地方政府融资平台举债行为及其影响分析
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摘要
近些年来,美国次贷危机引起的金融危机对全世界经济产生了深远影响。为了应对金融危机,各国都用积极财政政策和量化宽松的货币政策来拉动经济增长。但是这种经济救助方式不但没有使经济复苏,反而使一些国家经济陷入更加衰退的地步,欧洲主权债务危机就是很好的例子。中国应对金融危机的方式与其他国家并没有什么不同,即依靠大量的信贷资金来支持投资计划,刺激经济增长速度。中国不仅很快从金融危机的阴霾中走出并创造了被世界称为“奇迹”的经济增长速度,并且表面上看中国政府的财政赤字和债务规模占GDP的比例均低于其它国家。在保持高速经济增长的同时,中国国内也出现了各种各样的社会问题,也一度被称为“走在十字路口”的中国。中国高速增长的事实也引发了学术界关于是否存在“中国模式”的热门讨论。由于所有这些现象背后是否有内在联系,看似错综复杂的经济现实引发了笔者浓厚的研究兴趣。通过对经济素材的搜集和对经济现实的思考积累后,我们把研究着眼点放在了融资平台上。
2008年金融危机发生后,中国政府出台了四万亿经济救助方案。这其中有1.18万亿元由中央政府提供,中央政府代地方政府发行2000亿元债券,其余则由地方政府配套。而地方政府由于受自身财政状况的约束,一时无法提供这么多的配套资金。2009年初,人民银行和银监会联合发布《关于进一步加强信贷结构调整促进国民经济平稳较快发展的指导意见》,其中指出：“支持有条件的地方政府组建投融资平台,发行企业债、中期票据等融资工具,拓宽中央政府投资项目的配套资金融资渠道”。在此文件指导下,融资平台如雨后春笋般发展起来。融资平台的产生看似偶然,其实也具有必然性。融资平台和我国经济转轨过程中其他有待完善的因素纠缠共生,所以研究融资平台问题不应该仅囿于融资平台本身,而应该立足我国经济发展现实,进行全面分析。由于融资平台和中国城市化进程紧密相关,从某种程度上可以说,融资平台开辟了独特的中国式城市建设模式。所以也希望从这个角度可以对中国经济发展脉络窥一斑而知全豹,对理解“中国模式”或者中国式城市建设模式起到抛砖引玉的作用。
对此,本文主要做了以下工作：
第一章为导论,主要介绍了文章选题背景、主要内容、研究意义、研究思路、研究方法、可能的创新点以及不足等,并重点就文章相关概念进行了界定。
第二章为文献综述与理论基础。文献综述主要在城市化中关于地方政府债务的研究、关于地方政府融资平台的研究、关于商业银行的研究、关于金融加速器的研究等几个方面对文献进行了梳理。理论基础部分重点介绍了公共选择理论、预算软约束理论、财政分权理论、委托-代理理论。在财政分权理论中,在分析从传统财政分权理论到市场维护型分权理论的演进后,重点分析了中国式财政分权的演化逻辑。
第三章为政府融资平台举债行为分析。本部分借鉴公共选择理论中的“铁三角”分析,利用中国现实中的“铁三角”即微观主体、中央政府和地方政府来分析地方政府举债行为。在此基础上指出融资平台举债中的“铁三角”是中央政府、地方政府和商业银行。之后基于中国现实分别从中央政府对地方政府的约束机制和商业银行和地方政府双冲动框架下分析融资平台举债行为。
第四章为纵向分析,即从中央和地方财政关系变迁中分析地方政府举债行为。主要从财政分权博弈和委托代理关系两方面来考察中央和地方关系变迁。在财政分权博弈中首先分析了在我国财政体制沿革下地方政府行为变化,即从财政包干制下的“经营企业”行为到分税制下的“经营城市”行为。之后建立理论模型论证了中央和地方财政博弈下地方政府举债行为,并基于融资平台在现实中的运转流程验证了理论分析结果。本章第二部分在中央和地方委托代理关系框架下分析了地方政府举债行为。
第五章为横向分析,分析了地方政府融资平台的信贷加速器效应。本部分在金融加速器思路指引下,把土地因素纳入到分析中来,基于我国现实建立了地方政府和商业银行双冲动下融资平台信贷加速器模型。在地方政府效用最大化分析中得到了地方政府分别具有投资冲动、征地冲动和举债冲动的命题,而基于政策性负担分析框架下的商业银行行为分析中得到商业银行具有放贷冲动的命题。在地方政府和商业银行双冲动下,融资平台具有信贷加速器效应。最后分别探讨了理论上和现实中的融资平台信贷加速器效应。
第六章为地方政府融资平台举债风险分析。本章分别分析了融资平台风险形成、偿债风险、风险转移和风险控制等方面。其中风险形成方面,分析了严重依赖土地因素形成融资风险、过度依赖银行信贷形成金融风险、地方政府担保缺乏法律效力形成法律风险三个方面。在偿债风险分析中,借鉴《马斯特里赫特条约》规定的债务临界值标准和地方政府偿债率作为衡量地方政府偿债能力的标准,并对地方政府财政收入和土地出让收入进行测算的基础上,计算融资平台偿债风险。地方政府融资平台风险转移是指融资平台风险的转嫁升级。首先融资平台风险可能由下向上转嫁,即由地方向中央转嫁,形成财政风险并倒逼中央银行发行货币,也可能由点向面升级,即由地方政府债务升级成宏观经济风险。按照金融加速器理论,经济中的微小冲击可能对宏观经济造成重大影响,以上风险若不能及时控制,可能引发金融危机甚至经济危机的发生。最后本章结合信贷加速器理论,分析了融资平台风险的可控性。
第七章为本文结论及相关政策建议。本文主要结论是在地方政府和商业银行双冲动下融资平台具有信贷加速器效应,并且信贷加速器效应可造成风险冲击。为了规避风险,文章最后从规范政府行为、规范商业银行行为、深化体制机制改革并完善相关政策规定、整顿地方政府融资平台、考虑发行市政债券几个方面提出相关政策建议。
In recent years, the financial crisis caused by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis has had a profound impact on the world economy. In order to rescue the financial crisis, many countries take advantage of active fiscal policy and quantitative easing monetary policy to stimulate economic growth. However, this economic rescue mode are not only failed to revive the economy, but causes some countries economy deeper into recession. The European