基于审计视角对大股东“掏空”行为监督的实证研究
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摘要
在发展过程中,我国证券市场出现了许多违法违规的操作,例如:欺诈客户、虚假陈述、内幕交易、操纵市场、擅自改变募股资金用途等。然而目前最为堪忧,讨论密集的是上市公司的“掏空”现象。“掏空”现象又称“隧道挖掘”行为,即控股大股东凭借自身的权限通过各种非公开的手段如证券回购、资产转移、内部转移定价交易等创造私有收益从而损害中小股东权益的现象。随着“掏空”行为给证券市场带来了越来越多的负面影响,包括审计在内的各种监督手段是否能够有效地识别和防范控股大股东“掏空”行为成为国内外学术研究的热点。
借鉴前人的研究,本文首先对大股东“掏空”行为及其审计监督进行理论综述,进而从审计需求和供给视角,剖析大股东“掏空”行为与审计监督两者的理论关系。其次,根据上述理论分析,利用我国2002—2007年A股钢铁行业上市公司经验数据实证考察大股东“掏空”方式与审计意见的关系和大股东“掏空”行为与会计师事务所选择的关系。具体说来,一是从审计供给方面开展研究,以注册会计师审计意见为因变量,大股东“掏空”的不同方式为自变量建立模型,求证在我国新兴市场中审计能够起到充分反映作用从而有效监督大股东的“掏空”行为:二是从审计需求方面开展研究,即以“选择高质量会计师事务所与否”这个哑变量为因变量,大股东资金占用等为自变量设计模型,求证发生大股东“掏空”行为的上市公司,面临代理成本的上升,会倾向于选择高质量会计师事务所,利用独立审计外部监督作用降低企业代理成本。实证结果显示:
从审计供给角度来说,业务往来关联交易、上市公司为大股东提供担保以及大股东直接占用上市公司资金三种大股东“掏空”常用手段的表征变量和审计意见这个因变量在5%的水平上显著负相关,也即是说业务往来关联交易越是频繁,上市公司越是容易收到非标准审计意见;上市公司以自己名义为其大股东担保额越多,越是容易收到非标准市计意见:上市公司被其大股东直接占用的资金越多,越是容易收到非标准审计意见。
从审计需求角度来说,大股东资金占用和会计师事务所的选择在10%的水平上显著正相关,也即是说发生大股东“掏空”行为的上市公司,面临代理成本的上升,会倾向于选择高质量会计师事务所。另外,第一大股东的持股比例与会计师事务所的选择也呈显著的二次方关系。具体说来,当第一大股东的持股比例在低于58.75%时,随着大股东持股比例的增大,股权趋向集中于大股东,大股东和上市公司的管理层越是缺乏雇用高质量事务所的动机;当第一大股东的持股比例在高于58.75%时,随着大股东持股比例的增大,控股大股东和上市公司的中小投资者的利益趋于一致,控股大股东越倾向于聘请高质量事务所向外界传递信号吸引更多的潜在投资者以抬高上市公司市价。
对实证结果进行分析概括,可以得出结论:在我国新兴市场中,审计能够起到充分反映作用从而有效监督大股东的“掏空”行为。而且,大股东“掏空”行为越严重,越倾向于选择高质量审计师,以发挥外部审计监督的治理作用,降低代理成本。
最后,结合理论分析和实证结果,本文提出以经济手段为主,行政干预和经济手段相结合的相关建议,试图从完善外部制度、加强外部监管和优化内部治理三个方面着手改变大股东的行为选择,进而从根本上制止“掏空”行为,维护证券市场健康稳定。
本文的研究无论从理论上来说还是从实践上来说都具有重大意义。从理论上来说,本文对大股东“掏空”行为与审计监督两者关系的实证研究是对委托代理理论的补充检验。该研究有助于公司治理理论的深入发展,同时也有利于使我国上市公司中存在的代理问题得到更好的解决,提高资本营运效益。从实践上讲,本文为中小投资者权益保护制度的改进和完善提供相对新颖的数据支持。有利于满足中小投资者维护自身合法利益的需求,遏制上市公司“圈钱”心理。另外,可以满足监督部门对上市公司的监管需要,为其制定行之有效的法律法规健全市场经济秩序提供依据。
In the development process of domestic stock market,there are many illegal operations,such as false statements、insider trading、market manipulation、unauthorized use of funds etc.But what is the most worrying is "Tunneling" behavior of listed companies."Tunneling" behavior,also known as "hollowing out" phenomenon,is that majority shareholder by virtue of voting rights creates private gains against minority shareholders interests through various means such as non-public securities,asset transfer,the use of transfer pricing for internal transactions.With the increasing number of negative effects brought by "Tunneling" behavior,whether the various monitoring tools including independent audit effectively identify and guard against "Tunneling" behavior of listed companies by majority shareholder becomes a hot topic at home and abroad.
