中国上市公司大股东侵占行为及影响因素研究
|
摘要
大股东利用控股地位侵占中小股东的利益,严重影响了上市公司的正常经营活动,损害了投资者的信心。股权分置改革是我国证券市场经历的一次重大制度性变革,主要用于解决非流通股与流通股问题。股改以后,大股东侵占的影响因素有何变化,是本文主要研究的问题。
大股东侵占的理论基础是大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题,而代理问题产生的条件是控制权与现金流量权的分离。控制权与现金流量权分离后,控制权通常大于现金流量权,控股股东可以用较小的股权达到控制上市公司的目的。本文在理论研究基础上,分析了我国上市公司大股东侵占的途径,并解析了我国发生大股东侵占行为的制度背景和外部环境。
本文将2006年股改后的上市公司作为基本样本,并以当年未股改的上市公司作为比较样本。研究在不同控制权与现金流量权分离程度下,大股东侵占有何不同,为此把已股改公司的样本分为4类,加上未股改公司样本,共得到5类样本。并用上市公司与大股东的关联交易度量大股东侵占,提出8个解释变量与2个控制变量,构建多元回归模型。通过回归分析发现,现金流量权与控制权的分离程度越高(大于或等于10%)时,变量对大股东侵占影响越大。控股股东与第二大股东持股之比是最明显的因素,在5类样本中均显著正相关。控股股东性质、董事长与总经理是否为同一人以及审计意见均不是大股东侵占的关键因素。变量对未股改公司和已股改公司的影响差别不大,唯一区别是,未股改公司的控股股东持股比例与大股东侵占不显著,而已股改公司的控股股东持股比例与大股东侵占负相关。
最后,根据分析结果,本文对后股改时期大股东侵占的治理提出了相应建议。主要包括以下几个方面:(1)优化股权结构,加强公司治理,建议在我国引进机构投资者以改善股权结构,完善独立董事制度以加强公司治理。(2)完善信息披露制度,最大程度保障投资者获悉信息的公平性。(3)加强法制建设,建议借鉴发达国家经验,引进新制度。(4)加强诚信建设与职业道德建设,增强广大中小投资者的保护意识。
Large shareholders utilize their control position to snatch interests from medium and small shareholders; these behaviors have seriously damaged normal business activities of listed companies and done harm to the confidence of investors. Equity division reform is an important institutional transformation of stock market in China. Equity division reform has solved the problem of non-circulating stock and circulating stock. What's the difference between pre and post of equity division reform? It is the main problem that this paper to be studied.
The theoretical basis of large shareholders expropriation is the agency problem between large shareholders and medium-small shareholders. And production condition of agency problem is the separation between control rights and cash flow rights. After the separation of control rights and cash flow rights, control rights is usually larger than cash flow rights, controlling shareholder can achieve the goal that control listed companies by using less stockholding. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper analyses invading ways of large shareholders, and describes the system background and external environment of large shareholders expropriation.
This paper chooses listed companies which have finished equity division reform in 2006 as basic samples, and chooses listed companies which have not reformed as contrast samples. In order to study the differences of large shareholders expropriation under different separation degrees of control rights and cash flow rights, this paper divides reformed samples into four kinds, together with samples which have not reformed, there are five kinds of samples. This paper uses related transaction to measure large shareholders expropriation. Eight explanatory variables and two control variables are adopted in the multivariate regression model. The results of regression analysis show that the higher separation degree between control rights and cash flow rights is, the greater influence (equal to or greater than 10%) of variables to large shareholders expropriation will be. The ratio between controlling shareholder and the second shareholder is the most significant factor of all, it is positive correlated with all the five kinds of samples. The nature of controlling shareholder, whether board chairman and general manager is the same one, and audit opinion are all not the key factors of large shareholders expropriation. The difference of variables’influence between reformed listed companies and non-reformed listed companies is very little; the only difference is the relation between stock-holding proportion of controlling shareholder and large shareholders expropriation, it is not obvious in non-reformed listed companies, but it is positive correlated with large shareholders expropriation in reformed listed companies.
At last, this paper gives several treatment advices of large shareholders expropriation in the post equity division reform era according to the analytical results. It mainly concludes the following several aspects: (1) Optimizing equity structure and strengthening company governance. And we should introduce institutional investors to improve stock right structure and perfect independent director system to strengthen company governance. (2) Perfecting information disclosure system to guarantee fairness of investors’information acquirement to the utmost extent. (3) Strengthening legal construction. And we should learn the experiences from developed countries and introduce new legal systems. (4) Strengthening credit construction, professional ethics construction and protection consciousness of the most medium-small investors.