sovereign debt crisis is a good example. China's response to the financial crisis is no different with other countries, which rely on a large number of credit funds to support the investment plan in order to stimulate the economic growth rate. But China quickly got rid of the financial crisis and maintain higher economic growth rate known as the "miracle". In the meantime both the Chinese government's budget deficit and the size of the debt to GDP ratio are lower than other countries. While maintaining higher rapid economic growth, there have been a variety of social problems in China. This phenomenon was once referred to as "a crossroads" in China. The miracle of China's rapid growth has also led to the popular discussion of the academic community about the existence of the "China model". Are all these phenomena intrinsically linked? We have keen interest in all these seemingly complex economic reality. Accumulated through the collection of economic material and economic realities thinking, we focus on the financing platforms.
After the2008financial crisis, the Chinese government introduced a4trillion economic program, of which1.18trillion provided by the central government, the central government on behalf of local governments to issue200billion in bonds, the rest is provided by the local government matching. Due to the constraints of their own financial situation, the local government can not provide so many matching funds in that time. In early2009, the PBOC and CBRC jointly issued "on further strengthening the credit structure adjustment to promote stable and rapid economic development of the guidance", which states that:"support qualified local government set up investment and financing platform, issue corporate bonds, medium-term notes and other financing instruments, to broaden the central government investment projects matching funds financing channels." Under the guidance of this document, Financing platforms have sprung up in a quickly way. Financing platform generation seemingly by chance, in fact, has its inevitability. In the process of economic transition in China, financing platform and other factors to be improved are entangled symbiosis. So research financing platform should not only confined to the financing platform itself, but should be based on the reality of China's economic development, to conduct a comprehensive analysis. The financing platform closely related to the urbanization process in China, so to some extent we can say that the financing platform opens up unique Chinese urban construction mode. In this point, we hope that we can know the context of China's economic development which was evident by the knowledge the whole picture. And those understandings play a valuable role in understanding of the "China model"or the unique Chinese urban construction mode.