Draw on previous research,this paper,first of all,summarizes "Tunneling" behavior by majority shareholder and the supervisory role of independent audit in theory,and then carries out an analysis of the relationship between "Tunneling" behavior and the supervisory role of independent audit from the audit perspective.Based on the date about Chinese A share listed companies over period 2002-2007,this paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure,a proxy for the degree of investor protection,and controlling shareholder embezzlement of listed companies funds,a proxy for tunneling.The results show:the more heavily expropriated by the large shareholders,the higher likelihood for companies to choose the auditors known for quality auditing reports to reduce the agency costs.In addition,independent audit can play a role in fully reflecting and effectively supervising "Tunneling" behavior by majority shareholder in emerging markets such as China.
Finally,based on theoretical analysis and empirical results,this paper argues that economic instruments should be combined with administrative intervention and the former should be the main means.The measures should be taken from the three aspects improving the external system, strengthening the external monitoring,and optimizing the corporate governance to change the choice of major shareholder,which can Fundamentally curb "Tunneling" behavior,keep stock market healthy and stable.
This study,both in theory and in practice,is of great importance.In theory,this paper, studying the relationship between "Tunneling" behavior and the supervisory role of independent audit,is a supplementary examination to the principal-agent theory,which contributes to the study of theory of corporate governance in depth,solves agent problem in China's listed companies,and also helps to reduce agency costs and improve operational efficiency of capital.In practice,this article provides data to improve the system which protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders,conducive to meet the needs of minority shareholders to understand and safeguard the legitimate interests of their own and to curb "Tunneling" behavior.In addition,the supervision of listed companies can meet the Department's monitoring needs,make the relevant departments improve the market economic order,provide the basis for the development of effective laws and regulations.
借鉴前人的研究,本文首先对大股东“掏空”行为及其审计监督进行理论综述,进而从审计需求和供给视角,剖析大股东“掏空”行为与审计监督两者的理论关系。其次,根据上述理论分析,利用我国2002—2007年A股钢铁行业上市公司经验数据实证考察大股东“掏空”方式与审计意见的关系和大股东“掏空”行为与会计师事务所选择的关系。具体说来,一是从审计供给方面开展研究,以注册会计师审计意见为因变量,大股东“掏空”的不同方式为自变量建立模型,求证在我国新兴市场中审计能够起到充分反映作用从而有效监督大股东的“掏空”行为:二是从审计需求方面开展研究,即以“选择高质量会计师事务所与否”这个哑变量为因变量,大股东资金占用等为自变量设计模型,求证发生大股东“掏空”行为的上市公司,面临代理成本的上升,会倾向于选择高质量会计师事务所,利用独立审计外部监督作用降低企业代理成本。实证结果显示:
从审计供给角度来说,业务往来关联交易、上市公司为大股东提供担保以及大股东直接占用上市公司资金三种大股东“掏空”常用手段的表征变量和审计意见这个因变量在5%的水平上显著负相关,也即是说业务往来关联交易越是频繁,上市公司越是容易收到非标准审计意见;上市公司以自己名义为其大股东担保额越多,越是容易收到非标准市计意见:上市公司被其大股东直接占用的资金越多,越是容易收到非标准审计意见。
从审计需求角度来说,大股东资金占用和会计师事务所的选择在10%的水平上显著正相关,也即是说发生大股东“掏空”行为的上市公司,面临代理成本的上升,会倾向于选择高质量会计师事务所。另外,第一大股东的持股比例与会计师事务所的选择也呈显著的二次方关系。具体说来,当第一大股东的持股比例在低于58.75%时,随着大股东持股比例的增大,股权趋向集中于大股东,大股东和上市公司的管理层越是缺乏雇用高质量事务所的动机;当第一大股东的持股比例在高于58.75%时,随着大股东持股比例的增大,控股大股东和上市公司的中小投资者的利益趋于一致,控股大股东越倾向于聘请高质量事务所向外界传递信号吸引更多的潜在投资者以抬高上市公司市价。
对实证结果进行分析概括,可以得出结论:在我国新兴市场中,审计能够起到充分反映作用从而有效监督大股东的“掏空”行为。而且,大股东“掏空”行为越严重,越倾向于选择高质量审计师,以发挥外部审计监督的治理作用,降低代理成本。
最后,结合理论分析和实证结果,本文提出以经济手段为主,行政干预和经济手段相结合的相关建议,试图从完善外部制度、加强外部监管和优化内部治理三个方面着手改变大股东的行为选择,进而从根本上制止“掏空”行为,维护证券市场健康稳定。
