小企业互助融资与风险控制研究
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摘要
小企业在我国国民经济的发展过程中扮演着举足轻重的角色,然而,融资难问题始终是其发展的主要障碍。企业规模小、经营不稳定、财务不透明等因素提高了金融机构的监管成本和信贷风险。信贷配给政策是金融机构风险控制的重要手段,其结果是小企业经常被金融机构排除在信贷市场之外,许多小企业因融资问题,被迫退出市场。
为解决小企业融资难题,理论界和实务界都进行了大量的研究。其中,互助融资作为商业银行为缓解小企业融资难而进行的金融创新,在实践中已运作多时,积累了丰富的实践经验。通过对互助融资模式的研究,可以较好地了解这种模式的成功关键和潜在风险,对于完善互助融资模式、深化商业银行风险控制理论等具有重要的理论和现实意义。
从理论上看,小企业互助融资模式的研究,有助于解决“强制性优序融资”、“道德风险”和“信息不对称”等困扰小企业融资的难题。小企业要生存,首先必须解决资金供给问题,而企业自身发展的不确定性和企业内部信息的不对称性使得外部投资者将小企业融资视为次品市场：小企业主要依靠自身的利润积累,在融资方式的选择上按优先顺序依次为企业内部积累、各种商业信用、银行债务、股权等。这种顺序并非企业偏好所致,而是外部环境强迫所致。
在实践上,互助融资既能够降低银行风险又能够协助小企业获得融资。小企业利用这种融资模式,能够提高银行对它们的信任度,增加小企业的信贷额度,缓解企业的资金压力,促进企业稳定发展。同时,互助模式也能较好地实现借款成员的相互监督,减少银行的监督成本和信贷风险。通过对互助融资运作模式进行分析,了解互助融资的运行机制、风险识别、风险分析和风险控制,有利于促进这种模式在现实生活中的成功运用,更好地实现企业、银行、政府的共赢效果。
本文首先介绍了国内外互助融资的主要模式——互助担保融资模式和联保联贷融资模式,并针对我国实践中的互助融资模式进行进一步深入比较。在联保联贷模式的基础上,构建了互助融资参与者的行为制约博弈模型,从银行角度对互助融资借款人的甄别及其获得款项后的监督以及防范借款者策略违约的机制设计进行分析,并利用博弈方法,构建互助融资契约中的利益分享机制,寻找利益的最优分配值。
然后,针对小企业互助融资的善意风险和恶意风险的形成机理进行探讨,从动态角度分析了我国小企业在整个互助借款过程中的每个阶段(选择阶段、投资阶段、收益阶段和执行阶段)所面临的风险以及解决方案。
最后,以实际案例具体分析了联保联贷及互助担保融资模式的风险控制手段。在此基础上,从政府、金融机构以及互助机构三个层面提出加强小企业互助融资风险控制的措施。
经研究,本文得到主要结论如下：
第一,互助融资有利于解决小企业信息不对称问题,一定程度上缓解了小企业的融资难题。该模式是金融机构获取小企业融资信息的有效途径,提高了银行对小企业融资风险的防控能力。同时,该模式也有利于缓解信贷配给制度对小企业的融资约束。
第二,社会资本对互助融资的形成、发展具有积极影响。它能激励参与人进行横向选择,由相互熟悉的个体形成互助小组,提高联盟的稳定性。同时,它还能加强成员间的相互监督,通过声誉受损等社会惩罚来降低违约率,保障互助模式的长期稳定发展。
第三,为了维持互助联盟的稳定性,互助组织应建立适当的利益分享机制,保证互助融资的三方参与者(银行、借款企业、担保企业)获得公平且不被优超的利益。同时,依据沙普利值计算得到的最优支付进行各方的利益分配,可以看出三方合作所创造的收益比任意两者的合作或各自独立创造的收益更大。
第四,互助融资的风险可分为善意的和恶意的。为了防范风险,互助机构应注重提高信息透明度,加强成员管理；而金融机构应细化运作流程和机制设计、制定服务小企业的放贷和风控标准、合理发展互联网金融等,只有双方共同努力才能降低违约概率。
本文可能的创新之处概括如下：
一是系统研究了互助融资模式的运作原理。在安全型联盟和风险型联盟的甄别机制分析中,设置了不同的有限连带责任比例,使得机制分析既符合实际,又能够克服借款企业责任边界过大造成的风险分担不均衡造成的后果,可以有效促进了互助融资的推广和应用。
二是从理论上分析中小企业互助融资的信用机制及利益分享机制。为保持互助融资中银行与中小企业联盟的稳定进行,一方面,取决于联盟各方的信用；同时也要建立适当的利益分享机制。同时本文还对风险分享机制和利益分享机制进行设计,力图构建一个有利于互助融资稳定运行的利益分享和风险控制机制。
三是通过善意风险和恶意风险的形成机理研究,确定恶意风险的影响因素。应用博弈分析模型,得出在互助融资联盟成员人数增加时,联盟成员初始目标和网络的异化将会增大恶意风险出现的可能性。
Small enterprises play an important role in economy development. However, financing difficulty presents a big challenge on the way of their growth. Small enterprises'characteristics, such as small size, high performance volatility and accounting opaqueness, increase monitoring cost and credit risk of financial intermediaries. Therefore, credit rationing is an important measure to control risk, which leads to crowding-out effect for small enterprises. As a result, small enterprises are expected to be driven out of credit market.
In order to solve the problem of financing difficulty of small enterprises, researches have been conducted by practitioners and academic scholars. Mutual financing is a finance innovation of commercial banks to mitigate the financing difficulty for small enterprises, which has been in business for a long time and accumulated much experience in practice. By studying mutual finance, we could obtain a good understanding of the key to success and potential risk of this financing channel, which contributes to improvement of mutual financing and risk control of commercial bank in practice and theory.
From the perspective of theory, mutual financing of small enterprises is considered as a good solution to the problem of "mandatory pecking order","information asymmetry" and "adverse selection", which perplex small enterprises. In order to survive, small enterprises must have access to funds. But potential outside investors regard financial market related to small enterprises as lemon market because of growth uncertainty and information asymmetry. So small enterprise development relies on internal profit accumulation first, then commercial loans and stock lastly. The pecking order is not the preference of small enterprises, but the result of external financial constraints.
From perspective of practice, mutual financing could reduce the risk of bank and ensure small enterprises to obtain funds at the same time. That is, small enterprises could get higher credit and greater rationing from banks, which alleviate financing pressure of firm and promote the development of firm steadily. Simultaneously, mutual financing requires screening among borrowers, thus, reducing monitoring cost and credit risk. Through analyzing mutual financing, learning about operation mechanism, identifying risk, and understanding risk control, could prompt the successful application of mutual financing in practice and achieve a win-win goal among small enterprises, banks and government.
First, the paper introduces the mutual financing at home and aboard:mutual guarantee loan and group loan. We make a detailed comparison aiming at the practice of our nation between those two patterns. Based on group loan, we construct a behavior game theory model of players in group loan. In view of bank, we analyze mechanism design in mutual financing from the following three aspects:borrower identification, en ante screening, en post monitoring, In addition, we use game theory to design an interest share mechanism in mutual financing contract to find an optimal point of interest allocation.
Then, we analyze the mechanism aiming at contract default in mutual financing of small enterprise, In dynamic analysis, we study every stage (selection, investment, return, performance) of mutual financing in small enterprises facing with risk and solutions. Last, we analyze risk control of three more general and specific mutual financing mechanisms:group loan in chamber, group loan in cyberspace and mutual guarantee loan. Based on the above analysis, we provide specific measures enhancing the risk control of mutual financing in small enterprises from aspects of government, financial institutions and mutual financing intermediaries.
From the analysis of research, the main conclusions are as follow.
First, mutual financing can alleviate the information asymmetry of small enterprises and resolve the difficulty of financing in small enterprises to some extent. It is a good way for banks to get the inside information of enterprises, improving the ability of risk control for small enterprise financing. At the same time, mutual financing could ease the financial constraints of small enterprises as a result of credit rationing.
Second, public funds have a positive impact on the development of mutual financing. It encourages horizontal selection among participants, and helps form mutual groups, thus increasing the stability of alliances, In addition, it enhances peer monitoring, and reduces default probability through the reputation punishment, thus, ensuring the long term development of mutual financing.
Third, to stabilize the alliance of mutual financing, it is essential to establish appropriate interest share mechanism, ensuring the fair interests of banks, borrowing firms and guarantors. Based on Shapley value in alliance of banks and firms, the benefit created by collaboration is more than that created separately.
Fourth, the risk can be classified into good and ill-will ones. In case of risk, mutual financing intermediaries must focus on transparency of information and member management. On the other hand, financial institutions design operation rules and mechanisms, set standards of risk control aiming at bank loans of small enterprises and develop cyberspace finance. Only hard work in common could reduce the probability of default.
Our research has the following contributions.
First, we study operation principles of mutual financing systematically. We analyze risk recognition mechanism between security and risk alliance, set different proportion of joint liability, thus providing a practical analysis framework, overcoming the unbalanced risk sharing, as a result, promoting the application of mutual financing.
Second, we analyze the credit mechanisms and interest share mechanisms of mutual financing in small enterprises. To ensurethe smooth operation of mutual financing, on one hand, it depends on creditability of members in alliance; on the other hand, it needs to establish an appropriate interest sharing mechanism. In addition, it requires interest share and risk share mechanisms, which enable the mutual financing to operate normally.
Third, we analyze the development mechanisms of goodwill and ill-will risk, and find the factors of ill-will risk. By applying the game theory, we find that, when the number of participants increases, initial objectives of members and the heterogeneity of network lead to greater ill-will risk.
为解决小企业融资难题,理论界和实务界都进行了大量的研究。其中,互助融资作为商业银行为缓解小企业融资难而进行的金融创新,在实践中已运作多时,积累了丰富的实践经验。通过对互助融资模式的研究,可以较好地了解这种模式的成功关键和潜在风险,对于完善互助融资模式、深化商业银行风险控制理论等具有重要的理论和现实意义。
从理论上看,小企业互助融资模式的研究,有助于解决“强制性优序融资”、“道德风险”和“信息不对称”等困扰小企业融资的难题。小企业要生存,首先必须解决资金供给问题,而企业自身发展的不确定性和企业内部信息的不对称性使得外部投资者将小企业融资视为次品市场：小企业主要依靠自身的利润积累,在融资方式的选择上按优先顺序依次为企业内部积累、各种商业信用、银行债务、股权等。这种顺序并非企业偏好所致,而是外部环境强迫所致。
在实践上,互助融资既能够降低银行风险又能够协助小企业获得融资。小企业利用这种融资模式,能够提高银行对它们的信任度,增加小企业的信贷额度,缓解企业的资金压力,促进企业稳定发展。同时,互助模式也能较好地实现借款成员的相互监督,减少银行的监督成本和信贷风险。通过对互助融资运作模式进行分析,了解互助融资的运行机制、风险识别、风险分析和风险控制,有利于促进这种模式在现实生活中的成功运用,更好地实现企业、银行、政府的共赢效果。
本文首先介绍了国内外互助融资的主要模式——互助担保融资模式和联保联贷融资模式,并针对我国实践中的互助融资模式进行进一步深入比较。在联保联贷模式的基础上,构建了互助融资参与者的行为制约博弈模型,从银行角度对互助融资借款人的甄别及其获得款项后的监督以及防范借款者策略违约的机制设计进行分析,并利用博弈方法,构建互助融资契约中的利益分享机制,寻找利益的最优分配值。
然后,针对小企业互助融资的善意风险和恶意风险的形成机理进行探讨,从动态角度分析了我国小企业在整个互助借款过程中的每个阶段(选择阶段、投资阶段、收益阶段和执行阶段)所面临的风险以及解决方案。
最后,以实际案例具体分析了联保联贷及互助担保融资模式的风险控制手段。在此基础上,从政府、金融机构以及互助机构三个层面提出加强小企业互助融资风险控制的措施。
经研究,本文得到主要结论如下：
第一,互助融资有利于解决小企业信息不对称问题,一定程度上缓解了小企业的融资难题。该模式是金融机构获取小企业融资信息的有效途径,提高了银行对小企业融资风险的防控能力。同时,该模式也有利于缓解信贷配给制度对小企业的融资约束。
第二,社会资本对互助融资的形成、发展具有积极影响。它能激励参与人进行横向选择,由相互熟悉的个体形成互助小组,提高联盟的稳定性。同时,它还能加强成员间的相互监督,通过声誉受损等社会惩罚来降低违约率,保障互助模式的长期稳定发展。
第三,为了维持互助联盟的稳定性,互助组织应建立适当的利益分享机制,保证互助融资的三方参与者(银行、借款企业、担保企业)获得公平且不被优超的利益。同时,依据沙普利值计算得到的最优支付进行各方的利益分配,可以看出三方合作所创造的收益比任意两者的合作或各自独立创造的收益更大。
第四,互助融资的风险可分为善意的和恶意的。为了防范风险,互助机构应注重提高信息透明度,加强成员管理；而金融机构应细化运作流程和机制设计、制定服务小企业的放贷和风控标准、合理发展互联网金融等,只有双方共同努力才能降低违约概率。
本文可能的创新之处概括如下：
一是系统研究了互助融资模式的运作原理。在安全型联盟和风险型联盟的甄别机制分析中,设置了不同的有限连带责任比例,使得机制分析既符合实际,又能够克服借款企业责任边界过大造成的风险分担不均衡造成的后果,可以有效促进了互助融资的推广和应用。
二是从理论上分析中小企业互助融资的信用机制及利益分享机制。为保持互助融资中银行与中小企业联盟的稳定进行,一方面,取决于联盟各方的信用；同时也要建立适当的利益分享机制。同时本文还对风险分享机制和利益分享机制进行设计,力图构建一个有利于互助融资稳定运行的利益分享和风险控制机制。
三是通过善意风险和恶意风险的形成机理研究,确定恶意风险的影响因素。应用博弈分析模型,得出在互助融资联盟成员人数增加时,联盟成员初始目标和网络的异化将会增大恶意风险出现的可能性。
Small enterprises play an important role in economy development. However, financing difficulty presents a big challenge on the way of their growth. Small enterprises'characteristics, such as small size, high performance volatility and accounting opaqueness, increase monitoring cost and credit risk of financial intermediaries. Therefore, credit rationing is an important measure to control risk, which leads to crowding-out effect for small enterprises. As a result, small enterprises are expected to be driven out of credit market.
In order to solve the problem of financing difficulty of small enterprises, researches have been conducted by practitioners and academic scholars. Mutual financing is a finance innovation of commercial banks to mitigate the financing difficulty for small enterprises, which has been in business for a long time and accumulated much experience in practice. By studying mutual finance, we could obtain a good understanding of the key to success and potential risk of this financing channel, which contributes to improvement of mutual financing and risk control of commercial bank in practice and theory.
From the perspective of theory, mutual financing of small enterprises is considered as a good solution to the problem of "mandatory pecking order","information asymmetry" and "adverse selection", which perplex small enterprises. In order to survive, small enterprises must have access to funds. But potential outside investors regard financial market related to small enterprises as lemon market because of growth uncertainty and information asymmetry. So small enterprise development relies on internal profit accumulation first, then commercial loans and stock lastly. The pecking order is not the preference of small enterprises, but the result of external financial constraints.
From perspective of practice, mutual financing could reduce the risk of bank and ensure small enterprises to obtain funds at the same time. That is, small enterprises could get higher credit and greater rationing from banks, which alleviate financing pressure of firm and promote the development of firm steadily. Simultaneously, mutual financing requires screening among borrowers, thus, reducing monitoring cost and credit risk. Through analyzing mutual financing, learning about operation mechanism, identifying risk, and understanding risk control, could prompt the successful application of mutual financing in practice and achieve a win-win goal among small enterprises, banks and government.
First, the paper introduces the mutual financing at home and aboard:mutual guarantee loan and group loan. We make a detailed comparison aiming at the practice of our nation between those two patterns. Based on group loan, we construct a behavior game theory model of players in group loan. In view of bank, we analyze mechanism design in mutual financing from the following three aspects:borrower identification, en ante screening, en post monitoring, In addition, we use game theory to design an interest share mechanism in mutual financing contract to find an optimal point of interest allocation.
Then, we analyze the mechanism aiming at contract default in mutual financing of small enterprise, In dynamic analysis, we study every stage (selection, investment, return, performance) of mutual financing in small enterprises facing with risk and solutions. Last, we analyze risk control of three more general and specific mutual financing mechanisms:group loan in chamber, group loan in cyberspace and mutual guarantee loan. Based on the above analysis, we provide specific measures enhancing the risk control of mutual financing in small enterprises from aspects of government, financial institutions and mutual financing intermediaries.
From the analysis of research, the main conclusions are as follow.
First, mutual financing can alleviate the information asymmetry of small enterprises and resolve the difficulty of financing in small enterprises to some extent. It is a good way for banks to get the inside information of enterprises, improving the ability of risk control for small enterprise financing. At the same time, mutual financing could ease the financial constraints of small enterprises as a result of credit rationing.
Second, public funds have a positive impact on the development of mutual financing. It encourages horizontal selection among participants, and helps form mutual groups, thus increasing the stability of alliances, In addition, it enhances peer monitoring, and reduces default probability through the reputation punishment, thus, ensuring the long term development of mutual financing.
Third, to stabilize the alliance of mutual financing, it is essential to establish appropriate interest share mechanism, ensuring the fair interests of banks, borrowing firms and guarantors. Based on Shapley value in alliance of banks and firms, the benefit created by collaboration is more than that created separately.
Fourth, the risk can be classified into good and ill-will ones. In case of risk, mutual financing intermediaries must focus on transparency of information and member management. On the other hand, financial institutions design operation rules and mechanisms, set standards of risk control aiming at bank loans of small enterprises and develop cyberspace finance. Only hard work in common could reduce the probability of default.
Our research has the following contributions.
First, we study operation principles of mutual financing systematically. We analyze risk recognition mechanism between security and risk alliance, set different proportion of joint liability, thus providing a practical analysis framework, overcoming the unbalanced risk sharing, as a result, promoting the application of mutual financing.
Second, we analyze the credit mechanisms and interest share mechanisms of mutual financing in small enterprises. To ensurethe smooth operation of mutual financing, on one hand, it depends on creditability of members in alliance; on the other hand, it needs to establish an appropriate interest sharing mechanism. In addition, it requires interest share and risk share mechanisms, which enable the mutual financing to operate normally.
Third, we analyze the development mechanisms of goodwill and ill-will risk, and find the factors of ill-will risk. By applying the game theory, we find that, when the number of participants increases, initial objectives of members and the heterogeneity of network lead to greater ill-will risk.
引文
① 数据来源：《小微企业融资发展报告：中国现状及亚洲实践》,2013
② 泉州市金融办课题《创新金融服务小微企业报告》,2013
⑤ 中央政府门户网站www.gov.cn,2007年07月01日,来源：四川日报
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⑤ 朱民等译：穷人的的诚信,中信出版社,2007：1-252
⑥ BrettE Coleman. The impact of group lending in Northeast Thailand. Joumalof Development Economics.1999.105-141
⑦ Myers, Stewart, Nicholas S., Majluf. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firmshave Information that Investors Do Not Have[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1984,13(2):187-221
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