大股东侵占的理论基础是大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题,而代理问题产生的条件是控制权与现金流量权的分离。控制权与现金流量权分离后,控制权通常大于现金流量权,控股股东可以用较小的股权达到控制上市公司的目的。本文在理论研究基础上,分析了我国上市公司大股东侵占的途径,并解析了我国发生大股东侵占行为的制度背景和外部环境。
本文将2006年股改后的上市公司作为基本样本,并以当年未股改的上市公司作为比较样本。研究在不同控制权与现金流量权分离程度下,大股东侵占有何不同,为此把已股改公司的样本分为4类,加上未股改公司样本,共得到5类样本。并用上市公司与大股东的关联交易度量大股东侵占,提出8个解释变量与2个控制变量,构建多元回归模型。通过回归分析发现,现金流量权与控制权的分离程度越高(大于或等于10%)时,变量对大股东侵占影响越大。控股股东与第二大股东持股之比是最明显的因素,在5类样本中均显著正相关。控股股东性质、董事长与总经理是否为同一人以及审计意见均不是大股东侵占的关键因素。变量对未股改公司和已股改公司的影响差别不大,唯一区别是,未股改公司的控股股东持股比例与大股东侵占不显著,而已股改公司的控股股东持股比例与大股东侵占负相关。
最后,根据分析结果,本文对后股改时期大股东侵占的治理提出了相应建议。主要包括以下几个方面:(1)优化股权结构,加强公司治理,建议在我国引进机构投资者以改善股权结构,完善独立董事制度以加强公司治理。(2)完善信息披露制度,最大程度保障投资者获悉信息的公平性。(3)加强法制建设,建议借鉴发达国家经验,引进新制度。(4)加强诚信建设与职业道德建设,增强广大中小投资者的保护意识。
Large shareholders utilize their control position to snatch interests from medium and small shareholders; these behaviors have seriously damaged normal business activities of listed companies and done harm to the confidence of investors. Equity division reform is an important institutional transformation of stock market in China. Equity division reform has solved the problem of non-circulating stock and circulating stock. What's the difference between pre and post of equity division reform? It is the main problem that this paper to be studied.
The theoretical basis of large shareholders expropriation is the agency problem between large shareholders and medium-small shareholders. And production condition of agency problem is the separation between control rights and cash flow rights. After the separation of control rights and cash flow rights, control rights is usually larger than cash flow rights, controlling shareholder can achieve the goal that control listed companies by using less stockholding. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper analyses invading ways of large shareholders, and describes the system background and external environment of large shareholders expropriation.
This paper chooses listed companies which have finished equity division reform in 2006 as basic samples, and chooses listed companies which have not reformed as contrast samples. In order to study the differences of large shareholders expropriation under different separation degrees of control rights and cash flow rights, this paper divides reformed samples into four kinds, together with samples which have not reformed, there are five kinds of samples. This paper uses related transaction to measure large shareholders expropriation. Eight explanatory variables and two control variables are adopted in the multivariate regression model. The results of regression analysis show that the higher separation degree between control rights and cash flow rights is, the greater influence (equal to or greater than 10%) of variables to large shareholders expropriation will be. The ratio between controlling shareholder and the second shareholder is the most significant factor of all, it is positive correlated with all the five kinds of samples. The nature of controlling shareholder, whether board chairman and general manager is the same one, and audit opinion are all not the key factors of large shareholders expropriation. The difference of variables’influence between reformed listed companies and non-reformed listed companies is very little; the only difference is the relation between stock-holding proportion of controlling shareholder and large shareholders expropriation, it is not obvious in non-reformed listed companies, but it is positive correlated with large shareholders expropriation in reformed listed companies.
At last, this paper gives several treatment advices of large shareholders expropriation in the post equity division reform era according to the analytical results. It mainly concludes the following several aspects: (1) Optimizing equity structure and strengthening company governance. And we should introduce institutional investors to improve stock right structure and perfect independent director system to strengthen company governance. (2) Perfecting information disclosure system to guarantee fairness of investors’information acquirement to the utmost extent. (3) Strengthening legal construction. And we should learn the experiences from developed countries and introduce new legal systems. (4) Strengthening credit construction, professional ethics construction and protection consciousness of the most medium-small investors.
