公平偏好、企业内部薪酬不公平与企业业绩
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摘要
随着会计学、经济学、财务学和社会心理学的融合,越来越多的国外学者开始从人们具有公平偏好的角度来重新设计企业报酬契约模型、思考企业的薪酬政策,而我国在这方面的研究尚处于起步阶段。本文基于研究人们分配公平的公平理论、相对剥削理论,及研究报酬契约设计的经典契约理论,探讨以下问题:在人们具有公平偏好的前提下,企业内薪酬不公平程度及企业成员公平偏好强度,分别会对企业的业绩产生怎样的影响?
本文构建了公平偏好下的高管/普通员工单代理报酬契约模型和高管团队锦标赛多代理报酬契约模型,并基于模型和相关理论推导出关于企业成员公平偏好强度与企业业绩负相关、企业内薪酬差距与企业业绩呈倒“U”型关系的研究命题,从而为接下来的实证研究“中国上市公司的企业内薪酬不公平程度、企业成员公平偏好强度与业绩的关系”提供了理论支持。本文的主要创新点如下:
1.在前人模型框架基础上增加考虑了公司间薪酬差距的比较,构建了两个公平偏好下的报酬契约模型。通过模型推导,不仅得到了企业成员公平偏好强度与企业业绩负相关的命题,而且还推导出企业内薪酬差距与企业业绩呈倒“U”型关系的命题,为已有的实证结果提供了理论支持。
2.构建了企业内薪酬不公平程度计算公式,认为只有剔除由于企业成员投入差异形成的薪酬差异后,剩下的薪酬差异程度才是薪酬不公平程度。为了提高薪酬不公平程度指标计算的准确度,本文考虑了能反映企业成员投入差异的薪酬差异影响因素,并用中国上市公司数据证实了企业内薪酬不公平程度在一定大小范围内与企业业绩呈正相关关系。
3.为解决企业成员公平偏好强度的数据较难获得的问题,本文提出通过企业最终控制人性质和企业所在地两个维度的划分标准,对企业成员公平偏好强度进行度量;并运用中国上市公司数据证实了企业成员公平偏好强度较大将会减弱企业成员薪酬水平、企业内薪酬不公平程度对业绩的激励作用。
With the integration of Accounting, Economics, Finance and Social Psychology, more and more foreigner researchers have begun to research the model of compensation contract and reconsider firms' compensation strategy from fairness preference. However, The research in this area has been still at beginning stage in China. Therefore, based on the fairness theory and the relative deprivation theory which focus on the distributive justice preference, and the contract theory which focuses on the compensation contract design, the dissertation discusses the following questions: On the premise that people are characterized with fairness preference, how the intra-firm compensation inequity and firm members' fairness preference affect the firm performance?
I design a CEO/ worker compensation contract model for a single agent and a top management team compensation contract model for multiple agents in the tournament mechanisms based on the firm members' fairness preference. Several propositions are derived from the models and corresponding theories: the stronger the firm members' fairness preference is, the lower the firm performance; and the firm performance reacts in a reverse U-shaped way to compensation gap in the firm. These propositions form the theoretical foundations for the following empirical studies, which examines the relationship between intra-firm compensation inequity and firm performance, as well as firm members' fairness preference and firm performance. The main innovations of this dissertation are as follows:
1. Inter-firm compensation gap comparison is augmented into the existing model, and two compensation contract models are designed with the firm members' fairness preference. From the two models, I derive the proposition of negative relationship between firm members' fairness preference and firm's performance, which is verification to prior literature, and the proposition of a reverse U-shaped relationship between the firms' performance and intra-firm compensation gap, which gives a theoretical support to the prior empirical results.
2. I construct the formula to measure the intra-firm compensation inequity. The formula evidences that only the compensation gap irrelevant with the firm members' input difference can stand for the compensation inequity. In order to improve the accuracy of compensation inequity computation, the factors reflecting firm members' input difference, are augmented and supplemented into the empirical model. Using Chinese listed companies' data, I also empirically test the positive correlation between firm performance and intra-firm compensation inequality in some certain extent.
