上市公司股权结构与股权质押相关关系的实证研究
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摘要
本文以上市公司A股股权质押行为作为研究的对象,从公司治理结构层面对影响上市公司股权质押行为的微观因素进行实证分析。
本文的主要发现有: (1)股权结构对上市公司股权质押行为具有比较强的影响力。第一大股东持股比例与股权质押行为负相关。(2)股权集中度与股权质押行为负相关。(3)相对于国家终极控制的上市公司,非国家终极控制公司发生股权质押的概率更高。(4)在实际控制人性质不同的上市公司,股权制衡机制对于股权质押行为的影响作用是不同的。在国家终极控制公司,第一、二大股东持股比例的比值与股权质押正相关;相反,在非国家终极控制公司,第一、二大股东持股比例的比值与股权质押负相关。
本文的主要贡献体现在: (1)对股权质押行为及其内在根源等问题进行了实证分析,为解释企业股权质押行为提供了经验证据和具有一定启示性的研究结论。(2)考察了股权结构特征对上市公司股权质押行为的影响,为公司治理结构影响企业风险决策的研究提供了补充。
In a sample of pledging corporations in A-shares, this dissertation analyzes the ownership structure features affecting stock pledge behavior from corporate governance perspective.
Our results show that:(1) Ownership structure significantly influences corporation pledge behavior. The first shareholder has a negative relationship with pledge behavior. (2)There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and pledge behavior. (3)The probability of pledge behavior of non-state-owned corporations is higher than that of corporations controlled by state. (4)The influence of ownership balancing mechanism on pledge behavior is different in corporations of different types of ultimate controlling shareholders. In state-owned corporations, there is a positive relationship between overage pledging and Z index. On the contrary, there is a negative relationship between overage pledging and Z index in non-state-owned corporations.
The contributions of this dissertation follow:(1) Empirical analyzing pledging and its cause, providing empirical evidences and some instructions for corporation pledge behavior. (2) Investigating the influence of ownership structure features on corporation pledge behavior, offering complementary for the influence of corporate governance on risk management decisions.
本文的主要发现有: (1)股权结构对上市公司股权质押行为具有比较强的影响力。第一大股东持股比例与股权质押行为负相关。(2)股权集中度与股权质押行为负相关。(3)相对于国家终极控制的上市公司,非国家终极控制公司发生股权质押的概率更高。(4)在实际控制人性质不同的上市公司,股权制衡机制对于股权质押行为的影响作用是不同的。在国家终极控制公司,第一、二大股东持股比例的比值与股权质押正相关;相反,在非国家终极控制公司,第一、二大股东持股比例的比值与股权质押负相关。
本文的主要贡献体现在: (1)对股权质押行为及其内在根源等问题进行了实证分析,为解释企业股权质押行为提供了经验证据和具有一定启示性的研究结论。(2)考察了股权结构特征对上市公司股权质押行为的影响,为公司治理结构影响企业风险决策的研究提供了补充。
In a sample of pledging corporations in A-shares, this dissertation analyzes the ownership structure features affecting stock pledge behavior from corporate governance perspective.
Our results show that:(1) Ownership structure significantly influences corporation pledge behavior. The first shareholder has a negative relationship with pledge behavior. (2)There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and pledge behavior. (3)The probability of pledge behavior of non-state-owned corporations is higher than that of corporations controlled by state. (4)The influence of ownership balancing mechanism on pledge behavior is different in corporations of different types of ultimate controlling shareholders. In state-owned corporations, there is a positive relationship between overage pledging and Z index. On the contrary, there is a negative relationship between overage pledging and Z index in non-state-owned corporations.
The contributions of this dissertation follow:(1) Empirical analyzing pledging and its cause, providing empirical evidences and some instructions for corporation pledge behavior. (2) Investigating the influence of ownership structure features on corporation pledge behavior, offering complementary for the influence of corporate governance on risk management decisions.
引文
[1]白仲林.上市公司股权结构与市场价值的实证研究[J].天津商学院学报,2002,5.
[2]陈信元,汪辉.股东制衡与公司价值:模型及经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004,11:102一110.
[3]陈彦晶,周磊.托宾Q理论的解读及应用[J].经济学导刊,2006,4:23一2
[4]高兰芬.董监事股权质押之代理问题对会计资讯与公司绩效之影响[D].台湾:国立成功大学,2002.
[5]葛敬东.现金流权比例对终极股东剥夺行为的约束程度分析[J].会计研究,2006,7:52一58.
[6]李亚静,朱宏泉,黄登仕,周应峰.股权结构与公司价值创造[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(5):65一75.
[7]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排—来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,12:3一13
[8]孟刚.银行视角的股权质押法律问题研究[EB/OL]. http://www.cel.Cn ,2005-02-23.
[9]吕长江,张玉彪.公司治理结构、大股东资产侵占行为与公司业绩[A].中国会计评论理事会.第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集[C].上海:2005.
[10]彭白颖.最终控制股东控制权与现金权偏离的实现机制[J].工业技术经济,2006,10:74一76.
[11]邱正仁,熊大中,高兰芬.财务危机与股权质押关联性之研究.Working Paper,2002.
[12]苏启林、朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,8:36一45.
[13]唐越军,谢仍明.大股东制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应一来自1999一2003年中国上市公司的证据[J].南开经济研究,2006,1:60一78.
