从分税制看中央与地方分权
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摘要
中央与地方关系是宪政理论研究的重点问题之一,同时因其重要的现实性意义和对国家结构形式深刻的影响,成为现代宪政研究的热点所在。中央与地方政府的关系是如何划分的,在现实中的具体体现为何种制度,透过这些具体的制度权力又是如何在两极政府间运作的,权力的来源在权力分配这一运作过程中何以体现,这些都是宪政所要深入研究的。权力的博弈是中央与地方关系的关键所在,分权与集权体现了所有中央与地方关系的变更。
中央与地方关系自始至终都是国家发展的重要问题。也是历代领导人所重视的重要问题所在。党和国家在怎样处理好我国中央与地方关系上积极探索,做出了不懈的努力,围绕中央与地方权限划分问题,进行了一系列改革和尝试。毛泽东同志在《论十大关系》一文中,对中央与地方关系有着精辟的论断。在中国共产党十四届五中全会上,江泽民同志在《正确处理社会主义现代化建设中的若干重大关系》的讲话中亦提出了“充分发挥中央和地方两个积极性”的方针,再次将中央与地方关系提到了一个新高度。
我国的中央与地方关系自建国以来就在不断的调整中。一是由于我国特殊的政体,另外是由于我国不断调整的经济政策。改革开放以来,我国的各个方面都在不断的调整和创新中,社会环境发生了翻天覆地的变化,这种变革体现在各个领域、方方面面:法律、政治、经济等各个领域都在一系列重大变革之中迅速完善。中央与地方关系涉及社会生活的方方面面,不仅仅体现在法律关系,更体现在经济关系、政治关系等等方面。作为改革开放成果之一的分税制,可以说是中央与地方权力划分的一个体现,在高度集权的我国,有着重大的宪政意义。分税制被认为是中央与地方分权的体现,被学者认为是从经济关系开始,以期带动相配套的政治关系、法律关系的改革。根据马克思主义对于经济基础和上层建筑的相关论述,中央与地方关系问题,在根本的体现即为中央与地方在权益分配问题上的博弈。而财政税收问题又是权益分配的焦点问题。市场竞争要求财力相对分散,而宏观调控又要求财力相对集中。这种集中与分散的关系问题,反映到宪政理论上就是中央与地方之间的集权与分权的问题。在众多历史机缘下,为适应市场经济发展的必然要求,1994年我国实行了分税制改革,为规范我国中央与地方关系发挥了重要作用。
分税制的实施,是中央与地方经济关系的重大调整,对我国中央与地方关系的其它方面也产生了深远的影响。财政制度包括税收缴纳、公共支出、转移支付、决定府际间分配关系的财政体制,其中后者是财政制度的中心内容。解放初期,中央对地方实现高度集权的财政“统收统支”,到了80年代中期逐渐过渡到财政包干制度,九十年代中期(1994年)演变到相对较为集权的分税制体制,财政体制的变迁与影响国计民生的诸大关系无不密切相关,可以说,新中国的财政体制经历了一个复杂的变迁过程。分税制实施十五年,中国经济和社会以及政府间关系也发生着惊人的变化。
本文选取的具体制度,即当今最具中央与地方分权特色的分税制,结合政治学对权力的解读,深入分析了权力在中央与地方之间的分配,以权力来源制约的方式,以期通过与以往经济学效率分析不同的方式,对我国现行分权制度做以深入分析。
The relationship between central and local governments is the constitutional theory of one of the focus of the study, at the same time because of their important practical significance and the country a profound influence on the structure of the form, the study of modern constitutional government where the hot spots. The relationship between central and local governments is how to divide, and in reality as a concrete manifestation of what kind of system, through the power of these specific system is how the operation of the polarization between the government, the source of power in the distribution of power, why the course of this operation embodiment, which are constitutional to be studied in depth. Game of power relations between central and local governments is the key to decentralization and centralization of power embodies the spirit of all central and local relations changes.
