大股东资金侵占与上市公司的现金股利政策研究
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摘要
上市公司的大股东是否直接或以现金股利方式间接侵占公司资金一直是困绕学术界和实务界的共同问题。我国证券市场成立之初就被赋予了为国有企业改革服务的重要职责,特殊的历史和制度背景,决定了我国的上市公司有着不同于西方国家的独特而又复杂的股权结构。本文的研究正是以这一特殊的制度背景为基础展开的。
本文首先介绍了研究的主要内容,然后回顾了经典的股利理论,总结了与股权结构有关的资金侵占和股利政策方面的研究成果,并对我国目前上市公司的股权结构、现金股利分配和资金侵占的现状进行了分析。并且在以我国的股权分裂制度为背景,对大股东的股权定价模型进行扩展的基础上,结合以前的研究和我国的现状,提出了本文的5个假设。最后通过描述性统计、单因素分析和联立方程模型对本文的假设进行验证,得出了本文的结论。
本文的研究结果显示,第一大股东的持股比例对上市公司的资金侵占和现金股利政策有重要影响。第一大股东的持股比例与现金股利高度正相关,与资金侵占呈先上升后下降的倒“U”关系。国有控股股东有很强的现金股利偏好,但是其对上市公司的资金侵占程度比非国有控股股东低。资金侵占和现金股利同是大股东实现自身股权价值最大化的方式,两者具有相互替代性(负相关)。
Whether or not the large shareholders of listed companies embezzle the funds directly or use an indirectly way by using the cash dividend policy is a problem, which puzzled the academia a long time. At the beginning of the Chinese stock market coming into existence, it was designed to serve those state enterprises. To maintain the main body of the public ownership, all the state enterprises listed in the market are still controlled by the State. This paper is based on the special background.
Firstly, the paper presents the main content. Then it backdates the classic dividend theory, and sum up the research result which relate with the ownership structure, embezzlement and the dividend policy. And it analyzes the current status of ownership structure of listed companies, the cash dividend distribution and embezzlement in China. Based on the special background in our country, the paper expands the equity pricing model of the large shareholder. Combining the previous research and the current status of our country, the paper put forward five hypotheses. Finally, the paper verifies the hypotheses by using the descriptive statistics, the single factor analysis and the structure equation model, and gets the results.
The results shows that the equity rate of the large shareholder have an important impact on the embezzlement and the cash dividend policy. The equity rate of the large shareholder has positive impact on the cash dividend, and it has a reversed”U”relationship whit the embezzlement, witch first rising and then declining. State owned shareholders have a strong preference for cash dividend, and it has low degree of embezzlements than non-state-owned shareholders. Both the embezzlement and the cash dividend are the ways to maximize the value of shares by the biggest shareholders. Both of them are replaceable (negative correlation).
本文首先介绍了研究的主要内容,然后回顾了经典的股利理论,总结了与股权结构有关的资金侵占和股利政策方面的研究成果,并对我国目前上市公司的股权结构、现金股利分配和资金侵占的现状进行了分析。并且在以我国的股权分裂制度为背景,对大股东的股权定价模型进行扩展的基础上,结合以前的研究和我国的现状,提出了本文的5个假设。最后通过描述性统计、单因素分析和联立方程模型对本文的假设进行验证,得出了本文的结论。
本文的研究结果显示,第一大股东的持股比例对上市公司的资金侵占和现金股利政策有重要影响。第一大股东的持股比例与现金股利高度正相关,与资金侵占呈先上升后下降的倒“U”关系。国有控股股东有很强的现金股利偏好,但是其对上市公司的资金侵占程度比非国有控股股东低。资金侵占和现金股利同是大股东实现自身股权价值最大化的方式,两者具有相互替代性(负相关)。
Whether or not the large shareholders of listed companies embezzle the funds directly or use an indirectly way by using the cash dividend policy is a problem, which puzzled the academia a long time. At the beginning of the Chinese stock market coming into existence, it was designed to serve those state enterprises. To maintain the main body of the public ownership, all the state enterprises listed in the market are still controlled by the State. This paper is based on the special background.
