邮政业改革的国际比较及评价
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摘要
随着我国经济体制改革的进一步深化,垄断性行业的改革越来越被社会各界所关注。党的十六大把推进垄断行业改革作为一项重要的改革任务,明确提出“推进垄断行业改革,引入竞争机制,提高经济效益”。邮政业改革在世界各国垄断行业改革过程中具有典型性和代表性,其实践内容丰富。将邮政业改革进行系统的归纳和研究,具有重大的理论和现实意义。
一、相关理论与研究综述
相关理论与研究是邮政业改革的基础。邮政是一种典型的公共产品,邮政企业所产生利益的一部分可以由其提供者享用,具有私人产品的特征,但利益的另一部分能够被所有者之外的人享有,具有部分非排他性,是介于私人产品和纯公共产品之间的准公共产品,由此奠定了邮政服务由政府部门提供的理论基础。普遍服务理论提出要确保所有地域、所有用户、大众支付得起的价格和一定服务质量的邮政服务目标,要实现这一目标,需要企业具有强大的服务网络,这强化了邮政的自然垄断属性,从而进一步巩固了邮政的垄断地位。可竞争市场理论和自然垄断理论的发展,扩大了自然垄断的边界,邮政业服务网络所体现出的范围经济特性既不是必要也不是必须的。在这种情况下,出于对社会效率和服务质量的追求,邮政业放松管制引入竞争成为必然。要引入竞争,政府必须相应地制定一些配套的规范与规则,以管制竞争的进入和提高进入者的效率。于是,西方学者从政府监管的角度提出了激励性管制,如价格上限规制、区域间标尺竞争、特许投标制等多种思路,对于促进企业削减成本、提高效率具有积极意义。
二、世界典型国家邮政业改革模式分析
澳大利亚邮政通过3次改革之后走上了一条完全商业化的道路,更多的竞争进入了信函市场,政府与邮政企业之间建立了新型的关系,政府对邮政的监管由具体的日常工作转为战略调控,保证了良性发展;瑞典邮政取消垄断,完全放开了邮政市场,从而走在了世界的前列;尽管困难重重,但是新西兰邮政的改革过程就是国有企业引入市场竞争机制,向商业化经营转变的过程。通过这一过程,新西兰邮政由亏损、人员过多、业务单调、需要政府投资、网络效率低下的政府部门,发展成为提高了运营效率、扭亏为盈、提高了服务质量的新型服务部门;英国建立了包括邮政法、邮政行业管理委员会以及邮政用户理事会在内的完善的监管体系,维护邮政业公平的竞争环境和保护邮政用户的利益;德国邮政改革首先以法律的形式明确其结构、职责、义务和政府的关系,并根据国际市场的发展趋势及时开拓和调整自己的市场策略,树立品牌提高服务质量。
三、邮政业改革模式的国际比较及对我国的启示
由于邮政在国民经济中所处的重要地位及所发挥的特殊作用,绝大多数国家的政府对邮政的改革都是非常重视和慎重的,改革发展不仅要符合本国国情,又要和国际环境统一,避免不公平竞争。同时,既要使市场开放的进程、程度与邮政的发展水平相适应,又要考虑到政府监管市场的能力和邮政的承受能力。据万国邮联的不完全统计,政企合一的国家约占成员国总数的近30%,大多数国家的邮政属于国有公共企业或国有股份制公司,只有极少数国家的邮政实行了完全私有化。由于各国邮政普遍服务网络的运营成本很高,邮政又必须以用户支付得起的价格为全国用户提供普遍服务。为保障普遍服务的实施,各国政府通过法律手段和政策支持的方式来解决普遍服务的成本问题。主要方式有专营业务、国家财政补贴、建立补偿基金、减免税收及其他政策支持。对于我国邮政也来说,缩小专营权,逐步放开邮政市场,引入战略投资者,改变产权结构单一的现状,是增强邮政发展的后劲和活力的重要途径。
四、我国邮政业改革分析
我国邮政业改革参照了世界多个国家的改革模式,历经了邮电分营、政企分开、公司化改革、内部业务重组等多个阶段,使企业经营发展战略更加明晰,政府监管体系更为完善。改革后,我国邮政业的监管体制为典型的委托代理关系,存在着严重的信息不对称,要提高邮政企业服务效率尤其是普遍服务的效率,需要进一步完善监管体制。
五、我国邮政业改革效果静态评价研究
当前我国邮政业处于深化改革的关键阶段,在这种情况下,需要探讨既往改革的不足与成功之处,为进一步的改革提供有效的参考依据。在此背景下,本文从邮政业的特性出发,结合相关理论,提出了邮政业改革效果的定量评价方法和思路,借助哈佛学派SCP范式,从市场结构、市场行为、市场绩效三个维度出发,形成邮政业改革效果评价指标体系,建立了相应模型,采用模糊评价法和层次分析法对我国邮政业的改革效果进行了静态评价。结果表明,我国邮政业改革后的市场结构表现突出,基本上达到了打破垄断、引入竞争的目的,而受行业竞争状况、资源配置效率以及技术水平等因素的制约,市场行为、市场绩效表现一般,需要在今后的改革中加以强化。
六、我国邮政业改革效果动态评价研究
基于SCP范式的邮政业改革效果评价指标体系及实证研究只是从行业宏观层面上对邮政业改革绩效进行了评价,不能反映改革对微观层面上的各个邮政企业的实际影响。因此,本文又运用数据包络分析方法中的CRS模型、VRS模型和Malmquist指数,以我国邮政业2003-2009年的面板数据为基础,对我国邮政业31家样本企业的改革效果进行了动态研究。结果表明,改革能够促进微观层面的邮政企业改善内部经营管理、提高资源配置效率和技术水平,改革后,企业的综合技术效率、规模效率以及纯技术效率均有了明显的提高。
七、本文的主要创新
本研究的主要创新点表现在以下三个方面:1.本文在分析世界典型国家邮政业改革的过程中,提炼总结了这些国家邮政业改革的模式和改革的成果,并从改革类型与进程、涉及领域以及普遍服务补偿制度等方面对典型国家邮政业改革的模式进行了比较研究,得出了关于进一步深化我国邮政改革的方向性结论。2.从行业宏观角度出发,基于哈佛学派SCP范式,从市场结构、市场行为、市场绩效三维度出发,构建了邮政业改革效果四级评价指标体系,并采用层次分析法和模糊评价法对我国邮政业的改革效果进行了综合评价。3.从企业微观角度出发,运用数据包络分析方法,借助CRS、VRS、Malmquist模型,以我国邮政业31家邮政企业2003-2009年的面板数据为基础,对我国邮政业的改革效果进行了动态评价。