[14]王克敏,蔡新颖.上市公司股权变更效应研究[A].见:中国会计评论理事会.第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集[C].上海:2005
[15]张光荣.大股东的支撑行为与隧道行为一基于托普软件的案例研究[J].管理世界,2006,8:126一135.
[16]阎天怀.论股权质押[J].中国法学,1999,1:66一75.
[17]谢金贤.台湾上市公司董事会股权结构及持股质押因素与企业风险、经营绩效关联性之研究[D].厦门:厦门大学,2001.
[18]吴波、刘峰,2004,托宾Q值有效性研究一理论分析与经验证据[A].见:中国会计评论理事会.第三届实证会计国际研讨会论文集[C].天津:200
[19]王馄,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2):27一33.
[20]赵景文,于增彪.股权制衡与公司经营业绩[J].会计研究,2005,12:59一64.
[21]张红军.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J].经济科学,2000(4)
[22]郑德坦,沈华珊.股权结构与公司治理-对我国上市公司的实证分析[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2002(1)
[23] Berle, A. Means. G. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. MacMillan,New York,1932.
[24] Bennedsen,Morten and Wolfenzon. The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporation [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:113一139.
[25] Claessens S.,Djankov,S., Fan,J. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,6:2471一2771.
[26] Grossman,S. ,Hart,One-Share,One-Vote,and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:175一202.
[27] Jensen,M.C. Meckling,W.H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Costs and Ownership Structure [J],Journal of Financial Economics,1976 ,3:305一360.
[28] La Prota,R.,Lopez-de-Silanes,F. ,Sheleifer,A.,and Vishny, R. Corporate ownership around the World [J] Journal of Finance,1999,54:471一517
[29] Shleifer A.,and R. Vishny,Large Shareholder and Corporate Control [J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461一488.
[30] Yeh , Y.H. Board Composition and the Separation of ownership and Control[EB/OL]. Working Paper,2002,Fu-Jen Catholic University,Taipei.
[2]陈信元,汪辉.股东制衡与公司价值:模型及经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004,11:102一110.
[3]陈彦晶,周磊.托宾Q理论的解读及应用[J].经济学导刊,2006,4:23一2
[4]高兰芬.董监事股权质押之代理问题对会计资讯与公司绩效之影响[D].台湾:国立成功大学,2002.
[5]葛敬东.现金流权比例对终极股东剥夺行为的约束程度分析[J].会计研究,2006,7:52一58.
[6]李亚静,朱宏泉,黄登仕,周应峰.股权结构与公司价值创造[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(5):65一75.
[7]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排—来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,12:3一13
[8]孟刚.银行视角的股权质押法律问题研究[EB/OL]. http://www.cel.Cn ,2005-02-23.
[9]吕长江,张玉彪.公司治理结构、大股东资产侵占行为与公司业绩[A].中国会计评论理事会.第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集[C].上海:2005.
[10]彭白颖.最终控制股东控制权与现金权偏离的实现机制[J].工业技术经济,2006,10:74一76.
[11]邱正仁,熊大中,高兰芬.财务危机与股权质押关联性之研究.Working Paper,2002.
[12]苏启林、朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,8:36一45.
[13]唐越军,谢仍明.大股东制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应一来自1999一2003年中国上市公司的证据[J].南开经济研究,2006,1:60一78.
[14]王克敏,蔡新颖.上市公司股权变更效应研究[A].见:中国会计评论理事会.第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集[C].上海:2005
[15]张光荣.大股东的支撑行为与隧道行为一基于托普软件的案例研究[J].管理世界,2006,8:126一135.
[16]阎天怀.论股权质押[J].中国法学,1999,1:66一75.
[17]谢金贤.台湾上市公司董事会股权结构及持股质押因素与企业风险、经营绩效关联性之研究[D].厦门:厦门大学,2001.
[18]吴波、刘峰,2004,托宾Q值有效性研究一理论分析与经验证据[A].见:中国会计评论理事会.第三届实证会计国际研讨会论文集[C].天津:200
[19]王馄,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2):27一33.
[20]赵景文,于增彪.股权制衡与公司经营业绩[J].会计研究,2005,12:59一64.
[21]张红军.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J].经济科学,2000(4)
[22]郑德坦,沈华珊.股权结构与公司治理-对我国上市公司的实证分析[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2002(1)
[23] Berle, A. Means. G. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. MacMillan,New York,1932.
[24] Bennedsen,Morten and Wolfenzon. The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporation [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:113一139.
[25] Claessens S.,Djankov,S., Fan,J. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,6:2471一2771.
[26] Grossman,S. ,Hart,One-Share,One-Vote,and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:175一202.
[27] Jensen,M.C. Meckling,W.H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Costs and Ownership Structure [J],Journal of Financial Economics,1976 ,3:305一360.
[28] La Prota,R.,Lopez-de-Silanes,F. ,Sheleifer,A.,and Vishny, R. Corporate ownership around the World [J] Journal of Finance,1999,54:471一517
[29] Shleifer A.,and R. Vishny,Large Shareholder and Corporate Control [J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461一488.
[30] Yeh , Y.H. Board Composition and the Separation of ownership and Control[EB/OL]. Working Paper,2002,Fu-Jen Catholic University,Taipei.