是学者们普遍认为会计政策选择是公司治理中各相关利益方博弈均衡的结果、公司治理是影响会计政策选择的一个重要因素。
本文的第二部分,会计政策选择与公司治理的基本理论。包括会计政策选择与公司治理的理论基础,会计政策选择的基本理论及公司治理的基本理论。首先,讨论了会计政策选择与公司治理的理论基础:利益相关者理论。根据利益相关者理论,公司治理是协调公司利益集团关系的系统工程;会计政策选择的目标是利益相关者利益最大化;会计政策选择权属于利益相关者。其次,讨论了会计政策选择的基本理论:含义、类型、原因、内容。会计政策选择包括宏观会计政策选择和微观会计政策选择,本文主要研究微观会计政策选择即企业会计政策选择。根据会计政策选择的动机,会计政策选择分为机会主义型会计政策选择和效率型会计政策选择。会计政策选择的原因包括客观原因和主观原因。机会主义型会计政策选择与效率型会计政策选择的主观原因有所区别。机会主义型会计政策选择的主观原因为:企业管理当局的自利行为。效率型会计政策选择的主观原因为:平衡公司治理中各利益相关方的利益。最后,讨论了公司治理的基本理论:含义、内容及类型。公司治理是一个广义的概念,从内容上看,包括外部治理机制和内部治理结构。公司治理的类型主要有:外部监控式公司治理模式、内部监控式公司治理模式及家族监控式公司治理模式。
本文的第三部分,公司治理与会计政策选择的关系。包括:公司治理的目标与会计政策选择的目标;会计政策选择在公司治理中的地位;公司治理中各利益相关者对会计政策选择的影响;不同公司治理模式下会计政策选择的特点;公司治理与会计政策选择的关系。笔者认为会计政策选择影响着上市公司的整体利益,涉及公司的生存与发展,同时也影响到股东、董事会、经理层等各个方面的利益。股东、管理层、债权人、政府、员工分别在不同方面对会计政策选择产生了影响。股东出于资本安全、股利偏好、资本利得等动因会对会计政策选择产生影响;管理层利用其对会计信息的垄断地位,会在会计准则允许的范围内选择对自己最为有利的会计政策;债权人对会计政策选择的影响主要体现在债务契约的规范和完善上;员工出于工资、奖金、股利动因而关注会计政策选择。通过分析不同公司治理模式下会计政策选择的特点,笔者认为外部监控式公司治理模式下公司治理的关键问题是强管理层、弱股东,其会计政策选择的特点为效率性和机会主义行为并存;内部监控式公司治理模式下公司治理的关键问题是利益相关者的利益结合,其会计政策选择的特点为趋向于效率性;家族监控式公司治理模式下公司治理的关键问题是强家族大股东,弱中小股东,其会计政策选择的特点是效率性行为动机最强。最后,通过以上分析及结合2006年中国上市公司治理指数相关数据,笔者认为,公司治理是会计政策选择的内在约束机制,公司治理与会计政策选择之间是环境与系统的关系,公司治理在很大程度上影响会计政策选择;会计政策选择是公司治理中的利益相关者处理经济关系、协调经济矛盾、分配经济利益的一项重要措施;完善公司治理会实现会计政策选择的公允。
本文的第四部分,从公司治理视角看TCL集团合并会计方法的选择。首先,结合新会计准则研究了TCL集团合并会计方法选择对资产负债表及利润表的影响。结果表明:TCL集团在合并基准日(2003年6月30日),采用权益结合法下的无形资产、股东权益、资本公积的数值、少数股东权益均低于购买法,而未分配利润、净利润的数值高于购买法。其次,分析了TCL集团的2003年—2006年的经营状况和股权结构、股东大会、董事会、监事会及经营者激励等内部治理结构。研究发现,TCL集团的股权结构不合理,形成明显的“中央集权”;参加股东大会的人数逐年递减,而且出席股份的比例不高;TCL集团的董事会规模偏大,董事会代表的股权比例偏低;TCL集团的董事长兼任总经理,未能实现两职分离,难以实现董事会监督的独立性和有效性;董事会成员及监事会成员的学历偏低,年龄偏大;TCL集团的高管薪酬较高。最后,从公司治理的角度对TCL集团合并会计方法的选择进行了评析。笔者认为TCL集团公司治理具有外部监控式公司治理模式和内部监控式公司治理模式的特点;在TCL集团的公司治理下,会计政策选择的效率性和机会主义性并存;TCL集团合并会计方法的选择是股东、管理层、政府等各利益相关者博弈均衡的结果。
本文的第五部分,完善公司治理结构、实现会计政策选择的公允。笔者分析了现阶段公司治理中存在的主要问题并提出了完善公司治理的途径。现阶段公司治理的主要问题是:股权结构不合理、缺乏多元股权制衡机制,内部人控制严重,监事会职责弱化,对经营者缺乏有效的激励机制。完善公司治理的途径主要有:明晰产权,发挥产权制度对会计信息生成过程的规范和界定功能;优化上市公司股权结构;发展独立董事制度,防止“内部人控制”;加强监事会的独立性;建立完善的经营者评价与激励机制。笔者认为公司治理是会计政策选择的内在约束机制,在我国目前的公司治理模式下,会导致企业偏向机会主义型会计政策选择。公司治理的完善为会计政策选择提供一个良好的环境,从而有利于实现会计政策选择的公允。
本文的创新点在于:
1.分析了会计政策选择的客观原因及主观原因,认为机会主义型会计政策选择和效率型会计政策选择的主观原因是不同的。
2.具体分析了公司治理与会计政策选择的关系,本文认为公司治理是影响会计政策选择的内在原因,但不是唯一原因,完善公司治理结构会实现会计政策选择的公允。
3.研究了不同公司治理模式下会计政策选择的特点。本文分别从股权结构、控制权结构、公司治理目标等方面分析了外部监控式公司治理模式、内部监控式公司治理模式、家族监控式公司治理模式的特点及不同治理模式下会计政策选择的特点。
4.具体分析了2003年TCL集团合并会计方法选择的会计后果及TCL集团的公司治理结构,并从公司治理的角度对TCL集团合并会计方法的选择进行了评析。
