短生命周期产品供应链中订货策略博弈研究
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摘要
技术进步和需求多样化使得产品更新换代的速度不断加快,产品生命周期不断缩短,短生命周期产品成为市场中很重要的一部分。同时激烈的市场竞争使供应链中各节点企业为了追求利益最大化而产生冲突,短生命周期产品供应链的强不确定性和快速响应性使其上述问题更加突出。因此利用博弈理论来研究其中各种决策问题,对有效提高短生命周期产品供应链的效率与竞争力、认清决策问题的本质有十分重要的意义。
本文着重探讨了由供应商和零售商构成的短生命周期产品二级供应链环境下,当零售商和供应商分别为供应链的核心主导商时,供应链的订货决策模型。供应链中占主导地位的节点企业可以利用主导优势将供应链中的一些不利影响因素和潜在机会损失推向对方,因此订货过程中核心主导商不同会使上下游企业的订货决策变量发生显著变化。当供应商占主导地位时,供应商为了减少生产的盲目性,通过激励措施补偿需求不确定给零售商带来的损失从而刺激零售商提前订货,在保障了自身利益的前提下也刺激了零售商参与的积极性。当零售商占主导地位时,零售商则会通过竞价手段将供应商的产品订购价格压制在比较低的水平下,但零售商由于其直接面临消费群体的特殊地位,可以通过增加营销信号以帮助供应商消除产品积压的现象。本文综合运用博弈论、激励理论、系统优化与决策建模等理论方法,分析供应链中各利益主体在不同条件下的决策,并对比了不同决策下的利益分配。
Technological advances and demand diversifications make the replacement of product continue to accelerate, and continuously shorten product life cycle. While facing fierce competition in the market, success of every enterprise largely depends on the overall competitiveness of the supply chain, which relies on its quick response to the varieties. In current context, there are more stresses on cooperation between upstream and downstream firms. However, in order to pursue their interests, conflict is inevitable. Due to the nature of strong uncertainty and quick response of short life cycle product supply chain, these issues seem more prominent. Therefore, using game theory to study the decision-making problems in it could be a lot help to understand the nature of supply chain optimization, and it would be also of important theoretical and practical significance to raise the efficiency of short life cycle product supply chain effectively and enhance competitiveness of the supply chain.
Under the background of a short life cycle product, this paper discusses the ordering decision models, in a two-tier supply chain environment formed by suppliers and retailers, when the retailers and suppliers were respectively at the core of the supply chain. As supply chain leading enterprise changes, the dominant position of nodes enterprise will use this advantage to push some unfavorable factors and the potential loss push to other, therefore decision variables of each side will be significant changes in the ordering process. When suppliers are dominant, vendors stimulate retailers to advance orders through certain incentives. By doing so, it has prompted the retailer's active participation, under the premise of protection of their own interests. When retailers dominate, it means retailers will control the price under a relatively low level in the ordering through competitive pressure. But while facing directly to consumer groups, retailers are special status. They can put signal to help increase sales to eliminate the backlog of suppliers. In order to reduce the uncertainty of their own, retailers often compress lead time into a very short period of time. Especially for short life cycle products, time is profit, when suppliers and retailers want to reduce their uncertainty and potential losses through the leverage of time, their interests often conflict. This paper, by using game theory, motivation theory, system optimization modeling and decision theory, analyzes the different decisions of the main stakeholders in the supply chain under different conditions, and compares the different distribution of benefits.
