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上市公司前期差错自愿性更正动因实证研究
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摘要
我国现有会计准则及会计法规没有对前期差错更正时间作出强制性规定,默认为发现差错时更正。因此,上市公司往往是发现了前期差错不更正,直到监管部门查出差错时才更正,或是出于其它目的才更正。上市公司的这一行为,违背了财务报告的真实性、客观性要求,使财务报表使用者获得的会计信息失真,容易误导报表使用者。如果不予及时制止,就会严重干扰资本市场秩序。因此,有必要对上市公司前期差错自愿性更正的动因进行实证研究。
     在总结国内外现有研究成果的基础上,论文概述了前期差错更正研究的基本分类及理论基础,对我国上市公司前期差错更正进行了统计性描述,发现我国上市公司非自愿性更正前期差错的现象十分普遍,研究如何促使我国上市公司自愿性更正前期差错是十分必要的。本文选取了2003-2007年披露前期差错更正的深沪上市公司,并将其分为自愿性更正和非自愿性更正两组作为研究样本,运用均值检验、相关性检验和Logistic回归检验考察了上市公司自愿性更正前期差错的动因,实证研究结果表明:差错更正方向、绝对控股与前期差错自愿性更正正相关,差错更正影响程度、资产负债率与前期差错自愿性更正负相关,而相对控股假设和收益质量假设未能通过显著性检验。针对统计性描述和实证研究结果,论文提出如下四个建议:完善企业会计准则及相关会计制度;加强企业内部控制及管理制度的建设;提高会计人员的业务素质和道德修养;加大上市公司外部监管力度。
     本文的价值在于:以2003—2007年作为研究期间,研究对象是在这5年内所有进行了前期差错更正的A股上市公司,包括同时发行B股和同时发行H股的,并将其分为自愿性更正和非自愿性更正两组对自愿性更正的动因进行研究。在自愿性更正动因实证研究的研究假设中,提出差错更正方向假设、差错更正影响程度假设、绝对控股假设和相对控股假设。
The existing accounting standards and the accounting codes have not made the compulsory stipulation that when to correct the prior period errors. So it is always considered that when the prior period errors are found out. Therefore, listed companies often do not correct the prior period errors until the supervisory departments find out the errors, or correct them when they need. This behavior of the listed companies has violated the authenticity and objectivity request of financial report, which causes that the financial reporting users obtain distortive messages and misleads them. If this situation does not stop promptly, it will seriously disturb the order of capital market. Of course, it’s necessary that we study the motivations of voluntary correction by empirical study.
     Based on the present study about prior period errors at home and abroad, this thesis has outlined the basic classification of the prior period errors correction and the theory foundation. It has carried on the statistical description of listed companies’prior period errors correction, and discovered that the phenomenon of listed company non-voluntarily correct prior period errors is common. It concluded that it is essential to study how to stimulate the listed company voluntarily correct the prior period errors. The listed companies which disclose the prior period errors corrections during the period from 2003 to 2007 were selected as research sample, and then divided into the voluntary correction and non-voluntary correction two groups. Then the motivations which stimulate the listed companies voluntarily correct errors was testified by methods of mean value test and multivariate linear regression. The major empirical results are summarized below: The direction of errors correction and absolute control correlated positively with it. The effect degree of errors correction and the asset-liabilities ratio correlated negatively with it. The relative control and the income quality didn’t correlate with it. Based on the statistical description and the empirical research, the paper puts forward the following four proposals: Perfect the enterprise accounting standard and related accounting system; strengthen the construction of the enterprise internal control and the control system; improve accountants' professional quality and the moral cultivation; increases the exterior supervision dynamics of the listed companies.
     This article’s value lies in the object of study was A-Share Companies which have the prior period errors correction, including simultaneously publish stock B or stock H, during the period from 2003 to 2007. And they were divided into two groups the voluntary correction and the non-voluntary correction to study the motivations of voluntary correction. In the research supposition, this paper proposed that the direction of errors correction, the effect degree of errors correction, the absolutely control and the relative control.
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