According to stakeholder theory, stakeholder of corporate governance should share ownership and own explicit domination rights and profit rights of corporate. Accounting policy choice rights is one of residual control rights. Accounting policy choice rights belongs to stakeholder. Accounting policy choice is subjected to the restriction of outside and inside restrictive mechanism. Inside restrictive mechanism is corporate governance, and outside restrictive mechanism is stakeholder committee. This paper discusses the relationship between accounting policy choice and corporate governance deeply and characteristics of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance mode, and uses concrete accounting policy of TCL group from corporate governance angle to carry on the case analysis, with the purpose of making corporate governance theory and stakeholder theory richly, improving corporate governance and efficiency of accounting policy choice.
It is divided into five chapters:
Chapter one: preface. It concludes: research background, literature review, research method and the structure of this paper. The author discovers that there is not many documents about researching on the accounting policy choice from corporate governance angle by reviewing documents, but scholars universally think that accounting policy choice is the result of gambling among each stakeholder of corporate governance and corporate governance is one of the important factors that influence accounting policy choice.
Chapter two: basic theories of accounting policy choice and corporate governance. It includes: theoretical bases of accounting policy choice and corporate governance; basic theories of accounting policy choice and basic theories of corporate governance. First, it discusses the theoretical bases of accounting policy choice and corporate governance: stakeholder theory. According to stakeholder theory, corporate governance is systematic engineering that coordinates relationship among stakeholder; the object of accounting policy choice is to maximize the interests of stakeholder; accounting policy choice rights belongs to stakeholder. Second, it discusses the basic theories of accounting policy choice: definition, type, reason and contents. Accounting policy choice is consist of macro accounting policy choice and micro accounting policy choice. This paper researches on micro accounting policy choice, namely, enterprise accounting policy choice. According to the motive of accounting policy choice, accounting policy choice is divided into effective choice in accounting policy and opportunistic choice in accounting policy. The reasons for accounting policy choice include objective and subjective aspect. The subjective reason for effective choice in accounting policy is different from opportunistic choice in accounting policy. The subjective reason for effective choice in accounting policy is to balance the interests of each stakeholder of corporate governance. The subjective reason for opportunistic choice in accounting policy is self-interest behavior of enterprise administrative authority. Finally, it discusses the basic theories of corporate governance: definition, contents and type.