In this regard, we mainly do the following work:
The first chapter is an introduction, which introduces the background, main content, significance, research ideas, research methods, possible innovation and weaknesses, and focus on defining related concepts in the articles.
The second chapter is the literature review and theoretical basis. Literature review combs literatures about the research about urbanization aspects of local government debt, the research about local government financing, the research about commercial banks and the research about financial accelerator literature. The theoretical basis mainly introduces the public choice theory, the soft budget constraint theory, the theory of fiscal decentralization and principal-agent theory. In the theory of fiscal decentralization, after analyzing the evolution of fiscal decentralization from the traditional theory of fiscal decentralization to the market-preserving theory of fiscal decentralization, this article analyses the evolution of the Chinese fiscal decentralization logic.
The third chapter analyses local government financing platform debit behavior. This section draws on the "iron triangle" of public choice theory, the realities of China's "iron triangle" means microscopic principal, central government and local governments to analyze the behavior of local government borrowing. On this basis, we point out that "iron triangle" of debt financing platform are central government, local government and commercial banks. Based on the realities of China from the central government to local governments' constraint mechanism and under the dual impulse of commercial banks and local governments we analyze the financing platform debt behavior.
The fourth chapter is longitudinal analyses, which analyze the behavior of local government borrowing from the changes in the financial relationship between central and local changes. The changes mainly include the financial game and the central and local principal-agent. In the financial game we first analyze the local government behavior changes under China's financial system evolution, the behavior from the "business enterprise" behavior under the tax-contracting system to "city management" behavior under the tax-sharing system. After the establishment of a theoretical model to analyze the local government debit behavior under the central and local governments financial game, we verify the theoretical analysis results based on the operation process of the financing platform in the reality. The second part of this chapter analyzes local government debt behavior in the central and local principal-agent framework.
The fifth chapter is horizontal analysis, which analyzes the credit accelerator effect of local government financing platform. This part is in the guidance of financial accelerator ideas, and put the land factors into the.analysis, based on the reality of China to establish credit financing platform accelerator model under local governments and commercial banks double impulse. Through local government utility maximization analysis we get propositions of that local government have investment impulse, the land acquisition impulses and debt impulsive. Through commercial banks behavior analysis based on the policy burden analysis we get propositions of that the commercial banks have lending impulse proposition. Under the double impulse of local governments and commercial banks, credit financing platform has accelerator effect. At the end of this part we explore the financing platform credit accelerator effect in theory and reality.
The sixth chapter is local government financing platform debt risks analysis. This chapter analyzes the risk of financing platform:the formation of the debt risk, insolvency risk, risk transfer and risk control. Risk of formation is divided into three aspects:the financing risks formed by heavily dependent on land factors, financial risks formed by over-reliance on bank credit, the legal risk formed by lack of local government guarantees.In the debt risk analysis, draw on the debt threshold standards prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty and local government debt service ratio as a measure of the local government solvency. On the basis of local government revenue and land revenue estimates, we calculated local government debt risk. The risk transfer of local government financing platform is the risk passed on financing platform upgrade. Local government financing platform to pass the upgrade risk mainly refers to local government debt passed on from the bottom up, from the local to the central pass a financial risk and forced central bank to issue currency, may also be upgraded from the point to the surface, that is, by the local government debt upgrade into macroeconomic risks. In accordance with the financial accelerator theory, small economic impact may have a significant impact on the macroeconomy; all the risks if not controlled in time, may lead to financial crisis and even economic crises. At end of this part, combined the credit accelerator theory, we analyze the controllability of the financing platform risk.