引文
①资料来源:上海证券交易所网站,上市公司诚信记录中“上市公司资金占用清欠详细信息披露”。详见: http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/listcompany/FinancingImpropriateLiquidateList
①见上海证券交易所《上市公司资金占用再次被集中曝光沪深交易所继续深入推进清欠工作》。http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/listcompany/FinancingImpropriateLiquidateList
曹廷求,刘呼声.大股东治理与公司治理效率[J].改革, 2003,(1):32-37.
曹宇,李琳,孙铮.公司控制权对会计盈余稳健性影响的实证研究[J].经济管理, 2005, (14):34-42.
陈炜,孔翔,许年行.我国的法律制度能有效保护中小投资者利益吗?[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告, 2005, 8-26.
陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革一一来自我国资本市场的实证证据.经济研究[J], 2005,(4):77-86.
段亚林.论大股东股权滥用实例[M].北京:经济管理出版社, 2001.
贺建刚,刘峰.大股东控制、利益输送与投资者保护一一基于上市公司资产收购关联交易的实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究, 2005, 7(3):101-170.
韩志国.股改:划时代的革命[N].金融投资报. 2006, 12-30.
李志文,宋衍衡.影响中国上市公司配股决策的因素分析[J].经济科学, 2003,(3): 45-51.
刘成彦,陈炜.后股权分置时代上市公司大股东交易行为研究[N].证券市场导报, 2006, 10-10.
刘铁军,何旭强.后股权分置时代大股东行为、市场影响及监管策略[Z].深圳证券交易所第八届会员单位与基金公司研究成果,2006,3.
雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界, 2006,(1):129-136.
龙怒.大股东侵害行为和中小股东权益维护[J].湖南商学院学报, 2004,11(6):101.
孙新宇.后股权分置时代谨防大股东操纵股价[J].上海国贸, 2006,(7): 68-69.
孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究, 1999,(12):23-30.
孙永祥.上市公司的所有权与融资结构[J].当代经济科学, 2001,(6):29-33.
吴淑馄.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究: 1997-2000年上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济, 2002,(1):80-87.
吴悟.上市公司担保总额同比增四成[N].上海证券报, 2005, 4-28.
谢德仁.独立董事:代理问题之一部分[J].会计研究, 2005, (2):39-45.
谢清喜,王瑞英.中国上市公司内部人控制与非公平关联交易的实证分析[J].经济评论, 2004,(4): 113-117.
徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究, 2003, (3):64-74.
徐效鸿,上市公司大面积分红为哪般[N].上海证券报, 2005, 4-14.
余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论, 2004,(6): 33-38.
赵涛.股权分置背景下的隧道效应与过度融资[Z].深圳证券交易所第七届会员成果, 2005.
周沪,李宇.沪深交易所完成年报事后审查占用资金和违规担保仍较突出[N].中国证券报, 2005, 6-14.
周中胜.大股东资金占用与盈余管理[J].财贸研究, 2006,(3):128-135.
朱界馄.公司控制权配置论[M].北京:经济管理出版社, 2001.
朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[[J].经济研究, 2001,(12): 66-72.
Barcaly, Holderness. Private benefits from control of public corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989,(25):371-395.
Baysinger, B.D., and N.H.Butler,“Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1985,(1):96-112.
Bebchuk, Lucian, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis. Stock pyramids,cross-ownership, and dual class equity: The creation and agency costs of separating control from cash flow rights[Z]. Working paper 6951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 1999.
Berle A, Means G. The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M]. New York, Macmillan, 1932.
Changanti, Mahajan and Sharma. Corporate board size, composition, and corporate failures in the retailing industry[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 1985,(22): 400-417.
Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon, and Lang, Larry H. P. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations[J]. Journal of Economics , 2000,(58): 81-112.
Defond, M. L. Jiambalvo, J. Debt covenant effects and the manipulation of accruals[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1994, 17(1):145-176.
Elizabeth A. Gordon, Elaine Henry and Darius Palia. Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value[Z]. EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4377, August 2004.
Faccio, Mara, Lany Lang. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Companies[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,(65):365-395.
Fathi E. and J.P. Gueyie. Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Corporate Governance[J]. The International Journal of Effective Board Performance, 2001,(1):15-23.
Grossman, S.J, OD, Hart. One share-one vote and the market for corporate control. [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,(20):175-202.