Chapter three: the relationship between corporate governance and accounting policy choice. It includes: the object of corporate governance and the object of accounting policy choice; the status of accounting policy choice in corporate governance; the influence of each stakeholder of corporate governance on accounting policy choice; features of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance mode; the relationship between corporate governance and accounting policy choice. The author thinks that accounting policy choice influences the whole interests of the listed company, involves survival and development of the company, and influences the interests of shareholder, directors, and administrative authority. Shareholder, administrative authority, government, creditor and employee influence accounting policy choice separately in different aspect. Shareholder influences accounting policy choice as a result of capital security, dividend hobby and capital profit; administrative authority can take advantage of accounting information to choose the most beneficial accounting policy choice for them; creditors influence accounting policy choice mainly by improving debt contract; staff pay attention to accounting policy choice as a result of wages, bonuses and dividend. By analyzing features of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance, the author thinks: the key problem of outside monitoring corporate governance mode is“strong manager and weak shareholder”and the features of accounting policy choice are both efficiency and opportunism; the key problem of inside monitoring corporate governance mode is“interests’combination of stakeholder”and the features of accounting policy choice are towards efficiency; the key problem of family monitoring corporate governance mode is“strong big family shareholder and weak small shareholder”and the features of accounting policy choice are the strongest motive of effective choice in accounting policy. In conclusion, the author thinks: corporate governance is accounting policy choice’inside restrictive mechanism, the relationship between corporate governance and accounting policy choice is like environment and system, corporate governance influence accounting policy choice to a large degree; accounting policy choice is an important measure that stakeholder of corporate governance deal with economical relations, coordinate economical contradiction and assign economical interests; improving corporate governance will realize accounting policy choice’fair and just.
Chapter four: case analysis. It discusses merger accounting policy choice of TCL group from corporate governance angle. First, it discusses the influence that merger accounting method choice of TCL group on balance sheet and profit sheet in the new accounting criterion. Second, it analyses TCL group’management situation and TCL group’inside corporate governance from 2003 to 2006. Last, the author comments on merger accounting policy of TCL group from corporate governance angle. The author thinks that TCL group’corporate governance mode have the feathers of outside monitoring corporate governance mode and inside monitoring corporate governance mode, in this corporate governance mode, TCL group’accounting policy choice possess efficiency and opportunism, and TCL group’merger accounting policy choice is the result of gambling among each stakeholder of corporate governance.
Chapter five: improving corporate governance, realizing accounting policy choice’fair and just. It analyses the main problems of corporate governance in our country at present and put forward methods for improving corporate governance. The author thinks: corporate governance is inside restrictive mechanism of accounting policy choice; in corporate governance mode of our country at present, the enterprises may tend to make the opportunistic choice in accounting policy; as a result, the improvement of corporate governance will supply accounting policy choice with a good environment and be good for realizing accounting policy choice’fair and just.
The author thinks the new ideas of this paper are as follows:
1. It analyses the objective and subjective reason for accounting policy choice, it is thought that the subjective reason for accounting policy choice is different from objective reason.
2. It analyses the relationship between accounting policy choice and corporate governance concretely. It is thought that corporate governance is one of the reasons that influence accounting policy choice. Corporate governance’improvement will realize accounting policy choice’fair and just.
3. It discusses features of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance mode. It analyses the features of outside monitoring corporate governance, inside monitoring corporate governance and family monitoring corporate governance by stockholder structure, control power structure and the object of corporate governance, and the features of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance mode.
4. It analyses merger accounting method choice’accounting consequence and corporate governance of TCL group in the year 2003. It comments on merger accounting method choice from corporate governance angle.
