集装箱班轮运输战略联盟博弈研究
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摘要
面对激烈的市场竞争，近年来集装箱班轮公司纷纷组成战略联盟。船公司通过船舶、码头共享，提高设施设备的利用率，减少对集装箱运输设施设备的投资，从而降低投资和经营的风险，获得规模经济效益；同时扩大联盟成员航线覆盖范围、增加发船密度，从而为托运人提供更为优质而又可靠的运输服务，增强了自身的竞争力。竞争与合作贯穿于班轮联盟自始至终，促使联盟集团间纵横捭阖不断地进行重组。因此，联盟集团是不稳定的，对合作产生的价值分配，不但会影响联盟效率，甚至直接影响联盟是否继续存在。关于利益分配，传统经济学研究不多且其着眼点主要在于资源的有效配置及所依赖的市场价格机制，个体层面分析仅仅是在价格机制支配下的理性人的成本与收益比较。
博弈论是研究各理性决策个体在其行为直接发生相互作用时如何决策以及决策均衡问题。依据参与人是否达成具有约束力协议可分为合作博弈和非合作博弈。实践证明，博弈论成为研究和解决市场条件下的竞争合作问题的有效分析工具。
本文研究目的是通过运用博弈理论解释战略联盟的合理性，探讨班轮运输联盟收益如何在成员间进行分配，为战略联盟实践提供理论依据。班轮运输联盟成员从联盟中获取的利益往往与自身预期的利益有出入，因而许多成员会认为自身为联盟做的贡献大于自己从联盟获取的利益。因此他们会怀疑战略联盟的有效性，甚至会选择退出联盟。作者希望通过运用博弈理论分析，能够使联盟各方对联盟收益分配预期更为理性化，从而降低联盟的不稳定性。
本文阐述了班轮运输合作与联盟的沿革和发展现状，并且概括介绍了本文应用的博弈理论及相关经济学原理。应用非合作博弈理论“古诺模型”解释了战略联盟的合理性，并对合理性做进一步探讨；应用合作博弈理论讨价还价博弈(轮流出价讨价还价子博弈均衡)分析单个联盟成员间利益分配纳什均衡，应用“夏普里值”计算方法分析复杂联盟的利益分配问题；最后分析了联盟的不稳定性并提出风险防范措施。研究方法采用定性和定量相结合，注重理论联系实际。
Confronted with fierce competition for markets, strategic alliances have recently been formed' in succession among container lines'. Through sharing ships and docks, lines' have succeeded in raising utilization ration of equipments, reducing investment in equipment of container transportation, so that the risks of investment and management have been reduced, and large-scaled economic returns have been acquired. Meanwhile, through expanding the extent of shipping services covering, intensifying the frequency of services, lines provide better service for shipper and strengthen their own competitive power. Lines alliance is permeated with competition and cooperation from beginning to end, which impels alliance's group to realign. Therefore, alliance's group is unstable. The distribution of value through cooperation may not only affect working efficiency, but also directly influence the existence of the alliance. With regard to the distribution of profits, traditional economics put less emphasis and also focused
on the effective distribution of resources and price system. At the same time, the analysis of enterprise was confined to the contrast between cost and profit of rational humans subjected to price system.
Game theory studies the decision and its equilibrium. According to whether the binding agreement is achieved, the theory can be divided into co-operative game theory and non-co-operative game theory. Practices have proved that game theory has become an effective tool of analyzing and solving competitive and co-operative problems.
This paper aims to explain the rationality of strategic alliance with the help of game theory, discuss how to distribute the profit of lines' alliance among the members and provide theoretic basis for strategic alliance practice. There is always some discrepancy between the profit got from the alliance and the expected profit, so many members may think what they get from the alliance does not tally with what they have done for the alliance, which makes them doubt the effectiveness and
1
even choose to withdraw from the alliance. This paper intends to make use of game theory to analyze problems so as to make the members of the alliance have a more reasonable expectation for the distribution of profits and therefore reduce the instability of the alliance.
This paper expounds the past and current situations -of lines' cooperation and alliance, and gives a general explanation of game theory and relevant economic principles. For example, this paper explains the reasonability of strategic alliance by using non-co-operative game theory, i.e. Cournot duopoly model. In the end, this paper analyzes the instability of the alliance and proposes methods to take strict precautions.
Zhang Yankui(Communication & transportation
planning & management) Directed by professor & Dr. Zhao Gang
博弈论是研究各理性决策个体在其行为直接发生相互作用时如何决策以及决策均衡问题。依据参与人是否达成具有约束力协议可分为合作博弈和非合作博弈。实践证明，博弈论成为研究和解决市场条件下的竞争合作问题的有效分析工具。
本文研究目的是通过运用博弈理论解释战略联盟的合理性，探讨班轮运输联盟收益如何在成员间进行分配，为战略联盟实践提供理论依据。班轮运输联盟成员从联盟中获取的利益往往与自身预期的利益有出入，因而许多成员会认为自身为联盟做的贡献大于自己从联盟获取的利益。因此他们会怀疑战略联盟的有效性，甚至会选择退出联盟。作者希望通过运用博弈理论分析，能够使联盟各方对联盟收益分配预期更为理性化，从而降低联盟的不稳定性。
本文阐述了班轮运输合作与联盟的沿革和发展现状，并且概括介绍了本文应用的博弈理论及相关经济学原理。应用非合作博弈理论“古诺模型”解释了战略联盟的合理性，并对合理性做进一步探讨；应用合作博弈理论讨价还价博弈(轮流出价讨价还价子博弈均衡)分析单个联盟成员间利益分配纳什均衡，应用“夏普里值”计算方法分析复杂联盟的利益分配问题；最后分析了联盟的不稳定性并提出风险防范措施。研究方法采用定性和定量相结合，注重理论联系实际。
Confronted with fierce competition for markets, strategic alliances have recently been formed' in succession among container lines'. Through sharing ships and docks, lines' have succeeded in raising utilization ration of equipments, reducing investment in equipment of container transportation, so that the risks of investment and management have been reduced, and large-scaled economic returns have been acquired. Meanwhile, through expanding the extent of shipping services covering, intensifying the frequency of services, lines provide better service for shipper and strengthen their own competitive power. Lines alliance is permeated with competition and cooperation from beginning to end, which impels alliance's group to realign. Therefore, alliance's group is unstable. The distribution of value through cooperation may not only affect working efficiency, but also directly influence the existence of the alliance. With regard to the distribution of profits, traditional economics put less emphasis and also focused
on the effective distribution of resources and price system. At the same time, the analysis of enterprise was confined to the contrast between cost and profit of rational humans subjected to price system.
Game theory studies the decision and its equilibrium. According to whether the binding agreement is achieved, the theory can be divided into co-operative game theory and non-co-operative game theory. Practices have proved that game theory has become an effective tool of analyzing and solving competitive and co-operative problems.
This paper aims to explain the rationality of strategic alliance with the help of game theory, discuss how to distribute the profit of lines' alliance among the members and provide theoretic basis for strategic alliance practice. There is always some discrepancy between the profit got from the alliance and the expected profit, so many members may think what they get from the alliance does not tally with what they have done for the alliance, which makes them doubt the effectiveness and
1
even choose to withdraw from the alliance. This paper intends to make use of game theory to analyze problems so as to make the members of the alliance have a more reasonable expectation for the distribution of profits and therefore reduce the instability of the alliance.