Hanouna, P., A. Sarin, and A. Shapiro. Value of corporate control: some international evidence[Z], working paper, USC, 2001.
Jensen, Michael C. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1993,(48): 831-880.
Jensen, W. H. Meckling. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, Agency costs, and ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,(3): 305-360.
Jian M. and T.J. Wong. Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups[Z]. working paper, 2003.
Johnson, S., R., La Porta, F., Lopez-De-Silanes, A., Shleifer.. Tunnelling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000,(90):22-27.
Khanna, T and K. Palepu. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2000, 55(2):867-892.
La Porta., Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer. Corporate Ownership around the World[J]. Journal of Finance.1999,(54):471-518.
Leuz, Christian, Dhananjay Nanda, and Peter D. Wysocki. Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, (6):505-527.
Mark J. Kohlbeck and Brian W. Mayhew. Related Party Transactions[Z]. AAA 2005 FARS Meeting Paper. September 15, 2004.
McConnell J, Servaes H. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,(27):595-612.
Morck R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: an Empirical Analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988(20):293-315.
Peasnell, K.V, P.F, Pope, and S.Young. Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals[Z]. Working paper, Lmcaster University, 2001.
Pi L. and S.G. Timme. Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1993,(17): 515-530.
Prowse, Stephen. The structure of corporate ownership in Japan[J]. Journal of Finance, 1992, (47):1121一1140.
Qi, D, Wu, and H. Zhang. Shareholding structure and corporate performance of partiallyprivatized firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2000, (8): 587-610.
Rajan, Raghuran G, and Luigi Zingales. Financial dependence and growth[J]. American Economic Review, 1998, 88(3):559-586.
Shleifer, R. W. Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, (52):737-783.
Stulz, R. Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the market for corporate control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics , 1988,(20):25-54.
Volpin, Paolo. Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,(64): 61-90.
Watts, R. L, Zimmerman, J. L. Positive accounting theory: a ten year perspective[J]. The Accounting Review, 1990, 65(1):131-156.
Weisbach M.. Outside directors and CEO turnover[J]. Journal of Financial Economicse, 1988, (20):413-460.
Xu, Xiaonian and Yan Wang. Ownership structure, corporate governance and firms' performance[Z]: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies. Word Bank, policy working paper No.1794, 1997.
Zingales, Luigi. The Value of the Voting Right: A study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1994,(7):125-148.
①见上海证券交易所《上市公司资金占用再次被集中曝光沪深交易所继续深入推进清欠工作》。http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/listcompany/FinancingImpropriateLiquidateList
曹廷求,刘呼声.大股东治理与公司治理效率[J].改革, 2003,(1):32-37.
曹宇,李琳,孙铮.公司控制权对会计盈余稳健性影响的实证研究[J].经济管理, 2005, (14):34-42.
陈炜,孔翔,许年行.我国的法律制度能有效保护中小投资者利益吗?[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告, 2005, 8-26.
陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革一一来自我国资本市场的实证证据.经济研究[J], 2005,(4):77-86.
段亚林.论大股东股权滥用实例[M].北京:经济管理出版社, 2001.
贺建刚,刘峰.大股东控制、利益输送与投资者保护一一基于上市公司资产收购关联交易的实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究, 2005, 7(3):101-170.
韩志国.股改:划时代的革命[N].金融投资报. 2006, 12-30.
李志文,宋衍衡.影响中国上市公司配股决策的因素分析[J].经济科学, 2003,(3): 45-51.
刘成彦,陈炜.后股权分置时代上市公司大股东交易行为研究[N].证券市场导报, 2006, 10-10.
刘铁军,何旭强.后股权分置时代大股东行为、市场影响及监管策略[Z].深圳证券交易所第八届会员单位与基金公司研究成果,2006,3.
雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界, 2006,(1):129-136.
龙怒.大股东侵害行为和中小股东权益维护[J].湖南商学院学报, 2004,11(6):101.
孙新宇.后股权分置时代谨防大股东操纵股价[J].上海国贸, 2006,(7): 68-69.
孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究, 1999,(12):23-30.
孙永祥.上市公司的所有权与融资结构[J].当代经济科学, 2001,(6):29-33.
吴淑馄.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究: 1997-2000年上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济, 2002,(1):80-87.
吴悟.上市公司担保总额同比增四成[N].上海证券报, 2005, 4-28.
谢德仁.独立董事:代理问题之一部分[J].会计研究, 2005, (2):39-45.
