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我国城市房屋拆迁中的利益冲突及调整
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摘要
近十年来,随着全国各地城市规模的急剧膨胀和城市规划的不断调整,旧城改造、商业开发、政府重大工程等城建项目的实施,几乎每个城市都涉及到房屋拆迁问题。我国的城市房屋拆迁制度是与土地征收权相关的一项特有制度,其本质是国家基于公共利益,强制取得公民的私有财产。从目前来看,因城市拆迁制度设计缺陷而导致的种种社会矛盾和利益冲突,是转型时期中国社会的重要问题之一,它已严重影响了社会的和谐稳定,毫不讳言地说,城市房屋拆迁已经成为我国当前最易引起冲突、激发矛盾的社会问题。
     城市房屋拆迁问题的核心是利益的分配与调整。从本质上分析,拆迁过程中产生的矛盾与利益主体的多元化、逐利行为的多样性息息相关,加之各主体需求的社会资源和财富具有稀缺性与有限性的特征,利益主体间追求利益最大化的冲突是不可避免的。在城市房屋拆迁中,利益主体呈现多元化格局,包括地方政府、开发商、被拆迁人、拆迁(承办)单位、拆迁评估机构等等,各类主体的利益矛盾混杂、动迁难度明显增大。地方政府、开发商和被拆迁人三方利益主体作为城市拆迁中的核心利益相关者,他们彼此之间的利益诉求常常出现重叠与交叉,利益冲突问题也最为显著,本文也会重点分析这部分问题。
     在城市房屋拆迁中,利益相关者的目标是既要维护自身的利益,又要实现自己的利益最大化,同时还要争夺拆迁中其他利益相关者的利益,因此,拆迁过程中的利益冲突不断。本文认为,地方政府和开发商在其中始终处于优势地位,被拆迁人处于弱势地位,被拆迁人的利益得不到应有保护,利益冲突更加严重,被拆迁人甚至通过自焚等极端方式来表达自己的利益诉求,这种方式不仅将城市房屋拆迁中的利益冲突问题推到了风口浪尖,而且也引发了很多社会人士与政府官员的深刻反思。由此可见,我国城市房屋拆迁中的利益冲突问题已经亟待解决。本文通过解读城市房屋拆迁中的利益相关者的诉求、分析利益冲突产生的原因,对如何调整这种利益冲突提出了自己的看法。
     本文分为五章对拆迁中的利益冲突问题进行论述。
     第1章绪论。首先介绍了问题提出的背景,不仅包括当前城镇化的发展状况,还包括当前利益冲突事件的现状和人们对于现有拆迁条例的看法;其次介绍了国内外研究的现状,说明国内外学者对于相关问题的观点;绪论的最后是对本文研究的理论基础、理论意义和实用价值的表述。
     第2章城市房屋拆迁中的利益相关者和利益诉求。笔者先对本文所涉及到的基础知识做了概述,接下来主要针对城市房屋拆迁中的利益相关者(包括地方政府、房地产开发商和被拆迁人等)进行识别与分类,确定利益相关程度,找出主要的利益相关者,并针对核心的利益相关者的利益诉求进行了分析。
     第3章我国城市房屋拆迁中的利益冲突分析。首先简述了拆迁中利益冲突的类型和表现形式,接着全面分析我国拆迁中利益冲突产生的原因,包括公共利益界定不清楚、拆迁补偿范围界定不合理、《拆迁条例》与《物权法》等上位法相抵触和地方政府职能的错位。
     第4章我国城市房屋拆迁中利益冲突的调整。针对前文所述的问题,从界定公共利益的范畴、调整拆迁补偿的范围、规范拆迁工作和完善我国拆迁听证制度的角度来调整拆迁中的利益冲突问题。
     第5章结论。对前面章节进行综合阐述,并指出本文存在的不足。
Over the last ten years, as the rapid expansion of the size of cities across the country, the constant adjustments of urban planning and implementations of major government projects such as urban redevelopment, business development and urban construction projects, almost every city has issues related to housing demolition. The nature of China's urban housing demolition system which is a specific system related to the right of land expropriation is that government must be in behalf of public interest when private property of citizens are compulsorily acquired. From the current point of view, all kinds of social contradictions and conflicts of interests which are caused by the design defects of removal system are one of the important issues of the transition period of of Chinese society, it has a serious impact on social harmony and stability. Frankly speaking, urban housing demolition has been one of the social problems that most likely cause the current conflict and stimulate contradictory.
     The core of the removal of urban housing units are the distribution and adjustments of benefits. In essence, the contradiction in the demolition process is closely related to the diversity of main roles and their variety of pursuit of interest. As the nature of the social wealth and resources which they needed are scarce and limited, the conflicts among the interest roles caused by the pursuit of best interest is inevitable. In the urban housing demolition, interest roles are diversified, including local government, developers, the dismantleds, relocation (host) units, demolition assessment bodies and so on. The main types of conflicts of interests are mixed and the difficulty of mobilization clearly increased. Local government, developers and the dismantleds are considered as the core stakeholders, their demands of interests are often overlap and cross, and the conflict of interests are the most significant issue, so this paper will focus on an analysis of this problem.
     In the urban housing demolition, the objective of stakeholders is to protect their own interests, to achieve the largest of its own interests and to compete for their stakeholders'interest in demolition, the result of which causes the constant conflict of interests. From this paper's view, compared with the local government and developers in an advantageous position the dismantled has always been in the disadvantaged position without properly protection of their interests, the conflicts are getting worse and worse. The dismantled decided to use extreme ways like burning themselves to express their aspirations for interests, it not only pushed the conflict of interests in urban housing demolition to the teeth of storm, but also drew the attentions of many people and government officials. This shows that the conflict of interests in China's urban housing demolition has yet to be resolved. This paper explain the demand of urban housing stakeholders, analyse the cause of the conflict of interest and make some points on the adjustments of such a conflict of interests.
     This paper is divided into five chapters on the discussion of the demolition issue of conflict of interests.
     Chapter 1 Introduction. First it introduces the background issues, including not only the current state of development of urbanization, but also the status of the current conflict of interest and peoples' view of the Ordinance for the demolition; next it introduced the status of domestic and international research which shows that the relevant domestic and foreign scholars'view of the problem; the last part is the introduction of the theoretical basis of this study, theoretical and practical value of the expression.
     Chapter 2 Urban Housing Demolition and interests demands of stakeholders. First The author of this article involves an overview of the basics done, then identify and classify the stakeholders (including local government, real estate developers and the dismantled etc.) in urban housing demolition, and determine the degree of correlation of interests, identify the key stakeholders, and analyse the core interests of stakeholders.
     Chapter 3 The analysis of the conflict of interests in China's urban housing demolition. First it outlines the type and manifestations in conflict of interests in the removal, and then a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the removal of the conflict of interests, including that public interest is not clear, the Ordinance of demolition is against the higher law like Property Law, the local government functions are shifted and the demolition compensation defines are not reasonable.
     Chapter 4 The adjustments of Urban Housing Demolition in conflict of interests. Aimed at the problems previously mentioned, it adjust the the conflict of interests in demolition through the ways of defining the scope of the public interest, adjusting the scope of relocation compensation, being norm of demolition work and improving our hearing system.
     Chapter 5 Conclusions. This paper comprehensively expoundes on the previous section, and pointes out the shortcomings of this article.
引文
①中国社会科学院,《2010年城市蓝皮书》,2010年7月29日
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