Firstly, the paper presents the main content. Then it backdates the classic dividend theory, and sum up the research result which relate with the ownership structure, embezzlement and the dividend policy. And it analyzes the current status of ownership structure of listed companies, the cash dividend distribution and embezzlement in China. Based on the special background in our country, the paper expands the equity pricing model of the large shareholder. Combining the previous research and the current status of our country, the paper put forward five hypotheses. Finally, the paper verifies the hypotheses by using the descriptive statistics, the single factor analysis and the structure equation model, and gets the results.
The results shows that the equity rate of the large shareholder have an important impact on the embezzlement and the cash dividend policy. The equity rate of the large shareholder has positive impact on the cash dividend, and it has a reversed”U”relationship whit the embezzlement, witch first rising and then declining. State owned shareholders have a strong preference for cash dividend, and it has low degree of embezzlements than non-state-owned shareholders. Both the embezzlement and the cash dividend are the ways to maximize the value of shares by the biggest shareholders. Both of them are replaceable (negative correlation).
引文
曹崇延,唐雪艳.从股权结构看国有企业“所有者缺位”问题及对策[J].价值工程,2004.3:82-85.
陈信元,陈冬华,时旭.公司治理与现金股利:基于佛山照明的案例研究[J].管理世界, 2003.8:118-126.
吕长江,王克敏.上市公司股利政策的实证分析[J].经济研究, 1999.12:31-39.
李静.中西方上市公司股利政策对比分析[J].财会研究, 2004.6:61-63.
刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究, 2003.4:51-62.
刘星,李豫湘.灰色关联度评价法在股利政策相关因素分析中的应用[J].系统工程理论与实践, 1998.9:78-81.
李增泉,王志伟,孙铮.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究, 2004.12:3-13.
李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究, 2005.1:95-105.
马曙光,黄志忠,薛云奎.股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究, 2005.9:44-50
施东晖.股权结构,公司治理与绩效表现[J].世界经济, 2000.12:37-44.
孙晖,徐学丹.上市公司现金股利政策影响因素研究[J].辽宁工学院学报:社会科学版, 2005.2:69-71.
唐国琼,邹虹.上市公司现金股利政策影响因素的实证研究[J].财金科学, 2005.2:147-153
魏刚.中国上市公司股利分配问题研究[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社, 2001.
王合喜,胡伟.我国上市公司现金股利分配政策影响因素研究[J].财务与会计, 2004.2:21-23.
王家琪,孙玲玲.大股东占用上市公司资金的实证分析[J].统计与决策, 2005.12:115-117.
肖星.中国上司公司现金股利决策研究[D].清华大学博士学位论文, 2003.
阎大颖.中国上市公司控股股东价值取向对股利政策影响的实证研究[J].南开经济研究, 2004.6:94-100.
原红旗.中国上司公司股利政策分析[J].财经研究, 2001.3:33-41.
袁振兴,杨淑娥.大股东对不同现金股利政策的偏好与利益侵占[J].统计与决策, 2007.1:95-97.
杨淑娥,王勇,白革萍.我国股利分配政策影响因素的实证分析[J].会计研究, 2000.2:31-34.
赵春光,张雪丽,叶龙.股利政策:选择动因——来自我国证券市场的实证证据[J].财经研究, 2001.2:48-53.
张红军.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J].经济科学,2000.4:34-44.
张玉彪,吕长江.公司治理、大股东资产侵占行为与公司业绩的关系研究[D].吉林大学, 2006.
朱明秀.我国上市公司股权结构与股利政策关系的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究, 2005.05:87-95.
Avner Kalay. Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1982.10:211-233.
Bhattacharya, S. Imperfect information, dividend policy, and‘the bird in the hand’fallacy[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1979.3:259-270.
Black, F. The Dividend Puzzle[J]. Journal of Portfolio Management, 1976.2:5-8.
Campbell, J. Y. Asset Pricing at the Millennium[J]. The Journal ofFinance, 2000.l :1515-1566.