本文分为五个部分:
本文的第一部分,前言。包括研究背景,文献回顾及评析,研究方法,研究思路及本文结构。这部分内容是下文写作的基础。本文通过对会计政策选择及公司治理的文献回顾,发现从公司治理角度来探讨会计政策选择的文献不多,但是学者们普遍认为会计政策选择是公司治理中各相关利益方博弈均衡的结果、公司治理是影响会计政策选择的一个重要因素。
本文的第二部分,会计政策选择与公司治理的基本理论。包括会计政策选择与公司治理的理论基础,会计政策选择的基本理论及公司治理的基本理论。首先,讨论了会计政策选择与公司治理的理论基础:利益相关者理论。根据利益相关者理论,公司治理是协调公司利益集团关系的系统工程;会计政策选择的目标是利益相关者利益最大化;会计政策选择权属于利益相关者。其次,讨论了会计政策选择的基本理论:含义、类型、原因、内容。会计政策选择包括宏观会计政策选择和微观会计政策选择,本文主要研究微观会计政策选择即企业会计政策选择。根据会计政策选择的动机,会计政策选择分为机会主义型会计政策选择和效率型会计政策选择。会计政策选择的原因包括客观原因和主观原因。机会主义型会计政策选择与效率型会计政策选择的主观原因有所区别。机会主义型会计政策选择的主观原因为:企业管理当局的自利行为。效率型会计政策选择的主观原因为:平衡公司治理中各利益相关方的利益。最后,讨论了公司治理的基本理论:含义、内容及类型。公司治理是一个广义的概念,从内容上看,包括外部治理机制和内部治理结构。公司治理的类型主要有:外部监控式公司治理模式、内部监控式公司治理模式及家族监控式公司治理模式。
本文的第三部分,公司治理与会计政策选择的关系。包括:公司治理的目标与会计政策选择的目标;会计政策选择在公司治理中的地位;公司治理中各利益相关者对会计政策选择的影响;不同公司治理模式下会计政策选择的特点;公司治理与会计政策选择的关系。笔者认为会计政策选择影响着上市公司的整体利益,涉及公司的生存与发展,同时也影响到股东、董事会、经理层等各个方面的利益。股东、管理层、债权人、政府、员工分别在不同方面对会计政策选择产生了影响。股东出于资本安全、股利偏好、资本利得等动因会对会计政策选择产生影响;管理层利用其对会计信息的垄断地位,会在会计准则允许的范围内选择对自己最为有利的会计政策;债权人对会计政策选择的影响主要体现在债务契约的规范和完善上;员工出于工资、奖金、股利动因而关注会计政策选择。通过分析不同公司治理模式下会计政策选择的特点,笔者认为外部监控式公司治理模式下公司治理的关键问题是强管理层、弱股东,其会计政策选择的特点为效率性和机会主义行为并存;内部监控式公司治理模式下公司治理的关键问题是利益相关者的利益结合,其会计政策选择的特点为趋向于效率性;家族监控式公司治理模式下公司治理的关键问题是强家族大股东,弱中小股东,其会计政策选择的特点是效率性行为动机最强。最后,通过以上分析及结合2006年中国上市公司治理指数相关数据,笔者认为,公司治理是会计政策选择的内在约束机制,公司治理与会计政策选择之间是环境与系统的关系,公司治理在很大程度上影响会计政策选择;会计政策选择是公司治理中的利益相关者处理经济关系、协调经济矛盾、分配经济利益的一项重要措施;完善公司治理会实现会计政策选择的公允。
本文的第四部分,从公司治理视角看TCL集团合并会计方法的选择。首先,结合新会计准则研究了TCL集团合并会计方法选择对资产负债表及利润表的影响。结果表明:TCL集团在合并基准日(2003年6月30日),采用权益结合法下的无形资产、股东权益、资本公积的数值、少数股东权益均低于购买法,而未分配利润、净利润的数值高于购买法。其次,分析了TCL集团的2003年—2006年的经营状况和股权结构、股东大会、董事会、监事会及经营者激励等内部治理结构。研究发现,TCL集团的股权结构不合理,形成明显的“中央集权”;参加股东大会的人数逐年递减,而且出席股份的比例不高;TCL集团的董事会规模偏大,董事会代表的股权比例偏低;TCL集团的董事长兼任总经理,未能实现两职分离,难以实现董事会监督的独立性和有效性;董事会成员及监事会成员的学历偏低,年龄偏大;TCL集团的高管薪酬较高。最后,从公司治理的角度对TCL集团合并会计方法的选择进行了评析。笔者认为TCL集团公司治理具有外部监控式公司治理模式和内部监控式公司治理模式的特点;在TCL集团的公司治理下,会计政策选择的效率性和机会主义性并存;TCL集团合并会计方法的选择是股东、管理层、政府等各利益相关者博弈均衡的结果。
本文的第五部分,完善公司治理结构、实现会计政策选择的公允。笔者分析了现阶段公司治理中存在的主要问题并提出了完善公司治理的途径。现阶段公司治理的主要问题是:股权结构不合理、缺乏多元股权制衡机制,内部人控制严重,监事会职责弱化,对经营者缺乏有效的激励机制。完善公司治理的途径主要有:明晰产权,发挥产权制度对会计信息生成过程的规范和界定功能;优化上市公司股权结构;发展独立董事制度,防止“内部人控制”;加强监事会的独立性;建立完善的经营者评价与激励机制。笔者认为公司治理是会计政策选择的内在约束机制,在我国目前的公司治理模式下,会导致企业偏向机会主义型会计政策选择。公司治理的完善为会计政策选择提供一个良好的环境,从而有利于实现会计政策选择的公允。
本文的创新点在于:
1.分析了会计政策选择的客观原因及主观原因,认为机会主义型会计政策选择和效率型会计政策选择的主观原因是不同的。
2.具体分析了公司治理与会计政策选择的关系,本文认为公司治理是影响会计政策选择的内在原因,但不是唯一原因,完善公司治理结构会实现会计政策选择的公允。
3.研究了不同公司治理模式下会计政策选择的特点。本文分别从股权结构、控制权结构、公司治理目标等方面分析了外部监控式公司治理模式、内部监控式公司治理模式、家族监控式公司治理模式的特点及不同治理模式下会计政策选择的特点。
4.具体分析了2003年TCL集团合并会计方法选择的会计后果及TCL集团的公司治理结构,并从公司治理的角度对TCL集团合并会计方法的选择进行了评析。