本文着重探讨了由供应商和零售商构成的短生命周期产品二级供应链环境下,当零售商和供应商分别为供应链的核心主导商时,供应链的订货决策模型。供应链中占主导地位的节点企业可以利用主导优势将供应链中的一些不利影响因素和潜在机会损失推向对方,因此订货过程中核心主导商不同会使上下游企业的订货决策变量发生显著变化。当供应商占主导地位时,供应商为了减少生产的盲目性,通过激励措施补偿需求不确定给零售商带来的损失从而刺激零售商提前订货,在保障了自身利益的前提下也刺激了零售商参与的积极性。当零售商占主导地位时,零售商则会通过竞价手段将供应商的产品订购价格压制在比较低的水平下,但零售商由于其直接面临消费群体的特殊地位,可以通过增加营销信号以帮助供应商消除产品积压的现象。本文综合运用博弈论、激励理论、系统优化与决策建模等理论方法,分析供应链中各利益主体在不同条件下的决策,并对比了不同决策下的利益分配。
Technological advances and demand diversifications make the replacement of product continue to accelerate, and continuously shorten product life cycle. While facing fierce competition in the market, success of every enterprise largely depends on the overall competitiveness of the supply chain, which relies on its quick response to the varieties. In current context, there are more stresses on cooperation between upstream and downstream firms. However, in order to pursue their interests, conflict is inevitable. Due to the nature of strong uncertainty and quick response of short life cycle product supply chain, these issues seem more prominent. Therefore, using game theory to study the decision-making problems in it could be a lot help to understand the nature of supply chain optimization, and it would be also of important theoretical and practical significance to raise the efficiency of short life cycle product supply chain effectively and enhance competitiveness of the supply chain.
Under the background of a short life cycle product, this paper discusses the ordering decision models, in a two-tier supply chain environment formed by suppliers and retailers, when the retailers and suppliers were respectively at the core of the supply chain. As supply chain leading enterprise changes, the dominant position of nodes enterprise will use this advantage to push some unfavorable factors and the potential loss push to other, therefore decision variables of each side will be significant changes in the ordering process. When suppliers are dominant, vendors stimulate retailers to advance orders through certain incentives. By doing so, it has prompted the retailer's active participation, under the premise of protection of their own interests. When retailers dominate, it means retailers will control the price under a relatively low level in the ordering through competitive pressure. But while facing directly to consumer groups, retailers are special status. They can put signal to help increase sales to eliminate the backlog of suppliers. In order to reduce the uncertainty of their own, retailers often compress lead time into a very short period of time. Especially for short life cycle products, time is profit, when suppliers and retailers want to reduce their uncertainty and potential losses through the leverage of time, their interests often conflict. This paper, by using game theory, motivation theory, system optimization modeling and decision theory, analyzes the different decisions of the main stakeholders in the supply chain under different conditions, and compares the different distribution of benefits.
引文
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[2] Bower JL, Hout TM. Fast-cycle capability for competitive power. Harvard Business Review, 1988, (11-12): 110-118.
[3] Merrills R. How Northern Telecom Competes on time. Harvard Business Review, 1989, (7-8): 108-114.
[4] Stalk G Jr, Hout TM. Competing against time. New York: The Free Press, 1990.
[5] Thmos D J, Griffin P M. Coordinated supply chain management. European Journal of Operational Research, 1996, 94(1): 1-15.
[6] Rob Spencer. Shorter product life cycles, need for quality drive robotic assembly. Robotics World, 2001, 19(7): 20-23.
[7] Z. Kevin Weng, Tim McClurg. Coordinated ordering decisions for short life cycle products with uncertainty in delivery time and demand. European Journal of Operational Research, 2003, 151(1): 12-24.
[8] Yi Xu, Bhaba R. Sarker. Models for a family of products with shelf life, and production and shortage costs in emerging markets. Computers & Operations Research, 2003, 30(7): 925-938.
[9] Z Kevin Weng. The power of coordinated decisions for short-life-cycle products in a manufactureing and distribution supply chain. IIE Transactions, 31(11): 1037-1049.
[10]黄宝凤,仲伟俊,张玉林.短生命周期产品供应链中供需双方合作的价值研究.管理工程学报, 2005, 19(4): 105-110.
[11] Clarolo F W, Akella R, Morton T E. A periodic review, production planning model with uncertain demand-optimality of extended myopia. Management Science, 1994, 40: 320-332.
[12] Lau A, Lau H. The newsboy problem with price-dependent demand distribution. IIE Transactions, 1988, 20(2): 168-175.
[13] Fisher M, Raman A. Reducing the cost of demand uncertainty through accurate response to early sales. Operations Research, 1996, 44(1): 87-99.
