铁矿石定价机制研究
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摘要
铁矿石作为钢铁生产的原料对于一国的工业及至整体经济的发展都有重要的影响,对于中国这样一个处于高速工业化进程中,并且高度依赖于海外铁矿石资源的国家来说,稳定可靠的铁矿石供应,合理的交易价格都是至关重要的。而决定这两者的,不仅仅是市场的供需关系,铁矿石的定价机制也会影响到供需的格局、价格和铁矿石的供应数量。因此,对铁矿石市场以及对铁矿石价格形成和决定机制的研究就显得十分重要。尤其是在近几年国际铁矿石的定价机制经历的重大变化,这些变化无论对铁矿石行业还是钢铁行业都产生了极为深远的影响。
分析铁矿石定价机制如何作用于市场及市场的参与者,研究不同的定价机制可能对市场造成的不同结果,这是本文一个基本目标。在不同的铁矿石定价机制下,其价格、数量是如何安排和决定的,市场是如何被分割的,基于交易成本节约的“准租”是如何在两个行业间分配的。基于维护中国钢铁行业利益的立场,只有深入剖析上述内容,中国钢铁行业及其管理机构才有可能真正地对铁矿石定价机制进行有效地管理、改进或是选择。本文正是基于实用主义哲学观点,运用经济学中关于寡头垄断、卡特尔组织的基本理论,构建不同定价机制下的市场模型,论证了由于定价机制的变化对铁矿石上下游行业所产生的深刻影响,为铁矿石定价机制的选择和改进提供了理论依据。
第一章导论介绍了本文的研究目标、研究思路和研究方法。第二章回顾了与本文主题相关的理论和国内外对这一课题的研究现状,并总结了上述理论和研究对于本文研究的借鉴意义及其不足之处。
第三章系统介绍了铁矿石长协定价机制、指数定价机制、现货交易、掉期交易等定价机制的概念、历史发展过程、运行机理和所包含的内容等问题。并根据长协定价机制和指数定价机制基本定价机理,建立了与之相对应的经济学模型,指出两种定价机制最重要运行的特征。第三章还详细介绍了铁矿石定价机制从长协定价机制的产生、发展、成熟、崩溃,以及被指数定价机制所取代的整个历史过程,为后续的分析和研究奠定基础。
第四章通过对铁矿石资源和市场数据的收集整理,较为清晰地表明铁矿石在国际海运贸易市场具有明显的寡头垄断特征。这一市场结构极为有利于矿山寡头们运用其“市场势力”通过铁矿石的定价机制谋取更多的利益。基于历史数据的实证分析,第四章重点研究了矿山寡头们如果通过共谋并借助于长协定价机制发挥其垄断力量会造成怎样的结果。这一章以中国这一区域性市场为例,建立了在铁矿石需求不断增长情况下的卖方寡头垄断模型,并详细测算了模型的各项参数。通过把模型测算的结果和实际市场数据的对比分析,表明市场的结果和模型的结果具有高度的一致性,证明了垄断的矿山企业较为有效地利用了其市场势力,获取垄断利润。
第五章在阐述了源自于中国的需求冲击,以及需求冲击对铁矿石定价机制的影响之后,分别论证了长协定价机制和指数定价机制对不同区域和不同类型的钢铁企业的影响。本章所建立铁矿石市场分割模型表明：长协定价机制在中国铁矿石需求快速增长时期对中国钢铁行业有一定的保护作用,并指出了中国独立价格的恰当时机。针对铁矿石长协定价机制不成功的改革构想,即建立中国独立的长协定价机制,本章的分析结论认为：在中国铁矿石需求快速增长期,独立定价会把中国钢铁行业推到更为不利的境地,使矿山寡头们的歧视性定价成为可能。这一结论也同样适用于指数定价机制下的铁矿石市场。本章也详细论述了指数定价机制对铁矿石交易成本的影响,以及对钢铁企业内部的管理运营所带来的新的挑战。在本章的最后一节,进一步通过不同定价机制下不同商品价格波动的比较分析,说明铁矿石长协定价机制具有稳定市场价格的作用,而指数定价机制则放大了市场波动。
第六章进一步从行业间的角度对长协定价机制和指数定价机制进行分析,研究不同定价机制在上下游行业间利益分配中所起的作用。基于第四章对铁矿石市场特征分析,本章针对两种定价机制分别建立了卖方垄断市场下的定价模型。研究表明：在指数定价模式中,垄断的铁矿石企业以更少的产量下降,就能大幅提高市场的价格,并可以在一定时期实现超越于垄断企业的利润。因此,在寡头垄断的铁矿石市场结构下,指数定价机制进一步削弱了矿山企业之间的竞争,更便利于矿山寡头合谋对市场进行操纵。而在长协定价机制的谈判定价过程中,结合历史的定价数据表明,虽然矿山寡头在数量控制上做到垄断企业所造成的产量结果,但在价格上并没有做到这一点,长协价格长期低于现货价格证明了长协定价机制所给予钢铁企业的博弈空间。两者相较,说明了对于钢铁企业来说,长协定价是优于指数定价的选择。
最后,基于本文的研究发现和论证结果,第七章对国内过往的各类调控政策进行了简要的评述,并在此基础上提出了若干政策建议和铁矿石定价机制的设计方案。并基于当前铁矿石市场格局,从企业管理的角度,为中国钢铁企业提供了一个可供选择或是借鉴的集中采购方案,作为个体钢铁企业应对原料市场垄断力量的内部组织方案。
As a raw material of steel production, iron ore is very important for a country's industry and economic development, especially for China. Because of the rapidly developing of China's economy, the iron ore consumption is being in the high growth period and highly dependent on overseas iron ore resources. It is critical for stable and reliable supply of iron ore, and the reasonable price of iron ore. So it's even important to study price forming mechanism and pricing mechanism of iron ore market. Especially in recent years experienced significant changes in the international iron ore pricing mechanism, there are a far-reaching impact regardless of the iron ore industry or the steel industry.