3. In order to resolve the difficulties in obtaining the data of firm members' fairness preference, I measure firm members' fairness preference from two dimensions: the nature of firm ultimate ownership and the location of the firm. Using Chinese listed companies' data, I also empirically examine the fact that strong firm members' fairness preference can mitigate performance motivating effect of the members' compensation level and intra-firm compensation inequity.
本文构建了公平偏好下的高管/普通员工单代理报酬契约模型和高管团队锦标赛多代理报酬契约模型,并基于模型和相关理论推导出关于企业成员公平偏好强度与企业业绩负相关、企业内薪酬差距与企业业绩呈倒“U”型关系的研究命题,从而为接下来的实证研究“中国上市公司的企业内薪酬不公平程度、企业成员公平偏好强度与业绩的关系”提供了理论支持。本文的主要创新点如下:
1.在前人模型框架基础上增加考虑了公司间薪酬差距的比较,构建了两个公平偏好下的报酬契约模型。通过模型推导,不仅得到了企业成员公平偏好强度与企业业绩负相关的命题,而且还推导出企业内薪酬差距与企业业绩呈倒“U”型关系的命题,为已有的实证结果提供了理论支持。
2.构建了企业内薪酬不公平程度计算公式,认为只有剔除由于企业成员投入差异形成的薪酬差异后,剩下的薪酬差异程度才是薪酬不公平程度。为了提高薪酬不公平程度指标计算的准确度,本文考虑了能反映企业成员投入差异的薪酬差异影响因素,并用中国上市公司数据证实了企业内薪酬不公平程度在一定大小范围内与企业业绩呈正相关关系。
3.为解决企业成员公平偏好强度的数据较难获得的问题,本文提出通过企业最终控制人性质和企业所在地两个维度的划分标准,对企业成员公平偏好强度进行度量;并运用中国上市公司数据证实了企业成员公平偏好强度较大将会减弱企业成员薪酬水平、企业内薪酬不公平程度对业绩的激励作用。
With the integration of Accounting, Economics, Finance and Social Psychology, more and more foreigner researchers have begun to research the model of compensation contract and reconsider firms' compensation strategy from fairness preference. However, The research in this area has been still at beginning stage in China. Therefore, based on the fairness theory and the relative deprivation theory which focus on the distributive justice preference, and the contract theory which focuses on the compensation contract design, the dissertation discusses the following questions: On the premise that people are characterized with fairness preference, how the intra-firm compensation inequity and firm members' fairness preference affect the firm performance?
I design a CEO/ worker compensation contract model for a single agent and a top management team compensation contract model for multiple agents in the tournament mechanisms based on the firm members' fairness preference. Several propositions are derived from the models and corresponding theories: the stronger the firm members' fairness preference is, the lower the firm performance; and the firm performance reacts in a reverse U-shaped way to compensation gap in the firm. These propositions form the theoretical foundations for the following empirical studies, which examines the relationship between intra-firm compensation inequity and firm performance, as well as firm members' fairness preference and firm performance. The main innovations of this dissertation are as follows:
1. Inter-firm compensation gap comparison is augmented into the existing model, and two compensation contract models are designed with the firm members' fairness preference. From the two models, I derive the proposition of negative relationship between firm members' fairness preference and firm's performance, which is verification to prior literature, and the proposition of a reverse U-shaped relationship between the firms' performance and intra-firm compensation gap, which gives a theoretical support to the prior empirical results.
2. I construct the formula to measure the intra-firm compensation inequity. The formula evidences that only the compensation gap irrelevant with the firm members' input difference can stand for the compensation inequity. In order to improve the accuracy of compensation inequity computation, the factors reflecting firm members' input difference, are augmented and supplemented into the empirical model. Using Chinese listed companies' data, I also empirically test the positive correlation between firm performance and intra-firm compensation inequality in some certain extent.
3. In order to resolve the difficulties in obtaining the data of firm members' fairness preference, I measure firm members' fairness preference from two dimensions: the nature of firm ultimate ownership and the location of the firm. Using Chinese listed companies' data, I also empirically examine the fact that strong firm members' fairness preference can mitigate performance motivating effect of the members' compensation level and intra-firm compensation inequity.
引文
[1]转引自魏光兴等:公平偏好下的报酬契约设计及应用研究[C],四川大学出版社,2007:P4。
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