The reform of the Monopoly profession has been drawing more and more attention as China’s economic restructuring are further deepened. It is entitled as a major reform task by the 16th National Congress that“monopoly industry must be changed by introducing competition and improving economic returns.”Postal reform that was analyzed and studied here is one of the monopoly industry’s typical and representativeness example. It is theory of meaning and practical significance that we systematically induce and research the experience of postal reform.
1. Reviews of relevant theory and research
Postal reform should be processing on the basis of theory and research. Postal industry is a typical public goods. The postal enterprises could partly enjoy these profits produced by themselves which characterizes postal services business as a private goods. However, other parties besides captioned enterprises could also get benefits which marks its nonexcludability. To be more exactly, postal industry could be defined as a Quasi Public Goods, its essential nature decides that postal services should be provided by state-owned departments.
At the same time, universal service theory sets an objective that is to ensure the public, almost all users in all territories could afford the reasonable price for quality postal services, and in order to achieve this goal, enterprises within the industry should have well-covered network which emphasizes postal industry’s natural monopoly and highlights the necessity of being monopoly. On the other hand, with the development of contestable markets theory and natural monopoly, some scientists began to realize that features scope economy carrying by postal services network is neither compulsory nor necessary.
Under such circumstances, the pursuit for social efficiency and high quality services non-evitable lead to the deregulation and introduction of competition mechanisms in postal industry. Certainly government had to set principles and rules accordingly to ensure fair competition. Western scholars proposed incentive regulation from the prospective of government regulation, such as price cap, regional ruler competition, concession and bidding system, which had positive effects on enterprises in terms of cost control and efficiency enhancement.