The seventh chapter is conclusions and policy recommendations. The main conclusions of this paper is that under the double impulse of local governments and commercial banks financing platform has a credit accelerator effect, and the credit accelerator effect can cause a risk of shock. In order to avoid risks, this article finally makes related policy recommendations as follows:standardize government behavior, standardize the behavior of commercial banks, deepen the reform of institutional mechanisms and improve the relevant policies and regulations, to rectify local government financing platform, several aspects relevant policy recommendations to consider the issuance of municipal bonds.
2008年金融危机发生后,中国政府出台了四万亿经济救助方案。这其中有1.18万亿元由中央政府提供,中央政府代地方政府发行2000亿元债券,其余则由地方政府配套。而地方政府由于受自身财政状况的约束,一时无法提供这么多的配套资金。2009年初,人民银行和银监会联合发布《关于进一步加强信贷结构调整促进国民经济平稳较快发展的指导意见》,其中指出：“支持有条件的地方政府组建投融资平台,发行企业债、中期票据等融资工具,拓宽中央政府投资项目的配套资金融资渠道”。在此文件指导下,融资平台如雨后春笋般发展起来。融资平台的产生看似偶然,其实也具有必然性。融资平台和我国经济转轨过程中其他有待完善的因素纠缠共生,所以研究融资平台问题不应该仅囿于融资平台本身,而应该立足我国经济发展现实,进行全面分析。由于融资平台和中国城市化进程紧密相关,从某种程度上可以说,融资平台开辟了独特的中国式城市建设模式。所以也希望从这个角度可以对中国经济发展脉络窥一斑而知全豹,对理解“中国模式”或者中国式城市建设模式起到抛砖引玉的作用。
对此,本文主要做了以下工作：
第一章为导论,主要介绍了文章选题背景、主要内容、研究意义、研究思路、研究方法、可能的创新点以及不足等,并重点就文章相关概念进行了界定。
第二章为文献综述与理论基础。文献综述主要在城市化中关于地方政府债务的研究、关于地方政府融资平台的研究、关于商业银行的研究、关于金融加速器的研究等几个方面对文献进行了梳理。理论基础部分重点介绍了公共选择理论、预算软约束理论、财政分权理论、委托-代理理论。在财政分权理论中,在分析从传统财政分权理论到市场维护型分权理论的演进后,重点分析了中国式财政分权的演化逻辑。
第三章为政府融资平台举债行为分析。本部分借鉴公共选择理论中的“铁三角”分析,利用中国现实中的“铁三角”即微观主体、中央政府和地方政府来分析地方政府举债行为。在此基础上指出融资平台举债中的“铁三角”是中央政府、地方政府和商业银行。之后基于中国现实分别从中央政府对地方政府的约束机制和商业银行和地方政府双冲动框架下分析融资平台举债行为。
第四章为纵向分析,即从中央和地方财政关系变迁中分析地方政府举债行为。主要从财政分权博弈和委托代理关系两方面来考察中央和地方关系变迁。在财政分权博弈中首先分析了在我国财政体制沿革下地方政府行为变化,即从财政包干制下的“经营企业”行为到分税制下的“经营城市”行为。之后建立理论模型论证了中央和地方财政博弈下地方政府举债行为,并基于融资平台在现实中的运转流程验证了理论分析结果。本章第二部分在中央和地方委托代理关系框架下分析了地方政府举债行为。
第五章为横向分析,分析了地方政府融资平台的信贷加速器效应。本部分在金融加速器思路指引下,把土地因素纳入到分析中来,基于我国现实建立了地方政府和商业银行双冲动下融资平台信贷加速器模型。在地方政府效用最大化分析中得到了地方政府分别具有投资冲动、征地冲动和举债冲动的命题,而基于政策性负担分析框架下的商业银行行为分析中得到商业银行具有放贷冲动的命题。在地方政府和商业银行双冲动下,融资平台具有信贷加速器效应。最后分别探讨了理论上和现实中的融资平台信贷加速器效应。
第六章为地方政府融资平台举债风险分析。本章分别分析了融资平台风险形成、偿债风险、风险转移和风险控制等方面。其中风险形成方面,分析了严重依赖土地因素形成融资风险、过度依赖银行信贷形成金融风险、地方政府担保缺乏法律效力形成法律风险三个方面。在偿债风险分析中,借鉴《马斯特里赫特条约》规定的债务临界值标准和地方政府偿债率作为衡量地方政府偿债能力的标准,并对地方政府财政收入和土地出让收入进行测算的基础上,计算融资平台偿债风险。地方政府融资平台风险转移是指融资平台风险的转嫁升级。首先融资平台风险可能由下向上转嫁,即由地方向中央转嫁,形成财政风险并倒逼中央银行发行货币,也可能由点向面升级,即由地方政府债务升级成宏观经济风险。按照金融加速器理论,经济中的微小冲击可能对宏观经济造成重大影响,以上风险若不能及时控制,可能引发金融危机甚至经济危机的发生。最后本章结合信贷加速器理论,分析了融资平台风险的可控性。
第七章为本文结论及相关政策建议。本文主要结论是在地方政府和商业银行双冲动下融资平台具有信贷加速器效应,并且信贷加速器效应可造成风险冲击。为了规避风险,文章最后从规范政府行为、规范商业银行行为、深化体制机制改革并完善相关政策规定、整顿地方政府融资平台、考虑发行市政债券几个方面提出相关政策建议。
In recent years, the financial crisis caused by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis has had a profound impact on the world economy. In order to rescue the financial crisis, many countries take advantage of active fiscal policy and quantitative easing monetary policy to stimulate economic growth. However, this economic rescue mode are not only failed to revive the economy, but causes some countries economy deeper into recession. The European sovereign debt crisis is a good example. China's response to the financial crisis is no different with other countries, which rely on a large number of credit funds to support the investment plan in order to stimulate the economic growth rate. But China quickly got rid of the financial crisis and maintain higher economic growth rate known as the "miracle". In the meantime both the Chinese government's budget deficit and the size of the debt to GDP ratio are lower than other countries. While maintaining higher rapid economic growth, there have been a variety of social problems in China. This phenomenon was once referred to as "a crossroads" in China. The miracle of China's rapid growth has also led to the popular discussion of the academic community about the existence of the "China model". Are all these phenomena intrinsically linked? We have keen interest in all these seemingly complex economic reality. Accumulated through the collection of economic material and economic realities thinking, we focus on the financing platforms.
After the2008financial crisis, the Chinese government introduced a4trillion economic program, of which1.18trillion provided by the central government, the central government on behalf of local governments to issue200billion in bonds, the rest is provided by the local government matching. Due to the constraints of their own financial situation, the local government can not provide so many matching funds in that time. In early2009, the PBOC and CBRC jointly issued "on further strengthening the credit structure adjustment to promote stable and rapid economic development of the guidance", which states that:"support qualified local government set up investment and financing platform, issue corporate bonds, medium-term notes and other financing instruments, to broaden the central government investment projects matching funds financing channels." Under the guidance of this document, Financing platforms have sprung up in a quickly way. Financing platform generation seemingly by chance, in fact, has its inevitability. In the process of economic transition in China, financing platform and other factors to be improved are entangled symbiosis. So research financing platform should not only confined to the financing platform itself, but should be based on the reality of China's economic development, to conduct a comprehensive analysis. The financing platform closely related to the urbanization process in China, so to some extent we can say that the financing platform opens up unique Chinese urban construction mode. In this point, we hope that we can know the context of China's economic development which was evident by the knowledge the whole picture. And those understandings play a valuable role in understanding of the "China model"or the unique Chinese urban construction mode.
In this regard, we mainly do the following work:
The first chapter is an introduction, which introduces the background, main content, significance, research ideas, research methods, possible innovation and weaknesses, and focus on defining related concepts in the articles.
The second chapter is the literature review and theoretical basis. Literature review combs literatures about the research about urbanization aspects of local government debt, the research about local government financing, the research about commercial banks and the research about financial accelerator literature. The theoretical basis mainly introduces the public choice theory, the soft budget constraint theory, the theory of fiscal decentralization and principal-agent theory. In the theory of fiscal decentralization, after analyzing the evolution of fiscal decentralization from the traditional theory of fiscal decentralization to the market-preserving theory of fiscal decentralization, this article analyses the evolution of the Chinese fiscal decentralization logic.
The third chapter analyses local government financing platform debit behavior. This section draws on the "iron triangle" of public choice theory, the realities of China's "iron triangle" means microscopic principal, central government and local governments to analyze the behavior of local government borrowing. On this basis, we point out that "iron triangle" of debt financing platform are central government, local government and commercial banks. Based on the realities of China from the central government to local governments' constraint mechanism and under the dual impulse of commercial banks and local governments we analyze the financing platform debt behavior.
The fourth chapter is longitudinal analyses, which analyze the behavior of local government borrowing from the changes in the financial relationship between central and local changes. The changes mainly include the financial game and the central and local principal-agent. In the financial game we first analyze the local government behavior changes under China's financial system evolution, the behavior from the "business enterprise" behavior under the tax-contracting system to "city management" behavior under the tax-sharing system. After the establishment of a theoretical model to analyze the local government debit behavior under the central and local governments financial game, we verify the theoretical analysis results based on the operation process of the financing platform in the reality. The second part of this chapter analyzes local government debt behavior in the central and local principal-agent framework.
The fifth chapter is horizontal analysis, which analyzes the credit accelerator effect of local government financing platform. This part is in the guidance of financial accelerator ideas, and put the land factors into the.analysis, based on the reality of China to establish credit financing platform accelerator model under local governments and commercial banks double impulse. Through local government utility maximization analysis we get propositions of that local government have investment impulse, the land acquisition impulses and debt impulsive. Through commercial banks behavior analysis based on the policy burden analysis we get propositions of that the commercial banks have lending impulse proposition. Under the double impulse of local governments and commercial banks, credit financing platform has accelerator effect. At the end of this part we explore the financing platform credit accelerator effect in theory and reality.
The sixth chapter is local government financing platform debt risks analysis. This chapter analyzes the risk of financing platform:the formation of the debt risk, insolvency risk, risk transfer and risk control. Risk of formation is divided into three aspects:the financing risks formed by heavily dependent on land factors, financial risks formed by over-reliance on bank credit, the legal risk formed by lack of local government guarantees.In the debt risk analysis, draw on the debt threshold standards prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty and local government debt service ratio as a measure of the local government solvency. On the basis of local government revenue and land revenue estimates, we calculated local government debt risk. The risk transfer of local government financing platform is the risk passed on financing platform upgrade. Local government financing platform to pass the upgrade risk mainly refers to local government debt passed on from the bottom up, from the local to the central pass a financial risk and forced central bank to issue currency, may also be upgraded from the point to the surface, that is, by the local government debt upgrade into macroeconomic risks. In accordance with the financial accelerator theory, small economic impact may have a significant impact on the macroeconomy; all the risks if not controlled in time, may lead to financial crisis and even economic crises. At end of this part, combined the credit accelerator theory, we analyze the controllability of the financing platform risk.
The seventh chapter is conclusions and policy recommendations. The main conclusions of this paper is that under the double impulse of local governments and commercial banks financing platform has a credit accelerator effect, and the credit accelerator effect can cause a risk of shock. In order to avoid risks, this article finally makes related policy recommendations as follows:standardize government behavior, standardize the behavior of commercial banks, deepen the reform of institutional mechanisms and improve the relevant policies and regulations, to rectify local government financing platform, several aspects relevant policy recommendations to consider the issuance of municipal bonds.
引文
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8 根据民法通则第84条。
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45 转引自：何杨,满燕云.地方融资平台债务：规模、风险与治理.财政研究,2012(2)：35.
53 中国人民银行货币政策分析小组.2010年中国区域金融运行报告.2011-6-1.
54 据2010年7月20日银监会召开的今年第三次经济金融形势通报会议。
55 包括四大银行和交通银行。
56‘中国银行业监督管理委员会.2010年商业银行不良贷款情况表.http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home,docViewPage/110009.html,2011-1-24.
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64 《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》,国发[1993]85号。
70 1950年3月,政务院先后颁布《关于统一全国财政经济工作的决定》、《关于统一管理1950年度财政收支的决定》,决定在财政收支方面,实行统收统支。
71 主要指国家财政系统实行分级管理,分为中央级、大行政区级、省(市)级三级财政。
92 《查处土地违法行为立案标准》,国土资源部第176号文件,2005年8月31 日。
93 本表转引自：李尚蒲,罗必良.中央与j地方博弈：来白1999-2009年土地审批与违法用地的证据.第1一届中国制度经济学年会论文汇编(上)》.2011-10-27.
99 如鄂尔多斯、贵阳、三亚、常州等。具休报道可见：内地鬼城蔓延,如何拯救空城。http://www.bankrate.com.cn/a_2013_0225_88876.html,2013-2-25。中国内地“鬼城”蔓延,媒体预测复活最长或需上百年。http://www.s1979.com/ca.jing/loushi/20130212577474125.shtml,2013-2-25。
100 北京土地热降温,去年卖地收入跌45%。http://finance.eastday.com/economic/ml/20130123/u1a7150004.html.2013-1-23。
102 在此,并未把中央转移支付计算在内。因为当中央面临地方政府债务时,首先会考虑偿还债务,之后才会向地方政府转移支付(刘蓉,黄洪,2012)。
103 具体测算方法见中国国际金融有限公司.在发展中动态解决问题,地方政府融资平台贷款风险可控.2010-3-11.
106 具体见以下报道：我国货币供应量逼近100万亿,货币超发通近虏价。http://finance.qq.com/a/20130311/001008.htm。2013-3-11。今年货币应量近万亿,专家争议超发货币去向。http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-11/20,c_123973434-htm.2012-11-20。
107 中国金融：各银行大举延期地方政府巨额债务。http://cn.reuters.com/article/macroeconomicsNews/idCNL4S0AZlUF20130130?feedType=RSS&feedName=mac roeconomicsNews。2013-1-30。
108 土地违法具体定义详见5.2节分析。
109 卫星监测城市新增建设用地50%以上违法占用农地。中华人民共和国中央政府门户网站。http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-10/11/content_774331.htm。2007-10-11。
110 我国现在的《土地管理法》规定,土地补偿费和安置补助费的总和不得超过土地被征用前3年平均年产值的30倍,根据有关专家的测算,农民一亩地的最高补偿一般不超过6万元,折合每平方米不足100元,这显然和土地的实际市场价值相差甚远。由于征地补偿标准严重不合理,2012年11月底召开的国务院常务会议上,讨论通过了《中华人民共和国土地管理法修正案(草案)》,对农民集体所有土地征收补偿制度做了修改,拟提高征地补偿标准。
111 如发生在2011年引起社会广泛关注的乌坎事件,详见报道：广东陆丰数百村民不满土地出让聚集市政府上访。http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-11-22/055923503179.shtml。2011-11-12。近期媒体报道的广东上浦村,详见报道：广东上浦村：下一个乌坎?http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001049254.2013-3-5。
112 如凤凰网报道,河南周口：平坟不会停止,省委省政府都很认可。http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_11/22/19417574_0.shtml,2012-11-12。腾讯网报道,彝良农妇跪防总理被拘,警方称其影响恶劣。http://news.qq.com/a/20121122/000240.htm,2012-11-12。人民日报：征地拆迁何太急,多替农民想一想。http://www.cnr.cn/gundong/201207/t20120715_510224582.shtml,2012-07-05。
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43 审计署.全国地方政府性债务审计结果.http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-06/27/content_1893782.htm, 2011-6-27.
44 地方政府债务规模惊人,据估算己达财政收入3倍.中国经济时报,http://www.360doc.com/content/12/0515/19/4957406_21,2010-7-5.
45 转引自：何杨,满燕云.地方融资平台债务：规模、风险与治理.财政研究,2012(2)：35.
53 中国人民银行货币政策分析小组.2010年中国区域金融运行报告.2011-6-1.
54 据2010年7月20日银监会召开的今年第三次经济金融形势通报会议。
55 包括四大银行和交通银行。
56‘中国银行业监督管理委员会.2010年商业银行不良贷款情况表.http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home,docViewPage/110009.html,2011-1-24.
59 [美]黄佩华,迪帕克等.中国：国家发展与地方财政.吴素萍、王桂娟等译.北京：中信出版社,2003,第30页.
60 王绍光.分权的底限.中国计划出版社,1997,笫17页.
61 王绍光.分权的底限.中国计划出版社,1997,第76页.
62 三绍光,胡鞍钢.关于中国国家能力的研究报告,集权与分权.经济科学出版社,1997,第12页.
64 《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》,国发[1993]85号。
70 1950年3月,政务院先后颁布《关于统一全国财政经济工作的决定》、《关于统一管理1950年度财政收支的决定》,决定在财政收支方面,实行统收统支。
71 主要指国家财政系统实行分级管理,分为中央级、大行政区级、省(市)级三级财政。
92 《查处土地违法行为立案标准》,国土资源部第176号文件,2005年8月31 日。
93 本表转引自：李尚蒲,罗必良.中央与j地方博弈：来白1999-2009年土地审批与违法用地的证据.第1一届中国制度经济学年会论文汇编(上)》.2011-10-27.
99 如鄂尔多斯、贵阳、三亚、常州等。具休报道可见：内地鬼城蔓延,如何拯救空城。http://www.bankrate.com.cn/a_2013_0225_88876.html,2013-2-25。中国内地“鬼城”蔓延,媒体预测复活最长或需上百年。http://www.s1979.com/ca.jing/loushi/20130212577474125.shtml,2013-2-25。
100 北京土地热降温,去年卖地收入跌45%。http://finance.eastday.com/economic/ml/20130123/u1a7150004.html.2013-1-23。
102 在此,并未把中央转移支付计算在内。因为当中央面临地方政府债务时,首先会考虑偿还债务,之后才会向地方政府转移支付(刘蓉,黄洪,2012)。
103 具体测算方法见中国国际金融有限公司.在发展中动态解决问题,地方政府融资平台贷款风险可控.2010-3-11.
106 具体见以下报道：我国货币供应量逼近100万亿,货币超发通近虏价。http://finance.qq.com/a/20130311/001008.htm。2013-3-11。今年货币应量近万亿,专家争议超发货币去向。http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-11/20,c_123973434-htm.2012-11-20。
107 中国金融：各银行大举延期地方政府巨额债务。http://cn.reuters.com/article/macroeconomicsNews/idCNL4S0AZlUF20130130?feedType=RSS&feedName=mac roeconomicsNews。2013-1-30。
108 土地违法具体定义详见5.2节分析。
109 卫星监测城市新增建设用地50%以上违法占用农地。中华人民共和国中央政府门户网站。http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-10/11/content_774331.htm。2007-10-11。
110 我国现在的《土地管理法》规定,土地补偿费和安置补助费的总和不得超过土地被征用前3年平均年产值的30倍,根据有关专家的测算,农民一亩地的最高补偿一般不超过6万元,折合每平方米不足100元,这显然和土地的实际市场价值相差甚远。由于征地补偿标准严重不合理,2012年11月底召开的国务院常务会议上,讨论通过了《中华人民共和国土地管理法修正案(草案)》,对农民集体所有土地征收补偿制度做了修改,拟提高征地补偿标准。
111 如发生在2011年引起社会广泛关注的乌坎事件,详见报道：广东陆丰数百村民不满土地出让聚集市政府上访。http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-11-22/055923503179.shtml。2011-11-12。近期媒体报道的广东上浦村,详见报道：广东上浦村：下一个乌坎?http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001049254.2013-3-5。
112 如凤凰网报道,河南周口：平坟不会停止,省委省政府都很认可。http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_11/22/19417574_0.shtml,2012-11-12。腾讯网报道,彝良农妇跪防总理被拘,警方称其影响恶劣。http://news.qq.com/a/20121122/000240.htm,2012-11-12。人民日报：征地拆迁何太急,多替农民想一想。http://www.cnr.cn/gundong/201207/t20120715_510224582.shtml,2012-07-05。
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