内部控制有效性，代理成本与审计师选择
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摘要
内部控制作为公司重要的治理机制近几年来开始被学者们所重视,安然等众多财务舞弊与审计失败的案件使得投资者利益如何得到有效保护被再次提上议程。防范风险、解决代理问题从源头上保护投资者利益,弥补外部审计的不足并与外部审计形成双保险催生了美国内部控制的建立初衷。与之相应,2008年我国五部委颁布了《企业内部控制基本规范》,国内内部控制的研究开始大量兴起,其作用开始被逐步重视。我国企业内部控制的建立对于公司治理的关键问题—代理问题是否起到了应有的治理作用?在与外部审计形成双保险的情况下,面对相互联系的外部审计与内部控制,企业应怎样更合理地将这两种机制相结合?
本文在梳理关于代理成本治理的研究文献基础上,选取了2008年度沪市上市公司作为研究样本,构建出企业内部控制评价指标,检验了目前我国上市公司内部控制和外部审计对代理成本的治理效果,在比较分析了外部审计与内部控制在代理问题上的作用后,以信号传递理论为基础,进一步研究了企业在信息成本效益原则下,内部控制对于企业代理问题的治理效果如何影响企业对于审计师的选择。
本文的实证结果表明,内部控制与外部审计在代理问题的治理方面作用不同,企业内部控制的有效性明显影响代理成本,但外部审计对代理成本没有显著的治理作用。双保险中的外部审计其治理原理与内部控制不同,它对于代理成本并不具备从源头上的治理效用,而内部控制越有效意味着对代理问题的治理效果好这一信息会传递给管理层和投资者,影响企业对审计师的选择,在信息传递的成本效益原则下,内部控制的有效性与作为信息传递成本的审计收费共同影响了企业对于会计师事务所的选择:内部控制越有效,企业越倾向于选择小规模事务所用以节约信息传递的成本。
Internal control as an important governance mechanism of the company in recent years, the scholars began to pay attention to it. Financial fraud cases such as Enron and audit failure cases to put one thing on the agenda:How to protect the interests of investors in effect? America set up the institution of internal control in order to prevent risks, solve the agency problem, and protect the interests of investors thoroughly. The internal control fetch up the lack of external audit and the tow institutions make up double insurance to resolve the things which are mentioned in the above. In correspond, in 2008, Ministry of Finance promulgates the "basic norms of internal control", study for internal control has increased and internal control was paid much attention for its role. The system of companies’internal control whether can play an effective role in the key issue of corporate governance---agency problem or not? In the case of the formation of double insurance, the company how to combine the tow mechanism when it faces the connection between the external audit and internal control?
This essay is on the basis of the research literatures which are about how to administer the agency costs. We select Shanghai-listed companies as our study sample and construct internal control evaluation index. Utilize these indexes; this paper examines the treatment effect of internal control and external audit about our country’s listed companies. After comparing and analyzing the two institutions’functions, we base on the signaling theory to study influence the effectiveness internal control has made on agency problems to auditor choice according to the cost-effective principle.
The empirical results show that internal control and external audit play a different pole in solving agency problem. In company, effective internal control can influence agency costs obviously, but external audit doesn’t have this distinct function. Though this systematic theoretical analysis and comparison, this paper thinks that in twin insurance external audit has different roles with internal control. External audit can’t resolve agency problems from the source .The effective internal control means the good result on agency problem. This result is information for managers and investors, the information hence influence the choice for auditors. Square up information costs, the effective internal control and information costs---audit fees influent the choice of Certified Public Accountants together. If one company has better effective internal control, it tends to engage small-scale Certified Public Accountants for the purpose of saving the costs of information transmission.