2. Analysis on the typical modes of national postal reform
Australia post industry has gone through 3 times reforms which brought more competition to the letter market and helped to build up a kind of new relationship between postal corporations and the government whose focus has been shifted from routine supervision to strategic control. Australia Post now has been thoroughly commercialized and entered into the virtuous development track.
Swiss Post has stepped into the world’s leading class benefited from its unique reform through which monopoly has been broken and market has been opened up.
The similar reform also happened in New Zealand. After a series of tough restructuring, New Zealand Post has transformed from a loss-suffering, overstuffed, and ineffective government department to a quality service provider operating with profits and efficiency. To be concluded, the reform in New Zealand was a process of introducing market competition mechanism and commercial management to state-owned postal enterprises.
The U.K. established a complete regulatory system consisting of postal law, Post Industry Regulatory Commission and Postal Users Council in order to present a fair playing field and protect users’common interest.
German Post started the reform by clarifying its operating structure, rights and obligations at the very beginning, and then deepened the reform in means of adjusting marketing strategy with the development of global markets, at last it ended with successfully brand set-up and significantly enhancement of quality of service.
3. Comparison of international Postal reform model and the enlightenment to China Post
Many countries are circumspect and careful with the postal reform, since they are well recognized that the post services business plays an important role in the national economy. A postal reform in a country should be performed with its basic condition as well as international situation. At the same time, the liberalization of a country’s postal market need to be accordant with the development level of domestic post industry, local government’s capability of supervision and the market’s capacity should also be taken into consideration.
According to the incomplete statistics from the UPU, postal business is usually run by the combination of government and enterprises, which accounts for 30% of all its member states. Postal enterprises in most countries are in forms of state owned public or state owned joint-stock; only in a few countries they have been privatized.
Each country’s postal enterprises are obligated to provide universal services to its national users at an affordable price, and on the other hand, they have to suffer the high costs of operating the national-wide network. In such situation, governments issues relevant laws and preferential policies targeting to solve this problem. Generally, measures that are commonly taken include permits of industrial monopoly, provision of fiscal subsidies and tax preference, set-up of indemnification fund and other policy supports.
For Chinese postal industry, narrowing down postal franchising rights, gradually opening the market, introducing strategic investors and changing single structure of property rights are all necessary and important ways, if we are eyeing on long-term and sustainable development.
4. Analysis on China Post’s Reform
China post’s reform has referred to many different typical modes of other countries, and the development of our post industry has gone through several phases, such as the segmentation of posts from telecom operation, separation of government functions from enterprise management, commercialization and recombination.
With benefits from the reform, postal enterprises are now operating with clear strategy and a preliminary supervision system has been established. However, because of the principal agency relationship in current supervisory framework, the distribution of information among market player and executives is asymmetry.
In order to enhance the service efficiency of domestic postal enterprises, especially the universal services efficiency, the supervision system need to be further improved.
5. Static evaluation of Chinese Postal Reform
Chinese postal reformation is at critical stage now, so we should sum up both experience and defect based on which the reform will be continuingly taken forward. With the purpose stated above, this article analyses features of Chinese post industry and relevant theories, proposes to apply the quantitative evaluation method. The article use SCP method study from market structure, market behavior and market performance that create postal reform KPI and relative model than apply fuzzy evaluation and analytical hierarchy process concluded the static evaluation of postal reform. The result showed that China's marketing performance is very good, basically reached it's target that breakup of monopoly and introduced competition, but as postal market are enslaved to allocative efficiency and technical merit. The post market showed low market performance and low market behavior that is what we need to improve in the future reform.
6. Dynamic evaluation of Chinese Postal Reform
As SCP study can only show macroscopic level reform result so the article used data envelopment analysis' CRS model, VRS model and Malquist compared with 31 international post company's reform based on China post's 2003-2009 panel data. The result showed that the reform improved post's internal management, allocative efficiency, synthesis technique efficiency, scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency on microcosmic level.
7. Main innovation in the article
There are three main innovations in the article: 1.The article collected and concluded most of countries' reform model and experience in the world and then the article showed future directivity for China post's reform. 2. From macro-analysis the article use SCP, market structure, market behavior, market performance, multi-tiered analysis and fuzzy evaluation created a four level evaluation system. 3. From micro-analysis the article use data envelopment analysis, CRS model, VRS model and Malquist compared with 31 international post company's reform based on China post's 2003-2009 panel data static evaluated China Post's Reform.
