公司治理与会计信息质量关系研究
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摘要
会计信息是利益分配、财富转移的基础,具有协调利益分配的功能,它的可靠性直接决定着市场经济体制的公平性和经济运行的效率,也是社会经济正常运行的基础,不实的会计信息必将带来巨大的危害。然而,现阶段国内外不断曝光的会计丑闻,例如我国的“银广夏风暴”、美国的“安然事件”等。这些会计丑闻首先使投资者权益受到极大损害,进而极大地动摇了人们对资本市场的信心,严重影响了经济运行的效果。由于会计界承担生成会计信息的责任,而失真的会计信息破坏了市场的良性运作,社会公众对会计界的责备也随之而来。于是,如何治理会计信息失真现象进而提高会计信息质量就成了实务界和理论界关注的焦点。理论界从宏观经济环境、企业产权结构、会计人员的业务能力和职业道德、会计规范和监督、会计管制和制度安排等多个角度对会计信息失真问题加以分析,并提出相应的治理措施,其中最主要的一条建议就是完善公司治理结构。也就是说,学者们认为,会计信息质量与公司治理存在互动关系,完善公司治理结构可以提高会计信息质量,高质量的会计信息反过来也可以影响公司治理质量。但以上结论主要是靠规范研究得出的,国内外的实证研究对此并没有得到一致的结论,特别是由于我国转轨经济的特点,以上结论是不是适合所有公司,公司治理如何影响会计信息质量更是缺少实证数据的支持。本文采用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法,在回顾有关公司治理和会计信息质量关系研究文献的基础上,归纳出公司治理与会计信息质量两者关系的理论基础,提出本文的研究目标。在此基础上通过收集2001—2006年中国沪、深两市的577个上市公司作为样本,采用面板数据模型检验了公司治理对会计信息质量的影响。得到以下研究结论：
1、代理成本的高低影响公司治理与会计信息质量的互动关系,但在会计界内与资本市场上的影响是不一样的。对操控性应计利润而言,高代理成本组的公司治理对会计信息质量的影响系数要高于低代理成本组的公司治理对会计信息质量的影响系数,对盈余可信性而言,低代理成本组的公司治理对会计信息质量的影响系数高于高代理成本组的公司治理对会计信息质量的影响系数,而且是远远大于。说明会计信息质量在我国资本市场中并没被众多投资者充分识别,市场中投机成分严重。
2、公司治理与会计信息质量之间的互动关系是一个动态的变化过程。由于公司治理与会计信息质量都是一个多维变量,所以不能简单绝对地说,公司治理与会计信息质量是正相关或负相关关系。由本文数据可知,公司治理对由会计界提供的会计信息质量和由使用者理解的会计信息质量的相关关系方向是不一致的,如“四委”的存在、董事的薪酬、监事会会议次数、高管是否持股、高管薪酬、审计师是否“四大”。
本文的创新之处在于：
首先,本文采用的模型是计量经济学的最新成果——面板数据模型,它是一种系统模型,而我国目前的实证研究广泛采用收益——回报模型或创建的线性回归模型,这些模型是典型的截面数据模型。面板数据模型与横截面数据模型相比,具有以下优点：一是控制个体异质性(individual heterogeneity)。面板数据认为个体、公司、州或国家是异质的。时间序列和截面研究不能控制这种异质性导致得到偏差结果的风险。二是面板数据中的变量有更多信息含量的数据、更多的变异性(variability)、更少的共线性(collinearity)、更多的自由度和更强的有效性。而时间序列研究总是被多重共线性所困扰。三是面板数据能更好地用于调整的动态分析(dynamics of adjustment)。而看起来相对稳定的横截面分布背后暗藏着大量的变化。四是面板数据对在纯粹的截面数据或纯粹的时间序列数据中不可观察的数据有更好的识别和评估作用。五是面板数据模型与单纯的截面数据或时间序列数据模型相比,允许作者构造和检验更复杂的行为模型。六是集中在个人、公司和家庭的微观面板数据比宏观层面上的同类变量可能被更准确地估计。
其次,本文采用聚类分析方法,把样本公司分为高代理成本和低代理成本组。由于公司治理与代理成本存在内生性,且都是多维变量,有些方面可能考虑不周,导致忽略一些主要变量。而聚类分析能控制代理成本和公司治理的内生性问题和忽略相关变量问题。
最后,与同类研究相比,本文选取的数据的年限长,数据来自2001-2006年,基本上覆盖了我国公司治理发展的整个过程,同时,此期间的企业会计准则改革也没有结构性的变化,两者相辅相成。而国内与之相关的研究,一般是三年。数据的年限长,可避免由于时间短的原因而使结论有偏差,相对来说,得到的结论更可靠,能更好地解释公司治理影响会计信息质量的现象。
Accounting information is a foundation of interest distribution and wealth shifting. It has function of coordinating interest distribution. Accounting information's reliability directly decides the fair of economic system and the efficiency of economic development. Accounting information is a foundation of society good running, accounting information distortion surely brings huge perniciousness. However, at the present stage worldwide accounting scandals constantly exposured. For example, China's "yin guang xia storm", American's "enron affair". These accounting scandals firstly harmed investors'rights and benefits, secondly wavered investors'confidence. It had a strong impact on economic running's effect. Due to the accounting for generating accounting information, the distortion of accounting information and the market's benign operation, the social public rebukes. So, how to control the distortion of accounting information, and improve the quality of accounting information became practical and theoretical focus. Theorist analyzed accounting information distortion from macro-economic environment, enterprise property right structure, accountants' profession ability and profession ethics, accounting standard and management, accounting supervision and system arrangement, and so on. Then tabled relevant proposals. Among those proposals, the most familiar proposal is improving the corporate governance structure.This is to say, scholars believed accounting information quality and corporate governance has interactive relation. Perfect corporate governance structure can improve accounting information quality, while accounting information quality also effect corporate governance. However, above conclusions was derived by normative research approach. Worldwide empirical research didn't come to the coincident conclusion. Especially, China economy has transformation feature, above conclusion is or isn't pervasive applicability, it lacked empirical support. This thesis used normative research approach and empirical research approach, reviewed relevance documents, induced theory foundation. This study proposed target.Then, this article collected 577 listed company samples from China capital market in 2001-2006.Finally, this article tested corporate governance how to effect accounting information by penal data model and had following conclusion:
1. Agency costs influence of corporate governance and the quality of accounting information interaction, but in accounting limits and capital market effects are not the same. Generally speaking, the high cost of agent of the group company management accounting information quality is higher than the influence coefficient of low agency cost accounting information quality of corporate governance to influence coefficients. But, for different accounting information quality indicators, the influence of different groups, grouping for manipulating accruals, but not much influence on the credibility of surplus influences.
2. The interaction between corporate governance and the accounting information quality is a dynamic process. Because the company management and accounting information quality is a multi-dimensional variables, so you can't simply absolutely, corporate governance and the accounting information quality is a positive or negative correlation. From this data, accounting for corporate governance by can control the quality of accounting information and market from the accounting information quality reflects the relation direction is abhorrent, such as "committee", director of the salary and meetings of the board of supervisors, senior executive compensation, whether the shareholding, whether the auditor "four". In addition, by accounting for corporate governance can control the quality of accounting information and market reflect the influence on the quality of accounting information is different also, such as corporate governance of surplus variables influence coefficients far above the credibility of corporate governance of surplus credibility influence coefficients. Explain the accounting information quality in China's capital markets has not been fully identification, many investors in market speculation composition.
This innovation lies in:
Firstly, the paper adopts the econometrics model is the latest achievements of panel data model, it is a kind of system model, and the empirical research in our country at present is widely used to create the return model or a linear regression model, the model is the typical section of variables, the data model of time is through the time as virtual variables into consideration, get back again. Compared with the cross-sectional data model, has the following advantages:one is the individual heterogeneity controlled individual heterogeneity. The panel data that individual, corporation, or states are different. Time series and section to control the heterogeneity research cannot get the results. Two is there more variables panel data information content of data, more variation variability, the less of linear collinearity, more and more freedom. But time sequence of research is always multiple linear. There is a panel data to better the dynamic analysis for adjusting adjustment dynamics. But looks relatively stable transverse distribution of hidden behind the change. Four is purely for the panel data in the data or pure time-series data observation data in better recognition and evaluation function. The panel data model is simple and the cross-section data or time series data model, the author compared to allow more complex structure and the inspection behavior model. Six is focused on individual, company and home of micro panel data on the macroscopic level than similar variables may be more accurate estimation.
Secondly, this paper uses clustering analysis method, the sample companies into high agency cost and agent cost is low. Due to the existence of corporate governance and agency costs, and corporate governance and agency costs are multi-dimensional variables, some may cause ignore some main variables. While clustering analysis can control agent cost and corporate governance of endogenous variables and ignore related problems.
