公司治理结构中大股东非理性行为分析
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摘要
公司治理问题受到广泛关注以来便一直集中于委托-代理关系下所有者与经营者代理问题的理论研究,经营者“道德风险”的防范问题一直是公司治理问题的核心。实际上随着所有权从分散走向集中,大股东的治理活动已经越来越活跃,股东与董事会信任托管关系下所引发出来的大股东侵占小股东利益问题已经成为当前公司治理问题中的突出问题。在公司治理结构中操纵公司、掌握着公司控制权的大股东(控股股东)都普遍存在着侵占小股东利益的非理性行为,对大股东这种非理性行为进行研究对于提高公司治理绩效来说具有很重要的现实意义。大股东行为的动因是什么?影响大股东非理性行为程度的主要因素是哪些?本文通过收集相关资料、数据,利用国内、外专家的相关研究成果建立模型对以上问题分析得出:法律环境不同、股权结构不同,相应地大股东非理性行为的收敛程度也不同,它们之间存在着一种内在的、互动的耦合机制。为约束大股东的这种非理性行为,保护小股东的利益不受到大股东的侵害,提高公司的治理绩效,就必须加大法律环境、股权结构的完善力度,这对于在这两方面都还存在着严重缺陷的我国公司治理现状来说意义尤其重大。
Since the corporate governance to be extensive concerned, we always concentrate in the theories research of the proprietor and executive acts under the relation of entrust- act, the problem of the executive" the morals risk" guard against has been the core in the corporate governance.Actually with the concentration of ownership in listed firms, it comes the concentration of the control by the large shareholders. Under the trusteeship relation of the stockholders and the board of directors, the problem of the large shareholders usurping on small shareholders benefits have become more and more outstanding in current corporate governance. Large shareholders manipulate and control the company, and usurp on small stockholders benefits. In order to improve the performance of corporate governance, it is important to research on large shareholders' irrational behavior. What is the motivation of the large shareholders' ? Which is the main factor that affects the large shareholders' inept behavior ? The paper collected the related data, and made use of the related research result of the domestic, outside expert to establish model,and analyse the above problem: The legal institutions dissimilarity, the ownership structure is different, corresponding the degree of the large shareholders' inept behavior is also different, they exist a kind of inside and interactive mechanism.For controling the large shareholders' irrational behavior, protecting the benefits of the small shareholder, and improving the achievment of the company ,we must improve the legal institutions and the ownership structure, it is particularly important for our country corporate governance which exist the serious blemish in this both sideses .
Since the corporate governance to be extensive concerned, we always concentrate in the theories research of the proprietor and executive acts under the relation of entrust- act, the problem of the executive" the morals risk" guard against has been the core in the corporate governance.Actually with the concentration of ownership in listed firms, it comes the concentration of the control by the large shareholders. Under the trusteeship relation of the stockholders and the board of directors, the problem of the large shareholders usurping on small shareholders benefits have become more and more outstanding in current corporate governance. Large shareholders manipulate and control the company, and usurp on small stockholders benefits. In order to improve the performance of corporate governance, it is important to research on large shareholders' irrational behavior. What is the motivation of the large shareholders' ? Which is the main factor that affects the large shareholders' inept behavior ? The paper collected the related data, and made use of the related research result of the domestic, outside expert to establish model,and analyse the above problem: The legal institutions dissimilarity, the ownership structure is different, corresponding the degree of the large shareholders' inept behavior is also different, they exist a kind of inside and interactive mechanism.For controling the large shareholders' irrational behavior, protecting the benefits of the small shareholder, and improving the achievment of the company ,we must improve the legal institutions and the ownership structure, it is particularly important for our country corporate governance which exist the serious blemish in this both sideses .
引文
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[19] 李维安.公司治理.南开大学出版社,2001
[20] 李明辉.简述中小股东利益的保护.当代经济研究,2001,8
[21] 李永森.从制度上根除“恶东”。嘹望新闻周刊,2004,14
[22] 吕庆华.大股东治理的负面效应及其防范.山西财经大学学报,2003,8
[23] 彭亚敏.对公司治理结构和中小投资者利益保护机制的探讨.现代管理科学,2003,7
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[25] 瞿娟娟.保护小股东的利益刻不容缓.今日科技,2004,4
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[27] 饶育蕾.制度适应与市场博弈:企业资本结构的形成机理.经济科学出版社,2003
[28] 饶育蕾,胡徽.从上市公司治理结构分析我国《公司法》的缺陷.管理评论,2003,4
[29] 申尊焕.大股东补偿、激励与中小股东利益保护.贸易研究,2003,5
[30] 申淑芳,梁平,李伟奇.论《公司法》对公司治理结构的完善.经济论坛,2002,13
[31] 唐宗明,奚俊芳,蒋位.大股东侵害小股东的原因及影响分析.上海交通大学学报,2003,4
[32] 陶静燕,胡守忠.从“经济人”假设看国有企业治理问题.上海工程技术大学学报,2002,9
[33] 谭成武.公司法上小股东保护制度综述.商业研究,2004,7
[34] 王斌.股权结构论.中国财政经济出版社,2001
[35] 吴敬琏.控股股东行为与公司治理.中国审计,2001,8
[36] 夏冬林,钱苹.“搭便车”与公司治理结构中股东行为的分析.经济科学,2000,4
[37] 许辉.对上市公司控股股东侵占中小股东利益的探讨.中央财经大学学报,2003,9
[38] 余珂.《上市公司治理准则》将带来什么.经济月刊,2003,2
[39] 殷伟,王明照.公司治理中的大、小股东监督行为分析.工业技术经济,2002,6
[40] 周新德.论代理权争夺与公司治理的完善.学术交流,2003,2
[41] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996
[42] 张千帆,贺富强,张子刚,魏建国.小股东“搭便车”与利益受损的分析.武汉理工大学学报,2001,4
[43] 郑长德.投资者保护、公司治理与企业价值.西南民族学院学报,2002,8
[44] 郑德程,沈华珊,张晓顺.股权结构的理论、实践与创新.经济科学出版社,2003
[45] Berle & Means, The Modem Crporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York, 1932
[46] Clifford G. Holdemess, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, FRBNY Economic Policy Reuiew, 2001
[47] Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economy, 1985
[48] Fabrizio Barca, Some Views On U. S Corporate Governance, SSRN Working Paper, 2001
[49] La Porta et. al, Corprate Ownership Around the world, Journal of Finance, 1999
[50] La Porta et. al, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economics, 1998.
[51] Shleifer & vishny, A Surver of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 1997
[52] Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in East Asia: A Framework for Analysis
[2] 程宗璋.论我国公司经理权约束机制的路径思考.经济与管理研究,2002,6
[3] 曹廷求,刘呼声.大股东治理与公司治理效率.改革,2003,1
[4] 陈解生,王宛秋.不完善的公司治理结构与上市公司非理性财务行为.成人高教学刊,2004,3
[5] 陈清泰.改造控股股东,完善公司治理.经贸导刊,2001,12
[6] 陈爱蓓.股份公司控制股东的行为分析与权利制约.现代经济探讨,2002,8
[7] 董秀良,薛丰慧.股权结构、股东行为与核心代理问题研究.经济评论,2003,4
[8] 段亚林.监管控股股东滥用股权的博弈分析.工业经济,2000,5
[9] 丁根明.对小股东保护的法律理论依据的探讨.江苏市场经济,2001,2
[10] 冯根福,闫冰.公司股权的“市场结构”类型与股东治理行为.中国工业经济,2004,6
[11] 郭济环.论上市公司中小股东的公司法保护.龙岩师专学报,2002,4
[12] 何维达,宋胜洲,徐鸣.公司治理结构的理论与案例.经济科学出版社,1999
[13] 贺卫.寻租经济学.中国发展出版社,1999
[14] 蒋大兴.独立董事:在传统框架中行动?.法学评论,2003,2
[15] 贾生华,陈宏辉.全球化背景下公司治理模式的演进趋势分析.企业经营与管理,2003,1
[16] 李德林.德隆内幕.当代中国出版社,2004
[17] 郎咸平,张信东,周宏波,覃海波.德隆系:“类家族企业”中国模式.新财富,2001,2
[18] 刘彤.小股东权益与公司治理绩效改善.经济科学,2002,2
[19] 李维安.公司治理.南开大学出版社,2001
[20] 李明辉.简述中小股东利益的保护.当代经济研究,2001,8
[21] 李永森.从制度上根除“恶东”。嘹望新闻周刊,2004,14
[22] 吕庆华.大股东治理的负面效应及其防范.山西财经大学学报,2003,8
[23] 彭亚敏.对公司治理结构和中小投资者利益保护机制的探讨.现代管理科学,2003,7
[24] 钱颜文,姚波,吴政.股权结构、关联交易和公司治理制度安排.西安财经学院学报,2004,2
[25] 瞿娟娟.保护小股东的利益刻不容缓.今日科技,2004,4
[26] 饶育蕾,刘达锋.行为金融学.上海财经出版社,2003
[27] 饶育蕾.制度适应与市场博弈:企业资本结构的形成机理.经济科学出版社,2003
[28] 饶育蕾,胡徽.从上市公司治理结构分析我国《公司法》的缺陷.管理评论,2003,4
[29] 申尊焕.大股东补偿、激励与中小股东利益保护.贸易研究,2003,5
[30] 申淑芳,梁平,李伟奇.论《公司法》对公司治理结构的完善.经济论坛,2002,13
[31] 唐宗明,奚俊芳,蒋位.大股东侵害小股东的原因及影响分析.上海交通大学学报,2003,4
[32] 陶静燕,胡守忠.从“经济人”假设看国有企业治理问题.上海工程技术大学学报,2002,9
[33] 谭成武.公司法上小股东保护制度综述.商业研究,2004,7
[34] 王斌.股权结构论.中国财政经济出版社,2001
[35] 吴敬琏.控股股东行为与公司治理.中国审计,2001,8
[36] 夏冬林,钱苹.“搭便车”与公司治理结构中股东行为的分析.经济科学,2000,4
[37] 许辉.对上市公司控股股东侵占中小股东利益的探讨.中央财经大学学报,2003,9
[38] 余珂.《上市公司治理准则》将带来什么.经济月刊,2003,2
[39] 殷伟,王明照.公司治理中的大、小股东监督行为分析.工业技术经济,2002,6
[40] 周新德.论代理权争夺与公司治理的完善.学术交流,2003,2
[41] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996
[42] 张千帆,贺富强,张子刚,魏建国.小股东“搭便车”与利益受损的分析.武汉理工大学学报,2001,4
[43] 郑长德.投资者保护、公司治理与企业价值.西南民族学院学报,2002,8
[44] 郑德程,沈华珊,张晓顺.股权结构的理论、实践与创新.经济科学出版社,2003
[45] Berle & Means, The Modem Crporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York, 1932
[46] Clifford G. Holdemess, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, FRBNY Economic Policy Reuiew, 2001
[47] Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economy, 1985
[48] Fabrizio Barca, Some Views On U. S Corporate Governance, SSRN Working Paper, 2001
[49] La Porta et. al, Corprate Ownership Around the world, Journal of Finance, 1999
[50] La Porta et. al, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economics, 1998.
[51] Shleifer & vishny, A Surver of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 1997
[52] Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in East Asia: A Framework for Analysis