一、相关理论与研究综述
相关理论与研究是邮政业改革的基础。邮政是一种典型的公共产品,邮政企业所产生利益的一部分可以由其提供者享用,具有私人产品的特征,但利益的另一部分能够被所有者之外的人享有,具有部分非排他性,是介于私人产品和纯公共产品之间的准公共产品,由此奠定了邮政服务由政府部门提供的理论基础。普遍服务理论提出要确保所有地域、所有用户、大众支付得起的价格和一定服务质量的邮政服务目标,要实现这一目标,需要企业具有强大的服务网络,这强化了邮政的自然垄断属性,从而进一步巩固了邮政的垄断地位。可竞争市场理论和自然垄断理论的发展,扩大了自然垄断的边界,邮政业服务网络所体现出的范围经济特性既不是必要也不是必须的。在这种情况下,出于对社会效率和服务质量的追求,邮政业放松管制引入竞争成为必然。要引入竞争,政府必须相应地制定一些配套的规范与规则,以管制竞争的进入和提高进入者的效率。于是,西方学者从政府监管的角度提出了激励性管制,如价格上限规制、区域间标尺竞争、特许投标制等多种思路,对于促进企业削减成本、提高效率具有积极意义。
二、世界典型国家邮政业改革模式分析
澳大利亚邮政通过3次改革之后走上了一条完全商业化的道路,更多的竞争进入了信函市场,政府与邮政企业之间建立了新型的关系,政府对邮政的监管由具体的日常工作转为战略调控,保证了良性发展;瑞典邮政取消垄断,完全放开了邮政市场,从而走在了世界的前列;尽管困难重重,但是新西兰邮政的改革过程就是国有企业引入市场竞争机制,向商业化经营转变的过程。通过这一过程,新西兰邮政由亏损、人员过多、业务单调、需要政府投资、网络效率低下的政府部门,发展成为提高了运营效率、扭亏为盈、提高了服务质量的新型服务部门;英国建立了包括邮政法、邮政行业管理委员会以及邮政用户理事会在内的完善的监管体系,维护邮政业公平的竞争环境和保护邮政用户的利益;德国邮政改革首先以法律的形式明确其结构、职责、义务和政府的关系,并根据国际市场的发展趋势及时开拓和调整自己的市场策略,树立品牌提高服务质量。
三、邮政业改革模式的国际比较及对我国的启示
由于邮政在国民经济中所处的重要地位及所发挥的特殊作用,绝大多数国家的政府对邮政的改革都是非常重视和慎重的,改革发展不仅要符合本国国情,又要和国际环境统一,避免不公平竞争。同时,既要使市场开放的进程、程度与邮政的发展水平相适应,又要考虑到政府监管市场的能力和邮政的承受能力。据万国邮联的不完全统计,政企合一的国家约占成员国总数的近30%,大多数国家的邮政属于国有公共企业或国有股份制公司,只有极少数国家的邮政实行了完全私有化。由于各国邮政普遍服务网络的运营成本很高,邮政又必须以用户支付得起的价格为全国用户提供普遍服务。为保障普遍服务的实施,各国政府通过法律手段和政策支持的方式来解决普遍服务的成本问题。主要方式有专营业务、国家财政补贴、建立补偿基金、减免税收及其他政策支持。对于我国邮政也来说,缩小专营权,逐步放开邮政市场,引入战略投资者,改变产权结构单一的现状,是增强邮政发展的后劲和活力的重要途径。
四、我国邮政业改革分析
我国邮政业改革参照了世界多个国家的改革模式,历经了邮电分营、政企分开、公司化改革、内部业务重组等多个阶段,使企业经营发展战略更加明晰,政府监管体系更为完善。改革后,我国邮政业的监管体制为典型的委托代理关系,存在着严重的信息不对称,要提高邮政企业服务效率尤其是普遍服务的效率,需要进一步完善监管体制。
五、我国邮政业改革效果静态评价研究
当前我国邮政业处于深化改革的关键阶段,在这种情况下,需要探讨既往改革的不足与成功之处,为进一步的改革提供有效的参考依据。在此背景下,本文从邮政业的特性出发,结合相关理论,提出了邮政业改革效果的定量评价方法和思路,借助哈佛学派SCP范式,从市场结构、市场行为、市场绩效三个维度出发,形成邮政业改革效果评价指标体系,建立了相应模型,采用模糊评价法和层次分析法对我国邮政业的改革效果进行了静态评价。结果表明,我国邮政业改革后的市场结构表现突出,基本上达到了打破垄断、引入竞争的目的,而受行业竞争状况、资源配置效率以及技术水平等因素的制约,市场行为、市场绩效表现一般,需要在今后的改革中加以强化。
六、我国邮政业改革效果动态评价研究
基于SCP范式的邮政业改革效果评价指标体系及实证研究只是从行业宏观层面上对邮政业改革绩效进行了评价,不能反映改革对微观层面上的各个邮政企业的实际影响。因此,本文又运用数据包络分析方法中的CRS模型、VRS模型和Malmquist指数,以我国邮政业2003-2009年的面板数据为基础,对我国邮政业31家样本企业的改革效果进行了动态研究。结果表明,改革能够促进微观层面的邮政企业改善内部经营管理、提高资源配置效率和技术水平,改革后,企业的综合技术效率、规模效率以及纯技术效率均有了明显的提高。
七、本文的主要创新
本研究的主要创新点表现在以下三个方面:1.本文在分析世界典型国家邮政业改革的过程中,提炼总结了这些国家邮政业改革的模式和改革的成果,并从改革类型与进程、涉及领域以及普遍服务补偿制度等方面对典型国家邮政业改革的模式进行了比较研究,得出了关于进一步深化我国邮政改革的方向性结论。2.从行业宏观角度出发,基于哈佛学派SCP范式,从市场结构、市场行为、市场绩效三维度出发,构建了邮政业改革效果四级评价指标体系,并采用层次分析法和模糊评价法对我国邮政业的改革效果进行了综合评价。3.从企业微观角度出发,运用数据包络分析方法,借助CRS、VRS、Malmquist模型,以我国邮政业31家邮政企业2003-2009年的面板数据为基础,对我国邮政业的改革效果进行了动态评价。