Analysis of iron ore pricing mechanism how to play a role in market and market participants, and study different possible outcome caused by different pricing mechanisms, it is the basic goal of this paper.In different iron ore pricing mechanism, how is price and quantity to be arranged and decided, how is the market be divided, and how is the "rent" which based on transaction cost be distribution between two industry. Only in-depth analysis of the above content, China Iron and steel industry and its management mechanism could makes it possible to manage iron ore pricing mechanism effectively and improved it. Based on the philosophy of pragmatism, this paper using the basic theory of economics to builds different models under different market pricing mechanism, demonstrated the profound influence between upstream and downstream industry of iron ore, which due to the change of pricing mechanism. Finally provides a theoretical basis for the selection and improvement of the iron ore pricing mechanism.
The first chapter introduced the research goal, this research ideas and research methods. The second chapter reviewed the related theory of this thesis's theme and the present situation of research on this subject at domestic and foreign, and summarized the significance and shortcomings of those theories and research for this article research.
The third chapter introduces the benchmark pricing system, index pricing mechanism, spot transactions and swaps pricing mechanism concept and those pricing mechanism's historical development process, operational mechanism and the contains and so on. According to the basic price mechanism of benchmark pricing system and index pricing mechanism, establishing the economic model, those model point out the most important characteristics of those pricing mechanism. The third chapter also introduced the history of iron ore pricing mechanism, from the benchmark pricing system development, mature, collapse, and replaced by index pricing mechanism, it laid a foundation for the analysis and follow-up study.
The fourth chapter clearly shows that iron ore has obvious characteristics of oligopoly in the international shipping market by collected iron ore resources date and market date. Through the iron ore pricing mechanism, the market structure is extremely conducive to mining oligarchs to use its "market forces" to reap more benefits. The fourth chapter describes the specific mechanism and the course of development of the long agreement price mechanism, focusing on the results, if mining oligarchs conspiracy and use its monopoly power by means of long agreement price mechanism. As an example, this paper use of the regional markets established seller oligopoly model in the case of growing demand for iron ore, and measurement and calculation of every model parameter. The results demonstrate a high degree of consistency of the mine oligopolistic market behavior and the model results.
In the fifth chapter, elaborated the demand shock from China, and the impact on the iron ore pricing mechanism of demand shocks. In this kind market background, this paper demonstrates the different influence of different regions and different kind steel enterprises by benchmark pricing system and index pricing mechanism. For the unsuccessful reform vision for a long iron ore price agreement mechanism that is to establish independent long agreement price mechanism of China. In the fifth chapter of this paper demonstrated the demand for iron ore in China is still in a period of rapid growth, China's steel industry will be pushed to the disadvantage by this change idea, made it possible for mining oligarchs discriminatory pricing. Through the establishment of the iron ore market segmentation model to prove that long agreement price mechanism have a protective effect for China's steel industry in the period of the needing of iron ore rapid growing, and pointing out that a reasonable opportunity to develop independent price. This conclusion is also applicable to the index pricing mechanism of iron ore market. This chapter also discussed the influence iron ore trading costs in index pricing mechanism, and a new challenge in internal management to the iron enterprise and steel enterprise which brought by the change of pricing mechanism. In the last section of this chapter, this article points out that the price mechanism has immanent instability. While the index pricing mechanism amplifying Market Volatility.
From the industry perspective the sixth chapter further analyzed the benchmark pricing system and the index pricing mechanism, study on the distribution of interests between the upstream and downstream industry in different pricing mechanism. According to the analysis of the iron ore market in fourth chapter, two kind of pricing mechanism model are established under the monopoly market. The model of seller monopoly of iron ore index pricing show that with the index pricing model the monopoly of iron ore enterprises will be able to significantly improve the market price by dropped to less production, and get beyond the monopoly profits during a certain period of time. Therefore, in the oligopolistic structure of the iron ore market, competition between mining enterprises are further weaken under the index pricing mechanism, and more convenient in collusion and manipulation. Combined with historical pricing data this chapter also researched negotiating pricing mechanism, it shows that although mining oligarch monopoly is successful in control the number of yield, but the price did not do this, for a long time the long association price is lower than the spot price, it proved that there are some game space for steel enterprises given by the long agreement price mechanism.
Finally, based on the discovery and demonstration results of this study, The article puts forward several policy recommendations and the design of the pricing mechanism. And from the perspective of business management, to provide an alternative or centralized purchasing plan for Chinese steel enterprises, to enhance the competitiveness of steel enterprise.
分析铁矿石定价机制如何作用于市场及市场的参与者,研究不同的定价机制可能对市场造成的不同结果,这是本文一个基本目标。在不同的铁矿石定价机制下,其价格、数量是如何安排和决定的,市场是如何被分割的,基于交易成本节约的“准租”是如何在两个行业间分配的。基于维护中国钢铁行业利益的立场,只有深入剖析上述内容,中国钢铁行业及其管理机构才有可能真正地对铁矿石定价机制进行有效地管理、改进或是选择。本文正是基于实用主义哲学观点,运用经济学中关于寡头垄断、卡特尔组织的基本理论,构建不同定价机制下的市场模型,论证了由于定价机制的变化对铁矿石上下游行业所产生的深刻影响,为铁矿石定价机制的选择和改进提供了理论依据。
第一章导论介绍了本文的研究目标、研究思路和研究方法。第二章回顾了与本文主题相关的理论和国内外对这一课题的研究现状,并总结了上述理论和研究对于本文研究的借鉴意义及其不足之处。
第三章系统介绍了铁矿石长协定价机制、指数定价机制、现货交易、掉期交易等定价机制的概念、历史发展过程、运行机理和所包含的内容等问题。并根据长协定价机制和指数定价机制基本定价机理,建立了与之相对应的经济学模型,指出两种定价机制最重要运行的特征。第三章还详细介绍了铁矿石定价机制从长协定价机制的产生、发展、成熟、崩溃,以及被指数定价机制所取代的整个历史过程,为后续的分析和研究奠定基础。
第四章通过对铁矿石资源和市场数据的收集整理,较为清晰地表明铁矿石在国际海运贸易市场具有明显的寡头垄断特征。这一市场结构极为有利于矿山寡头们运用其“市场势力”通过铁矿石的定价机制谋取更多的利益。基于历史数据的实证分析,第四章重点研究了矿山寡头们如果通过共谋并借助于长协定价机制发挥其垄断力量会造成怎样的结果。这一章以中国这一区域性市场为例,建立了在铁矿石需求不断增长情况下的卖方寡头垄断模型,并详细测算了模型的各项参数。通过把模型测算的结果和实际市场数据的对比分析,表明市场的结果和模型的结果具有高度的一致性,证明了垄断的矿山企业较为有效地利用了其市场势力,获取垄断利润。
第五章在阐述了源自于中国的需求冲击,以及需求冲击对铁矿石定价机制的影响之后,分别论证了长协定价机制和指数定价机制对不同区域和不同类型的钢铁企业的影响。本章所建立铁矿石市场分割模型表明：长协定价机制在中国铁矿石需求快速增长时期对中国钢铁行业有一定的保护作用,并指出了中国独立价格的恰当时机。针对铁矿石长协定价机制不成功的改革构想,即建立中国独立的长协定价机制,本章的分析结论认为：在中国铁矿石需求快速增长期,独立定价会把中国钢铁行业推到更为不利的境地,使矿山寡头们的歧视性定价成为可能。这一结论也同样适用于指数定价机制下的铁矿石市场。本章也详细论述了指数定价机制对铁矿石交易成本的影响,以及对钢铁企业内部的管理运营所带来的新的挑战。在本章的最后一节,进一步通过不同定价机制下不同商品价格波动的比较分析,说明铁矿石长协定价机制具有稳定市场价格的作用,而指数定价机制则放大了市场波动。
第六章进一步从行业间的角度对长协定价机制和指数定价机制进行分析,研究不同定价机制在上下游行业间利益分配中所起的作用。基于第四章对铁矿石市场特征分析,本章针对两种定价机制分别建立了卖方垄断市场下的定价模型。研究表明：在指数定价模式中,垄断的铁矿石企业以更少的产量下降,就能大幅提高市场的价格,并可以在一定时期实现超越于垄断企业的利润。因此,在寡头垄断的铁矿石市场结构下,指数定价机制进一步削弱了矿山企业之间的竞争,更便利于矿山寡头合谋对市场进行操纵。而在长协定价机制的谈判定价过程中,结合历史的定价数据表明,虽然矿山寡头在数量控制上做到垄断企业所造成的产量结果,但在价格上并没有做到这一点,长协价格长期低于现货价格证明了长协定价机制所给予钢铁企业的博弈空间。两者相较,说明了对于钢铁企业来说,长协定价是优于指数定价的选择。
最后,基于本文的研究发现和论证结果,第七章对国内过往的各类调控政策进行了简要的评述,并在此基础上提出了若干政策建议和铁矿石定价机制的设计方案。并基于当前铁矿石市场格局,从企业管理的角度,为中国钢铁企业提供了一个可供选择或是借鉴的集中采购方案,作为个体钢铁企业应对原料市场垄断力量的内部组织方案。
As a raw material of steel production, iron ore is very important for a country's industry and economic development, especially for China. Because of the rapidly developing of China's economy, the iron ore consumption is being in the high growth period and highly dependent on overseas iron ore resources. It is critical for stable and reliable supply of iron ore, and the reasonable price of iron ore. So it's even important to study price forming mechanism and pricing mechanism of iron ore market. Especially in recent years experienced significant changes in the international iron ore pricing mechanism, there are a far-reaching impact regardless of the iron ore industry or the steel industry.
Analysis of iron ore pricing mechanism how to play a role in market and market participants, and study different possible outcome caused by different pricing mechanisms, it is the basic goal of this paper.In different iron ore pricing mechanism, how is price and quantity to be arranged and decided, how is the market be divided, and how is the "rent" which based on transaction cost be distribution between two industry. Only in-depth analysis of the above content, China Iron and steel industry and its management mechanism could makes it possible to manage iron ore pricing mechanism effectively and improved it. Based on the philosophy of pragmatism, this paper using the basic theory of economics to builds different models under different market pricing mechanism, demonstrated the profound influence between upstream and downstream industry of iron ore, which due to the change of pricing mechanism. Finally provides a theoretical basis for the selection and improvement of the iron ore pricing mechanism.
The first chapter introduced the research goal, this research ideas and research methods. The second chapter reviewed the related theory of this thesis's theme and the present situation of research on this subject at domestic and foreign, and summarized the significance and shortcomings of those theories and research for this article research.
The third chapter introduces the benchmark pricing system, index pricing mechanism, spot transactions and swaps pricing mechanism concept and those pricing mechanism's historical development process, operational mechanism and the contains and so on. According to the basic price mechanism of benchmark pricing system and index pricing mechanism, establishing the economic model, those model point out the most important characteristics of those pricing mechanism. The third chapter also introduced the history of iron ore pricing mechanism, from the benchmark pricing system development, mature, collapse, and replaced by index pricing mechanism, it laid a foundation for the analysis and follow-up study.
The fourth chapter clearly shows that iron ore has obvious characteristics of oligopoly in the international shipping market by collected iron ore resources date and market date. Through the iron ore pricing mechanism, the market structure is extremely conducive to mining oligarchs to use its "market forces" to reap more benefits. The fourth chapter describes the specific mechanism and the course of development of the long agreement price mechanism, focusing on the results, if mining oligarchs conspiracy and use its monopoly power by means of long agreement price mechanism. As an example, this paper use of the regional markets established seller oligopoly model in the case of growing demand for iron ore, and measurement and calculation of every model parameter. The results demonstrate a high degree of consistency of the mine oligopolistic market behavior and the model results.
In the fifth chapter, elaborated the demand shock from China, and the impact on the iron ore pricing mechanism of demand shocks. In this kind market background, this paper demonstrates the different influence of different regions and different kind steel enterprises by benchmark pricing system and index pricing mechanism. For the unsuccessful reform vision for a long iron ore price agreement mechanism that is to establish independent long agreement price mechanism of China. In the fifth chapter of this paper demonstrated the demand for iron ore in China is still in a period of rapid growth, China's steel industry will be pushed to the disadvantage by this change idea, made it possible for mining oligarchs discriminatory pricing. Through the establishment of the iron ore market segmentation model to prove that long agreement price mechanism have a protective effect for China's steel industry in the period of the needing of iron ore rapid growing, and pointing out that a reasonable opportunity to develop independent price. This conclusion is also applicable to the index pricing mechanism of iron ore market. This chapter also discussed the influence iron ore trading costs in index pricing mechanism, and a new challenge in internal management to the iron enterprise and steel enterprise which brought by the change of pricing mechanism. In the last section of this chapter, this article points out that the price mechanism has immanent instability. While the index pricing mechanism amplifying Market Volatility.
From the industry perspective the sixth chapter further analyzed the benchmark pricing system and the index pricing mechanism, study on the distribution of interests between the upstream and downstream industry in different pricing mechanism. According to the analysis of the iron ore market in fourth chapter, two kind of pricing mechanism model are established under the monopoly market. The model of seller monopoly of iron ore index pricing show that with the index pricing model the monopoly of iron ore enterprises will be able to significantly improve the market price by dropped to less production, and get beyond the monopoly profits during a certain period of time. Therefore, in the oligopolistic structure of the iron ore market, competition between mining enterprises are further weaken under the index pricing mechanism, and more convenient in collusion and manipulation. Combined with historical pricing data this chapter also researched negotiating pricing mechanism, it shows that although mining oligarch monopoly is successful in control the number of yield, but the price did not do this, for a long time the long association price is lower than the spot price, it proved that there are some game space for steel enterprises given by the long agreement price mechanism.
Finally, based on the discovery and demonstration results of this study, The article puts forward several policy recommendations and the design of the pricing mechanism. And from the perspective of business management, to provide an alternative or centralized purchasing plan for Chinese steel enterprises, to enhance the competitiveness of steel enterprise.
引文
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