本文在梳理关于代理成本治理的研究文献基础上,选取了2008年度沪市上市公司作为研究样本,构建出企业内部控制评价指标,检验了目前我国上市公司内部控制和外部审计对代理成本的治理效果,在比较分析了外部审计与内部控制在代理问题上的作用后,以信号传递理论为基础,进一步研究了企业在信息成本效益原则下,内部控制对于企业代理问题的治理效果如何影响企业对于审计师的选择。
本文的实证结果表明,内部控制与外部审计在代理问题的治理方面作用不同,企业内部控制的有效性明显影响代理成本,但外部审计对代理成本没有显著的治理作用。双保险中的外部审计其治理原理与内部控制不同,它对于代理成本并不具备从源头上的治理效用,而内部控制越有效意味着对代理问题的治理效果好这一信息会传递给管理层和投资者,影响企业对审计师的选择,在信息传递的成本效益原则下,内部控制的有效性与作为信息传递成本的审计收费共同影响了企业对于会计师事务所的选择:内部控制越有效,企业越倾向于选择小规模事务所用以节约信息传递的成本。
Internal control as an important governance mechanism of the company in recent years, the scholars began to pay attention to it. Financial fraud cases such as Enron and audit failure cases to put one thing on the agenda:How to protect the interests of investors in effect? America set up the institution of internal control in order to prevent risks, solve the agency problem, and protect the interests of investors thoroughly. The internal control fetch up the lack of external audit and the tow institutions make up double insurance to resolve the things which are mentioned in the above. In correspond, in 2008, Ministry of Finance promulgates the "basic norms of internal control", study for internal control has increased and internal control was paid much attention for its role. The system of companies’internal control whether can play an effective role in the key issue of corporate governance---agency problem or not? In the case of the formation of double insurance, the company how to combine the tow mechanism when it faces the connection between the external audit and internal control?
This essay is on the basis of the research literatures which are about how to administer the agency costs. We select Shanghai-listed companies as our study sample and construct internal control evaluation index. Utilize these indexes; this paper examines the treatment effect of internal control and external audit about our country’s listed companies. After comparing and analyzing the two institutions’functions, we base on the signaling theory to study influence the effectiveness internal control has made on agency problems to auditor choice according to the cost-effective principle.
The empirical results show that internal control and external audit play a different pole in solving agency problem. In company, effective internal control can influence agency costs obviously, but external audit doesn’t have this distinct function. Though this systematic theoretical analysis and comparison, this paper thinks that in twin insurance external audit has different roles with internal control. External audit can’t resolve agency problems from the source .The effective internal control means the good result on agency problem. This result is information for managers and investors, the information hence influence the choice for auditors. Square up information costs, the effective internal control and information costs---audit fees influent the choice of Certified Public Accountants together. If one company has better effective internal control, it tends to engage small-scale Certified Public Accountants for the purpose of saving the costs of information transmission.
引文
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2美国会计师协会.《注册会计师对财务报表的审计》[R],1936.
3美国会计师协会.《审计程序的扩展》[R],1939.5.
4美国注册会计师协会审计程序委员会.《内部控制—一个协调的系统要素及其对管理当局和注册会计师的重要性》[R],1949.
5美国注册会计师协会.《审计准则公告第55号》[R],1988.
6 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, COSO.《内部控制—整体架构》[R],1998.
7方红星、王宏.企业风险管理—整合框架[M].东北:东北财经大学出版社,2004.
8 Berle, A., and Means G. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Macmillan [J]. 1932:69.
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12陈汉文.《审计理论》[M].机械工业出版社,2009.
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2美国会计师协会.《注册会计师对财务报表的审计》[R],1936.
3美国会计师协会.《审计程序的扩展》[R],1939.5.
4美国注册会计师协会审计程序委员会.《内部控制—一个协调的系统要素及其对管理当局和注册会计师的重要性》[R],1949.
5美国注册会计师协会.《审计准则公告第55号》[R],1988.
6 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, COSO.《内部控制—整体架构》[R],1998.
7方红星、王宏.企业风险管理—整合框架[M].东北:东北财经大学出版社,2004.
8 Berle, A., and Means G. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Macmillan [J]. 1932:69.
9 Jensen and Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, (3):305-360.
10 Jensen and Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, (3):305-360.
11费方域.《经理行为,代理成本与所有权结构:詹森和梅克林的企业理论评介》[J].外国经济与管理,1995,(10):31-34.
12陈汉文.《审计理论》[M].机械工业出版社,2009.
13阿尔文·A·阿伦斯,詹姆斯·K·洛布贝克.《审计学》(上)[M].中国审计出版社.2001,1:312-313.
[1]DeFond , M L., The Association between Changes in Client Firm Agency Costs and Auditor Switching[J].Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory.1992, Spring,11(1):16-31.
[2]Joseph P.H.Fan and T.J.Wong, Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia [J].Journal of Accounting Research, 2004, 43,(1):35-72.
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