Dewenter, Kathryn L and Warther Vincent A. Dividends, asymetric information, and agency conflicts: Evidence from a comparison of the dividend policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms[J]. Journal of Finance, 1998.12:879-904.
Da Silva, L., Goergen, M., Renneboog, L.. Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance[M]. Oxford: Oxfod University Press, 2004.
Easterbrook, F. H. Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends[J]. American Economic Review, 1984(9):650-659.
Farrelly, Baker, H.K. Corporate dividend: views of institutional investers[J]. Akron Business and Economic Review, 1989.20(2):89-100.
Gugler. K and B. Yurtoglu. Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany[D]. University of Vienna Working Paper Series, 2001.
Jensen, M. C. The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J]. American Economic Review, 1986.2:323-329.
Jensen, M. C. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems[J]. Journal of Finance, 1993.3:831-880.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs andOwnership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976.3:305-360.
Johnson. S, Porta. R. L., Lopez-De-Silanes. F., Shleifer.A.. Tunneling[J]. the American Economic Review, 2000(90):22-27.
Khan, Tehmina. Company dividends and ownership structure: evidence from UK panel data[EB/01]. http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/khan.pape.pdf, 2005
La Porta, R,Lopez-de-Silanes, E , Shleifer, A. et al. Agency problems and Dividend Policies around the World[J]. Journal of Finance, 2000.1:1-33.
Lintner, J. Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes[J]. American Economic Review, 1956.2:97-113.
Mara Faccio, Larry HP Lang, Leslie Young. Dividends and Expropriation[J]. American EconomicReview, 2000(54):30-56.
Miller, M., Modigliani, F. Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares[J]. Journal of Business, 1961.4: 411-433.
Miller, M., Rock, K. Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information[J]. Journal of Finance, 1985.4:1031-1051.
Mock. E, A.Shleifer, R.Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1998(20):293-315.
Pruitt, S. W., Gitman, L. J. The interactions between the investment, financing, and dividend decisions of major U. S. firms[J]. Financial Review, 1991.26(3):409-430.
Ross,S.A. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signaling Approach[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1977.1: 23-40.
Rozeff, M. S. Growth, Beta, and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 1982.5:249-259.
Shleifer, A, Vishny, R. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986.3:461-488.
Shleifer. A., R. W. Vishny. A survey of corporate governance[J]. Journal of Finance 1997.12:737-783.
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry H P Lang. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998.5:81-112.
Thomas H. Noe and Michael J. Rebello. Asymmetric Information, Managerial Opportunism, Financing, and Payout Policies[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1996.2:637-660.
Thomsen, S. Blockholder Ownership, Dividends and Firm Value In Continental Europe[DB/OL]. Working paper presented at ISNIE, 2004
陈信元,陈冬华,时旭.公司治理与现金股利:基于佛山照明的案例研究[J].管理世界, 2003.8:118-126.
吕长江,王克敏.上市公司股利政策的实证分析[J].经济研究, 1999.12:31-39.
李静.中西方上市公司股利政策对比分析[J].财会研究, 2004.6:61-63.
刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究, 2003.4:51-62.
刘星,李豫湘.灰色关联度评价法在股利政策相关因素分析中的应用[J].系统工程理论与实践, 1998.9:78-81.
李增泉,王志伟,孙铮.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究, 2004.12:3-13.
李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究, 2005.1:95-105.
马曙光,黄志忠,薛云奎.股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究, 2005.9:44-50
施东晖.股权结构,公司治理与绩效表现[J].世界经济, 2000.12:37-44.
孙晖,徐学丹.上市公司现金股利政策影响因素研究[J].辽宁工学院学报:社会科学版, 2005.2:69-71.
唐国琼,邹虹.上市公司现金股利政策影响因素的实证研究[J].财金科学, 2005.2:147-153
魏刚.中国上市公司股利分配问题研究[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社, 2001.
王合喜,胡伟.我国上市公司现金股利分配政策影响因素研究[J].财务与会计, 2004.2:21-23.
王家琪,孙玲玲.大股东占用上市公司资金的实证分析[J].统计与决策, 2005.12:115-117.
肖星.中国上司公司现金股利决策研究[D].清华大学博士学位论文, 2003.