The relationship between central and local governments throughout the country's development are important issues. History is also an important leader of the great importance where the problem lies. The party and the state in how to handle the relationship between central and local governments of China's active exploration, have made unremitting efforts, focusing on delineation of central and local authority issues a series of reforms and attempts. Comrade Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Great Relations" article on the relationship between central and local governments have a brilliant thesis. 14 session of the Chinese Communist Party in the fifth plenum, Comrade Jiang Zemin, "correctly handle the socialist modernization of a number of significant relations" also made a speech, "give full play to both central and local initiative" and once again the central government and local relations to a new height.
China's central-local relations since coming on in the constant adjustment. First, as a result of a special form of government in our country, and is continuously adjusted as a result of China's economic policy. Since reform and opening up all aspects of our constant adjustment and innovation, the social environment has changed dramatically, this change reflected in the various fields, in all its aspects: legal, political, economic and other fields in a series of major change improving rapidly. The relationship between central and local governments involved in all aspects of social life, not only reflected in the legal relationship, but also reflected in the economic relations, political relations and so on. One of the outcomes of reform and opening up as the tax system, it can be said that the division of powers between the central and local, a reflection of our country in a highly centralized, has a major constitutional significance. Tax system is considered the central and local manifestation of the separation of powers, the scholars believe that economic relations from the start, with a view to promote political relations match, the reform of the legal relationship. According to Marxist economic foundation and superstructure for the relevant paper, the relationship between central and local governments, in the embodiment of the fundamental is in the interests of central and local governments on the distribution of the game. Financial and tax issues and is the focal point of the allocation of rights and interests. Requirements of the financial market is relatively fragmented, and the macro-control requirements and the relative concentration of financial resources. Centralization and decentralization that the question of the relationship is reflected in constitutional theory between central and local governments the issue of centralization and decentralization. Among the many historical opportunity, to adapt to the inevitable development of the market economy requirements, the implementation of the 1994 reform of the tax system, to regulate the relationship between central and local governments in China have played an important role.
The implementation of the tax system is the relationship between the Central Authorities and the local economy a major adjustment to China's central and local governments are also other aspects of relations have a profound impact. Financial system, including tax payers, public expenditure, transfer payments, the Government decided to interpersonal relations between the distribution of the financial system, the latter of which is the center of the financial system. The liberation of the early realization of a high degree of central and local fiscal centralization "EC Commission received support", by the mid-80's gradual transition to the financial responsibility of setting up the system, the mid-90's (1994) evolved from a relatively centralized system of tax system, financial system and the changes large impact on the relationship between the various people's livelihood are closely related, it can be said that the new China's financial system has undergone a complex evolution. The tax system in the implementation of fifteen years, China's economic and social as well as intergovernmental relations of the staggering changes taking place.
In this paper, to select a specific system, that is, most of today's separation of powers between the central and local characteristics of the tax system, combined with the power politics of interpretation, in-depth analysis of power between central and local governments in the distribution of source of power constraints in the way, with a view to the adoption and Economic efficiency analysis of the past in different ways, the current decentralized system of our country in-depth analysis done.
中央与地方关系自始至终都是国家发展的重要问题。也是历代领导人所重视的重要问题所在。党和国家在怎样处理好我国中央与地方关系上积极探索,做出了不懈的努力,围绕中央与地方权限划分问题,进行了一系列改革和尝试。毛泽东同志在《论十大关系》一文中,对中央与地方关系有着精辟的论断。在中国共产党十四届五中全会上,江泽民同志在《正确处理社会主义现代化建设中的若干重大关系》的讲话中亦提出了“充分发挥中央和地方两个积极性”的方针,再次将中央与地方关系提到了一个新高度。