According to stakeholder theory, stakeholder of corporate governance should share ownership and own explicit domination rights and profit rights of corporate. Accounting policy choice rights is one of residual control rights. Accounting policy choice rights belongs to stakeholder. Accounting policy choice is subjected to the restriction of outside and inside restrictive mechanism. Inside restrictive mechanism is corporate governance, and outside restrictive mechanism is stakeholder committee. This paper discusses the relationship between accounting policy choice and corporate governance deeply and characteristics of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance mode, and uses concrete accounting policy of TCL group from corporate governance angle to carry on the case analysis, with the purpose of making corporate governance theory and stakeholder theory richly, improving corporate governance and efficiency of accounting policy choice.
It is divided into five chapters:
Chapter one: preface. It concludes: research background, literature review, research method and the structure of this paper. The author discovers that there is not many documents about researching on the accounting policy choice from corporate governance angle by reviewing documents, but scholars universally think that accounting policy choice is the result of gambling among each stakeholder of corporate governance and corporate governance is one of the important factors that influence accounting policy choice.
Chapter two: basic theories of accounting policy choice and corporate governance. It includes: theoretical bases of accounting policy choice and corporate governance; basic theories of accounting policy choice and basic theories of corporate governance. First, it discusses the theoretical bases of accounting policy choice and corporate governance: stakeholder theory. According to stakeholder theory, corporate governance is systematic engineering that coordinates relationship among stakeholder; the object of accounting policy choice is to maximize the interests of stakeholder; accounting policy choice rights belongs to stakeholder. Second, it discusses the basic theories of accounting policy choice: definition, type, reason and contents. Accounting policy choice is consist of macro accounting policy choice and micro accounting policy choice. This paper researches on micro accounting policy choice, namely, enterprise accounting policy choice. According to the motive of accounting policy choice, accounting policy choice is divided into effective choice in accounting policy and opportunistic choice in accounting policy. The reasons for accounting policy choice include objective and subjective aspect. The subjective reason for effective choice in accounting policy is different from opportunistic choice in accounting policy. The subjective reason for effective choice in accounting policy is to balance the interests of each stakeholder of corporate governance. The subjective reason for opportunistic choice in accounting policy is self-interest behavior of enterprise administrative authority. Finally, it discusses the basic theories of corporate governance: definition, contents and type.
Chapter three: the relationship between corporate governance and accounting policy choice. It includes: the object of corporate governance and the object of accounting policy choice; the status of accounting policy choice in corporate governance; the influence of each stakeholder of corporate governance on accounting policy choice; features of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance mode; the relationship between corporate governance and accounting policy choice. The author thinks that accounting policy choice influences the whole interests of the listed company, involves survival and development of the company, and influences the interests of shareholder, directors, and administrative authority. Shareholder, administrative authority, government, creditor and employee influence accounting policy choice separately in different aspect. Shareholder influences accounting policy choice as a result of capital security, dividend hobby and capital profit; administrative authority can take advantage of accounting information to choose the most beneficial accounting policy choice for them; creditors influence accounting policy choice mainly by improving debt contract; staff pay attention to accounting policy choice as a result of wages, bonuses and dividend. By analyzing features of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance, the author thinks: the key problem of outside monitoring corporate governance mode is“strong manager and weak shareholder”and the features of accounting policy choice are both efficiency and opportunism; the key problem of inside monitoring corporate governance mode is“interests’combination of stakeholder”and the features of accounting policy choice are towards efficiency; the key problem of family monitoring corporate governance mode is“strong big family shareholder and weak small shareholder”and the features of accounting policy choice are the strongest motive of effective choice in accounting policy. In conclusion, the author thinks: corporate governance is accounting policy choice’inside restrictive mechanism, the relationship between corporate governance and accounting policy choice is like environment and system, corporate governance influence accounting policy choice to a large degree; accounting policy choice is an important measure that stakeholder of corporate governance deal with economical relations, coordinate economical contradiction and assign economical interests; improving corporate governance will realize accounting policy choice’fair and just.
Chapter four: case analysis. It discusses merger accounting policy choice of TCL group from corporate governance angle. First, it discusses the influence that merger accounting method choice of TCL group on balance sheet and profit sheet in the new accounting criterion. Second, it analyses TCL group’management situation and TCL group’inside corporate governance from 2003 to 2006. Last, the author comments on merger accounting policy of TCL group from corporate governance angle. The author thinks that TCL group’corporate governance mode have the feathers of outside monitoring corporate governance mode and inside monitoring corporate governance mode, in this corporate governance mode, TCL group’accounting policy choice possess efficiency and opportunism, and TCL group’merger accounting policy choice is the result of gambling among each stakeholder of corporate governance.
Chapter five: improving corporate governance, realizing accounting policy choice’fair and just. It analyses the main problems of corporate governance in our country at present and put forward methods for improving corporate governance. The author thinks: corporate governance is inside restrictive mechanism of accounting policy choice; in corporate governance mode of our country at present, the enterprises may tend to make the opportunistic choice in accounting policy; as a result, the improvement of corporate governance will supply accounting policy choice with a good environment and be good for realizing accounting policy choice’fair and just.
The author thinks the new ideas of this paper are as follows:
1. It analyses the objective and subjective reason for accounting policy choice, it is thought that the subjective reason for accounting policy choice is different from objective reason.
2. It analyses the relationship between accounting policy choice and corporate governance concretely. It is thought that corporate governance is one of the reasons that influence accounting policy choice. Corporate governance’improvement will realize accounting policy choice’fair and just.
3. It discusses features of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance mode. It analyses the features of outside monitoring corporate governance, inside monitoring corporate governance and family monitoring corporate governance by stockholder structure, control power structure and the object of corporate governance, and the features of accounting policy choice in different corporate governance mode.
4. It analyses merger accounting method choice’accounting consequence and corporate governance of TCL group in the year 2003. It comments on merger accounting method choice from corporate governance angle.
