风险投资契约机制研究
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摘要
风险投资作为一种新型的投融资制度,具有独特的运作机理,风险投资中投资者、风险投资家与风险企业家三个不同运作主体之间所存在的复杂利益冲突和多种形式的信息不对称关系构成了本文研究主线,本文的研究重点就是解决投资者和风险投资家之间、风险投资家和风险企业家之间以及投资者、风险投资家和风险企业家三者之间的契约形式,减少投融资过程中的委托代理成本,解决委托代理冲突等问题,具体内容如下:
(1)运用委托代理论和激励理论建立投资者和风险投资家之间的最优契约模型,解决由信息不对称所引起的委托代理关系,使得投资者在不能直接观察到风险投资家类型的情况下,也可以根据该模型所提供的一系列激励约束机制协调投资者和风险投资家之间的关系,保证投资者利益最优。
(2)从激励、约束和监督三个方面研究风险投资有限合伙制的治理机制特征;并从定量的角度,运用委托代理理论研究有限合伙制成功运行的内在原因,通过建立有限合伙制的最优契约模型,从理论上阐明投资者对风险投资家有效的激励约束;并结合中国风险投资市场的现状,探讨符合中国国情的风险投资机构的组织形式。
(3)在双边道德风险下,建立一个风险投资家和多个风险企业家之间的最优契约结构模型,并证明该模型不仅能够影响双方不可观察的努力程度,还能够进一步影响风险投资家的投资收益。
(4)研究信息不对称情况下,多个风险投资家进行联合投资的情况。从理论上建立契约模型并比较多个风险投资家在合作和不合作的条件下,对风险企业所投入的管理成本和管理行为的不同特征。然后通过问卷方式对联合投资的风险投资家之间横向和纵向的关系做了实证调查,得到风险投资家参与联合投资的动机,以及他们事前选择和事后对风险企业所采取的管理行为的特征。
(5)从团队生产这一新视角尝试分析并建立了探求投资者、风险投资家和风险企业家三者之间关系的团队契约模型,使得团队成员之间的利益能够更好地得到协调,从而使风险资本的运作得以良性循环。
Venture capital is a new pattern of financing system with a unique operationalmechanism and theory. There are complicate interest conflicts and several kinds ofasymmetric information between investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.Therefore, this dissertation will attach importance to establish different contracts notonly between investors and venture capitalists, between venture capitalists andentrepreneurs, but also among the three of investors, venture capitalists andentrepreneurs, which can be used for reducing principal-agent costs and conflicts.Thus, the contents of the dissertation are summarized as follows.
(1) An optimal contract model is set up to resolve the principal-agent problemscaused by asymmetric information using principal-agent theory and incentive theory.Even if investors cannot observe the true types of venture capitalists under the exante condition, they also can assort with venture capitals on the basis of a series ofincentive and constraint schemes provided by the model and get the optimal profits.
(2) The characteristics of the venture capital limited partnership are given withrespects to incentive, constraint and monitor. An optimal contract model of thelimited partnership is set up depending on principal-agent theory. And we canquantitatively and theoretically explain the internal reasons about the successfuloperation of the limited partnership. Some kinds of organization structures arediscussed here according to the current situations in China venture capital industryand China national conditions.
(3) Due to the dual moral hazard, an optimal contract model is set up betweenone venture capitalist and several entrepreneurs under the dual moral hazards. It isproved that the model have an influence not only on the effort levels of both sides,but on the investment income of the venture capitalist.
(4) Under asymmetric information, the syndication is studied in the dissertation.A contract model is built to compare the management costs and actions devoted intothe venture enterprise by different venture capitalists participating in syndicationunder respective cooperation and non-cooperation. The motives of syndication andthe characters of ex ante selection and ex post management from venture capitalistsare got from a survey in China venture capital industry that covers the transverse andlongitudinal relationship between venture capitalists and the venture enterprise.
(5) From a new view of team production, a team contract model is attentively
set up between investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, to coordinate theinterests of team members and to use venture capital in a virtuous cycle.
(1)运用委托代理论和激励理论建立投资者和风险投资家之间的最优契约模型,解决由信息不对称所引起的委托代理关系,使得投资者在不能直接观察到风险投资家类型的情况下,也可以根据该模型所提供的一系列激励约束机制协调投资者和风险投资家之间的关系,保证投资者利益最优。
(2)从激励、约束和监督三个方面研究风险投资有限合伙制的治理机制特征;并从定量的角度,运用委托代理理论研究有限合伙制成功运行的内在原因,通过建立有限合伙制的最优契约模型,从理论上阐明投资者对风险投资家有效的激励约束;并结合中国风险投资市场的现状,探讨符合中国国情的风险投资机构的组织形式。
(3)在双边道德风险下,建立一个风险投资家和多个风险企业家之间的最优契约结构模型,并证明该模型不仅能够影响双方不可观察的努力程度,还能够进一步影响风险投资家的投资收益。
(4)研究信息不对称情况下,多个风险投资家进行联合投资的情况。从理论上建立契约模型并比较多个风险投资家在合作和不合作的条件下,对风险企业所投入的管理成本和管理行为的不同特征。然后通过问卷方式对联合投资的风险投资家之间横向和纵向的关系做了实证调查,得到风险投资家参与联合投资的动机,以及他们事前选择和事后对风险企业所采取的管理行为的特征。
(5)从团队生产这一新视角尝试分析并建立了探求投资者、风险投资家和风险企业家三者之间关系的团队契约模型,使得团队成员之间的利益能够更好地得到协调,从而使风险资本的运作得以良性循环。
Venture capital is a new pattern of financing system with a unique operationalmechanism and theory. There are complicate interest conflicts and several kinds ofasymmetric information between investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.Therefore, this dissertation will attach importance to establish different contracts notonly between investors and venture capitalists, between venture capitalists andentrepreneurs, but also among the three of investors, venture capitalists andentrepreneurs, which can be used for reducing principal-agent costs and conflicts.Thus, the contents of the dissertation are summarized as follows.
(1) An optimal contract model is set up to resolve the principal-agent problemscaused by asymmetric information using principal-agent theory and incentive theory.Even if investors cannot observe the true types of venture capitalists under the exante condition, they also can assort with venture capitals on the basis of a series ofincentive and constraint schemes provided by the model and get the optimal profits.
(2) The characteristics of the venture capital limited partnership are given withrespects to incentive, constraint and monitor. An optimal contract model of thelimited partnership is set up depending on principal-agent theory. And we canquantitatively and theoretically explain the internal reasons about the successfuloperation of the limited partnership. Some kinds of organization structures arediscussed here according to the current situations in China venture capital industryand China national conditions.
(3) Due to the dual moral hazard, an optimal contract model is set up betweenone venture capitalist and several entrepreneurs under the dual moral hazards. It isproved that the model have an influence not only on the effort levels of both sides,but on the investment income of the venture capitalist.
(4) Under asymmetric information, the syndication is studied in the dissertation.A contract model is built to compare the management costs and actions devoted intothe venture enterprise by different venture capitalists participating in syndicationunder respective cooperation and non-cooperation. The motives of syndication andthe characters of ex ante selection and ex post management from venture capitalistsare got from a survey in China venture capital industry that covers the transverse andlongitudinal relationship between venture capitalists and the venture enterprise.
(5) From a new view of team production, a team contract model is attentively
set up between investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, to coordinate theinterests of team members and to use venture capital in a virtuous cycle.
引文
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