我国的中央与地方关系自建国以来就在不断的调整中。一是由于我国特殊的政体,另外是由于我国不断调整的经济政策。改革开放以来,我国的各个方面都在不断的调整和创新中,社会环境发生了翻天覆地的变化,这种变革体现在各个领域、方方面面:法律、政治、经济等各个领域都在一系列重大变革之中迅速完善。中央与地方关系涉及社会生活的方方面面,不仅仅体现在法律关系,更体现在经济关系、政治关系等等方面。作为改革开放成果之一的分税制,可以说是中央与地方权力划分的一个体现,在高度集权的我国,有着重大的宪政意义。分税制被认为是中央与地方分权的体现,被学者认为是从经济关系开始,以期带动相配套的政治关系、法律关系的改革。根据马克思主义对于经济基础和上层建筑的相关论述,中央与地方关系问题,在根本的体现即为中央与地方在权益分配问题上的博弈。而财政税收问题又是权益分配的焦点问题。市场竞争要求财力相对分散,而宏观调控又要求财力相对集中。这种集中与分散的关系问题,反映到宪政理论上就是中央与地方之间的集权与分权的问题。在众多历史机缘下,为适应市场经济发展的必然要求,1994年我国实行了分税制改革,为规范我国中央与地方关系发挥了重要作用。
分税制的实施,是中央与地方经济关系的重大调整,对我国中央与地方关系的其它方面也产生了深远的影响。财政制度包括税收缴纳、公共支出、转移支付、决定府际间分配关系的财政体制,其中后者是财政制度的中心内容。解放初期,中央对地方实现高度集权的财政“统收统支”,到了80年代中期逐渐过渡到财政包干制度,九十年代中期(1994年)演变到相对较为集权的分税制体制,财政体制的变迁与影响国计民生的诸大关系无不密切相关,可以说,新中国的财政体制经历了一个复杂的变迁过程。分税制实施十五年,中国经济和社会以及政府间关系也发生着惊人的变化。
本文选取的具体制度,即当今最具中央与地方分权特色的分税制,结合政治学对权力的解读,深入分析了权力在中央与地方之间的分配,以权力来源制约的方式,以期通过与以往经济学效率分析不同的方式,对我国现行分权制度做以深入分析。
The relationship between central and local governments is the constitutional theory of one of the focus of the study, at the same time because of their important practical significance and the country a profound influence on the structure of the form, the study of modern constitutional government where the hot spots. The relationship between central and local governments is how to divide, and in reality as a concrete manifestation of what kind of system, through the power of these specific system is how the operation of the polarization between the government, the source of power in the distribution of power, why the course of this operation embodiment, which are constitutional to be studied in depth. Game of power relations between central and local governments is the key to decentralization and centralization of power embodies the spirit of all central and local relations changes.
The relationship between central and local governments throughout the country's development are important issues. History is also an important leader of the great importance where the problem lies. The party and the state in how to handle the relationship between central and local governments of China's active exploration, have made unremitting efforts, focusing on delineation of central and local authority issues a series of reforms and attempts. Comrade Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Great Relations" article on the relationship between central and local governments have a brilliant thesis. 14 session of the Chinese Communist Party in the fifth plenum, Comrade Jiang Zemin, "correctly handle the socialist modernization of a number of significant relations" also made a speech, "give full play to both central and local initiative" and once again the central government and local relations to a new height.
China's central-local relations since coming on in the constant adjustment. First, as a result of a special form of government in our country, and is continuously adjusted as a result of China's economic policy. Since reform and opening up all aspects of our constant adjustment and innovation, the social environment has changed dramatically, this change reflected in the various fields, in all its aspects: legal, political, economic and other fields in a series of major change improving rapidly. The relationship between central and local governments involved in all aspects of social life, not only reflected in the legal relationship, but also reflected in the economic relations, political relations and so on. One of the outcomes of reform and opening up as the tax system, it can be said that the division of powers between the central and local, a reflection of our country in a highly centralized, has a major constitutional significance. Tax system is considered the central and local manifestation of the separation of powers, the scholars believe that economic relations from the start, with a view to promote political relations match, the reform of the legal relationship. According to Marxist economic foundation and superstructure for the relevant paper, the relationship between central and local governments, in the embodiment of the fundamental is in the interests of central and local governments on the distribution of the game. Financial and tax issues and is the focal point of the allocation of rights and interests. Requirements of the financial market is relatively fragmented, and the macro-control requirements and the relative concentration of financial resources. Centralization and decentralization that the question of the relationship is reflected in constitutional theory between central and local governments the issue of centralization and decentralization. Among the many historical opportunity, to adapt to the inevitable development of the market economy requirements, the implementation of the 1994 reform of the tax system, to regulate the relationship between central and local governments in China have played an important role.