谢清喜,王瑞英.中国上市公司内部人控制与非公平关联交易的实证分析[J].经济评论, 2004,(4): 113-117.
徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究, 2003, (3):64-74.
徐效鸿,上市公司大面积分红为哪般[N].上海证券报, 2005, 4-14.
余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论, 2004,(6): 33-38.
赵涛.股权分置背景下的隧道效应与过度融资[Z].深圳证券交易所第七届会员成果, 2005.
周沪,李宇.沪深交易所完成年报事后审查占用资金和违规担保仍较突出[N].中国证券报, 2005, 6-14.
周中胜.大股东资金占用与盈余管理[J].财贸研究, 2006,(3):128-135.
朱界馄.公司控制权配置论[M].北京:经济管理出版社, 2001.
朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[[J].经济研究, 2001,(12): 66-72.
Barcaly, Holderness. Private benefits from control of public corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989,(25):371-395.
Baysinger, B.D., and N.H.Butler,“Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1985,(1):96-112.
Bebchuk, Lucian, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis. Stock pyramids,cross-ownership, and dual class equity: The creation and agency costs of separating control from cash flow rights[Z]. Working paper 6951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 1999.
Berle A, Means G. The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M]. New York, Macmillan, 1932.
Changanti, Mahajan and Sharma. Corporate board size, composition, and corporate failures in the retailing industry[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 1985,(22): 400-417.
Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon, and Lang, Larry H. P. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations[J]. Journal of Economics , 2000,(58): 81-112.
Defond, M. L. Jiambalvo, J. Debt covenant effects and the manipulation of accruals[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1994, 17(1):145-176.
Elizabeth A. Gordon, Elaine Henry and Darius Palia. Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value[Z]. EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4377, August 2004.
Faccio, Mara, Lany Lang. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Companies[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,(65):365-395.
Fathi E. and J.P. Gueyie. Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Corporate Governance[J]. The International Journal of Effective Board Performance, 2001,(1):15-23.
Grossman, S.J, OD, Hart. One share-one vote and the market for corporate control. [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,(20):175-202.
Hanouna, P., A. Sarin, and A. Shapiro. Value of corporate control: some international evidence[Z], working paper, USC, 2001.
Jensen, Michael C. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1993,(48): 831-880.
Jensen, W. H. Meckling. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, Agency costs, and ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,(3): 305-360.
Jian M. and T.J. Wong. Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups[Z]. working paper, 2003.
Johnson, S., R., La Porta, F., Lopez-De-Silanes, A., Shleifer.. Tunnelling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000,(90):22-27.
Khanna, T and K. Palepu. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2000, 55(2):867-892.
La Porta., Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer. Corporate Ownership around the World[J]. Journal of Finance.1999,(54):471-518.
Leuz, Christian, Dhananjay Nanda, and Peter D. Wysocki. Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, (6):505-527.
Mark J. Kohlbeck and Brian W. Mayhew. Related Party Transactions[Z]. AAA 2005 FARS Meeting Paper. September 15, 2004.
McConnell J, Servaes H. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,(27):595-612.
Morck R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: an Empirical Analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988(20):293-315.
Peasnell, K.V, P.F, Pope, and S.Young. Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals[Z]. Working paper, Lmcaster University, 2001.
Pi L. and S.G. Timme. Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1993,(17): 515-530.
Prowse, Stephen. The structure of corporate ownership in Japan[J]. Journal of Finance, 1992, (47):1121一1140.
Qi, D, Wu, and H. Zhang. Shareholding structure and corporate performance of partiallyprivatized firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2000, (8): 587-610.
Rajan, Raghuran G, and Luigi Zingales. Financial dependence and growth[J]. American Economic Review, 1998, 88(3):559-586.
Shleifer, R. W. Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, (52):737-783.
Stulz, R. Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the market for corporate control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics , 1988,(20):25-54.
Volpin, Paolo. Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,(64): 61-90.
Watts, R. L, Zimmerman, J. L. Positive accounting theory: a ten year perspective[J]. The Accounting Review, 1990, 65(1):131-156.
Weisbach M.. Outside directors and CEO turnover[J]. Journal of Financial Economicse, 1988, (20):413-460.
Xu, Xiaonian and Yan Wang. Ownership structure, corporate governance and firms' performance[Z]: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies. Word Bank, policy working paper No.1794, 1997.
Zingales, Luigi. The Value of the Voting Right: A study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1994,(7):125-148.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |