政府管制下的国有企业高管激励机制研究
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摘要
对公司高管人员进行有效的激励和约束是实现经理与股东利益一致，降低代理成本、提升公司价值的主要途径之一。自改革开放以来，随着社会主义市场经济体制的逐步完善，我国国有企业高管人员的激励契约也逐渐从计划经济体制向市场化方向迈进。目前转型时期，国有企业高管激励机制在政府管制的背景下还存在许多问题。政府对国有企业的干预以及公司治理结构的不完善都使得市场化的激励契约难以有效实施。因此，分析当前政府管制下的国有企业高管激励机制的现状以及存在的问题将为未来高管激励机制的改革提供出路。
本文在对国内外文献回顾的基础上，结合我国国有企业高管薪酬激励的制度背景，就国有企业高管货币薪酬激励与隐性激励机制进行了深入的分析。文章主要以2003年之后国务院国有资产监督管理委员会颁布的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》和《中央企业负责人薪酬管理暂行办法》为基点，以2003年之后的国有上市公司数据为样本就政府管制下的国有企业高管薪酬出现的刚性现象以及当前国有企业高管薪酬激励机制的有效性作了详细的分析。在此基础之上，本文利用最优契约设计的方法探讨了政府管制下的国有企业高管自利行为对薪酬契约的影响，并结合实证研究检验了薪酬管制和管理层权力对国有企业高管隐性收益的影响。论文的主要内容体现在以下几个方面：
①论文将我国国有企业高管薪酬制度改革的历程划分为三个阶段，回顾各阶段的相关法律政策对国有企业收入分配的影响。进一步以我国1999-2010年国有上市公司数据为样本对高管薪酬总体现状、地区差异、行业差异、公司规模差异和国有与民营企业差异进行了全面的统计分析。通过对国有上市公司高管薪酬激励的现状分析，指出当前我国国有企业高管薪酬激励的特点和存在的问题。
②论文基于我国国有企业高管薪酬激励的制度背景，认为公司外部政府干预会导致一对一的薪酬契约无法施行，也模糊了高管薪酬与业绩之间的联系。另一方面，公司内部公司治理结构的不完善会导致管理层权力过大，高管利用手中权力谋取个人私利成为可能。本文具体以2005-2010年我国国有上市公司为样本，实证研究发现政府管制、管理层权力会导致国有企业高管薪酬产生刚性现象。政府管制导致国有企业高管薪酬不仅具有向下的刚性，也具有向上的刚性。另一方面，高管利用手中权力影响了自身薪酬契约，导致薪酬具有向下的刚性和向上的弹性。
③公司投资活动是高管作出的重要财务决策之一，是联系高管薪酬与公司价值之间的桥梁。分析高管日常经营活动中的重要财务决策行为对公司当前及未来业绩的交互影响，以及进一步对自身薪酬的影响能够更进一步说明高管薪酬契约是否有效。本文基于公司资本投资视角，检验了当前我国上市公司高管薪酬激励是否有效。选取2004-2010年上市公司数据为样本，基于内生视角检验了高管薪酬激励机制与公司投资行为之间的交互关系。研究发现公司资本投资与高管薪酬之间存在交互影响。公司投资活动通过公司会计业绩显著地影响了高管薪酬水平。而基于会计业绩的高管薪酬契约无法对高管长期投资活动产生激励作用，基于股票和期权的激励机制能够显著地提高公司投资强度。
④高管隐性激励机制是高管激励机制的组成之一，尤其是在当前国有企业薪酬管制的背景下，隐性激励机制可能成为高管激励机制的替代形式。论文主要在线性契约委托代理模型中引入代理人的自利行为，包括代理人的隐藏收益和在职消费行为。通过理论模型和数值分析发现，代理人隐藏、转移收益自利行为降低了最优激励契约业绩薪酬系数。代理人在职消费自利行为提高了最优激励契约业绩薪酬系数。说明代理人不同自利行为下，委托人提供的最优激励契约是不同的。从代理人的最优努力程度来看，代理人的自利行为不同程度地提高了自身的努力水平。
⑤论文以我国国有企业在政府干预下出现的高管激励机制扭曲为线索，说明政府管制下高管激励机制可能会出现异化，替代性的隐性激励机制可能成为高管自我激励的表现。论文具体以2004-2010年国有上市公司为样本，实证检验了政府薪酬管制、高管控制权力对国有企业高管隐性收益的影响，包括超额成本费用、超额在职消费，并分析国有企业高管隐性收益的价值效应。本文研究发现政府薪酬管制的结果导致国有企业高管隐性收益增加，并且权力越大的管理者通过权力寻租获取的隐性收益也越大，高管隐性收益显著地降低了公司价值。
基于论文的主要研究内容，本文的研究特色与创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面：
①本文基于我国国有企业高管薪酬激励的制度背景，从国有企业外部政府管制以及内部管理层权力两个视角通过理论和实证分析合理解释了国有企业高管薪酬产生的刚性现象。当前研究政府管制下的国有企业高管激励机制文献并不多见。此外，已有研究也并未对高管薪酬产生的刚性现象做出解释。本文研究合理地诠释了我国国有企业高管薪酬刚性产生的原因，丰富了政府管制的经济后果相关研究以及为管理层权力理论领域的研究增添了新证据。
②已有高管薪酬激励有效性的研究大都是基于高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的敏感性来分析，因此缺乏高管薪酬与公司绩效背后内在机理的研究。本文从公司资本投资更短的价值链分析了高管薪酬激励的有效性，以及考虑了高管激励与公司投资之间可能存在内生关系，通过建立联立方程模型实证检验了高管激励与公司投资之间的关系。研究结论更进一步说明了公司财务活动、公司业绩和高管薪酬之间的内在联系。
③基于我国国有企业薪酬管制的背景，高管激励机制可能产生扭曲，替代性的隐形激励机制成为高管自我激励的源泉。本文在线性契约委托代理框架中引入代理人的自利行为，主要从隐藏收益和在职消费两种自利行为视角分析代理人的自利行为对最优激励契约设计的影响。本文对最优激励契约设计的研究进行了拓展，并说明了委托人提供的激励契约需要考虑代理人的自利行为。通过理论模型分析表明在当前我国企业薪酬激励制度的背景下，代理人的自利行为可能表现为一种自我激励机制。
④目前直接研究高管隐性收益的实证研究文献并不多，并且已有研究主要体现在高管特权、额外津贴等职务消费研究上。本文尝试以国有相比民营上市公司的超额成本费用和超额在职消费来间接衡量高管获得的隐性收益大小，并实证检验了政府薪酬管制和高管控制权力对国有企业高管隐性收益的影响以及高管隐性收益激励的价值效应。本文对高管隐性激励契约的研究进行了拓展，为高管隐形收益方面的研究增添了新的研究成果。
Effective incentives and restraint is one of the main ways to bring managers’interests into correspondence with shareholders’, that can reduce agency costs andenhance the value of the corporation. With the improvement of the socialist marketeconomic system since the reform and opening up, executives incentive contracttransformed from planned economy to market-oriented direction in state-ownedenterprises. Under the government regulation, executives incentive mechanisms stillhave many problems in the transition period. Government intervention and imperfectcorporate governance make the market-oriented incentive contract difficult toimplement. Therefore, the analysis of the current situation and existing problems willprovide a way out for future executives incentive mechanisms reform.
Based on the literature review and the institutional background of executivesincentive mechanisms, this paper deeply analyses executives compensation and theimplicit incentives. After SASAC issued “Interim Procedures of Business PerformanceEvaluation for Central State-Owned Enterprises Principal” and “Interim Procedures ofCompensation Administration for Central State-Owned Enterprises Principal”, thispaper analyses the phenomenon of executive compensation rigidity under thegovernment regulation and the effect of executives incentive mechanisms by using thedata of listed company after2003. On this basis, this paper uses Optimal ContractDesign method to analyse the influence of executives selfish behaviors on executivesincentive mechanisms and uses empirical studies to analyse the influence ofcompensation regulation and managerial power on executives incentive mechanisms.The main content of the paper has the following several aspects.
(1) This paper divides the course of the reform of executives incentive mechanismsinto three stages and reviews the relevant laws and policies on income distribution ofstate-owned enterprises. Further, this paper provides comprehensive statistical analysison the overall current situation of executive compensation, regional differences,industry differences, differences in corporation size and state-owned and privateenterprises differences. Through analysing on the current situation of executivecompensation incentives in state-owned listed company, this paper points out thecharacteristics and existing problems of state-owned enterprises executives incentive.
(2) Based on the institutional background of executives incentive mechanisms, this paper argues that as a result of government intervention, market-oriented compensationcontract can not be done. That also blurs the correlation between executivecompensation and performance. On the other hand, the imperfection of internalcorporate governance structure will lead to excessive managerial power. It is possible touse their power to seek personal gain. This paper analyses the influence of governmentregulation and managerial power on compensation rigidity by selecting the data ofstate-owned listed corporation from2005to2010. We find that executive compensationnot only has the downward rigidity, but also has the upward rigidity. Under theinfluence of managerial power, executive compensation not only has the downwardrigidity, but also has the upward elasticity.
(3) Corporation investment is one of important financial decisions that theexecutives make. It is a bridge to connect with executive compensation and corporatevalue. Analyzing on the interaction between important financial decisions, current andfuture performance and executive compensation can further explains the effectivenessof executive compensation contracts. Based on the corporate capital investmentperspective, this paper examines the effectiveness of current executive compensationcontracts of listed companies. Based on endogeneity perspective, this paper examinesthe relationship between executive incentives and corporate investment, using the dataof listed companies from2004to2010. The study finds that there is an interactionbetween capital investment and executive compensation. Corporate investmentactivities significantly affect the level of executive compensation through the company'saccounting performance. Executive compensation contracts basing on accountingperformance can not stimulate long-term investment activities of the executives. Whilestock options can significantly improve the company's investment strength.
(4) Executive implicit incentive mechanisms may become an alternative form ofexecutive incentive mechanisms, especially in the institutional background ofcompensation regulation of state-owned enterprises. Introducing agent’s self-interestbehaviors into the linear contract principal-agent framework, this paper analyzes theeffect of agent’s self-interest behaviors on the optimal incentive contracts design fromtwo perspectives of hidden income and perks. By theoretical model and numericalanalysis, we find that agent’s hidden income behavior leads to the lower coefficient ofpay-performance sensitivity and agent’s perks behavior leads to the higher coefficient ofpay-performance sensitivity. It shows that the optimal incentive contracts which theprincipal provides depend on agent’s self-interest behaviors. In addition, agent’s self-interest behaviors improve the level of their own efforts to varying degrees.
(5) The government intervening in executive compensation distorts the enterpriseoriginal incentive mechanism. Alternative implicit private income may be managerialself-motivation. This paper analyses the influence of compensation regulation andmanagerial control power on executive implicit income and the value analysis ofexecutive implicit private income by selecting the data of state-owned enterprises from2004to2010, including excess costs and excess perks. We find that governmentcompensation regulation results in more implicit income of executives in thestate-owned enterprises. More managerial control power of executives leads to higherimplicit income by rent-seeking. In addition, we find that implicit income reduces thevalue of the corporation.
Based on the main research content, this paper has many characteristics andinnovations, as follows:
(1) Based on the institutional settings of executive incentive of state-ownedenterprises, this paper further explains that the government regulation and managerialpower may lead to executive compensation rigidity At present, there are not manystudies on executive incentive mechanisms of state-owned enterprises under thegovernment regulation. The current studies also have been unable to make a goodexplanation of executive compensation rigidity phenomenon in state-owned enterprises.This paper puts forward explains for compensation rigidity and evidences on theeconomic consequences of government regulation and the theory of managerial power.
(2) Existing executive compensation incentive effectiveness studies are mostlybased on the sensitivity between executive compensation and corporate performance.Therefore, it lacks to explain the internal mechanism of the executive compensation andcorporate performance. This paper analyses the effectiveness of executive compensationcontracts basing on capital investment and realizes the endogeneity between executivecompensation and capital investment. Through the establishment of the simultaneousequations model, we test the relationship between the executive incentive andinvestment. The research findings further illustrate the intrinsic link between thecompany's financial activities, company performance and executive compensation.
(3) Based on the institutional settings of executive regulation of state-ownedenterprises, executive incentive mechanisms may be distorted. So, executive implicitincentive alternatively become a source of self-motivation. Introducing agent’sself-interest behaviors into the linear contract principal-agent framework, this study analyzes the effect of agent’s self-interest behaviors on the optimal incentive contractsdesign from two perspectives of hidden income and perks. This paper expands thestudies on optimal incentive contract design. It shows that incentive contract which theprincipal provide should take agent’s self-interest behaviors into account. By modelanalysis, this paper shows that agent’s self-interest behaviors may be show as a kind ofself incentive mechanism under the institutional settings of executive incentivemechanisms of state-owned enterprises.
(4) At present, these is on many empirical studies on executive implicit income. Themain research are focus on executive privilege, additional allowances and so on. Thispaper examines the effect of government regulation and managerial power on executiveimplicit income which is measured by excess costs and excess perks. Moreover, it alsoprovides evidences on the effect of executive implicit incentive on corporate value. Thispaper expands the studies on executive implicit incentive contract and puts forward newresearch achievement for executive implicit incentive.
本文在对国内外文献回顾的基础上，结合我国国有企业高管薪酬激励的制度背景，就国有企业高管货币薪酬激励与隐性激励机制进行了深入的分析。文章主要以2003年之后国务院国有资产监督管理委员会颁布的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》和《中央企业负责人薪酬管理暂行办法》为基点，以2003年之后的国有上市公司数据为样本就政府管制下的国有企业高管薪酬出现的刚性现象以及当前国有企业高管薪酬激励机制的有效性作了详细的分析。在此基础之上，本文利用最优契约设计的方法探讨了政府管制下的国有企业高管自利行为对薪酬契约的影响，并结合实证研究检验了薪酬管制和管理层权力对国有企业高管隐性收益的影响。论文的主要内容体现在以下几个方面：
①论文将我国国有企业高管薪酬制度改革的历程划分为三个阶段，回顾各阶段的相关法律政策对国有企业收入分配的影响。进一步以我国1999-2010年国有上市公司数据为样本对高管薪酬总体现状、地区差异、行业差异、公司规模差异和国有与民营企业差异进行了全面的统计分析。通过对国有上市公司高管薪酬激励的现状分析，指出当前我国国有企业高管薪酬激励的特点和存在的问题。
②论文基于我国国有企业高管薪酬激励的制度背景，认为公司外部政府干预会导致一对一的薪酬契约无法施行，也模糊了高管薪酬与业绩之间的联系。另一方面，公司内部公司治理结构的不完善会导致管理层权力过大，高管利用手中权力谋取个人私利成为可能。本文具体以2005-2010年我国国有上市公司为样本，实证研究发现政府管制、管理层权力会导致国有企业高管薪酬产生刚性现象。政府管制导致国有企业高管薪酬不仅具有向下的刚性，也具有向上的刚性。另一方面，高管利用手中权力影响了自身薪酬契约，导致薪酬具有向下的刚性和向上的弹性。
③公司投资活动是高管作出的重要财务决策之一，是联系高管薪酬与公司价值之间的桥梁。分析高管日常经营活动中的重要财务决策行为对公司当前及未来业绩的交互影响，以及进一步对自身薪酬的影响能够更进一步说明高管薪酬契约是否有效。本文基于公司资本投资视角，检验了当前我国上市公司高管薪酬激励是否有效。选取2004-2010年上市公司数据为样本，基于内生视角检验了高管薪酬激励机制与公司投资行为之间的交互关系。研究发现公司资本投资与高管薪酬之间存在交互影响。公司投资活动通过公司会计业绩显著地影响了高管薪酬水平。而基于会计业绩的高管薪酬契约无法对高管长期投资活动产生激励作用，基于股票和期权的激励机制能够显著地提高公司投资强度。
④高管隐性激励机制是高管激励机制的组成之一，尤其是在当前国有企业薪酬管制的背景下，隐性激励机制可能成为高管激励机制的替代形式。论文主要在线性契约委托代理模型中引入代理人的自利行为，包括代理人的隐藏收益和在职消费行为。通过理论模型和数值分析发现，代理人隐藏、转移收益自利行为降低了最优激励契约业绩薪酬系数。代理人在职消费自利行为提高了最优激励契约业绩薪酬系数。说明代理人不同自利行为下，委托人提供的最优激励契约是不同的。从代理人的最优努力程度来看，代理人的自利行为不同程度地提高了自身的努力水平。
⑤论文以我国国有企业在政府干预下出现的高管激励机制扭曲为线索，说明政府管制下高管激励机制可能会出现异化，替代性的隐性激励机制可能成为高管自我激励的表现。论文具体以2004-2010年国有上市公司为样本，实证检验了政府薪酬管制、高管控制权力对国有企业高管隐性收益的影响，包括超额成本费用、超额在职消费，并分析国有企业高管隐性收益的价值效应。本文研究发现政府薪酬管制的结果导致国有企业高管隐性收益增加，并且权力越大的管理者通过权力寻租获取的隐性收益也越大，高管隐性收益显著地降低了公司价值。
基于论文的主要研究内容，本文的研究特色与创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面：
①本文基于我国国有企业高管薪酬激励的制度背景，从国有企业外部政府管制以及内部管理层权力两个视角通过理论和实证分析合理解释了国有企业高管薪酬产生的刚性现象。当前研究政府管制下的国有企业高管激励机制文献并不多见。此外，已有研究也并未对高管薪酬产生的刚性现象做出解释。本文研究合理地诠释了我国国有企业高管薪酬刚性产生的原因，丰富了政府管制的经济后果相关研究以及为管理层权力理论领域的研究增添了新证据。
②已有高管薪酬激励有效性的研究大都是基于高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的敏感性来分析，因此缺乏高管薪酬与公司绩效背后内在机理的研究。本文从公司资本投资更短的价值链分析了高管薪酬激励的有效性，以及考虑了高管激励与公司投资之间可能存在内生关系，通过建立联立方程模型实证检验了高管激励与公司投资之间的关系。研究结论更进一步说明了公司财务活动、公司业绩和高管薪酬之间的内在联系。
③基于我国国有企业薪酬管制的背景，高管激励机制可能产生扭曲，替代性的隐形激励机制成为高管自我激励的源泉。本文在线性契约委托代理框架中引入代理人的自利行为，主要从隐藏收益和在职消费两种自利行为视角分析代理人的自利行为对最优激励契约设计的影响。本文对最优激励契约设计的研究进行了拓展，并说明了委托人提供的激励契约需要考虑代理人的自利行为。通过理论模型分析表明在当前我国企业薪酬激励制度的背景下，代理人的自利行为可能表现为一种自我激励机制。
④目前直接研究高管隐性收益的实证研究文献并不多，并且已有研究主要体现在高管特权、额外津贴等职务消费研究上。本文尝试以国有相比民营上市公司的超额成本费用和超额在职消费来间接衡量高管获得的隐性收益大小，并实证检验了政府薪酬管制和高管控制权力对国有企业高管隐性收益的影响以及高管隐性收益激励的价值效应。本文对高管隐性激励契约的研究进行了拓展，为高管隐形收益方面的研究增添了新的研究成果。
Effective incentives and restraint is one of the main ways to bring managers’interests into correspondence with shareholders’, that can reduce agency costs andenhance the value of the corporation. With the improvement of the socialist marketeconomic system since the reform and opening up, executives incentive contracttransformed from planned economy to market-oriented direction in state-ownedenterprises. Under the government regulation, executives incentive mechanisms stillhave many problems in the transition period. Government intervention and imperfectcorporate governance make the market-oriented incentive contract difficult toimplement. Therefore, the analysis of the current situation and existing problems willprovide a way out for future executives incentive mechanisms reform.
Based on the literature review and the institutional background of executivesincentive mechanisms, this paper deeply analyses executives compensation and theimplicit incentives. After SASAC issued “Interim Procedures of Business PerformanceEvaluation for Central State-Owned Enterprises Principal” and “Interim Procedures ofCompensation Administration for Central State-Owned Enterprises Principal”, thispaper analyses the phenomenon of executive compensation rigidity under thegovernment regulation and the effect of executives incentive mechanisms by using thedata of listed company after2003. On this basis, this paper uses Optimal ContractDesign method to analyse the influence of executives selfish behaviors on executivesincentive mechanisms and uses empirical studies to analyse the influence ofcompensation regulation and managerial power on executives incentive mechanisms.The main content of the paper has the following several aspects.
(1) This paper divides the course of the reform of executives incentive mechanismsinto three stages and reviews the relevant laws and policies on income distribution ofstate-owned enterprises. Further, this paper provides comprehensive statistical analysison the overall current situation of executive compensation, regional differences,industry differences, differences in corporation size and state-owned and privateenterprises differences. Through analysing on the current situation of executivecompensation incentives in state-owned listed company, this paper points out thecharacteristics and existing problems of state-owned enterprises executives incentive.
(2) Based on the institutional background of executives incentive mechanisms, this paper argues that as a result of government intervention, market-oriented compensationcontract can not be done. That also blurs the correlation between executivecompensation and performance. On the other hand, the imperfection of internalcorporate governance structure will lead to excessive managerial power. It is possible touse their power to seek personal gain. This paper analyses the influence of governmentregulation and managerial power on compensation rigidity by selecting the data ofstate-owned listed corporation from2005to2010. We find that executive compensationnot only has the downward rigidity, but also has the upward rigidity. Under theinfluence of managerial power, executive compensation not only has the downwardrigidity, but also has the upward elasticity.
(3) Corporation investment is one of important financial decisions that theexecutives make. It is a bridge to connect with executive compensation and corporatevalue. Analyzing on the interaction between important financial decisions, current andfuture performance and executive compensation can further explains the effectivenessof executive compensation contracts. Based on the corporate capital investmentperspective, this paper examines the effectiveness of current executive compensationcontracts of listed companies. Based on endogeneity perspective, this paper examinesthe relationship between executive incentives and corporate investment, using the dataof listed companies from2004to2010. The study finds that there is an interactionbetween capital investment and executive compensation. Corporate investmentactivities significantly affect the level of executive compensation through the company'saccounting performance. Executive compensation contracts basing on accountingperformance can not stimulate long-term investment activities of the executives. Whilestock options can significantly improve the company's investment strength.
(4) Executive implicit incentive mechanisms may become an alternative form ofexecutive incentive mechanisms, especially in the institutional background ofcompensation regulation of state-owned enterprises. Introducing agent’s self-interestbehaviors into the linear contract principal-agent framework, this paper analyzes theeffect of agent’s self-interest behaviors on the optimal incentive contracts design fromtwo perspectives of hidden income and perks. By theoretical model and numericalanalysis, we find that agent’s hidden income behavior leads to the lower coefficient ofpay-performance sensitivity and agent’s perks behavior leads to the higher coefficient ofpay-performance sensitivity. It shows that the optimal incentive contracts which theprincipal provides depend on agent’s self-interest behaviors. In addition, agent’s self-interest behaviors improve the level of their own efforts to varying degrees.
(5) The government intervening in executive compensation distorts the enterpriseoriginal incentive mechanism. Alternative implicit private income may be managerialself-motivation. This paper analyses the influence of compensation regulation andmanagerial control power on executive implicit income and the value analysis ofexecutive implicit private income by selecting the data of state-owned enterprises from2004to2010, including excess costs and excess perks. We find that governmentcompensation regulation results in more implicit income of executives in thestate-owned enterprises. More managerial control power of executives leads to higherimplicit income by rent-seeking. In addition, we find that implicit income reduces thevalue of the corporation.
Based on the main research content, this paper has many characteristics andinnovations, as follows:
(1) Based on the institutional settings of executive incentive of state-ownedenterprises, this paper further explains that the government regulation and managerialpower may lead to executive compensation rigidity At present, there are not manystudies on executive incentive mechanisms of state-owned enterprises under thegovernment regulation. The current studies also have been unable to make a goodexplanation of executive compensation rigidity phenomenon in state-owned enterprises.This paper puts forward explains for compensation rigidity and evidences on theeconomic consequences of government regulation and the theory of managerial power.
(2) Existing executive compensation incentive effectiveness studies are mostlybased on the sensitivity between executive compensation and corporate performance.Therefore, it lacks to explain the internal mechanism of the executive compensation andcorporate performance. This paper analyses the effectiveness of executive compensationcontracts basing on capital investment and realizes the endogeneity between executivecompensation and capital investment. Through the establishment of the simultaneousequations model, we test the relationship between the executive incentive andinvestment. The research findings further illustrate the intrinsic link between thecompany's financial activities, company performance and executive compensation.
(3) Based on the institutional settings of executive regulation of state-ownedenterprises, executive incentive mechanisms may be distorted. So, executive implicitincentive alternatively become a source of self-motivation. Introducing agent’sself-interest behaviors into the linear contract principal-agent framework, this study analyzes the effect of agent’s self-interest behaviors on the optimal incentive contractsdesign from two perspectives of hidden income and perks. This paper expands thestudies on optimal incentive contract design. It shows that incentive contract which theprincipal provide should take agent’s self-interest behaviors into account. By modelanalysis, this paper shows that agent’s self-interest behaviors may be show as a kind ofself incentive mechanism under the institutional settings of executive incentivemechanisms of state-owned enterprises.
(4) At present, these is on many empirical studies on executive implicit income. Themain research are focus on executive privilege, additional allowances and so on. Thispaper examines the effect of government regulation and managerial power on executiveimplicit income which is measured by excess costs and excess perks. Moreover, it alsoprovides evidences on the effect of executive implicit incentive on corporate value. Thispaper expands the studies on executive implicit incentive contract and puts forward newresearch achievement for executive implicit incentive.
引文
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