The reform of the Monopoly profession has been drawing more and more attention as China’s economic restructuring are further deepened. It is entitled as a major reform task by the 16th National Congress that“monopoly industry must be changed by introducing competition and improving economic returns.”Postal reform that was analyzed and studied here is one of the monopoly industry’s typical and representativeness example. It is theory of meaning and practical significance that we systematically induce and research the experience of postal reform.
1. Reviews of relevant theory and research
Postal reform should be processing on the basis of theory and research. Postal industry is a typical public goods. The postal enterprises could partly enjoy these profits produced by themselves which characterizes postal services business as a private goods. However, other parties besides captioned enterprises could also get benefits which marks its nonexcludability. To be more exactly, postal industry could be defined as a Quasi Public Goods, its essential nature decides that postal services should be provided by state-owned departments.
At the same time, universal service theory sets an objective that is to ensure the public, almost all users in all territories could afford the reasonable price for quality postal services, and in order to achieve this goal, enterprises within the industry should have well-covered network which emphasizes postal industry’s natural monopoly and highlights the necessity of being monopoly. On the other hand, with the development of contestable markets theory and natural monopoly, some scientists began to realize that features scope economy carrying by postal services network is neither compulsory nor necessary.
Under such circumstances, the pursuit for social efficiency and high quality services non-evitable lead to the deregulation and introduction of competition mechanisms in postal industry. Certainly government had to set principles and rules accordingly to ensure fair competition. Western scholars proposed incentive regulation from the prospective of government regulation, such as price cap, regional ruler competition, concession and bidding system, which had positive effects on enterprises in terms of cost control and efficiency enhancement.
2. Analysis on the typical modes of national postal reform
Australia post industry has gone through 3 times reforms which brought more competition to the letter market and helped to build up a kind of new relationship between postal corporations and the government whose focus has been shifted from routine supervision to strategic control. Australia Post now has been thoroughly commercialized and entered into the virtuous development track.
Swiss Post has stepped into the world’s leading class benefited from its unique reform through which monopoly has been broken and market has been opened up.
The similar reform also happened in New Zealand. After a series of tough restructuring, New Zealand Post has transformed from a loss-suffering, overstuffed, and ineffective government department to a quality service provider operating with profits and efficiency. To be concluded, the reform in New Zealand was a process of introducing market competition mechanism and commercial management to state-owned postal enterprises.
The U.K. established a complete regulatory system consisting of postal law, Post Industry Regulatory Commission and Postal Users Council in order to present a fair playing field and protect users’common interest.
German Post started the reform by clarifying its operating structure, rights and obligations at the very beginning, and then deepened the reform in means of adjusting marketing strategy with the development of global markets, at last it ended with successfully brand set-up and significantly enhancement of quality of service.
3. Comparison of international Postal reform model and the enlightenment to China Post
Many countries are circumspect and careful with the postal reform, since they are well recognized that the post services business plays an important role in the national economy. A postal reform in a country should be performed with its basic condition as well as international situation. At the same time, the liberalization of a country’s postal market need to be accordant with the development level of domestic post industry, local government’s capability of supervision and the market’s capacity should also be taken into consideration.
According to the incomplete statistics from the UPU, postal business is usually run by the combination of government and enterprises, which accounts for 30% of all its member states. Postal enterprises in most countries are in forms of state owned public or state owned joint-stock; only in a few countries they have been privatized.
Each country’s postal enterprises are obligated to provide universal services to its national users at an affordable price, and on the other hand, they have to suffer the high costs of operating the national-wide network. In such situation, governments issues relevant laws and preferential policies targeting to solve this problem. Generally, measures that are commonly taken include permits of industrial monopoly, provision of fiscal subsidies and tax preference, set-up of indemnification fund and other policy supports.
For Chinese postal industry, narrowing down postal franchising rights, gradually opening the market, introducing strategic investors and changing single structure of property rights are all necessary and important ways, if we are eyeing on long-term and sustainable development.
4. Analysis on China Post’s Reform
China post’s reform has referred to many different typical modes of other countries, and the development of our post industry has gone through several phases, such as the segmentation of posts from telecom operation, separation of government functions from enterprise management, commercialization and recombination.
With benefits from the reform, postal enterprises are now operating with clear strategy and a preliminary supervision system has been established. However, because of the principal agency relationship in current supervisory framework, the distribution of information among market player and executives is asymmetry.
In order to enhance the service efficiency of domestic postal enterprises, especially the universal services efficiency, the supervision system need to be further improved.
5. Static evaluation of Chinese Postal Reform
Chinese postal reformation is at critical stage now, so we should sum up both experience and defect based on which the reform will be continuingly taken forward. With the purpose stated above, this article analyses features of Chinese post industry and relevant theories, proposes to apply the quantitative evaluation method. The article use SCP method study from market structure, market behavior and market performance that create postal reform KPI and relative model than apply fuzzy evaluation and analytical hierarchy process concluded the static evaluation of postal reform. The result showed that China's marketing performance is very good, basically reached it's target that breakup of monopoly and introduced competition, but as postal market are enslaved to allocative efficiency and technical merit. The post market showed low market performance and low market behavior that is what we need to improve in the future reform.
6. Dynamic evaluation of Chinese Postal Reform
As SCP study can only show macroscopic level reform result so the article used data envelopment analysis' CRS model, VRS model and Malquist compared with 31 international post company's reform based on China post's 2003-2009 panel data. The result showed that the reform improved post's internal management, allocative efficiency, synthesis technique efficiency, scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency on microcosmic level.
7. Main innovation in the article
There are three main innovations in the article: 1.The article collected and concluded most of countries' reform model and experience in the world and then the article showed future directivity for China post's reform. 2. From macro-analysis the article use SCP, market structure, market behavior, market performance, multi-tiered analysis and fuzzy evaluation created a four level evaluation system. 3. From micro-analysis the article use data envelopment analysis, CRS model, VRS model and Malquist compared with 31 international post company's reform based on China post's 2003-2009 panel data static evaluated China Post's Reform.
引文
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