引文
1潘煜双,《企业会计政策选择的公允性——现状???选择原则?影响因素》,《会计研究》,2004,10
2杨瑞龙、周业安,《企业的利益相关者理论及其应用》,经济科学出版社,2000,第131页
3石劲磊,《公司治理:理论、模式与中国上市公司的实践》,博士论文,2003
4 Shipper,Commentary on earnings management,Accounting Horizons,1989
5 Healy、Whalen,A review of the earnings management literature and its implication for standard Setting,1999
6 William.K.Scott,Financial Accounting Theory,Prentice Hall,2000
7魏明海,《盈余管理的基本理论及其研究评述》,《会计研究》,2000,9
8陆建桥,《中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究》,中国财政经济出版,2002
9郝煜,《我国上市公司治理结构与盈余管理研究》,对外经济贸易大学优秀硕士论文,2006
10切瑞斯特和齐默尔曼,《会计程序的效率型和机会主义型:公司控制权竞争》,1994
11温琳,《基于利益相关者理论的会计政策选择》,中国海洋大学优秀硕士论文,2006
14谭安杰,《改革中的企业督导机制》,中国经济出版社,1997,第276—277页
16吴玉心,《TCL集团合并会计方法选择的财务效应》,《财会通讯(综合)》,2004,8
17吴玉欣,《TCL合并会计方法选择的财务效应》,《财会通讯(综合)》,2004,8
18邵东亚,《公司治理的机制与绩效》,《管理世界》,2003,12
19何浚,《上市公司治理结构的实证分析》,《经济研究》,1998,5
20吴世农,《独立董事制度若干问题的思考》,《证券市场导报》,2001
1.葛家澍,《会计大典》,中国财政经济出版社,1998
2.李维安,《公司治理》,天津:南开大学出版社,2001
3.王竹泉,《公司治理结构中的会计监督研究》,北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003,8
4.王运传,《会计政策选择研究—从契约理论到利益相关者理论》,厦门大学会计学博士论文,2003,4
5.中华人民共和国财政部,《新企业会计准则》,法律出版社.2007,1
6.唐松华,2000,《企业会计政策选择的经济学分析》,《会计研究》,3
7.杨兴全,2001,《降低会计政策选择负面影响的思考》,《财会通讯》,3
8.彭快先,2002,《会计政策选择的博弈分析》,《财会研究》,10
9.谢诗芬,2002,《上市公司会计政策选择与会计信息质量》,《四川会计》,12
10.李姝,2003,《基于公司治理的会计政策选择》,《会计研究》,7
11.贝洪俊,2004,《现阶段会计政策选择的理性思考》,《财会通讯》,1
12.衣长军,2004,《公司治理结构理论与公司治理模式比较研究》,《企业经济》,4
13.钟高,2004,《公司治理与会计信息质量的相关性研究》,《会计研究》,8
14.吴玉心,2004,《TCL集团合并会计方法选择的财务效应》,《财会通讯》,8
15.郭立田,2004,《公司治理结构目标与会计控制目标的偏离与纠正》,《经济论坛》,15
16.云静,2005,《论经济后果观与我国会计准则制定》,《事业财会》,2
17.黄华,2005,《国外四种公司治理模式的比较与启示》,《经济纵横》,2
18.刘伟新,2005,《企业会计政策选择存在的问题及对策》,《大众科技》9
19.杨成文,2005,《论会计政策选择目标》,《会计研究》,9
20.郝臣,2005,《多维度公司治理模式的比较研究》,《审计与经济研究》,9
21.杨昀,2005,《会计政策选择及其动机》,《财会月刊》,10
22.彭爱群,2005,《关于规范上市公司会计政策选择的思考》,《特区经济》,10
23.丁建军、苏祖安,2005,《公司治理理论综述》,《经济研究》,第11期
24.邓倩,2005,《我国上市公司会计政策选择与公司治理》,《财会月刊》,12
25.庞碧霞,2006,《论会计准则的经济后果》,《事业财会》,3
26.江金锁,2006,《企业会计政策选择研究》,《审计与经济研究》,3
27.褚仁凤,2006,《公司治理的理论基础及制度安排》,《财会通讯》,4
28.魏海丽,2006,《会计透明度与公司治理》,《当代财经》,4
29.苏海雁,2006,《西方基于利益相关者理论的财务目标理论探讨》,《财会通讯》,8
30.王怀明,2007,《公司治理与内部控制的动态演进与扩张》,《财会通讯》,1
31.康霞、邸丛枝,2007,《公允价值应用下的盈余管理》,《财会月刊(会计)》,5
32.Cullinan, 1999, International Trade and Accounting Policy Choice: Theory and Canadian Evidence, International Journal of Accounting
33.Kothari.S.P, 2000, Capital Markets Research in Accounting, Journal of Accounting and Economics
34.Farber and David B, 2005, Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter, Accounting Review
2杨瑞龙、周业安,《企业的利益相关者理论及其应用》,经济科学出版社,2000,第131页
3石劲磊,《公司治理:理论、模式与中国上市公司的实践》,博士论文,2003
4 Shipper,Commentary on earnings management,Accounting Horizons,1989
5 Healy、Whalen,A review of the earnings management literature and its implication for standard Setting,1999
6 William.K.Scott,Financial Accounting Theory,Prentice Hall,2000
7魏明海,《盈余管理的基本理论及其研究评述》,《会计研究》,2000,9
8陆建桥,《中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究》,中国财政经济出版,2002
9郝煜,《我国上市公司治理结构与盈余管理研究》,对外经济贸易大学优秀硕士论文,2006
10切瑞斯特和齐默尔曼,《会计程序的效率型和机会主义型:公司控制权竞争》,1994
11温琳,《基于利益相关者理论的会计政策选择》,中国海洋大学优秀硕士论文,2006
14谭安杰,《改革中的企业督导机制》,中国经济出版社,1997,第276—277页
16吴玉心,《TCL集团合并会计方法选择的财务效应》,《财会通讯(综合)》,2004,8
17吴玉欣,《TCL合并会计方法选择的财务效应》,《财会通讯(综合)》,2004,8
18邵东亚,《公司治理的机制与绩效》,《管理世界》,2003,12
19何浚,《上市公司治理结构的实证分析》,《经济研究》,1998,5
20吴世农,《独立董事制度若干问题的思考》,《证券市场导报》,2001
1.葛家澍,《会计大典》,中国财政经济出版社,1998
2.李维安,《公司治理》,天津:南开大学出版社,2001
3.王竹泉,《公司治理结构中的会计监督研究》,北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003,8
4.王运传,《会计政策选择研究—从契约理论到利益相关者理论》,厦门大学会计学博士论文,2003,4
5.中华人民共和国财政部,《新企业会计准则》,法律出版社.2007,1
6.唐松华,2000,《企业会计政策选择的经济学分析》,《会计研究》,3
7.杨兴全,2001,《降低会计政策选择负面影响的思考》,《财会通讯》,3
8.彭快先,2002,《会计政策选择的博弈分析》,《财会研究》,10
9.谢诗芬,2002,《上市公司会计政策选择与会计信息质量》,《四川会计》,12
10.李姝,2003,《基于公司治理的会计政策选择》,《会计研究》,7
11.贝洪俊,2004,《现阶段会计政策选择的理性思考》,《财会通讯》,1
12.衣长军,2004,《公司治理结构理论与公司治理模式比较研究》,《企业经济》,4
13.钟高,2004,《公司治理与会计信息质量的相关性研究》,《会计研究》,8
14.吴玉心,2004,《TCL集团合并会计方法选择的财务效应》,《财会通讯》,8
15.郭立田,2004,《公司治理结构目标与会计控制目标的偏离与纠正》,《经济论坛》,15
16.云静,2005,《论经济后果观与我国会计准则制定》,《事业财会》,2
17.黄华,2005,《国外四种公司治理模式的比较与启示》,《经济纵横》,2
18.刘伟新,2005,《企业会计政策选择存在的问题及对策》,《大众科技》9
19.杨成文,2005,《论会计政策选择目标》,《会计研究》,9
20.郝臣,2005,《多维度公司治理模式的比较研究》,《审计与经济研究》,9
21.杨昀,2005,《会计政策选择及其动机》,《财会月刊》,10
22.彭爱群,2005,《关于规范上市公司会计政策选择的思考》,《特区经济》,10
23.丁建军、苏祖安,2005,《公司治理理论综述》,《经济研究》,第11期
24.邓倩,2005,《我国上市公司会计政策选择与公司治理》,《财会月刊》,12
25.庞碧霞,2006,《论会计准则的经济后果》,《事业财会》,3
26.江金锁,2006,《企业会计政策选择研究》,《审计与经济研究》,3
27.褚仁凤,2006,《公司治理的理论基础及制度安排》,《财会通讯》,4
28.魏海丽,2006,《会计透明度与公司治理》,《当代财经》,4
29.苏海雁,2006,《西方基于利益相关者理论的财务目标理论探讨》,《财会通讯》,8
30.王怀明,2007,《公司治理与内部控制的动态演进与扩张》,《财会通讯》,1
31.康霞、邸丛枝,2007,《公允价值应用下的盈余管理》,《财会月刊(会计)》,5
32.Cullinan, 1999, International Trade and Accounting Policy Choice: Theory and Canadian Evidence, International Journal of Accounting
33.Kothari.S.P, 2000, Capital Markets Research in Accounting, Journal of Accounting and Economics
34.Farber and David B, 2005, Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter, Accounting Review