This paper expounds the past and current situations -of lines' cooperation and alliance, and gives a general explanation of game theory and relevant economic principles. For example, this paper explains the reasonability of strategic alliance by using non-co-operative game theory, i.e. Cournot duopoly model. In the end, this paper analyzes the instability of the alliance and proposes methods to take strict precautions.
Zhang Yankui(Communication & transportation
planning & management) Directed by professor & Dr. Zhao Gang
引文
1. Ireland, R. D, Hitt, M. A,& Vaidyanath, D. Alliance Management as a Source of Competitive Advantage. Journal of Management 2002,28
2. Das T.k & Teng, B-S. Risk types and interfirm alliance structure. Journal of Management Studies. 1996,33
3. Das T.k & Teng, B-S. Instabilities of s.trategic alliance: An internal tensions perspective. Organization Science. 2000,11
4．简汉权，李恒．战略联盟的形成机制——非零和合作博弈．科学学与科学技术管理．1998，9
5. Barkema H G, Shenkar O, Vermeulen F, Bell J H J. Working abroad, working with others: How firms learn to operate international joint ventures. Academy of Management Journal. 1997,17
6. Browning L D, Beyer J M, Shetler J C. Building cooperation in a competitive industry: SEMATECH and the semiconductor industry. Academy of Management Journal. 1995,38
7．徐飞，徐立敏．战略联盟理论研究综述．管理评论．2003，6
8．付小平．经济学视角下的战略联盟：一个研究综述．江西财经大学学报．2003，5
9．王曙光．班轮公司战略联盟的方式与动机．水运管理．2002，3
10．梁慎刚．论国际航运业战略联盟的若干问题．水运管理．2002，2
11．胡献礼，林国龙．航运战略联盟动因浅析与国有航运企业的对策．水运管理．1998，5
12. BRIAN SLACKC, CLAUDE COMTOIS, ROBERT McCALLA. Strategic alliance in the container shipping industry: a global perspective. Maritime Policy &Management 2002, vol. 29 65-76
13. DONG-WOOK SONG and PHOTIS M.PANAYIDES. A conceptual application of cooperative theory to liner shipping strategic alliance Maritime Policy &Management 2002,vol.29 285-298
14. MARTIN J. OSBORNE. ARIEL RUBINSTEIN. A COURSE IN GAME THEORY(魏玉根译) 北京：中国社会科学出版社
15．陈耀．企业战略联盟理论研究与评述．江海学刊．2002，4
16．张延锋，刘益，李恒．国内外战略联盟理论阐释评述．科学学研究．2003，1
17．丁育松．集装箱班轮航线合作的基本形式及其协议的主要内容．集装箱化．2003，1
18．丁育松．论国际集装箱班轮运输联盟．集装箱化．2003，2
19．王彦，吕靖．国际航运经济与市场．大连：大连海事大学出版社，2002，3
20．王杰，王琦．国际航运组织的垄断与竞争．大连：大连海事大学出版社，2002，5
21．航贸咨询网．http://www.21shipping.com．
22. Containerisation international 2003-2004
23．张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学 上海：上海人民出版社，1996
24．谢识予．经济博弈论(第二版)上海：复旦大学出版社，2002
25．詹姆斯．M．亨德森，理查德．E．匡特．(舒元，马海燕译)．微观经济理论—数理分析方法．上海：上海译文出版社，1992
26．姚宗明，林国龙．集装箱运输管理．大连：大连海运学院出版，1990
27．项枫．战略联盟的经济学解释及其对我国企业的启示．青海大学学报(自然科学版)．2002，5
28．彭坤，周贤良．基于不完全信息动态博弈理论的战略联盟．南昌航空工业学院学报(社会科学版)．2002，2
29．贾平，刘雷．企业动态联盟的博弈分析．生产力研究．2003，2
30．汪克强，华武．战略联盟与联盟战略．技术经济与管理研究．2002，5
31．华武，缪柏其．战略联盟的不完全契约分析．企业经济．2002，7
32．邱毅．跨国公司战略联盟的博弈诠释．贵州财经学院学报．2001，6
33．颜士梅，王重鸣．战略联盟与并购：两种企业组织方式的比较分析．科学学研究．2002，3
34．刘景光．企业战略联盟选择方法研究．中国煤炭经济学院学报．2002，6
35．沈青．企业战略联盟与企业竞争力关系的思考．商业研究．2003，13
36．王洋，张子刚，郭志东等．企业联盟高失败率的原因剖析与对策．科技进步与对策．2002，11
37．胡希宁，贾小立．博弈论的理论精华及其现实意义．中共中央党校学报．2002，2
38．李晓光．N人协作式博弈联盟构型理论的基本框架．中国软科学．2000，12
39．彭绍仲．企业博弈论—企业参与国际竞争研究报告．北京：中国物价出版社，1999．5
40．雷霖，刘倩．现代企业经营决策——博弈论方法应用．北京：清华大学出版社，1999，8
41．林季红．跨国公司战略联盟．北京：经济科学出版社，2003．8
42．林旭东，李一智，候晓鸿．企业集团组建决策的博弈模型．中南工业大学学报．2000，8
43．林林，胡达沙．团队合作中的利益分配机制及其调整过程探讨．价值工程．2003，5
44．张树义，李晓龙，武振业．企业竞争中的最小赢得联盟．西南交通大学学报．2002，6
45．孟卫东，龙勇，唐浩阳．合作机会对企业战略合作参与者地位影响分析．重庆大学学报．2002，11
46．张树义，赵东梅，李强．论企业战略联盟分配机制设计．郑州工业大学学报．2001，12
47．简兆权．战略联盟的合作博弈分析．数量经济技术经济研究．1999，8
48．胡珑瑛，唐志新．国际技术转移行为的合作博弈模型研究．哈尔滨工业大学学报．2000，4
49．罗利，鲁若愚．Shapley值在产学研合作博弈利益分配博弈分析中的应用．软科学．2001，2
50．魏斌．技术创新中收益分配方案的博弈分析．青岛大学学报．1999，12
51．吕坚，孙林岩，马新莉．虚拟企业组建的合作动力与利益协调分析．陕西工业学院学报．2001，9
52．张树义，李肖军，武振业．试论企业战略俩联盟分配问题．系统工程理论方法与应用．2002，9
53．周鹏博，赵松岭，周晶．合作博弈与决策应用．统计与咨询．2003，4
54．向玫．战略联盟的风险及风险回避．科技进步与对策．2003，S1
55．魏光兴．战略联盟的风险及其对策分析．企业经济．2003，12
2. Das T.k & Teng, B-S. Risk types and interfirm alliance structure. Journal of Management Studies. 1996,33
3. Das T.k & Teng, B-S. Instabilities of s.trategic alliance: An internal tensions perspective. Organization Science. 2000,11
4．简汉权，李恒．战略联盟的形成机制——非零和合作博弈．科学学与科学技术管理．1998，9
5. Barkema H G, Shenkar O, Vermeulen F, Bell J H J. Working abroad, working with others: How firms learn to operate international joint ventures. Academy of Management Journal. 1997,17
6. Browning L D, Beyer J M, Shetler J C. Building cooperation in a competitive industry: SEMATECH and the semiconductor industry. Academy of Management Journal. 1995,38
7．徐飞，徐立敏．战略联盟理论研究综述．管理评论．2003，6
8．付小平．经济学视角下的战略联盟：一个研究综述．江西财经大学学报．2003，5
9．王曙光．班轮公司战略联盟的方式与动机．水运管理．2002，3
10．梁慎刚．论国际航运业战略联盟的若干问题．水运管理．2002，2
11．胡献礼，林国龙．航运战略联盟动因浅析与国有航运企业的对策．水运管理．1998，5
12. BRIAN SLACKC, CLAUDE COMTOIS, ROBERT McCALLA. Strategic alliance in the container shipping industry: a global perspective. Maritime Policy &Management 2002, vol. 29 65-76
13. DONG-WOOK SONG and PHOTIS M.PANAYIDES. A conceptual application of cooperative theory to liner shipping strategic alliance Maritime Policy &Management 2002,vol.29 285-298
14. MARTIN J. OSBORNE. ARIEL RUBINSTEIN. A COURSE IN GAME THEORY(魏玉根译) 北京：中国社会科学出版社
15．陈耀．企业战略联盟理论研究与评述．江海学刊．2002，4
16．张延锋，刘益，李恒．国内外战略联盟理论阐释评述．科学学研究．2003，1
17．丁育松．集装箱班轮航线合作的基本形式及其协议的主要内容．集装箱化．2003，1
18．丁育松．论国际集装箱班轮运输联盟．集装箱化．2003，2
19．王彦，吕靖．国际航运经济与市场．大连：大连海事大学出版社，2002，3
20．王杰，王琦．国际航运组织的垄断与竞争．大连：大连海事大学出版社，2002，5
21．航贸咨询网．http://www.21shipping.com．
22. Containerisation international 2003-2004
23．张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学 上海：上海人民出版社，1996
24．谢识予．经济博弈论(第二版)上海：复旦大学出版社，2002
25．詹姆斯．M．亨德森，理查德．E．匡特．(舒元，马海燕译)．微观经济理论—数理分析方法．上海：上海译文出版社，1992
26．姚宗明，林国龙．集装箱运输管理．大连：大连海运学院出版，1990
27．项枫．战略联盟的经济学解释及其对我国企业的启示．青海大学学报(自然科学版)．2002，5
28．彭坤，周贤良．基于不完全信息动态博弈理论的战略联盟．南昌航空工业学院学报(社会科学版)．2002，2
29．贾平，刘雷．企业动态联盟的博弈分析．生产力研究．2003，2
30．汪克强，华武．战略联盟与联盟战略．技术经济与管理研究．2002，5
31．华武，缪柏其．战略联盟的不完全契约分析．企业经济．2002，7
32．邱毅．跨国公司战略联盟的博弈诠释．贵州财经学院学报．2001，6
33．颜士梅，王重鸣．战略联盟与并购：两种企业组织方式的比较分析．科学学研究．2002，3
34．刘景光．企业战略联盟选择方法研究．中国煤炭经济学院学报．2002，6
35．沈青．企业战略联盟与企业竞争力关系的思考．商业研究．2003，13
36．王洋，张子刚，郭志东等．企业联盟高失败率的原因剖析与对策．科技进步与对策．2002，11
37．胡希宁，贾小立．博弈论的理论精华及其现实意义．中共中央党校学报．2002，2
38．李晓光．N人协作式博弈联盟构型理论的基本框架．中国软科学．2000，12
39．彭绍仲．企业博弈论—企业参与国际竞争研究报告．北京：中国物价出版社，1999．5
40．雷霖，刘倩．现代企业经营决策——博弈论方法应用．北京：清华大学出版社，1999，8
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