[14] Tsay A. The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Consumer Incentives. Management Science, 1999, 45(10): 1339-1358.
[15] Shil W. Optimal inventory policies when stockout result from defective product. International Journal of Production Research, 1993, 31(6): 52-64.
[16] Panida PetsongG, The effects of quality and substitutability on price competition in supply chain. UMI, 2002, UMI Number: 3027361.
[17] Ravi Anupindi, Ram Akella, Diversification under supply uncertainty. Management Science, 1993, 39(8): 944-963.
[18] Jashankarya M. Snaminathan, J. George Shanthikumar. Supplier diversification: effect of discrete demand. Operations Research Letters, 1999, 24(5): 213-221.
[19] Cachon G. P, Lariviere M. A. Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain. Management Science, 2001, 47(5): 629-646.
[20] Gavirneni S. Information Flows in Capacitated Supply Chains with Fixed Ordering Costs. Management Science, 2002, 48(5): 644-651.
[21] Gupta S, Loulou R. Process Innovation, Product Differentiation, and Channel Structure: Strategic Incentives in a Duopoly. Marketing Science. 1998, 17(4): 301-316.
[22] Srivastava J, Chakravarti D, Rapoport A. Price and Margin Negotiations in Marketing Channels: An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining Under One-sided Uncertainty and Opportunity Cost of Delay. Marketing Science. 2000, 19(2): 163-184.
[23] Lariviere M. A, Porteus E. L. Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management. 2001, 3(4): 293-305.
[24] Krishnan H, Kapuscinski R, Hutz Q. A. Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort. Management Science. 2004, 50(1): 48-63.
[25] Trivedi, M. Distribution Channels: An Extension of Exclusive Retailership. Mangement Science. 1998, 44(7). 896-909.
[26]谢识予.经济博弈论.上海:复旦大学出版社, 2001.
[27]赵泉午,卜祥智,杨秀.基于返利策略的易逝品供应链合同研究.管理工程学报. 2005, 19(4): 104-109.
[28] Roland Berger strategy consultants.国际零售业发展历史回顾及其启示. www.rolandberger.com.cn.
[29]王飞锋,李晓锦.零售商在供应链中地位的演化.商业经济文荟, 2004, 6: 40-43.
[30]宋华.现代物流与供应链管理案例.北京:经济管理出版社, 2000.
[31]贾尔斯(美).沃尔玛连锁经营.哈尔滨:哈尔滨出版社, 2004.
[32] Douglas J. Thomas, Paul M. Grinffin. Coordinated supply chain management. European Journal of Operational Research, 1996, 94(1): 1-15.
[33] Fangruo chen. Coordination mechanisms for a distribution system with one supplier and multiple retailers. Management Science, 2001, 47(5): 693-708.
[34] Huang Z, Li S X. Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chains: A game theory approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 2001, 135(3): 527-544.
[35]张龙,宋士吉,刘连臣,吴澄.带有供需双方促销努力的供应链合同问题研究.清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2003, 43(9): 1226-1229.
[36]郭亚军,东明.博弈理论在企业接受订货决策中的应用.东北大学学报(自然科学版), 2002, 23(12): 1200-1202.
[37]卜祥智,赵泉午,黄庆,武振业.易逝商品最优广告投入与订货策略的博弈分析.系统工程理论与实践. 2004, 24(11): 100-105.
[38]牟德一.制造商-零售商供应链的联合定价决策模型.南开大学学报(自然科学版), 2004, 37(3): 55-60.
[39] Viswanath Cvsa, Stephen M. Gilbert. Strategic commitment versus postponement in a two-tier supply chain. European journal of operational research, 2002, 141(3): 526-543.
[40]浦徐进,石琴等.鼓励零售商提前订货策略的进一步研究.管理科学, 2005, 18(6): 6-11.
[41] Donohue K. supply contracts and fashion goods: optimizing channel profit. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1996.
[42] Ernst R., Morris Cohen. Analysis of coordinated alternaives in a manufacturer/dealer inventory system under stochastic demand. Production and Operations Management Journal, 1992, 1(3): 254-258.
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