本文的研究无论从理论上来说还是从实践上来说都具有重大意义。从理论上来说,本文对大股东“掏空”行为与审计监督两者关系的实证研究是对委托代理理论的补充检验。该研究有助于公司治理理论的深入发展,同时也有利于使我国上市公司中存在的代理问题得到更好的解决,提高资本营运效益。从实践上讲,本文为中小投资者权益保护制度的改进和完善提供相对新颖的数据支持。有利于满足中小投资者维护自身合法利益的需求,遏制上市公司“圈钱”心理。另外,可以满足监督部门对上市公司的监管需要,为其制定行之有效的法律法规健全市场经济秩序提供依据。
In the development process of domestic stock market,there are many illegal operations,such as false statements、insider trading、market manipulation、unauthorized use of funds etc.But what is the most worrying is "Tunneling" behavior of listed companies."Tunneling" behavior,also known as "hollowing out" phenomenon,is that majority shareholder by virtue of voting rights creates private gains against minority shareholders interests through various means such as non-public securities,asset transfer,the use of transfer pricing for internal transactions.With the increasing number of negative effects brought by "Tunneling" behavior,whether the various monitoring tools including independent audit effectively identify and guard against "Tunneling" behavior of listed companies by majority shareholder becomes a hot topic at home and abroad.
Draw on previous research,this paper,first of all,summarizes "Tunneling" behavior by majority shareholder and the supervisory role of independent audit in theory,and then carries out an analysis of the relationship between "Tunneling" behavior and the supervisory role of independent audit from the audit perspective.Based on the date about Chinese A share listed companies over period 2002-2007,this paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure,a proxy for the degree of investor protection,and controlling shareholder embezzlement of listed companies funds,a proxy for tunneling.The results show:the more heavily expropriated by the large shareholders,the higher likelihood for companies to choose the auditors known for quality auditing reports to reduce the agency costs.In addition,independent audit can play a role in fully reflecting and effectively supervising "Tunneling" behavior by majority shareholder in emerging markets such as China.
Finally,based on theoretical analysis and empirical results,this paper argues that economic instruments should be combined with administrative intervention and the former should be the main means.The measures should be taken from the three aspects improving the external system, strengthening the external monitoring,and optimizing the corporate governance to change the choice of major shareholder,which can Fundamentally curb "Tunneling" behavior,keep stock market healthy and stable.
This study,both in theory and in practice,is of great importance.In theory,this paper, studying the relationship between "Tunneling" behavior and the supervisory role of independent audit,is a supplementary examination to the principal-agent theory,which contributes to the study of theory of corporate governance in depth,solves agent problem in China's listed companies,and also helps to reduce agency costs and improve operational efficiency of capital.In practice,this article provides data to improve the system which protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders,conducive to meet the needs of minority shareholders to understand and safeguard the legitimate interests of their own and to curb "Tunneling" behavior.In addition,the supervision of listed companies can meet the Department's monitoring needs,make the relevant departments improve the market economic order,provide the basis for the development of effective laws and regulations.
引文
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