阎大颖.中国上市公司控股股东价值取向对股利政策影响的实证研究[J].南开经济研究, 2004.6:94-100.
原红旗.中国上司公司股利政策分析[J].财经研究, 2001.3:33-41.
袁振兴,杨淑娥.大股东对不同现金股利政策的偏好与利益侵占[J].统计与决策, 2007.1:95-97.
杨淑娥,王勇,白革萍.我国股利分配政策影响因素的实证分析[J].会计研究, 2000.2:31-34.
赵春光,张雪丽,叶龙.股利政策:选择动因——来自我国证券市场的实证证据[J].财经研究, 2001.2:48-53.
张红军.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J].经济科学,2000.4:34-44.
张玉彪,吕长江.公司治理、大股东资产侵占行为与公司业绩的关系研究[D].吉林大学, 2006.
朱明秀.我国上市公司股权结构与股利政策关系的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究, 2005.05:87-95.
Avner Kalay. Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1982.10:211-233.
Bhattacharya, S. Imperfect information, dividend policy, and‘the bird in the hand’fallacy[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1979.3:259-270.
Black, F. The Dividend Puzzle[J]. Journal of Portfolio Management, 1976.2:5-8.
Campbell, J. Y. Asset Pricing at the Millennium[J]. The Journal ofFinance, 2000.l :1515-1566.
Dewenter, Kathryn L and Warther Vincent A. Dividends, asymetric information, and agency conflicts: Evidence from a comparison of the dividend policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms[J]. Journal of Finance, 1998.12:879-904.
Da Silva, L., Goergen, M., Renneboog, L.. Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance[M]. Oxford: Oxfod University Press, 2004.
Easterbrook, F. H. Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends[J]. American Economic Review, 1984(9):650-659.
Farrelly, Baker, H.K. Corporate dividend: views of institutional investers[J]. Akron Business and Economic Review, 1989.20(2):89-100.
Gugler. K and B. Yurtoglu. Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany[D]. University of Vienna Working Paper Series, 2001.
Jensen, M. C. The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J]. American Economic Review, 1986.2:323-329.
Jensen, M. C. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems[J]. Journal of Finance, 1993.3:831-880.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs andOwnership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976.3:305-360.
Johnson. S, Porta. R. L., Lopez-De-Silanes. F., Shleifer.A.. Tunneling[J]. the American Economic Review, 2000(90):22-27.
Khan, Tehmina. Company dividends and ownership structure: evidence from UK panel data[EB/01]. http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/khan.pape.pdf, 2005
La Porta, R,Lopez-de-Silanes, E , Shleifer, A. et al. Agency problems and Dividend Policies around the World[J]. Journal of Finance, 2000.1:1-33.
Lintner, J. Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes[J]. American Economic Review, 1956.2:97-113.
Mara Faccio, Larry HP Lang, Leslie Young. Dividends and Expropriation[J]. American EconomicReview, 2000(54):30-56.
Miller, M., Modigliani, F. Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares[J]. Journal of Business, 1961.4: 411-433.
Miller, M., Rock, K. Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information[J]. Journal of Finance, 1985.4:1031-1051.
Mock. E, A.Shleifer, R.Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1998(20):293-315.
Pruitt, S. W., Gitman, L. J. The interactions between the investment, financing, and dividend decisions of major U. S. firms[J]. Financial Review, 1991.26(3):409-430.
Ross,S.A. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signaling Approach[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1977.1: 23-40.
Rozeff, M. S. Growth, Beta, and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 1982.5:249-259.
Shleifer, A, Vishny, R. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986.3:461-488.
Shleifer. A., R. W. Vishny. A survey of corporate governance[J]. Journal of Finance 1997.12:737-783.
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry H P Lang. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998.5:81-112.
Thomas H. Noe and Michael J. Rebello. Asymmetric Information, Managerial Opportunism, Financing, and Payout Policies[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1996.2:637-660.
Thomsen, S. Blockholder Ownership, Dividends and Firm Value In Continental Europe[DB/OL]. Working paper presented at ISNIE, 2004