The implementation of the tax system is the relationship between the Central Authorities and the local economy a major adjustment to China's central and local governments are also other aspects of relations have a profound impact. Financial system, including tax payers, public expenditure, transfer payments, the Government decided to interpersonal relations between the distribution of the financial system, the latter of which is the center of the financial system. The liberation of the early realization of a high degree of central and local fiscal centralization "EC Commission received support", by the mid-80's gradual transition to the financial responsibility of setting up the system, the mid-90's (1994) evolved from a relatively centralized system of tax system, financial system and the changes large impact on the relationship between the various people's livelihood are closely related, it can be said that the new China's financial system has undergone a complex evolution. The tax system in the implementation of fifteen years, China's economic and social as well as intergovernmental relations of the staggering changes taking place.
In this paper, to select a specific system, that is, most of today's separation of powers between the central and local characteristics of the tax system, combined with the power politics of interpretation, in-depth analysis of power between central and local governments in the distribution of source of power constraints in the way, with a view to the adoption and Economic efficiency analysis of the past in different ways, the current decentralized system of our country in-depth analysis done.
引文
[1]本节对于权力概念的分析,主要借鉴政治学的分析方法。
[2]马克思对经济基础与上层建筑的关系有精辟的论证。然而,同其他社会学家一样,马克思的社会构想停留于抽象世界,而非在现实社会中实践。对于经济的论证,马克思借鉴了大卫·李嘉图的经济论断和当时经济原则中的不足。
[3]参见《政治社会学——主体政治的社会剖析》(美)安东尼·奥罗姆 著,张华青 孙嘉明等译,上海人民出版社,1989年3月第1版,第152页。以下对权利概念的分析,缘于以上概念。
[4]权力范围的概念参见《权力的概念》,《行为科学》第二期(1957年7月)第201-215页
[1]参见帕森斯相关论述,他认为,选票就象技巧本身一样,也是一种权源。
[2]《权利的成本——为什么权利依赖与税》(美)霍尔姆斯等著;毕竟悦译.—北京:北京大学出版社,2004.6,第35页.
[3]《权利的成本——为什么权利依赖与税》(美)霍尔姆斯等著:毕竟悦译.—北京:北京大学出版社,2004.6,第43页
[1]参见美国当代公法学家凯斯·孙斯坦的相关论述。他认为税收就是“权利的成本”。在谈到政府的各种功能时,说道:“为了完成所有这些工作,政府首先需要通过征税收集钱财,然后明智而负责任地引导这些钱的使用。这种权利的实施以良好的市场作为先决条件,它总是涉及‘征税与开支'”。税收是政府管理功能在公民生产、生活中创造的价值,也是公民对社会环境保障的必要投资与报酬。这种理念对税收具有无偿和强制性是一种颠覆。有学者认为过于激进。
[2]《税法基本问题——财政宪法篇》葛克昌著.第二版.台北市:元照,2005年9月,第4页
[3]同上
[1]《权利的成本——为什么权利依赖与税》(美)霍尔姆斯等著;毕竟悦译.—北京:北京大学出版社,2004.6,第169页
[1]王绍光:《分权的底线》,中国计划出版社,1997年。
[2]80年代中央两次通过设立:“基金”,分别是“能源交通基金”和“预算调节基金”。
[3]“财政大包干”的财政体制分别1985年和1988年发生了两次变革
[4]这37个财政单位包括各省、自治区、直辖市和一些计划单列市
[5]这六种办法分别是收入递增包干、总额分成、总额分成加增长分成、上解额递增包干、定额上解和定额补助。
[1]Jean Oi,Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism.World Politics 45(1)(October 1992),pp.99-126.
[1]赵阳、周飞舟:《农民负担和财税体制:从县、乡两级的财税体制看农民负担的制度原因》,《香港社会科学学报》2000年秋季卷。
[2]阎坤、张立承:《中国县乡财政困境分析与对策研究》,《经济研究参考》2003年第90期。
[3]关于分权和集权的优缺点,可以参看王绍光《分权的底线》第三章“分权与集权的利弊”。此书之后,分权和集权讨论又有发展,参看Yingyi Qian and Barry R.Weingast,Federalism As a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives,Journal of Economic Perspectires 11(4)(Fall 1997),P.83-92;J.Litvack,J.Ahmad,and R.Bird,Rethinking Decentralization,Washington:World Bank,1998。
[4]Soft Budget Problem软预算约束问题,参见Hamid Davoodi,and Heng-fu Zou.Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth:A Cross-Country Study,JournalofUrban Economics 43(1998).P.244-423;L.R.De MellO,Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations:A Cross-Country Analysis,World Development 28(2),2000,P.365-380。
[1]此概念由科尔奈提出,用于解释国有企业与政府的关系,见科尔奈《短缺经济学》(经济科学出版社,1986年)。
[2]Jonathan Rodden,Gunnar S.Eskeland,and Jennie Litvack(eds.),Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints.Cambridge:The MIT Press,2003.
[3]Pranab Bardhan,Irrigation and Cooperation:An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India,Economic Development and Cultural Change 48(4),2000,P.847-865;Mary Kay Gugerty,and Edward Migual,Community Participation and Social Sanctions in Kenyan Schools,Mimeo,Harvard University,2000.
[4]Emanuela Galasso,and Martin Ravallion,Decentralization Targeting of an Anti-Poverty Program.Mimeo.Development Research Group,World Bank,2001
[1]中央初次分配收入=中央预算固定收入+中央共享收入;地方初次分配收入=地方预算固定收入+地方共享收入。见刘明慧主编《政府预算管理》(经济科学出版社,2004年)
[2]这些称谓在不同的书和地方预算编制中颇有差异,对于地方政府而言,多将经过补助和上解之后的收入称为“可支配财力”
[1]《税法基本问题——财政宪法篇》葛克昌著.第二版.台北市:元照,2005年9月,第6页
[1]参见著名经济学家斯蒂格勒《地方政府功能的适当范围》一文,1957年。
[2]奥茨定理,参见奥茨在《财政联邦主义》一书中的观点,1927年。
[1]《税法基本问题——财政宪法篇》葛克昌著.第二版.台北市:元照,2005年9月,第5页
1、王绍光:《分权的底线》,中国计划出版社,1997年。
2、Jean Oi,Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism.World Politics 45(1)(October 1992)
3、赵阳、周飞舟:《农民负担和财税体制:从县、乡两级的财税体制看农民负担的制度原因》,《香港社会科学学报》2000年秋季卷
4、阎坤、张立承:《中国县乡财政困境分析与对策研究》,《经济研究参考》2003年第90期
5、Hamid Davoodi,and Heng-fu Zou,Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth:A Cross-Country Study,JournalofUrban Economics 43(1998),pp.244-423;L.R.De Mello,Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovemmental Fiscal Relations:A Cross-Country Analysis,World Development 28(2),2000,
6、科尔奈《短缺经济学》(经济科学出版社,1986年)
7、Jonathan Rodden,Gurmar S.Eskeland,and Jennie Litvack(eds.),Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints.Cambridge:The MIT Press,2003.
8、Pranab Bardhan,Irrigation and Cooperation:An Empirical Analysis of 48Irrigation Communities in South India,Economic Development and Cultural Change 48(4),2000,pp.847-865;Mary Kay Gugerty,and Edward Migual,Community Participation and Social Sanctions in Kenyan Schools,Mimeo,Harvard University,2000.
9、Emanuela Galasso,and Martin Ravallion,Decentralization Targeting of an Anti-Poverty Program.Mimeo.Development Research Group,World Bank,2001.
10、刘明慧主编《政府预算管理》(经济科学出版社,2004年)
11、项怀诚主编《中国财政五十年》(中国财政经济出版社,1999年)
12、刘世定:《嵌入性关系合同》,《社会学研究》1999年第4期
13、城市化与土地制度改革课题组:《城市化、土地制度和经济可持续发展:以土地为依托的城市化到底能持续多久?》,世界银行,2005年。
14、周开君《划分税权和完善分税制的比较与借鉴》
15 石恩祥《税收体系优化问题探析》。
16 王卫星《中国分税制财政体制及其运行情况》。
17 谷义、秦家顺、佟玉凯《分税制模式修正研究》。
18 赵越、施洪发《西方发达国家分税制的比较》。
19 张国富《试论国外分税制对进一步完善我国分税制的启示》。
20 梅春国、王逸《分散与统一:美国的分税制》。
21 邹展霞《分税制的国际比较及借鉴》。
22 阎坤《日、美、法分税制比较》。
23 段启华《深化分税制改革的探讨》。
24 王振宇《分税制财政体制“缺陷性”研究》《中国经济时报》(2006-07-14)
25 《中国经济体制改革与经济法的关系》出处:http://www.fllww.com/Article/105340.html
26 《宪政视域中的中央与地方关系》作者:赵永林,《甘肃政法成人教育学院学报》2007年6月。
[2]马克思对经济基础与上层建筑的关系有精辟的论证。然而,同其他社会学家一样,马克思的社会构想停留于抽象世界,而非在现实社会中实践。对于经济的论证,马克思借鉴了大卫·李嘉图的经济论断和当时经济原则中的不足。
[3]参见《政治社会学——主体政治的社会剖析》(美)安东尼·奥罗姆 著,张华青 孙嘉明等译,上海人民出版社,1989年3月第1版,第152页。以下对权利概念的分析,缘于以上概念。
[4]权力范围的概念参见《权力的概念》,《行为科学》第二期(1957年7月)第201-215页
[1]参见帕森斯相关论述,他认为,选票就象技巧本身一样,也是一种权源。
[2]《权利的成本——为什么权利依赖与税》(美)霍尔姆斯等著;毕竟悦译.—北京:北京大学出版社,2004.6,第35页.
[3]《权利的成本——为什么权利依赖与税》(美)霍尔姆斯等著:毕竟悦译.—北京:北京大学出版社,2004.6,第43页
[1]参见美国当代公法学家凯斯·孙斯坦的相关论述。他认为税收就是“权利的成本”。在谈到政府的各种功能时,说道:“为了完成所有这些工作,政府首先需要通过征税收集钱财,然后明智而负责任地引导这些钱的使用。这种权利的实施以良好的市场作为先决条件,它总是涉及‘征税与开支'”。税收是政府管理功能在公民生产、生活中创造的价值,也是公民对社会环境保障的必要投资与报酬。这种理念对税收具有无偿和强制性是一种颠覆。有学者认为过于激进。
[2]《税法基本问题——财政宪法篇》葛克昌著.第二版.台北市:元照,2005年9月,第4页
[3]同上
[1]《权利的成本——为什么权利依赖与税》(美)霍尔姆斯等著;毕竟悦译.—北京:北京大学出版社,2004.6,第169页
[1]王绍光:《分权的底线》,中国计划出版社,1997年。
[2]80年代中央两次通过设立:“基金”,分别是“能源交通基金”和“预算调节基金”。
[3]“财政大包干”的财政体制分别1985年和1988年发生了两次变革
[4]这37个财政单位包括各省、自治区、直辖市和一些计划单列市
[5]这六种办法分别是收入递增包干、总额分成、总额分成加增长分成、上解额递增包干、定额上解和定额补助。
[1]Jean Oi,Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism.World Politics 45(1)(October 1992),pp.99-126.
[1]赵阳、周飞舟:《农民负担和财税体制:从县、乡两级的财税体制看农民负担的制度原因》,《香港社会科学学报》2000年秋季卷。
[2]阎坤、张立承:《中国县乡财政困境分析与对策研究》,《经济研究参考》2003年第90期。
[3]关于分权和集权的优缺点,可以参看王绍光《分权的底线》第三章“分权与集权的利弊”。此书之后,分权和集权讨论又有发展,参看Yingyi Qian and Barry R.Weingast,Federalism As a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives,Journal of Economic Perspectires 11(4)(Fall 1997),P.83-92;J.Litvack,J.Ahmad,and R.Bird,Rethinking Decentralization,Washington:World Bank,1998。
[4]Soft Budget Problem软预算约束问题,参见Hamid Davoodi,and Heng-fu Zou.Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth:A Cross-Country Study,JournalofUrban Economics 43(1998).P.244-423;L.R.De MellO,Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations:A Cross-Country Analysis,World Development 28(2),2000,P.365-380。
[1]此概念由科尔奈提出,用于解释国有企业与政府的关系,见科尔奈《短缺经济学》(经济科学出版社,1986年)。
[2]Jonathan Rodden,Gunnar S.Eskeland,and Jennie Litvack(eds.),Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints.Cambridge:The MIT Press,2003.
[3]Pranab Bardhan,Irrigation and Cooperation:An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India,Economic Development and Cultural Change 48(4),2000,P.847-865;Mary Kay Gugerty,and Edward Migual,Community Participation and Social Sanctions in Kenyan Schools,Mimeo,Harvard University,2000.
[4]Emanuela Galasso,and Martin Ravallion,Decentralization Targeting of an Anti-Poverty Program.Mimeo.Development Research Group,World Bank,2001
[1]中央初次分配收入=中央预算固定收入+中央共享收入;地方初次分配收入=地方预算固定收入+地方共享收入。见刘明慧主编《政府预算管理》(经济科学出版社,2004年)
[2]这些称谓在不同的书和地方预算编制中颇有差异,对于地方政府而言,多将经过补助和上解之后的收入称为“可支配财力”
[1]《税法基本问题——财政宪法篇》葛克昌著.第二版.台北市:元照,2005年9月,第6页
[1]参见著名经济学家斯蒂格勒《地方政府功能的适当范围》一文,1957年。
[2]奥茨定理,参见奥茨在《财政联邦主义》一书中的观点,1927年。
[1]《税法基本问题——财政宪法篇》葛克昌著.第二版.台北市:元照,2005年9月,第5页
1、王绍光:《分权的底线》,中国计划出版社,1997年。
2、Jean Oi,Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism.World Politics 45(1)(October 1992)
3、赵阳、周飞舟:《农民负担和财税体制:从县、乡两级的财税体制看农民负担的制度原因》,《香港社会科学学报》2000年秋季卷
4、阎坤、张立承:《中国县乡财政困境分析与对策研究》,《经济研究参考》2003年第90期
5、Hamid Davoodi,and Heng-fu Zou,Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth:A Cross-Country Study,JournalofUrban Economics 43(1998),pp.244-423;L.R.De Mello,Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovemmental Fiscal Relations:A Cross-Country Analysis,World Development 28(2),2000,
6、科尔奈《短缺经济学》(经济科学出版社,1986年)
7、Jonathan Rodden,Gurmar S.Eskeland,and Jennie Litvack(eds.),Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints.Cambridge:The MIT Press,2003.
8、Pranab Bardhan,Irrigation and Cooperation:An Empirical Analysis of 48Irrigation Communities in South India,Economic Development and Cultural Change 48(4),2000,pp.847-865;Mary Kay Gugerty,and Edward Migual,Community Participation and Social Sanctions in Kenyan Schools,Mimeo,Harvard University,2000.
9、Emanuela Galasso,and Martin Ravallion,Decentralization Targeting of an Anti-Poverty Program.Mimeo.Development Research Group,World Bank,2001.
10、刘明慧主编《政府预算管理》(经济科学出版社,2004年)
11、项怀诚主编《中国财政五十年》(中国财政经济出版社,1999年)
12、刘世定:《嵌入性关系合同》,《社会学研究》1999年第4期
13、城市化与土地制度改革课题组:《城市化、土地制度和经济可持续发展:以土地为依托的城市化到底能持续多久?》,世界银行,2005年。
14、周开君《划分税权和完善分税制的比较与借鉴》
15 石恩祥《税收体系优化问题探析》。
16 王卫星《中国分税制财政体制及其运行情况》。
17 谷义、秦家顺、佟玉凯《分税制模式修正研究》。
18 赵越、施洪发《西方发达国家分税制的比较》。
19 张国富《试论国外分税制对进一步完善我国分税制的启示》。
20 梅春国、王逸《分散与统一:美国的分税制》。
21 邹展霞《分税制的国际比较及借鉴》。
22 阎坤《日、美、法分税制比较》。
23 段启华《深化分税制改革的探讨》。
24 王振宇《分税制财政体制“缺陷性”研究》《中国经济时报》(2006-07-14)
25 《中国经济体制改革与经济法的关系》出处:http://www.fllww.com/Article/105340.html
26 《宪政视域中的中央与地方关系》作者:赵永林,《甘肃政法成人教育学院学报》2007年6月。