Finally, the paper compared with similar research, the data of fixed number of year,2006 data from 2001-basically, covering the entire development of corporate governance in China. But domestic related research, general is 3 years. Data of fixed number of year, can avoid long time due to the reason of short and make conclusions have deviation, relatively speaking, the conclusion is more reliable and can better explain corporate governance effect the quality of accounting information quality.
1、代理成本的高低影响公司治理与会计信息质量的互动关系,但在会计界内与资本市场上的影响是不一样的。对操控性应计利润而言,高代理成本组的公司治理对会计信息质量的影响系数要高于低代理成本组的公司治理对会计信息质量的影响系数,对盈余可信性而言,低代理成本组的公司治理对会计信息质量的影响系数高于高代理成本组的公司治理对会计信息质量的影响系数,而且是远远大于。说明会计信息质量在我国资本市场中并没被众多投资者充分识别,市场中投机成分严重。
2、公司治理与会计信息质量之间的互动关系是一个动态的变化过程。由于公司治理与会计信息质量都是一个多维变量,所以不能简单绝对地说,公司治理与会计信息质量是正相关或负相关关系。由本文数据可知,公司治理对由会计界提供的会计信息质量和由使用者理解的会计信息质量的相关关系方向是不一致的,如“四委”的存在、董事的薪酬、监事会会议次数、高管是否持股、高管薪酬、审计师是否“四大”。
本文的创新之处在于：
首先,本文采用的模型是计量经济学的最新成果——面板数据模型,它是一种系统模型,而我国目前的实证研究广泛采用收益——回报模型或创建的线性回归模型,这些模型是典型的截面数据模型。面板数据模型与横截面数据模型相比,具有以下优点：一是控制个体异质性(individual heterogeneity)。面板数据认为个体、公司、州或国家是异质的。时间序列和截面研究不能控制这种异质性导致得到偏差结果的风险。二是面板数据中的变量有更多信息含量的数据、更多的变异性(variability)、更少的共线性(collinearity)、更多的自由度和更强的有效性。而时间序列研究总是被多重共线性所困扰。三是面板数据能更好地用于调整的动态分析(dynamics of adjustment)。而看起来相对稳定的横截面分布背后暗藏着大量的变化。四是面板数据对在纯粹的截面数据或纯粹的时间序列数据中不可观察的数据有更好的识别和评估作用。五是面板数据模型与单纯的截面数据或时间序列数据模型相比,允许作者构造和检验更复杂的行为模型。六是集中在个人、公司和家庭的微观面板数据比宏观层面上的同类变量可能被更准确地估计。
其次,本文采用聚类分析方法,把样本公司分为高代理成本和低代理成本组。由于公司治理与代理成本存在内生性,且都是多维变量,有些方面可能考虑不周,导致忽略一些主要变量。而聚类分析能控制代理成本和公司治理的内生性问题和忽略相关变量问题。
最后,与同类研究相比,本文选取的数据的年限长,数据来自2001-2006年,基本上覆盖了我国公司治理发展的整个过程,同时,此期间的企业会计准则改革也没有结构性的变化,两者相辅相成。而国内与之相关的研究,一般是三年。数据的年限长,可避免由于时间短的原因而使结论有偏差,相对来说,得到的结论更可靠,能更好地解释公司治理影响会计信息质量的现象。
Accounting information is a foundation of interest distribution and wealth shifting. It has function of coordinating interest distribution. Accounting information's reliability directly decides the fair of economic system and the efficiency of economic development. Accounting information is a foundation of society good running, accounting information distortion surely brings huge perniciousness. However, at the present stage worldwide accounting scandals constantly exposured. For example, China's "yin guang xia storm", American's "enron affair". These accounting scandals firstly harmed investors'rights and benefits, secondly wavered investors'confidence. It had a strong impact on economic running's effect. Due to the accounting for generating accounting information, the distortion of accounting information and the market's benign operation, the social public rebukes. So, how to control the distortion of accounting information, and improve the quality of accounting information became practical and theoretical focus. Theorist analyzed accounting information distortion from macro-economic environment, enterprise property right structure, accountants' profession ability and profession ethics, accounting standard and management, accounting supervision and system arrangement, and so on. Then tabled relevant proposals. Among those proposals, the most familiar proposal is improving the corporate governance structure.This is to say, scholars believed accounting information quality and corporate governance has interactive relation. Perfect corporate governance structure can improve accounting information quality, while accounting information quality also effect corporate governance. However, above conclusions was derived by normative research approach. Worldwide empirical research didn't come to the coincident conclusion. Especially, China economy has transformation feature, above conclusion is or isn't pervasive applicability, it lacked empirical support. This thesis used normative research approach and empirical research approach, reviewed relevance documents, induced theory foundation. This study proposed target.Then, this article collected 577 listed company samples from China capital market in 2001-2006.Finally, this article tested corporate governance how to effect accounting information by penal data model and had following conclusion:
1. Agency costs influence of corporate governance and the quality of accounting information interaction, but in accounting limits and capital market effects are not the same. Generally speaking, the high cost of agent of the group company management accounting information quality is higher than the influence coefficient of low agency cost accounting information quality of corporate governance to influence coefficients. But, for different accounting information quality indicators, the influence of different groups, grouping for manipulating accruals, but not much influence on the credibility of surplus influences.
2. The interaction between corporate governance and the accounting information quality is a dynamic process. Because the company management and accounting information quality is a multi-dimensional variables, so you can't simply absolutely, corporate governance and the accounting information quality is a positive or negative correlation. From this data, accounting for corporate governance by can control the quality of accounting information and market from the accounting information quality reflects the relation direction is abhorrent, such as "committee", director of the salary and meetings of the board of supervisors, senior executive compensation, whether the shareholding, whether the auditor "four". In addition, by accounting for corporate governance can control the quality of accounting information and market reflect the influence on the quality of accounting information is different also, such as corporate governance of surplus variables influence coefficients far above the credibility of corporate governance of surplus credibility influence coefficients. Explain the accounting information quality in China's capital markets has not been fully identification, many investors in market speculation composition.
This innovation lies in:
Firstly, the paper adopts the econometrics model is the latest achievements of panel data model, it is a kind of system model, and the empirical research in our country at present is widely used to create the return model or a linear regression model, the model is the typical section of variables, the data model of time is through the time as virtual variables into consideration, get back again. Compared with the cross-sectional data model, has the following advantages:one is the individual heterogeneity controlled individual heterogeneity. The panel data that individual, corporation, or states are different. Time series and section to control the heterogeneity research cannot get the results. Two is there more variables panel data information content of data, more variation variability, the less of linear collinearity, more and more freedom. But time sequence of research is always multiple linear. There is a panel data to better the dynamic analysis for adjusting adjustment dynamics. But looks relatively stable transverse distribution of hidden behind the change. Four is purely for the panel data in the data or pure time-series data observation data in better recognition and evaluation function. The panel data model is simple and the cross-section data or time series data model, the author compared to allow more complex structure and the inspection behavior model. Six is focused on individual, company and home of micro panel data on the macroscopic level than similar variables may be more accurate estimation.
Secondly, this paper uses clustering analysis method, the sample companies into high agency cost and agent cost is low. Due to the existence of corporate governance and agency costs, and corporate governance and agency costs are multi-dimensional variables, some may cause ignore some main variables. While clustering analysis can control agent cost and corporate governance of endogenous variables and ignore related problems.
Finally, the paper compared with similar research, the data of fixed number of year,2006 data from 2001-basically, covering the entire development of corporate governance in China. But domestic related research, general is 3 years. Data of fixed number of year, can avoid long time due to the reason of short and make conclusions have deviation, relatively speaking, the conclusion is more reliable and can better explain corporate governance effect the quality of accounting information quality.
引文
3陈少华,防范企业会计信息舞弊的综合对策研究,中国财政经济出版社,2003.11,P167-184
4袁小勇,虚假财务报告研究——识别.侦查.治理,经济管理出版社,2006,P212-217
5付磊,我国企业会计改革的回顾与思考,会计研究,2007.12,P32
6林钟高,吴利娟.公司治理与会计信息质量的相关性研究.会计研究.2004.8.P6-8
7本文中的会计信息是指公司会计和外部报告系统评价和定期披露考虑公开上市公司的财务状况及业绩的量化数据经审计后的产成品。已审资产负债表,利润表和现金流量表,与之一起的支持性披露,组成了投资者和监管者可得到的公司特别信息的基础。
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11付磊,我国企业会计改革的回顾与思考,会计研究,2007.12,P32
12 Stuart L. Gillan, Recent Developments in Corporate Governance:An Overview,Journal of Corporate Finance 12(2006)381-402, P384
13魏明海,会计信息质量经验研究的完善与运用,会计研究,2005.3,P43
14赵宇龙,会计盈余披露的信息含量——来自上海股市的经验证据,经济研究,1998.7
15陈晓、陈小悦、刘钊,A股盈余报告的有用性研究——来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据,经济研究,1999.6
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